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1. Food and Historical Research 
Over the past two decades, the issue of the history of food and eating has received greater 
academic attention. Not only has the body of research expanded, but many universities 
have also increasingly instituted courses of culinary history combining other study 
programmes, such as nutrition and cultural studies as well as the history of crop plants, 
agricultural and food processing technologies and food commerce. Supported by such 
academic programmes and grant-providing institutions, large and expanding bodies of 
literature on food history have been produced on a continuous basis (Scholliers and 
Claflin 2012: forthcoming; Messer et al 2000: 1378). 
One of the major factors behind the recent increased tt ntion to the matter of diet 
is the widespread anxiety about food and eating. On the one hand, globalization and the 
development of industrial food systems have made it possible for people to find familiar 
foods they consume in their own country when they travel abroad. But at the same time, 
industrialization has made the process by which our f od is delivered from farms to our 
table obscure, and the progress of food science has led to the proliferation of unwanted 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The scandal of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) has continued to raise people’s fears about the food they eat all, 
over the world. Frequent outbreaks of food-related illnesses and concerns about the 
unhealthy effects of food additives in processed foods require people to make the right 
decision about the choice of their own diet (Lien 2004: 1). These circumstances inspire 
interest in understanding our culinary heritage andthe food choices made by earlier 
generations.    
Culinary history studies the origins and development of the foodstuffs, equipment, 
and techniques of cookery, the presentation and eating of meals and the meanings of these 
activities to the societies that produce them (Messer et al. 2000: 1367). We all, as living 
beings, need enough food for biological survival. Food is one of the absolute fundamental 
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physical requirements for the daily existence of human beings (Bergier 1998: 1).  
Beyond its material importance as a nutritional source which directly affects the 
health of human bodies, food is central to human living to the extent that can be 
expressed as follows: ‘Food is life, and life can be studied and understood through food’ 
(Counihan and van Esterik 1997: 1). Due to its close connection with living, food is not 
only an important theme worthy of study, but also becomes a useful means with which to 
deepen our understanding of various issues and to reinfo ce research. Food practices were 
not simply determined by the scarcity of food, but were socio-cultural patterns of actions 
which connected with social norms and were shaped by the economic and political 
context of society (Teuteberg 1992: 4). This can be explained by the fact that we do not 
ingest foods randomly, but that we make a choice, either consciously or innately, about 
what food to eat and what food not to eat (Coveney 2000: 2). That is to say a bodily 
process – eating or the craving to eat – is not to be interpreted as purely a product of 
biology but as a social construction that connotes various social and cultural meanings. 
For this reason, the study of culinary history is a widely interdisciplinary field dealing 
with many research themes and methods, and crossing co ceptual and academic 
disciplinary boundaries, as explained below:   
Culinary history can also be defined by what it is not. It is not, for example, simply 
a narrative account of what was eaten by a particular people at a particular time. 
Nor is it a matter of rendering entertaining stories about food, or telling anecdotes 
of people cooking and eating, or surveying cookbooks. But it is informed analysis 
of how food expresses the character of a time, place, society, and culture. Put 
plainly, culinary history goes beyond anecdotal food f lklore and descriptions of 
cuisine and cooking at a particular point in time to incorporate historical 
dimensions.  
(Messer et al. 2000: 1367)  
The boundary-crossing and interdisciplinary nature of food can be a useful means 
with which to study history in two respects. Since the nineteenth century, modern 
nutrition-related science has gradually accumulated. However, the focus of this has been 
overwhelmingly on scientific research, such as the nature of foodstuffs eaten by people, 
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the research results of which were used for the preservation of human health (Teuteberg 
1992: 1-2). Most of food studies conducted in Europe by the 1950s was concerned with 
aspects of production and trading in agricultural and economic history, dealing with 
foodstuffs which had political or macroeconomic implications, such as salt, wine and 
spices (Bergier 1998: 3). However, foodways intersect concretely with various issues; 
economics, politics, social structure and culture. For example, the theme of food and war, 
in the connections between which food researchers have recently become interested, had 
been approached by scholars using two distinct appro ches (Trentmann and Just 2006: 2). 
Thus, firstly, the focus on food enables scholars to connect elements of history that are 
studied separately (Cwiertka 2007: 242).  
The second merit of focusing on food is that it is h ghly useful to deepen our 
insight into the interpretation of the complex and interrelated influence of human 
behaviour and the social environment. As eating habits were constructed in relation to 
various social, cultural and political factors, they can be viewed as an important index of 
change, reflecting on a macro level the consequences of macro-political and economic 
processes (Cwiertka 2006b: 389). Peter Scholliers stated that food crosses the border 
between the ‘outside’ and the ‘inside’, the so-called ‘principle of incorporation’ of food 
(2001: 8). I consider that this argument holds truein considering the relationship between 
individual food attitudes (a private matter) and socio-economic and cultural factors 
(public issues) which have absolutely affected what, why and how people eat. Studying 
the history of dietary practices enables us to deepen our understanding of the major 
questions of ‘outside’ history related to food. At the same time, we can discover ‘inside’ – 
the mundane reality of people’s lives – interwoven with the social environment. Food is a 
window which allows us to see many things and which illuminates people and societies 
that we otherwise would not be fully able to see.  
Despite the importance of food as a tool as well as the subject of research, food-
related issues have been seen from rather biased perspectives among scholars, and they 
were not treated as serious subjects for research until the 1980s. One of the major factors 
responsible for the marginal attention food studies had received in academia was the 
dualistic tradition of Western philosophy that put the mind above the body (Miller and 
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Deutsch 2009: 7). Generally speaking, food and acts related to it (i.e., eating and cooking) 
were regarded as being of the temporal world, and this attitude was shared even by the 
anthropologists who took the lead in studying food during the first half of the twentieth 
century. The practices of cooking and eating were considered transitory and feminine, 
linked with physical labour and the servicing of bodies related to bodily impurity and 
animality, in contrast to philosophy – the ‘clean’ purity of masculine rational thought. In 
nineteenth century America, for example, culinary history was studied by feminist 
historians who considered women’s domestic work (private sphere) in contrast to men’s 
salaried work (public sphere). They focused more on childrearing and other household 
tasks than the kitchen which symbolized women’s submission to the patriarchal order 
(Messer et al. 2000: 1368). The mundane aspect of food was separated from scholarly 
consideration. Instead, the consumption of food was treated rather symbolically in 
relation to the ritual activities and the process of civilization (Lupton 1998: 2-3, 9).  
The framework of the early food scholars was mainly focused on exposing the 
apparently ‘fixed’ nature of already established eating habits. The well-known 
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss treated food as a language, identifying the primary 
binary opposition between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. He saw the latter as a complex process 
which distinguished the human as unique in existence, and considered that cooking was 
part of the process towards ‘culture’ (Ibid.: 9). His theory of cooking was well 
represented in his ‘culinary triangle’, presented in the 1960s. Within a triangular semiotic 
field whose three points corresponding to the categori s of the raw, the cooked and the 
rotted, the cooked is, he said, a cultural transformation of the raw, whereas the rotted is a 
natural transformation of either the raw or the cooked (Lévi-Strauss 1997). Mary Douglas, 
another prominent anthropologist considered eating to be a patterned activity and that it 
fell within an ordered pattern. Considering the structure and order of meals in connection 
with the social system, she attempted to decipher meals using linguistic terms (Douglas 
1997). These scholars saw food as the embodiment of a s cial and cultural code with a 
timeless structure, and did not pay attention to the c anging nature of food. In short, the 
earlier academic approach adopted by the scholars above was rather conceptual, without 
historical accounts or examinations of the mundane spects of eating in the context of 
everyday life. Almost no attention was paid to human behaviour in relation to food and 
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eating, such as consumption practices (Bergier 1998: 3; Lupton 1998: 10).   
From the mid-1970s the earlier structuralists’ views of food in terms of 
symbolism and cultural representation began to be challenged by scholars with different 
understandings of food. Lévi-Strauss’s famous dictum of ‘foods good to think’ was 
criticized by Marvin Harris in his 1985 book Good to Eat: Riddles of Food and Culture 
which offered a challenge to the traditional academic framework of food studies:   
For my part, I do not wish to deny that foods convey messages and have symbolic 
meanings. But which come first, the messages or the preferences and aversion? To 
extend the scope of a famous dictum proposed by Claude Lévi-Strauss, some foods 
are “good to think,” others are “bad to think.” But I hold that whether they are good 
or bad to think depends on whether they are good or bad to eat. Food must nourish 
the collective stomach before it can feed the colletiv  mind.  
(Harris 1985: 15) 
Harris’s basic notion in food study was that the foodways of peoples varied from each 
other and were changing due to a variety of outer boundary circumstances, such as 
ecological conditions, economic and political power, and were by no means to be 
dominated by timeless arbitrary symbols (Ibid.: 16-18, 248).  
Also challenging the static character of the earlier structuralists’ approach, Stephen 
Mennnell used historical sociological methods to analyze the development of cuisine and 
the formation of eating habits in England and France between the Middle Ages and the 
twentieth century in All Manners of Food: Eating and Taste in England and France from 
the Middle Age to the Present (1985). In his research, Mennell saw eating habits as a 
‘product’ of social experience and as a ‘result’ of what people encounter in their 
community and societies as they change and develop over the years (Mennell 1985: 15).  
Within a developing social figuration, modes of indivi ual behaviour, cultural 
tastes, intellectual ideas, social stratification, political power and economic 
organization are all entangled with each other in complex ways which themselves 
change over time in ways that need to be investigated.   
(Ibid.: 15) 
To clarify the origin of food preference and avoidance, he stressed the need for careful 
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examination of the social influences which shaped di tary practices over a long period. 
Though he was a sociologist, in this research, he elaborated his discussion relying to a 
large extent on historiography (Ibid.).   
Jack Goody is also a crucial figure in the progress of food studies in that he 
demonstrated that dietary practices were influenced by various cultural and social 
environmental factors. He was critical of the earlier structuralists’ research methods that 
did not employ historical examination or consider how social forces affected dietary 
practices. He stressed the importance of the use of empirical and historical approaches to 
clarify the differences in foodways in many societies (Goody 1982: 10-39). In Cooking, 
Cuisine and Class: A Study in Comparative Sociology (1982), Goody emphasized that the 
analysis of cooking must be related to the wider social context and its action and the 
distribution of power and authority in the economic sphere. Using the processional matrix 
of cooking phases – production, distribution, prepaation and consumption – he examined 
the cultural and social environmental factors behind the emergence of the regional 
differentiated cuisines, comparing different countries (Ibid.: 37). Like Mennell, he posited 
cuisines as a reflection of the socio-economic factors affecting each society. He pointed 
out the fact that economic factors, such as the development of techniques of mass 
production and storage, significantly affected food and dietary practices in specific 
societies (Ibid.: 154-174).  
In addition to paying increasing attention to food t  examine the interrelationships 
between it and broad social processes, the notion of identity taken up by scholars in the 
1980s led to considerable development in food studies (Scholliers 2001: 7). As Margaret 
Morse stated, food is the ‘symbolic medium par excellence’ (1994: 95), and the practice 
of food consumption was a mark of the boundaries betwe n social classes, geographic 
regions, nations, cultures, genders, life-cycle stages, religions and occupations. Being 
classified into binary categories – animal and vegetabl , raw or cooked, good or bad, 
masculine or feminine, powerful or weak, alive or dea , healthy or non-healthy and 
sophisticated or gauche – each food carries a number of cultural meanings which clearly 
marks the distinction from other foods (Lupton 1998: 1-2).  
In his acclaimed book Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, 
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sociologist Pierre Bourdieu revealed the clear differences in the food preferences and 
eating habits of people belonging to different ranks of social position and cultural and 
economic capital using the concept of ‘taste’ and ‘habitus’ (1984). More recently, Amy 
Bentley demonstrated food’s role as a signifier of gender differences. She demonstrated 
that women played active parts in food riots in twentieth century Europe and the America 
on the basis of their responsibilities for food procurement and preparation (Bentley: 
2001). Michael Wildt demonstrated housewives’ negative reaction against using canned 
food in comparison to their own homemade foods in 1950s West Germany (2001). Such 
cultural patterns of food were transmitted to the nxt generation, functioning as 
significant indicators of distinction between groups within society.  
The close relationship between food and identity formation is to be found in the 
concept of ‘national cuisine’ which emerged during the last decades of the twentieth 
century. The ‘national cuisine’ stands for the ‘imagined national identity and cultural 
homogeneity, and is a product of nationalist ideology externalised by modern machineries 
of meaning’ (Hennera 1992, quoted in Cwiertka 1999: 30). Cuisines which had existed 
within the territories of nation-states (sometimes through adoptions of foreign elements) 
were set up as representative foods within the institutional frameworks of nation-states. 
These foods were a tradition deliberately manufactured by the state, frequently embedded 
in nostalgia with a sense of authenticity and legitimacy (Cwiertka 1999: 30).  
According to Yu-Jen Chen, on the one hand, the rise of national cuisine was 
closely related to movements in local societies motivated by the desire to develop 
identities and to self-reposition in order to maint local cultures against or within the 
wave of globalization (2010: 2). Food and dietary patterns related to local foods are an 
integral part of local culture. On the other hand, she observes that national cuisine was 
elaborated as a part of national culture with the strategic purpose of crafting nationhood 
by nations that had been colonized in the past or which had tenuous links with their 
people. Cuisine, the nation’s traditional symbol of culture, had an important role for the 
ruling classes in fostering the sense of self-recognition and national unity among the 




The significance of national cuisine helps us to understand that food and eating is 
not only a private matter but also a public issue which was central to the politics of state. 
As explained earlier, Harris, Mennell and Goody demonstrated that social contexts, such 
as political and economic power, are closely related to shaping the dietary practices of the 
people. In other words, macro-political and economic power – which could be 
represented by politics – are important factors which determine people’s food practices, 
what and how they eat on a daily basis. We must then ask how politics are able to reach 
people’s everyday diets? To what extent do politica and economic contexts change the 
diet of the individual? What does the involvement of the external factors mean? 
This study seeks answers to these questions by examining the transition of dietary 
practice in relation to major economic and political hanges in twentieth-century Korea.1 
Based on Harris, Mennell, and Goody’s insight that t e eating habits of societies have 
been constructed by various socio-economic powers and authorities, I will identify the 
micro-level transformation of diet as a reflection f macro-level political and economic 
influence by examining the historical connection between the politics of food and 
people’s dietary lives in Korea. Before turning to the explanation of the turbulent 
twentieth-century Korean social context which is closely tied to the dietary changes of the 
Korean people, I would like to discuss the issue of the politicization of food in relation to 
nutritional science and war – which are central to the politics of food – in the following 
section.   
2. The Modern Nation-State and the Politics of Food 
As Bourdieu showed in his research, food, the symbol of cultures and identities, 
marks the differences and boundaries between classes in society. Yet at the same time, it 
serves as a medium for interdependence, constituting meaningful relationships at 
different levels and of different kinds (Lien 2004: 9). The physiological indispensability 
of food has compelled humans through history to develop techniques and systems to 
produce and distribute provisions, aimed at efficiently ensuring stable food supplies. The 
                                                
1 In terms of the time span of this study after Korea’s liberation from the Japanese colonial rule in 1945, it 
covers only the context of the southern part of the country, the US military occupation zone (1945-1948) 
and South Korea (1948- ). Therefore, the term ‘Korea’ used in this study represents colonial Korea or South 
Korea depending on the context.   
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food trade and the relationship between domestication, exploitation and reciprocity 
surrounding the food management system increased int rdependence among people. 
Most importantly, the capability of food to restric people by means of food resources 
makes us vulnerable and easy to be controlled by it. It s in this way that food itself 
became a major force as well as a political object. Al hough the means for the 
politicization of food are less obvious, as they are embedded in social practices and 
conventions that are not always labelled ‘political’, food has been a highly political object 
by and through which power relations of domination and subordination were implicated 
and perpetuated (Ibid.: 6, 9). As Harris stated, food is often a source of power for the few 
who have sought to control others, as well as a source of nourishment for the many 
(1985: 15-17).    
The connection between food and politics has been fou d in many parts of the 
world for many centuries. From Roman times, governme ts in Europe attempted to 
supervise and control the quality, price, trade andconsumption of foodstuffs – salt, tea, 
and alcoholic beverages, and principal staples such as flour – by means of sumptuary 
laws, taxation and bans on speculation. The purposes f the control were to ensure 
smooth distribution and government revenue. (Messer et al. 2000: 1371).  
In the nineteenth century, when state control over national bodies intensified with 
the rise of the nation-states, the mutual interdependence between politics and food grew 
to a greater degree than at any other time in history. The modern nation-state relied 
greatly upon its citizens’ physical strength for production capacity and as potential 
soldiers. In terms of the relationship between the two, on the one hand, it became the duty 
of citizens to be fit and healthy to support the nation. The state, on the other hand, 
devoted organized efforts to promoting the health of the population as a fundamental 
responsibility of the nation, even using coercive masures to keep its people fit. It was in 
this atmosphere that the strong connection between di tary practices and the health 
problem began to be defined by scientists and disseminated by promotion by the state 
which expected its citizens to maintain their health and fitness (Kamminga and 
Cunningham 1995: 2-3).  
Nutritional science emerged in such interdependent r lationship between the 
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modern nation state and its people’s bodies. It emerged in the mid-nineteenth century in 
the Western nations, at the same time as widespread mass poverty and food scarcity, 
especially among the poor and working classes, brought about by economic recession. 
The development of nutritional science in Britain, which has been largely followed by 
other countries in Western Europe, was firmly located in the government’s social policies 
for dealing with poverty and the poor physique of the nation (Horrocks 1995: 235). Much 
of the concern of the British authorities was caused by finding that they did not have 
enough men who were ‘fighting fit’ to defend the country in the face of the Boer War 
(1880-1881 and 1899-1902). To improve the poor physique and ill-health found among 
the British nation, the authorities promoted health reform projects within social welfare 
programmes (Akiyama 2008: 1).  
The scientific discovery of nutritional elements became a useful tool for 
improving the nutrition and health of the nation. By the mid-nineteenth century in Britain, 
carbohydrates, fat, proteins and other essential micronutrients had been identified, and by 
1930 the specific link between individual vitamin deficiencies and bodily conditions, 
such as beriberi and poor vision, had been made by scientists (Lupton 1998: 70-71). At 
first, all of this newly discovered nutritional science was used for the economic 
management of prisons and asylums and the political management of society. However, 
the principles for the efficient government of such state institutions were quickly applied 
to handling the problems of a healthy and effective working class supported on a 
minimum but proper nutritional intake. Since scientific eating and nutritional knowledge 
were matters linked to the nutritionally adequate diet as well as to economical spending 
(Turner 1982b: 268).  
The concept of nutritional science as a social agenda i  the modern nation-state is 
an excellent example of the arguments of Harris (1985) and Sidney Mintz (1986); that the 
political and economic interests of specific groups of people lie behind food consumption 
and eating. Inculcating scientific eating habits among the poor was beneficial for the 
nineteenth century British bourgeoisie middle classes, as it became a viable argument 
against the demands by workers for higher wages. For the government, it was better to 
educate people about how to make the ‘right’ food choi es and to adhere to good eating 
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so that they would shoulder their own responsibility to be healthy, rather than spending 
more money on their behalf (Coveney 2000: 19). Following Foucault’s notion, John 
Coveney argued that nutrition functioned as knowledge – a technique of social control by 
the modern state – by preserving the individuals’ autonomy which is in fact controlled by 
power at a distance (2000:14-15, 18, and 89).  
Nutritional education and cookery training aimed at alleviating health problems 
was part of the state’s nutritional strategy in nineteenth century Britain. The education 
programme was institutionalised within home economics for girls at school, and attempts 
at propagating nutritionally-appropriate eating became more common.2 In fact, domestic 
education for working-class girls presented the prefer d solution to the improvement of 
the diet of the poor and gave a significant boost t the development of home economics 
in the country (Smith and Nicolson 1995: 292). Women in low-income classes were 
frequently criticized for being ignorant, idled, and indifferent to their family’s healthy 
eating by politicians and nutritionists. Scientific eating and paying attention to nutrition 
was investigated with new moral meanings of controls ver one’s own life and self-
training (Smith and Nicolson 1995: 288-292). The social role of science and the 
dissemination of scientific knowledge remained matters of great political importance in 
many modern states throughout the twentieth century. The British-style welfare system 
served as a model for other countries, such as the Japanese authorities who strove to 
develop a ‘welfare state’ to alleviate social poverty at the beginning of the twentieth 
century (Garon 1997: 25-59). Such a social policy was also introduced in 1930s colonial 
Korea, as will be discussed in Chapter Four.    
Control over the nation’s diet as a political agenda is vastly more important in times 
of strife and war. The creation of specialized staff  o  government employees – the armed 
forces – involves turning a productive workforce into troops, and multiplies the number 
of hungry mouths for which the government has direct sponsibility (Tilly 1975: 393, 
396). For the countries at war, an adequate diet is non-negligible in order to sustain armed 
forces in the battlefield, but it is equally imperative to ensure the health, working 
efficiency and morale of the civilian who sustains the war on the home front. Because 
                                                
2 On cookery education from the viewpoint of health promotion in Britain, see Akiyama 2008.  
Introduction 
12 
modern war requires not only war munitions necessary in the field, but also entire 
material and human resources to be mobilized towards the ends of war (Cwiertka 2006a: 
115-116). In the context of so-called all-out war, the matter of civilian health was of ‘the 
same importance as bullets and warships’, and the management of food resources gained 
strategic significance for achieving victory (Hara 1944: 4-6). In order to channel 
provisions to supply military requirements as a top priority, yet to still feed civilians, state 
control over food consumption became important to an extraordinary degree (Kamminga 
and Cunningham 1995: 2). Although imperfect control systems were often accompanied 
by thriving black markets,3 extensive control over the distribution and pricing of food 
constitute an integral part of the overall programme for economic mobilization in war 
waging countries (Johnston 1953: 165).  
The state’s extensive food controls during war years results in changes in the pattern 
of food consumption and the eating habits of nations. For example, Katarzyna J. Cwiertka 
discussed the experiences of wartime food regulations during World War One; military 
catering and food rationing changed the food preferences and eating habits of the 
Japanese people, and led to nationalization and homogenization of food tastes in Japan 
(2006a). In research on food rationing during World War Two in America, Amy Bentley 
stated the far-reaching impact of the wartime food p licies of America as follows: ‘More 
than fifty years after the end of WWII, the kitchen – and much of American food 
production and consumption – remains a battlefront, whether between producers and 
consumers, government and watchdog agencies, developing and industrialized nations, or 
individuals and their waistlines or wallets’ (1998: 171).  
The state’s effort to control food consumption during war was not just a 
straightforward response to scarcity but was also a significant element of political 
strategy which was closely related to distinctive ideological perspectives and the 
economy in the post-war management of the society. Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska’s 
research demonstrated that in Britain, food rationing and austerity policies originally 
introduced as wartime strategies during WWII were not dismantled; indeed they were 
                                                
3 There is a large body of literature considering black market phenomena which developed in various part  
of the world under the controlled economy systems during the First and the Second World Wars. For 
example, Katarzyna J. Cwiertka (forthcoming), Hans J. Teuteberg  2011, Paul Steege 2007, Edward 
Smithies 1984 and Marshall B. Clinard 1952.     
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intensified and maintained for another decade with the purpose of the economic recovery 
of the country (2004). In the Japanese government’s drive toward the post-war 
reconstruction of society in 1950s Japan, people were urged to rationalize and improve 
their nutrition in almost exactly the same manner as they were under the austerity 
campaigns implemented during WWII (Garon 1997: 149-72). War is a significant factor 
which stimulates state intervention in people’s eating habits. Wartime food regulations 
impact upon post-war societies politically and economically, as is demonstrated in a 
variety of ways.  
That food is a highly political object can also be explained by the fact that 
countries which aspire to join the ranks of the stronger modern states attach great weight 
to the eating of their nations. Fragmented political power, imperialism, nation-building 
and the creation of modern citizens; all of these social circumstances surrounding East 
Asian countries between the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century 
required a modernization effort within their own societies. For example, appreciating that 
reconstituting people into modern subject-citizens u der the emperor was imperative to 
ensure the future stability of the nation, the Meiji governments (1868-1912) implemented 
wide-ranging modernization projects. Among the projects, eating meat – which 
represented the image of Western civilization and modernization – was propagated to 
express Meiji Japan’s legitimacy domestically and iternationally as well as to improve 
nutrition (Cwiertka 2006a: 13-34). The strategy of meat eating was a vehicle which 
transformed Japan into a modern nation by deliberately shaping people’s eating habits 
and was carefully orchestrated for the purpose of the state’s ‘civilization and 
enlightenment’ (bunmei kaika文明開化) (Ibid.: 17).  
Similarly, in the early years of the twentieth century in China, the eating habits of 
a citizen were seen by the elite as the key for building a modern and strong nation. In the 
face of increasing foreign imperialist power, Chinese leaders emphasized that their 
county strengthen itself by improving its people’s health. From such a nationalistic view, 
the state’s organized efforts were devoted to givin women housewifery education, which 
remained one of the core national strategies through t the first half of the twentieth 
century in China (Schneider 2011). Women were entrusted with the role of strengthening 
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Chinese families within the modern nation-building project. In twentieth century Korean 
society, as in Japan and China, the reform of people’s eating habits remained an important 
political strategy as will be discussed in Chapter Six of this study. For nation-states, the 
use of food as an official agenda was important to ensure strong bodies to contribute to 
the country’s development. At the same time, the social issue of food functioned as a 
vehicle for providing more communitarian rhetoric to the people, and illustrated the stark 
consequences of social solidarity, which was indispen able for consolidating society.   
Lien observed that food effectively dissolves most preconceived distinctions 
between nature and culture, family and society and the individual and the collective 
(2004: 9). Lien’s statement is particularly relevant when we consider that food figured 
prominently in the reciprocal relationship between the modern nation and its citizens. 
Involved in intricate contemporary social transformations and power relations between 
colonization, modernization and industrialization, food has been politicized and exploited 
by governments to control their people. At the same ti , many power relationships were 
also constructed by and through the medium of food (Lien 2004: 9).  
3. The Topic of This Thesis: The State and Food in South Korea  
This study examines the governmental policies through which people’s food practices 
were intervened in, controlled and modified in twenti th-century South Korea. The 
study’s main focus is on the wars that occurred in twentieth-century Korea, as it acted as 
an important stimulus in increasing state interference in the daily diet of the people and 
contributed to the transformation of Korean foodways.     
The main purposes of this study are twofold: firstly, I will document the adoption 
of the matter of the people’s diet as the focus of economic policies in order to sustain 
national fighting power, and will investigate the wide range of channels through which 
the authorities devoted consistent efforts to controlling the daily diet of the Korean people. 
Secondly, I will demonstrate the food-control programmes once developed as war 
strategies were not abolished after the end of wars, but rather reinforced as part of the 
government’s post-war social management. The goal of this study is to explore the long-
term impact of colonial Japan’s wartime food policies on the formation of the dietary 
practices of Korean in the latter half of the twenti th century by demonstrating that the 
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wartime reforms instituted during the Second World War laid the foundations for post-
colonial food policies in South Korea.  
As elsewhere, controls over food played a central role in the policies of the 
authorities which took power in Korea. However, an examination of the modern Korean 
diet is particularly interesting due to the fact that the last century was one of the most 
turbulent eras in Korean history, during which a large number of momentous historical 
events occurred. Dramatic social changes – the experi nc  of the Second World War 
under Japan’s colonial rule (1910-1945), occupation by the United States and the Soviet 
Union (1945-1948), the division of the country into N rth and South Korea under the 
Cold War rivalry between these two countries (1948-), and the outbreak of the Korean 
War (1950-1953) – brought dramatic influences to bear on the country’s politics and 
economy. The specific social context was a potent factor behind the Korean authorities’ 
maintenance of rigid control over the food practices of the Korean people. Despite 
constant changes in the administration – from the Japanese colonial authorities and the 
US Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) to the South Korean government – food-
related policies have remained at the core of the country’s politics due to the 
overwhelming importance of food as a political tool. Modern Korean foodways have 
been great influenced by state policies that were fo mulated and implemented against a 
backdrop of war (and the threat of it), colonialism and industrialization, all of which were 
entangled with each other in complex ways.  
Most importantly, the outbreak of the Korean War and the tension of the Cold War 
surrounding the Korean peninsula was vital in maintaining the state control over food 
which instituted by the Japanese colonial government during WWII. The colonial food 
measures constituted essential components of the post-colonial authorities’ wartime 
policies to support the Korean War, post-war reconstruction, and economic development 
of the country. In short, against an intricate political and economic background, the 
centralized state food control system originating from Japanese imperialism was 
strengthened in liberated Korea. Despite the fact tha eating habits never change easily 
(Levenstein 1988: viii), conscious and careful administrative efforts to control and reform 
the eating habits of the Korean people became one of the major forces which have shaped 
modern Korean foodways.  
 This project brings together several areas of scholarly inquiry, including state 
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economic policies and food management systems, women’s policy and education, and 
colonialism, in particular the relationship of wars and the reinforcement of the 
government’s system of food control. By demonstrating various vehicles through which 
state control measures were transferred and inculcated, I will argue how food has been 
politicized, and demonstrate that the politics of food takes place everywhere in daily life, 
outside the domain of bureaucracy. This study also ttempts to reveal the influence of 
Korea’s modernization processes, which took place within the framework of colonialism, 
war and industrialization, on the transformation of K rean eating habits.   
Despite the fact that focusing on food sheds light on the multitudinous nature of 
modern Korean society, the dietary aspect, especially in colonial Korea, has received little 
attention. Due to the ideological confrontation with North Korea, the historiography of 
South Korea had tended to concentrate on enhancing the country’s legitimacy in dealing 
with colonial history.  Moreover, such a politicized historiography after 1945 has led to 
conscious efforts by Korean historians to distance themselves from subjects related to 
colonialism. Thus, a binary approach based on natiolism, such as the view of 
‘imperialist repression versus national resistance’, dominated South Korean 
historiography until the 1980s (Shin and Robinson 2000: 1-2, 5). Subjects other than 
macroscopic politics and economy were largely excluded, and the remaining traces of 
colonization in post-colonial Korean society had hardly been acknowledged (Kim T. N. 
2004: 14).   
With the end of Cold War, more inclusive and pluralist approaches to the 
historiography of colonial Korea began to emerge.4  Gi-Wook Shin and Michael 
Robinson’s Colonial Modernity in Korea (2000) is one of the attempts to identify the 
multiple paths of modern Japanese dominant mechanisms in colonial Korea. In this book, 
the authors stressed that Japanese colonial domination and the rise of Korean modernity 
which coincided with it were subtle and complex processes taking place within the 
interaction between the colonizer and the colonized. Pointing out that modern domination 
penetrates into the everyday lives of people far beyond the political realm, and that it 
even elicits their spontaneous consent to dominatio, Shin and Robinson emphasized that 
                                                
4 In regard to the changing historiography of Korean colonial study, see Yun H.D. 2003.   
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the dynamic nature and consequences of colonial historiography should not be 
underestimated (2000: 2-7). Kim Chin-gyun and Chŏng Kŭn-sik’s edited volume Kŭndae 
chuch’e-wa singminji kyuyul kwŏllyŏk 근대주체와 식민지 규율권력 (Modern Subject 
and Colonial Disciplinary Power) (1997) is also an in ovative work which stimulated the 
progress of the rediscovery of colonial Korean history. Following the theory of modern 
disciplinary power such as Foucault’s notion, this volume made an attempt to analyze the 
Japanese disciplinary control through which the colonial power was effectively operated 
to control everyday living and even the minds of colonial-period Koreans.        
In an effort to depict the dynamic mundane reality and to fill the historical void of 
colonial experience, the realm of everyday life came to be considered important (Kim T. 
N. 2004: 14). Publications within the last decade att st to the growing attention being 
paid to the subject in academia: Ilche-ŭi singmin chibae-wa ilsang saenghwal 일제의 
식민지배와 일상생활 (Everyday Lives of the Korean People under the Japanese 
Colonial Rule) (2004) and Ilche p’asijŭm chibae chŏngch’aek-kwa minjung saenghwal 
일제 파시즘 지배정책과 민중생활 (Japanese Fascist Policy in Korea and Korean 
Life) (2004) published under the auspices of Yonsei Un versity; Singminji-ŭi ilsang, 
chibae-wa kyunnyŏl 식민지의 일상, 지배와 균열 (Everyday Lives in a Colony, 
Domination and Division) (2006) edited by Kong Che-uk and Chŏng Kŭn-sik. New 
themes related to colonial Korean ways of life have be n explored: education, community 
life in rural areas, traditional market places, urban housing and clothing.  
Only a few attempts have so far been made to examine food as a major subject in 
research on colonial Korea. Given that it was only recently that the daily lives of civilians 
were rediscovered by researchers, it does not seem surprising that the study of food-
related issues, which had been regarded as distinctly trivial, should be still at the very 
initial stage and has not yet accumulated enough material. Chŏn Kang-su (1993), Hŏ 
Yŏng-nan (2000), Yi Song-sun (2003b) examined the colonia  government’s food-control 
policies during WWII, and a Japanese scholar Higuchi Yūichi studied the diet of farmers 
within the framework of the history of colonial Korean rural life (1998). The issue of diet 
was partly dealt with in studies on economic mobilization projects implemented between 
the 1930s and 1945, i.e., Yi Kyŏng-nan (2004), Inoue Kazue (2007), and An T’ae-yun 
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(2006), and it was considered with regard to the home economics education by Pak Sŏn-
mi (2007).  
In terms of food studies other than colonial historiography, the majority of studies 
centre largely on the nutritional issues (Cwiertka and Chen 2012: 191). Studies dealing 
with food in relation to the societal context are rather scarce. Kong Che-uk (2008) and 
Song In-ju (1998) examined state intervention into the eating habits of Korean people by 
examining the Korean government’s eating campaigns implemented in the 1970s to 
curtail the rice consumption of its people for economic and political purposes. In her 
thesis, Pak Sang-hŭi made an attempt to interpret food campaigns as part of the national 
mobilization system of the Korean government (2008). It was only recently that an 
anthropologist Chu Yŏng-ha took an essentailal step by sheding lights on the usefulness 
and potential of food studies as a separate disciplne in Ŭmsik inmunhak: ŭmsig-ŭro pon 
Han’gug-ŭi yŏksa-wa munhwa 음식인문학: 음식으로 본 한국의 역사와 문화  
(The Food Humanities: the History and Clture of Korea Vewed from Food) (2011).     
The body of scholarship on Korean food written in English is also very limited. The 
only monograph fully dealing with the history of Korean food is Michael Pettid’s Korean 
Cuisine: An Illustrated History (2008), while Cwiertka’s Cuisine, Colonialism and Cold 
War will be published soon. English journal articles on Korean food began to be written 
in the 1990s by a handful of Korean sociologists and thropologists, including Han 
Kyŏng-Koo (2010), Bak Sangmee (2010), and Moon Okpyo (2010). Although the studies 
are still superficial, these researchers’ cultural approaches to dietary practice are valuable 
in that they challenged the nutritional aspect-dominant food studies in Korea.  
Food research on how Japanese colonialism has affected the Korean food industry 
and dietary patterns is scant. In her research on the soy sauce industry and the 
consumption practice of it in Korea, Katarzyna J. Cwiertka demonstrated that the 
traditional Korean-style home-brewing soy sauce was replaced by the factory-made 
Japanese product introduced during the colonial era (2006b). Jung Keun-Sik examined 
another colonial legacy related to food which was systematically revived for commercial 
purposes in liberated Korea, presenting the consumption and story of monosodium 
glutamate in Korea (2005). These researches shows nt only the long-term influence of 
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Japanese colonial rule on the changing eating habits of Koreans, but also that colonial 
encounters continue to function in the formation of p st-colonial Korean food culture 
even though they are ‘unseen’ (Cwiertka 2006b: 404).There is now an expanding body of 
literature regarding food studies in Korea, although this is expanding only gradually.  
This study seeks to add to this body of food research focusing on the effects of 
broad social change on diet. It also follows the recent research direction of colonial 
historiography which attaches increasing weight to mundane aspects. It is hoped that this 
project will contribute to the discovery of the meanings of colonial experience which 
have hardly been acknowledged, but which laid the foundation for changing and forming 
the food practices of post-colonial Koreans in many wa s.     
Long reluctance to deal with the less political issues of colonial Korean history and 
the historians’ marginal attention to food-related issues have led to a lack of sufficient 
preliminary research and sources. This has caused considerable difficulty in carrying out 
this research. For example, while there is a great d l of research on the Korean War from 
the macro-political view, surprisingly the sources – not to mention research – concerning 
food rationing and the black market during the three-y ar war are nearly absent. Due to 
the paucity of sources, the issue of food rationing during the Korean War is not included 
in this study. For the same reason, black market phnomena after 1945 (Chapter Three) 
will be only partially discussed.        
It should be noted that even though this study establi hes the political forces as the 
controlling side which chiefly imposes regulations on the people’s diet, it does not 
necessarily mean that there was only a one-sided relationship between the government 
and the people. For example, under the food-rationing system, people had to negotiate 
their lives to fit to the newly shaped structural conditions. They adjusted their lifestyles 
and developed new practices, and as such played an active role, part of an ongoing 
relationship, rather than simply being on the receiving end of policies (Trentmann and 
Just 2006: 2-3). In order to demonstrate the dynamic nature of the state-people 
relationship, in this study, I will examine the part played by ordinary people as active 
participants in an established framework.       
 This research is largely divided into three parts: food distribution, food 
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consumption and food education. The framework is partly borrowed from the phases of 
social action - production, distribution, preparation and consumption – distinguished by a 
food anthropologist Goody when analyzing food practices (Goody 1982: 37). In addition 
to these, education has been added as one of the most i portant channels through which 
state controls could be imposed. As discussed earlier, nutritional knowledge is an 
important means of social control over the bodies of people, and the spread of such 
modern knowledge is primarily responsible for the systematic educational system 
established by the state. School is, according to Foucault, one of the places where modern 
docile bodies were intensively trained (1991: 139-140).  
 The first part of this project includes three chapters which deal with the issue of 
food rationing. Chapter One demonstrates the revival of the Japanese system of food 
rationing in post-colonial Korea, chiefly focusing on the role of the USAMGIK, which 
resurrected the Japanese machinery of food management to handle the food shortages in 
decolonized Korea. The first section looks at the Japanese staple-food distribution 
programmes implemented between 1940 and 1945, and the second covers the rationing 
controls under the USAMGIK (1945-1948) and during the formative years of the South 
Korean government (1948-1950). The centralized food-c ntrol system that originated 
with the colonial administration was further reinforced by the post-colonial authorities of 
the country, and this set the overall tone for the country’s food policies for decades to 
come.   
Chapter Two describes the process of the restoration of the Japanese food 
programme after 1945, following the same time frame as Chapter One. A major focus is 
placed on the role of the aegukpan (‘patriotic units’), the civilian groups involved in the 
administration of food rationing. The first section examines their pivotal role within the 
Japanese food-control mechanism, and the following section demonstrates that they were 
entrusted with exactly the same roles by the post-clonial governments in Korea. 
Notwithstanding the authorities’ efforts, the government system of food control remained 
incomplete, and there was a widespread black market, which is dealt with in Chapter 
Three. Emerging under the ill-fated Japanese food management system in the late 1930s, 
the black market was an established part of Korean people’s everyday lives and continued 
to exist in liberated Korea alongside the Japanese rationing system. This chapter covers 
the period between 1937 and 1950.  
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The second part of this study looks at the state’s control over food consumption, 
dealing with the state’s war mobilization campaigns carried out in the name of the 
improvement of daily life. The first section of Chapter Four focuses on the Japanese war 
campaigns during the Second World War, which appropriated the structure of the Rural 
Revitalization Campaign (Nongch’on chinhŭng undong) initiated in 1932 in colonial 
Korea. As discussed in the second section of this chapter, the Japanese campaigns for war 
mobilization were revived in 1951 in liberated Korea in an effort to address yet another 
conflict, the Korean War. The wartime campaigns of the South Korean government 
remained intact until 1960, long after the cease-fire agreement of 1953, allowing the 
authorities to intervene in the daily diet of the peo le for the purposes of post-war social 
reorganization and the modernization of the country.     
Food consumption is closely related to women, who were chiefly responsible for 
managing family meals in Korea. Chapter Five attempts to show how the transformation 
of the Korean diet proceeded as the result of an intricate and interactive relationship 
between women, colonialism and the state’s policies of mass mobilization. The first 
section documents the unique role of female Japanese immigrants in colonial Korea. As 
intermediaries between the state and the Korean public, they were actively involved in 
the Korean dietary reforms during the WWII. The following section focuses on Korean 
women’s active participation in Saemaŭl Undong, the state reform projects aimed at 
national economic development in 1970s’ South Korea. The women’s engagement in the 
state’s projects for dietary reform emerged as a powerful influence on the transformation 
of the Korean diet. A focus on women’s roles provides a fruitful angle for gaining a fuller 
understanding of the mechanism of the state’s intervention in the private sphere.  
The function of education as the principal vehicle for the implementation of the 
state’s nutritional policy and the shaping of Korean food practices is documented in the 
third part. The first section of Chapter Six considers the emergence of home economics 
during the first half of the twentieth century in Korea. It shows that this modern scientific 
discipline for women was disseminated alongside the ideology of the ‘wise mother, good 
wife’ (hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ), the idealized Korean womanhood, shaped under the influence 
of the Japanese concept of the ‘good wife, wise mother’. The second section discusses the 
growing importance of home economics in Japanese wartime austerity policy. The 
colonial authorities’ serious efforts to disseminate nutritional science in order to train 
Korean women to manage their family diet economically during the war years are 
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elaborated in this section. While the political conn tations are invisible, the principles of 
home economics definitely prevailed in the highly politicised war situation.        
Chapter Seven concentrates on South Korean food education, an area to which the 
authorities attached great importance in the reshaping of the eating habits of the people. 
The first section examines the school lunch programme as a reflection of state food 
policies during the last five decades of the twentieth century. Originally intended to 
achieve the improvement of nutritional intake amongst school children, the lunch 
programme became less focused on the recipient’s nutritional needs and more concerned 
with the larger forces of state food policies. The food on the children’s lunch trays was 
strategically selected so that it was beneficial for the country’s economic development. 
The development of the lunch programme, and the shift from bread to rice (mixed with 
other grain) as its staple food, clearly demonstrates that the policy of food education in 
the country has been shaped more by surplus food than ideas about healthy diets. The 
second section of this chapter deals with the honbunsik changnyŏ campaigns (which 
encouraged the eating of barley and wheat-based foos), with special emphasis on 
various projects carried out in the school curriculum in order to change the eating habits 
of pupils. The utility of the formal school system, an effective mechanism for reshaping 
individual thoughts and attitudes, enabled the Korean authorities to control the daily diet 
of the people.     
My conclusion shall remark The Korean authorities’ political exploitation of food 
– in the form of ‘nutritional science’ – to control the society for a century determined the 
state-society relations of the country, and the relationship still remained in Korean society 


















Wartime and Post-war Systems of Food Rationing 
 
In Japan, as in the other Western countries involved in the Second World War, food 
rationing was an integral part of the wartime economic mobilization programme 
(Johnston 1953: 165). Modern war is an all-out conflict which requires the mobilization 
of all available national resources – not merely the armed forces in the field, but also the 
everyday lives of civilians – in order to create thbelligerent power needed to sustain the 
war effort. Food, being a daily necessity both for c mbatants and civilians, was of 
significant importance in ensuring the productivity and morale of the population 
(Cwiertka 2006a: 115-116). As a Japanese colony, Korea was already a supplier of rice, 
the most important grain, to the Japanese people, and this role became particularly 
important during the war years. Under the absolute power of the colonial authorities, the 
Korean people’s everyday diet was tightly restricted within the framework of a controlled 
economy. Cumings observed that the Japanese colonial authorities constructed a high-
quality comprehensive and penetrating administrative structure in order to effectively 
mobilize and extract Korean resources for Japan (1981: 10-12). The Japanese 
government’s control over rice distribution in Korea is the best example of such a 
colonial control mechanism. The Korean rice market, which was incorporated into the 
colonial economic structure in 1910, provided the foundations for Japan’s wartime food 
control system.  
Centralized state control over food distribution remained essentially intact in post-
colonial Korea when it was run by the United States Army Military Government which 
occupied the southern part of the peninsula from the 38th parallel from August 1945 to 
August 1948. The Japanese methods of food management provided a highly effective 
model for the newly established government, which concentrated its efforts on preserving 
public order in its zone of occupation.     
In this chapter, I will examine the food rationing programmes implemented by the 
Japanese government during the WWII and under the US military occupation of southern 
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Korea. A major focus is placed on the distribution of cereal grains, chiefly rice, the most 
important food in the Korean diet. By revealing that the Japanese food control measures 
employed in wartime Korea were reused in post-colonia  food management strategies, 
this chapter attempts to demonstrate how the colonial authorities’ control methods were 
inherited and intensified in South Korea under the food policies of the American 
occupation authorities. The main argument of this chapter is that the colonial 
government’s wartime food-control policies laid the foundation for the centralized food 
management system in post-colonial Korea.  
1.1 The Japanese System of Wartime Food Control 
The Management of Staple Grains in Korea before 1937   
While it is often argued that the chief motive behind Japan’s imperialism in East Asia was 
political – to preserve its sovereignty in the face of Western expansionism – the ability of 
the colonies to act as an agricultural supplier for Japan was an important factor behind 
Japan’s colonialism. The potential of Korean agriculture, which was predominantly rice 
farming, had been drawn to Japan’s attention even bfore the establishment of the 
Protectorate Treaty in 1905 (Shin 1996: 43).  
Korea is mainly an agricultural nation. At the turn of the nineteenth century, 84 
per cent of Korean households worked in agriculture and rice was their major product 
(Mcnamara 1998: 21). Japan had been Korea’s leading partner in trade since the 
Kanghwa Treaty in 1876, the first modern treaty Korea signed with a foreign country. By 
the 1890s, Korea had become a market for Japan’s manufactured goods, such as cotton, 
farm tools and household utensils, and, more importantly, a provider of rice and soybeans 
to Japan (Mcnamara 1998: 28). In 1877, the value of rice exports to Japan totalled 2,000 
yen, which accounted for just 3.3 per cent of the 59,000 yen value of total exports to 
Japan. However, during the following two decades, rice exports markedly increased: by 
1897 they amounted to 5.6 million yen, 69 per cent of the total value of exports, which 
equalled 8.1 million yen (Song K. J. et al. 2004: 40-41).  
Rice was the backbone of Korean agriculture and the Kor ans depended on rice as 
their most important staple grain. Rice cultivation had gradually spread through the 
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Korean peninsula until about the fourth century BCE (Reinschmidt 2004: 512). During 
the Three Kingdoms period (57BCE-668CE), rice was established as major staple among 
royalty and aristocracy, and was also consumed by the army. High-ranking bureaucrats in 
the era of the Koryŏ Kingdom (918-1392) received their salaries in rice(Kang I. H. 2000: 
98, 107, and 170). During the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392-1910), 26 varieties of rice were 
cultivated in the peninsula and were consumed as a daily staple by the nobility. The grain 
was also accepted as payment for taxes by the government. However, rice was by no 
means a staple for the average Korean: the staple foods for the majority were coarse 
grains, such as barley, Japanese barnyard and Prosomillet, and soybeans (Ibid.: 108, 220). 
Rice was a luxurious and prestigious food for much of Korean history.  
Being eaten only by those of higher status and income, rice was the most popular 
staple among Koreans. In the past the term ‘rice and meat’ had been symbolic of wealth 
and was something to which people aspired (Kim K. O. 2010: 14). ‘Cooked rice’ (pap) 
referred not only to a specific dish, but was also u ed as a Korean generic word for ‘meal’ 
(Walraven 2002: 96-97). Rice became affordable for all Koreans in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, and despite a fall in its consumption due to the westernization of the 
Korean diet (see 7.1), it has remained as one of the most important foodstuffs ever since. 
Rice carries significant weight, not just as a food s urce, but also as part of the political 
economy, as well as being an undisputed icon of natio l identity and locality amid the 
globalization of the Korean diet (Kim K. O. 2010; Ham H. 2005). As Ohnuki-Tierney 
demonstrated in her book, Rice as Self, the great importance of rice in the Japanese diet 
and identity is also reflected in its centrality to the Korean diet (1993: 81-98).     
After Japan gained control of Korea in 1910, the ric -centric economic structure 
remained intact. In 1920, 87.1 per cent of the Korean population was engaged in 
agriculture (Grajdanzev 1944: 79). More than a quarter of the total value of all products 
in Korea in 1929, including industrial, commercial and all other output was from rice 
production (Lee H. K. 1969: 55, 256). Such a predominance of rice farming without 
diversified agricultural production in colonial Korea was chiefly the result of the 
Japanese government encouraging monoculture in an effort to increase rice exports from 
Korea to Japan (Grajdanzev 1944: 90; McCune 1950: 3). 
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Securing a food supply emerged as a critical matter on the Japanese agenda at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Japan’s food shortage became apparent in the 1910s 
as rapid industrialization and urbanization progressed. During the early decades of the 
Meiji Era (1868-1912), Japan was able to increase its agricultural production through the 
improvement of the methods and techniques of farming. However, by the 1910s, 
agricultural growth had slowed down. The increase in annual output of 2.38 per cent in 
the period 1897-1901 decreased to 1.91 per cent in 1897, and to just 0.44 per cent 
between 1917 and 1931 (Ho 1984: 349). A farming population that had markedly 
diminished over the turn of the nineteenth and twenieth centuries was also responsible 
for the decrease in Japan’s productivity: between 1872 and 1920, the proportion of people 
engaged in agriculture fell from 80 per cent to 52 per cent, while there was a 14 per cent 
rise in the total population between 1907 and 1917. An increasing number of people were 
moving to urban areas to work in factories and offices in search of a life better than 
farming. Such urbanization led to an increase in the consumption of food in Japan by 
turning many food producers into consumers (Cwiertka 1999: 66-67). For the Japanese 
government, which sought to handle the shortage of food through lower investments so as 
not to affect the country’s industrialization projects, developing its colonies to be the 
agricultural suppliers for its people was the best solution (Ho 1984: 349-350).       
Serious planning to turn Korea into a supplier of rice for Japan began in 1920 with 
the Programme to Increase Rice Production (Sanmai zōshoku keikaku産米増殖計画). 
The development project was initiated as a measure to cope with a series of major 
demonstrations that had swept Japanese cities in 1918, the so-called Rice Riots. The 
shortage and soaring price of rice, coupled with ramp nt inflation in Japan after the First 
World War (1914-1918), triggered public anxiety, and led to a series of urban protests 
against the Japanese government. The central government’s immediate response to the 
riots included a plan to agriculturally develop and i crease rice production in Korea 
(Cwiertka 2006a: 121; Johnston 1953: 50). Until the programme was abandoned in 1934 
to protect Japanese agriculture, which was endangered by 1930 due to excessive rice 
imports from the colonies, expanding the production of rice remained the central 
economic policy of the Government-General in Korea (Ōmameuda 1993: 328-329). Table 
1-1 shows rice production and exports to Japan fromK rea between 1915 and 1945.  
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Table 1-1: Rice production and exports to Japan from Korea, 1915-1945 (in thousand 
sŏk5) 
 Rice year (s)* Production (a) Index Exports (b) Index (b)/(a) (%) 
1915-1919 13,934 100 2,204 100 15.8 
1920-1924 14,523 104 3,565 162 24.5 
1925-1929 14,917 107 4,814 218 33.2 
1930-1935 17,658 127 7,824 355 44.3 
1936 19,411 139 9,513 432 49.0 
1937 26,797 192 7,201 327 26.9 
1938 24,139 173 10,997 499 45.6 
1939 14,356 103 6,894 313 48.0 
1940 21,527 154 602 27 2.8 
1941 24,886 179 4,232 192 17.0 
1942 15,688 113 2,273 103 14.5 
1943 18,719 119 1,303 57 7.0 
1944 16,052 115 4,121 187 25.7 
1945 12,850 92 1,756 80 13.7 
*The rice year is from November to October. 
Data from Song K. J. et al. 2004: 126-127; the percentages and index were computed by the 
author. 
As Table 1-1 shows, the programme proved effective. The rice crop in Korea between 
1915-1919 and 1938 showed more than a 70 per cent increase, from 13,934,000 sŏk 
(approximately 2,006,496 metric tons) to 24,139,000 sŏk (3,476,016 tons), and exports to 
Japan witnessed a fivefold increase, from 2,204,000 sŏk (317,376 tons) to 10,997,000 sŏk 
(1,583,568 tons), accounting for 46 per cent of the total rice production of Korea. Along 
with the remarkable increase in the volume of deliveries of Korean rice, Japanese people 
were increasingly dependent upon rice from its other colonies. Table 1-2 indicates the 
sources of rice imports and their ratio to the total volume of Japanese imports.  
Table 1-2: Sources of Japanese rice imports, 1911-138 (in per cent) 
                                                
5 A traditional Korean unit of grain measurement. One sŏk of rice is equivalent to 180 litres or to 
approximately 143 kilograms.  
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Period Korea (%) Formosa (%) Non-Empire sources (%) 
1911-1915 24 20 56 
1916-1920 37 18 45 
1921-1925 47 17 36 
1926-1930 57 21 22 
1931-1935 65 30  5 
1936-1938 63 35  2 
Source: Johnston 1953: 51 
While the rice delivered from Korea accounted for just 24 per cent of Japan’s total rice 
imports between 1911 and 1915, this sharply increased to 63 per cent between 1936 and 
1938, reducing the distribution of imports from other colonies and foreign countries. If 
we consider that Japan’s total rice imports considerably increased between the 1910s and 
1930s, the increased importance of Korean rice for Japan is obvious: between 1917 and 
1918 net imports of rice leapt from 224,000 to nearly  million metric tons. Throughout 
the 1920s imports averaged close to 1.2 million tons, a d increased further in the 1930s. 
Imported rice represented 16 per cent of the total rice supply for the Japanese people 
between 1930 and 1938, and constituted a much higher proportion of that eaten in the 
cities (Johnston 1953: 45, 47). The focus of Korean rice agriculture was placed on 
increasing exports in order to meet the demand for rice in Japan Proper6 (Grajdanzev 
1944: 93). In light of pivotal role of Korean rice for Japan, controlling its distribution was 
extraordinarily important for the colonial government.  
Japan’s realignment of the commercial circulation of food resources in Korea 
began with the promulgation of Market Regulations (Sijō kisoku市場規則) in 1914, 
which were amended in 1920 and 1924 (Lee H. K. 1969: 235). The bare bones of the 
Market Regulations put all previously free and spontaneous market transactions under the 
control of the government. This was part of the reorganization of the Korean economic 
order to fit with the goals of the colonial administration. The objective of the government 
controls was not only to secure the rice supply, but to regulate a broad range of market-
based economic activities in Korea. As a result, state involvement in the market system 
                                                
6 In this study, I use the term ‘Japan Proper’ to distinguish the area of mainland Japan from its outlying 
territories in the Japanese Empire before 1945. 
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greatly changed the Korean rice market in a way that allowed rice to be delivered more 
easily to Japan without the need for direct governme t control.       
The market-reorganization project was implemented based on a series of 
extensive research studies carried out by the Bureau of Taxation in 1909. Detailed 
information concerning markets and economic activities, such as the mechanisms and 
operation of markets, the items traded, and the participation of people at each market, was 
collected by the government (Hŏ Y. N. 1994: 268; Lee H. K. 1969: 253). Market 
Regulations categorized markets as follows: 1) ordinary periodical markets (changsi場
市); 2) markets where dealers meet to trade, mainly, i  grains and foodstuffs; 3) markets 
where goods are sold by auction on a consignment basis; nd 4) markets where 
businessmen in the same line meet for both actual and futures trading, where trades are 
based on grain samples (Lee H. K. 1969: 252).  
Under the Act, details of the markets, including their names, locations, sizes, 
operational facilities, working days and hours, andthe goods handled, were to be reported 
to, and controlled by, the local governors (Hŏ Y. N. 1994: 268, 277). Local governors 
were also empowered to control the establishment, abolition and relocation of markets 
through a government permit system. Under the system, he government only granted 
licences for the operation of markets to public institutions and officially authorized 
people (who were mainly Japanese), which had the effect of reducing the number of 
privately owned markets in existence (Hŏ Y. N.1994: 276; Chŏng S. M. 2002: 45). 
Between 1914 and 1941, the number of privately run-markets recognized by the 
government fell from 138 to 14 (Song K. J. et al. 2004: 187-188).   
Control over the markets brought visible results for the colonial administration. 
The government introduced a one per cent tax on the sales of all merchandise traded at 
markets. This became one of the main sources of incme for local governments: during 
the 1910s, income from market transactions accounted for between 13 and 30 per cent of 
the total tax revenue of local governments (Hŏ Y. N. 1994: 280). Until the local tax 
system was revised in 1926, it was even levied on th se who were not making profits, 
that is, the farmers selling their own products (Ibid.: 281).  
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A significant change brought in by the market regulation programme, closely 
related to grain distribution, was the attenuation of the function of traditional Korean 
periodical markets. The periodical markets were centres for commercial activities such as 
the sale of grain and other commodities. Depending on the locality, the markets operated 
on five or six days per month. A large marketplace would attract several thousand people 
interested in buying or selling, and served as a place not only for trading but also for 
amusement, communication and association (Lee H. K. 1969: 253-254). For the colonial 
authorities, such large markets that attracted many Koreans were seen as ‘dangerous’ 
places where rebellious ideas and improper behaviour c ld prevail, threatening the 
colonial administration (Hŏ Y. N. 1994: 279). Therefore, the government tightly regulated 
periodical markets and strategically weakened their operation. While there were 1,369 
periodical markets registered nationwide at the endof 1930, many of them had in fact 
gone out of business and ceased to trade due to the l w value of the transactions taking 
place (Hŏ Y. N. 1994: 296-297; Lee H. K. 1969: 253-254).     
Grain, which had chiefly been traded at periodical m rkets, came to be bought and 
sold at larger commercialized markets. When the harvest had been gathered in, grain was 
collected from farmers’ yards by local dealers. These middlemen traditionally sold the 
grain to wholesalers on behalf of farmers, who were not informed of market conditions. 
After paying the standard price established at major markets close to the farmers, the 
dealers then shipped the grain to the place where they sold it to the millers and hullers; 
railway stations, ports and commercial centres were common locations for such trades. 
Farmers living near to the shipping points took their products to the wholesalers to trade 
with them directly (Lee H. K. 1969: 253, 261). By the 1930s, periodical markets had 
chiefly become the places where cheaper grains, such as Manchurian millet, were traded 
between farmers and local consumers. Rice, which was sold at a relatively high price, 
was now delivered to the larger markets or commercial centres, where major grain deals 
were conducted between the middlemen and merchants (Lee H. K. 1969: 257).           
Inch’ŏn Rice and Soybean Exchange (Inch’ŏn midu ch’wiinso仁川米豆取引所) 
was one of the most remarkable markets, which was chiefly responsible for expanding 
the volume of Korean rice traded with Japan. The Exchange was created in 1896 by a 
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Japanese resident in Inch’ŏn, a port city near Seoul (McNamara 1998: 141, 146). With the 
1920 revision of the Market Regulations, this organiz tion was put under the control of 
the Government-General, and merged with the Korean Exchange in 1932 as one of the 
Government-Chartered Firms (tokushū gaisha特殊会社). These firms represented the 
core instruments of state policy in the colonial economy of Korea (Ibid.: 144). The major 
functions of the Exchange were promoting grain exports, stabilizing the prices and the 
quality of grain, and improving the quality of products for export. Inch’ŏn Rice and 
Soybean Exchange assured Japanese traders of the supply of Korean rice, and by the 
1910s, it had become the leading grain exchange in Korea. Fuelling a speculation boom, 
chiefly in Japanese exports, the transactions that took place there were worth 15.5 million 
yen in 1916, 69 million in 1920, and 285 million in 1930. Moreover, the Exchange served 
as a central clearing-house, affecting the supply, demand and pricing of grain in Korea 
(Ibid.: 145-146). Until the end of grain trading operations in 1939 as a result of the 
government food-control policy, it served as a significant nexus for the increasing grain 
exports from Korea to Japan.      
In addition to the Exchange described above, a number of grain markets in major 
ports were placed under state management by the 1920 Market Revision in an effort to 
ensure the supply of Korean grain for export. Comprised of local grain dealers trading in 
grain and soybeans, there were more than twenty markets that operated similarly to 
Inch’ŏn Rice and Soybean Exchange. Of these, nine markets (in Seoul, Kanggyŏng, 
Kunsan, Mokp’o Taegu, Chinnamp’o, Sinŭ ju, Wŏnsan and Pusan) were officially 
recognized by the government (Yi H. J. 1992: 99). Among them, those in Kunsan, 
Mokp’o, and Pusan, the leading rice production centres in Korea, were the most active in 
grain trading (Lee H. K. 1969: 259). Later, these government-controlled major grain 
markets came to function as important gateways for supplying wartime foodstuffs to 
Japan.  
In principle, the Korean economy was a free-market system until wartime 
economic reconstruction began in the latter half of the 1930s. However, market 
reformation to ensure grain exportation to Japan had been put in place as early as the 
1920s. The institutional framework and the export channels which had served to stabilize 
Chapter One 
34 
grain exports to Japan in peacetime became fundament l to the implementation of Japan’s 
wartime food management programme.  
Paving the Way to a Wartime Food Control Programme   
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1937), Korea was officially designated as 
Japan’s ‘advance military supply base’ to support its penetration of China (Eckert 1996: 
12). To ensure Korea’s wartime role of economic provisi ner for the Japanese armed 
forces in Manchuria through the development of its own industries, the Government-
General carried out a reorganization of the economic structure that paralleled the 
measures in effect in Japan (Ibid.). The National General Mobilization Law (Kokka 
sōdōinhō 国家総動員法 ), promulgated in April 1938 and brought into force the 
following month in both Japan and its colonies, provided the government with the 
absolute power to mobilize all available national resources in order to sustain the war 
effort. A growing number of vital commodities, staring with raw materials for the 
manufacturing industries, were put under price regulations, which set maximum prices 
for traded items and implemented mandatory rationing controls (Kim I. H. 2000: 53).  
Food rationing in Korea began in 1940 as the result of a shortage of rice caused 
by a record-breaking crop failure in 1939 that marked the beginning of wartime food 
shortages in the Japanese Empire (Johnston 1953: 137). As demonstrated in Table 1-1 
above, the harvest of 1939 produced 14,356,000 sǒk (2,067,264 metric tons), less than 60 
per cent of the 24,139,000 sǒk (3,476,016 tons) harvested in the previous year. Once the 
harvest had recovered in 1940 and 1941 from the disastrous crop failure of 1939, it 
followed a declining trend towards 1945: the harvest totalled 21,527,000 sŏk (3,099,888 
tons) in 1940, 15,668,000 (2,259,072 tons) in 1942, and 16,052,000 (2,311,488 tons) in 
1944 (see Table 1-1). This decline was largely due to continuous drought and flood cycles 
during the first half of the 1940s. However, a reduction in production capacity, caused by 
the mobilization of 2.3 million farmers during 1938 and 1945 for military and industrial 
conscription, was also an important factor behind the decreased output. Between 1938 
and 1942, the ratio of the farming population to the otal population fell from 73.6 per 
cent to 66.2 per cent (Yi S. S. 2003b: 148, 157). Despite such a diminished rice 
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production capability, demand grew steadily, leading to a food shortage. Compulsory rice 
deliveries to the Japanese troops in Korea and Manchuria reduced the supply of rice for 
ordinary Koreans: about 150,000 tons of rice was appropriated for military use in 1941 
and 1942, with similar quantities assigned to the military in later years (Johnston 1953: 
137). During the first half of the 1940s, rice was in short supply in colonial Korea. These 
conditions notwithstanding, Korean rice continued to be delivered to Japan.  
Throughout the colonial period, the Korean staple-food deficit was chiefly 
compensated for with imported grains from Manchuria. As shown in Table 1-1, yearly 
rice production in Korea grew considerably during the 1920s and 1930s. However, it is 
more notable that the increase of rice exports to Japan exceeded the increase in the level 
of production: while rice production in 1938 showed an average of 73 per cent growth 
over the years 1915-1919, the volume of exports was five times higher during the same 
period (see Table 1-1). These enormous rice exports fr m Korea to Japan, referred to as 
‘starvation (famine) exports’ because they involved the curtailed consumption of rice by 
Koreans, were a result of the Japanese government’s food strategy for its territories 
(Johnston 1953: 54; Shin 1996: 46). In exchange for the rice exported to Japan, cheaper 
coarse grains were imported from Manchuria as a substit te. This food policy was further 
intensified during the war, when the Japanese governm nt established a ‘triangular barter 
system’ between Japan, Korea and Manchuria. The syst m entailed delivering rice from 
Korea to Japan; barley, wheat, and wheat flour from Japan to Manchuria; and other grains, 
mainly millet, from Manchuria to Korea (Yi S. S. 2003b: 47). The wartime food controls 
in Korea were within the overall food management programmes designed for the entire 
Japanese Empire.  
The Korean Foodstuffs Management Ordinance (Chōsen shokuryō kanrirei朝鮮
食糧管理令), promulgated by the Government-General in August 1943, provided a 
comprehensive legal framework for the distribution f staple foods in Korea (Chōsen 
shokuryō eidan 1945: 28-37). Following the Foodstuffs Management Law, promulgated a 
year previously in Japan, it established a nationwide uniform distribution system for 
staple foods in Korea. Staple foods, meaning rice and other grains (that is, barley, naked 
barley and millet) were the first foodstuffs to be rought under the control of the 
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distribution system in Korea. Until the uniform system was introduced in 1943, various 
methods were used to control food rationing, depending upon the food situation and 
administrative capacity of each local government.7 The collection and distribution of 
staple foods was controlled through separately establi hed regulations that differed for 
each food item. Detailed food management plans were specially designed for each year, 
based on the individual regulations.  
In November 1939, as one of the first steps towards controlling the distribution of 
staple foods, the Inch’ŏn Rice and Soybean Exchange was restructured as the Korean 
Rice Market Company (Chōsen beikoku shijō gaisha朝鮮米穀市場会社), a quasi-
governmental company set up exclusively to organize rice exports to Japan.8 Even though 
the free trading of rice was no longer permitted, the knowledge of experienced traders 
was useful under the new rice control system. Following the Korean Rice Market 
Company Ordinance (Chōsen beikoku kaisharei朝鮮米穀会社令 ) promulgated in 
September 1939, the Company became the sole institution for handling rice exports to 
Japan, and sales of rice at markets had to fall within he price margins set by the 
government.9 Until it became involved in the domestic distribution of rice in 1942, the 
Company was chiefly responsible for dealing with the international trade of rice (Kuksa 
p’yǒnch’an wiwǒnhoe 1978: 248-253). Grain sellers and millers who handled the exports 
of rice in the major cities – Seoul, Inch’ŏn, Kunsan, Mokp’o, Chinnamp’o, Wŏnsan and 
Pusan – were organized into local branches of the Ric Export Association (Beikoku 
yushutsu kumiai米穀輸出組合).10  This Association was responsible for dealing with the 
international trade of rice under the supervision of the Korean Rice Market Company. In 
1939, the Korean Central Distribution Association for Imported Miscellaneous Grains 
(Chōsen yuinyū zakkoku chūō haikyū kumiai 朝鮮輸移入雑穀中央配給組合) was 
established. Comprised of major grain dealers, it was in charge of the importation of 
                                                
7 ‘Sinmigog-ŭi paegŭp kigu chibang-chŏk ppŭllŏk t’ap’a ch’ongdokpu-sŏ ilwŏn-chŏk t’ongje 新
米穀의配給機構地方的 쁠럭打破 總督府서 一元的統制’, Chosŏn ilbo 朝鮮日報, 29 June 1940, p.4.    
8 ‘Miduyŏmuk米豆餘墨’, Tonga ilbo東亜日報, 11 March 1939, p.4; ‘Migok hoesa ch’angnip chiyŏn 米
穀會社 創立遅延’, Chosŏn ilbo, 16 September 1939, p.4.     
9 ‘Migok paegŭp chojŏngryŏng 米穀配給調整令’, Chosǒn ilbo, 19 September 1939, p.2.  
10 ‘Ch’urha p’anmae kangje myǒngnyǒng migoksang hǒga chedo-ro Chosǒn migok paegǔp chojǒngnyǒng 
kagǔi t’onggwa yǒnnae kongp’o irwǒlchung silsi出荷販売強制命令 米穀商許可制度로 
朝鮮米穀配給調整令閣議通過 年内公布 一月中實施’, Chosǒn ilbo, 24 December 1939, p.4.  
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grain, chiefly Manchurian millet. From 1940, the entire grain import/export 
administration was entrusted to the Korean Rice Market Company (Chōsen shokuryō 
eidan 1945: 2, 4).  
The Korean Rice Distribution Ordinance (Chōsen beikoku haikyū chōseirei朝鮮
米穀配給調整令), issued in December 1939, marked the beginning of direct government 
control over staple-food distribution in Korea. Modelled after the Rice Distribution 
Control Law enacted in Japan in April 1939, the lawgave the government the authority to 
control the collection, delivery, storage and distribution of rice whenever such action was 
considered necessary. In order to gain effective control over the distribution channels, the 
government instituted a national permit system for grain dealers, reduced the number of 
shopkeepers and wholesalers, and ordered authorized sellers to form rationing 
associations.11 These associations, comprised of local grain dealers, were set up in each 
province, city and county: by the end of January 1940, a month after the promulgation of 
the Ordinance, nearly every provincial government had set up its own organization.12 For 
example, in Seoul, 167 selected grain sellers formed the Keijō Food Rationing 
Association (Keijō haihyū kumiai京城配給組合) on 27 January 1941.13   
State measures to control the distribution of other grains soon came into force. In 
June 1940, the Barley Family Rationing Control Principles (Bakurui haikyū tōsei kisoku
麦類配給統制規則) were promulgated, putting the distribution of barley, rye, wheat and 
oats under the control of the government. This was soon followed by the comprehensive 
Korean Miscellaneous Grains Rationing Control Regulation (Chōsen zakkoku haikyū 
tōsei kisoku朝鮮雑穀配給統制規則) the following month. Under this Regulation, the 
provincial governments were officially entrusted with the authority to order collections 
and distributions of a wide range of staples, including beans and grains already under 
                                                
11 ‘Sibo migok nyǒndo-ǔi singnyang paegǔpch’aek kyǒlchǒng su-ich’ulmi, sobimi, su-iip chapkok tǔng 
chǒnmyǒn-chǒk ǔro kangnyǒk t’ongje十五米穀年度의 食糧配給策決定 輸移出米, 消費米, 輸移入
雑穀等 全面的으로强力統制’, Chosǒn ilbo, 28 December 1939, p.4; :Paegŭp wŏnhwal-kwa kagyŏk 
chŏkchŏng kido 配給圓滑과 價格 適正企圖’, Chosŏn ilbo, 28 December 1939, p.4.   
12 ‘Chǒn Chosǒn singnyang paegǔp kigu-ǔi chǒngbi wallyo全朝鮮食糧配給機構의構整備完了’, Tonga 
ilbo, 12 January 1940, p.8.   
13 ‘Singnyang-ǔi wǒnhwal mokp’yo Kyǒngsǒngbu singnyang paegǔp chohap-ǔl kyǒlsǒng puyun-i 
kamdok食糧의 円滑目標 京城府食糧配給組合을結成 府尹이監督’, Tonga ilbo, 30 January 1940, p.3. 
Chapter One 
38 
government control (Yi S. S. 2001: 52). Some provincial governments organized dealers’ 
associations to handle these grains separately fromth se associations dealing in rice, 
while others entrusted one association with both roles (Chōsen shokuryō eidan 1945: 5). 
Until all the organizations involved in the rationing programmes were merged into the 
Korean Foodstuffs Company (Chōsen shokuryō eidan朝鮮食糧営団) under the unified 
food-rationing system established in 1943, they all played an important role in grain 
distribution within and beyond their provinces. 
Staple-Food Rationing in Seoul 
As the shortage of rice became prominent in Seoul due to the serious crop failure of 1939, 
a variety of rice-saving campaigns were implemented, l  by the municipal government. 
From November 1939, 70 per cent polished rice was set a  the standard staple for the 
citizens, and the processing and sale of white rice was banned (Yi K. H. et al. 1939: 18-
22). What was available was domestically produced rice mixed with low-quality 
imported rice and barley in a ratio of 3:3:4.14 People were not allowed to buy more than 
one toe (1.8 litres) of grain at once (Ibid. : 19) In an effort to regulate the purchase of rice, 
a purchasing records system was introduced in April 1940, under which the amount of 
grain sold and customers’ personal details were to be recorded by sellers.15 However, 
these disjointed methods did not serve to improve the worsening problems surrounding 
the availability of food, such as the very long queues to buy grain. 
Staple-food rationing in Seoul began on 3 May 1940. Two schemes were 
established, one using a ration card (chŏnp’yo傳票) and one a ration book (t’ongjang通
帳). At the end of April 1940, prior to the implementation of both systems, the Seoul 
government conducted an extensive survey on the siz of the population, and the 
consumption and possession of grain by citizens. In accordance with the results, those in 
possession of more than five sǒk (720 kilograms) of grain were excluded from the 
distribution programme. Approximately 60 per cent of Seoul citizens (596,806 people, 
                                                
14  ‘Oemi taeryang ipha kihoe-ro singnyang paegŭp-e sin pangch’im Chosŏnmi 3 oemi 3 pori 4 piyul-lo 
kkyŏsŏ p’algiro kyŏlchŏng kŭm sail  putŏ punae silsi 外米大量入荷機会로 食糧配給에 新方針 
朝鮮米 3外米 3 보리 4比率로 껴서 팔기로決定 今四日부터 府内實施’, Chosǒn ilbo, 5 April 1940, p.2. 
15 ‘Paegŭp wŏnbu-rŭl chaksŏng 配給原簿를 작성’, Chosŏn ilbo, 10 April 1940, p.2.   
Wartime and Post-war Systems of Food Rationing 
39  
belonging to 113,412 households) were given ration cards based on their household 
unit.16 These people were daily staples buyers with low incomes and a financial inability 
to buy grain in bulk, and they were suffering the most from the difficulty of procuring 
staples at that time (Kyŏnggi-do kyŏngch’al pujang 1940: 3). 
The ration-book system was designed for the 73 caterers, including the canteens at 
the Keijō Electrical Railroad Company, the Railway Bureau and factories, hospitals and 
for bulk buyers. Ration-book users were allowed to buy grain relatively freely on the 
condition that they kept purchasing records in their ration books (Keijōfu 1942: 22-23). 
In general, bulk buyers had a tendency to patronize certain grain shops and were offered a 
delivery service from the sellers. Therefore, bulk buyers’ ration books were kept by the 
grain sellers, and the record-keeping was entrusted to them. Until a new staple-rationing 
system was introduced in 1942, under which all households were to maintain their own 
ration-books in order for them to receive rations, staple foods were distributed via these 
two schemes.  
  Shipments of grain from surplus to deficit areas were coordinated at the 
provincial government level under the control of the Government-General. Once the 
distribution had been determined by provincial governments, grain was collected by the 
rationing associations of the producing provinces and delivered to the rationing 
associations of the areas in need.17 For example, grain for Seoul citizens was collected by 
the Grain Rationing Association of Kyŏnggi Province, and delivered to the Grain 
Rationing Association of Seoul City, before finally being handed out at the distribution 
stations (Figure 1-1).    
Figure 1-1: Outline of Grain Distribution in Seoul 
 
                                                
16 ‘Kumaep’yo paebu inwŏn-ŭn chŏn pumin-ŭi yukhal karyang Kyŏngsŏngbu chosa, yanggok paegŭp 
sanghwang 購買票配布人員은 全府民의 六割가량 京城府調査, 糧穀配給狀況’, Chosǒn ilbo, 3 May 
1940, p.2. 
17 ‘Sibo migok nyǒndo-ǔi singnyang paegǔpch’aek kyǒlchǒng su-ich’ulmi, sobimi, su-iip chapkok tǔng 
chǒnmyǒn-chǒk ǔro kangnyǒk t’ongje十五米穀年度의 食糧配給策決定 輸移出米,  消費米,  輸移入




While, in principle, the rationing programme was supervised by the government, 
civilian groups known as ‘town associations’ (chŏngdonghoe町洞會) and their sub-
organizations, ‘patriotic units’ (aegukpan愛國班 ), were entrusted with a variety of 
practical functions within the system. Chŏngdonghoe were originally created in 1933 to 
support the municipal administration. They were later incorporated under the Korean 
Federation for the Total Mobilization of the National Spirit (Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō 
Chōsen remmei国民精神総動員朝鮮連盟), a leading organization responsible for the 
mass campaigns for war mobilization that started in July 1938, a year after the outbreak 
of the Sino-Japanese War (Kim Y. M. 2005: 33).    
The aegukpan, the cell organizations compulsorily created under the 
chŏngdonghoe in 1938, were groups comprised of between ten and fifteen neighbouring 
households, and functioned as an extension of the stat control mechanism. By 1942, the 
number of aegukpan in Seoul had reached ten thousand (Yi C. M. 2004: 440). Originally 
set up with the aim of ideologically indoctrinating colonial Koreans for war mobilization, 
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way to control the people, including organizing labour mobilization and thrift campaigns, 
and encouraging conscription among Korean men (Chōsen sōtokufu 1940: 50). Of those 
tasks entrusted to the aegukpan in urban areas, food rationing was the most important. 
As indicated in Figure 1-1 above, food rationing was managed by chŏngdonghoe 
units with support from the aegukpan leaders. In order to feed the one million citizens of 
Seoul through the rationing programme, an accurate quantity of grain had to be secured at 
each distribution point. For this purpose a clear grasp of the population movements 
within the city, from one township to another, was needed. These responsibilities were 
entrusted to the chŏngdonghoe and aegukpan leaders. Based on the knowledge of family 
members and consumption habits collected by the aegukpan leaders, ration cards were 
issued by the chŏngdonghoe leaders. The cards were given to the representatives of grain 
distributors of each town. The distributors then went to the Seoul Grain Rationing 
Association where they showed the cards in order to collect the grain to be consumed in 
their town. When the grain was ready at the designated distribution stations, the ration 
cards were returned to the chŏngdonghoe, and then finally distributed to individual 
households via the aegukpan leaders. Grain in shops was sold to people in exchange for 
their ration cards (Kim Y. M. 2005: 70-71). People w re not allowed to buy food with 
defective purchasing permits. Ration cards lacking the seals of the chŏngdonghoe or 
aegukpan leaders, those with expired (or missing) purchasing dates, those that had been 
modified by family numbers without the approval of the leaders of the chŏngdonghoe or 
aegukpan, or those issued in other towns were not accepted (Kim I. H. 2006: 87). In 
addition to the supervision of ration cards, it was the responsibility of the aegukpan 
leaders to check the movement of people in and out of he area and report this 
information to the Seoul City government on a twice-monthly basis (Kim Y. M. 2005: 71).  
This reliance upon the chŏngdonghoe and aegukpan leaders led to their 
empowerment. In urban areas where the majority of pe ple had little choice but to resort 
to rationing distribution channels to acquire provisions, the citizens’ reliance upon local 
leaders was particularly high, and this dependency i reased as the number of foodstuffs 
included in the rationing programmes grew (Ibid.: 69). As the rationing of essential goods 
was based on aegukpan units, the power of the aegukpan leaders grew considerably, and 
their privileged positions were frequently abused. Abuses included secretly keeping 
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purchasing permits that should have been distributed to unit members, forging purchasing 
permits by adding non-existent people and issuing fake ration cards. Falsified permits 
were kept for themselves or given to friends and relatives (see Chapter Three).  
Another chronic problem with the rationing system was the huge difference in the 
supply situation from area to area. As an increasing number of commodities were in short 
supply, it was impossible to evenly distribute essentials to everyone. Therefore, the 
supply allocation at each rationing point was determined based on the sellers’ past sales 
records. Under this system, the quantities of rationed supplies varied widely, depending 
on the distributors’ previous sales. For example, it was difficult for those outside the city 
centre to procure cotton and rubber shoes, as fewer of these commodities were consumed 
in rural areas than in cities. Others were unable to purchase sugar for as long as a year as 
the designated shops in their area had not previously dealt in sugar (Hŏ Y. N. 2000: 322). 
The ubiquitous differences in supplies by township, and even by province, known as the 
‘town block’ (chŏng pŭllŏk町블럭) and the ‘provincial block’ (to pŭllŏk道블럭), were a 
central feature of the state rationing system (Ibid.).          
 The system of ration distribution based on dealers’ sales records gave the sellers 
plenty of opportunity to distribute unevenly. As explained previously, under the ration-
book system designed for bulk buyers, shopkeepers we able to sell grain as long as they 
kept records of their customers’ purchases. Once sell r  were supplied with the grain 
required, it was possible for them to distribute thrations in an arbitrary manner. One 
prevalent malpractice was to give preferential treatment to bulk buyers over ration-card 
users; obviously, it was more profitable to deal with customers who purchased large 
volumes of grain than it was to deal with individual shoppers. Such practices further 
increased the shortage of staple foods among ration-card users.18 
To eradicate the widespread practice of favouritism a ong sellers, the Seoul 
government abolished the ration-book method for bulk buyers that had relied upon the 
honesty of the distributors. From July 1942, the issuing and control of ration books for 
                                                
18 Jōsetsu senji konwakai 1941: 127-128; see also ‘Tan’gol, tanch’e paegŭp p’yeji ch’ilwŏl iril-putŏ migok 
kuip t’ongjangje silsi단골, 團體配給廢止 七月一日부터 米穀購入通帳制實施’, Maeil sinbo毎日申報, 
26 June 1942, p.2. 
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bulk buyers was entrusted to the chŏngdonghoe and aegukpan.19 In terms of curbing the 
illicit dealings of shopkeepers, it initially appear d to be a success: according to research 
by the Seoul government, approximately three thousand ŏk (approximately 432 metric 
tons) of surplus grain ‘appeared’ within the first three weeks.20 However, the revised 
rationing system gave more concentrated power to the leaders of the civilian groups and 
contributed to the increase of rationing malpractices among them (Hŏ Y. N. 2000: 320). 
The falsification of purchasing permits was chiefly responsible for the so-called ghost 
population of 150,000 that consumed 330 sŏk (approximatrely 47,520 kilograms) of 
‘extra’ staple grains in Seoul in 1944 (Mitsui 1944: 22). Illegally procured rations were 
frequently kept by the leaders, but it was also not uncommon for foodstuffs diverted from 
the rationing channel to be delivered to the black market, where commodities were traded 
at prices far higher than those fixed by the governme t (see Chapter Three).     
Due to supply shortages and an invigorated underground market, a declining 
number of foodstuffs were available through the rationing system. When staple-food 
rationing began in May 1940, for example, Seoul citizens were allotted three hop21 
(approximately 430 grams) of rice and other grains in a ratio of four to six. The share of 
grain was soon categorized according to sex, age and the kind of labour undertaken:  
three hop for adult males (in a ratio of five to five); five hop (715 grams) for male 
students (in a ratio of four to six); 3.5 hop (500 grams) for female students (five to five); 
four hop (570 grams) for factory girls (four to six), six hop (860 grams) for labourers 
(four to six); and 2.5 hop (360 grams) for the sick (six to four).22 As the supply of grain 
declined, however, rationing standards were continuously adjusted: by 1941, the quota for 
the average adult had fallen to 2.7 hop (385 grams), by 1942 it was 2.5 hop (360 grams), 
and by 1943 it was 2.3 hop (330 grams) (Yi S. S. 2001: 60-61). In practice, th  distributed 
ration was even smaller than the amount specified in theory. For example, in 1941, 
                                                
19 ‘T’ongjangje silsi chunbi chǒnghoe, tanch’e paegǔp kwan’gyeja soch’i hyǒbǔi 通帳制實施準備 町會, 
團體配給關係者招致協議’, Maeil sinbo, 26 June 1942, p.2.   
20 ‘Handal-e samch’ǒn sǒk chŏlyak t’ongjangje silsi-ro chach’oe-rǔl kamch’un ssal-ǔi ijung paegǔp한달에 
三千石節約 通調制實施로 자최를감춘쌀의二重配給’, Maeil sinbo, 22 July 1942, p.2.    
21 1 hop is almost equal to the Japanese gō 合 (in Korean) (1hop = 0.99 hap or gō), and 0.18 litres or 
approximately 143 grams. 
22 ‘Mi-chapkok paegŭp ‘irin samhap chuŭi’-r ŭl chaegŏmt’o yukhap naeji ihapojak-ŭro mŏngnŭn yang 
ttarasŏ changnyang米雑穀配給‘一人三合主義’를 再檢討 六合乃至二合五勺으로 먹는양 따라서 酌
量’, Chosŏn ilbo, 26 May 1940, p.2.  
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manual labourers received only 2.5 gō (360 grams) of grain, less than half of the six gō 
(860 grams) to which they were entitled (Jōsetsu senji keizai konwakai 1941: 168). At the 
85th Imperial Diet held in 1943 in Japan, it was reported hat staple supplies for Koreans 
fell below the minimum standards of 2.3 gō (330 grams) in both urban and rural areas 
(Kondō 1961: 90). Moreover, the government further restricted rice polishing. In April 
1942, the Seoul government set a level of just 50 per cent polished rice as the standard 
staple, abolishing the former 70 per cent level. The authorities emphasized that thirty 
thousand sǒk (432 tons) of extra rice would be obtained within seven months as a result 
of the new strategy.23 
Despite the government’s efforts, the state rationing programme continued to 
deteriorate. In August 1942, for instance, there was an estimated rice shortfall of 50,000 
koku24 (approximately 7,200 tons) in Seoul, which was to last until the new harvest was 
delivered. To cope with the situation, the Seoul government attempted to obtain wheat 
flour; however, it was only able to acquire half the quantity needed. This was mixed with 
chaff in a 20 per cent ratio and bread made with this mixed flour was distributed in the 
canteens of schools, factories, businesses and government offices (Hōmukyoku keijika 
1942a: 18). Such insufficient supplies prevented Seoul’s official food-rationing system 
from operating properly. Ko Yŏng-bok, who worked for a religious organization in the 
city, attested to the acute food scarcity:    
Rationing day came every ten days. But I had to return empty-handed when the 
food had not arrived from Yŏngdan [the Korean Foodstuffs Company]. Our 
grain container was empty. How would we manage to feed ourselves? Even 
when we received our rations, it was just two hopand three chak25 [330 grams] 
a day per person, including barley, soymeal26 nd millet. Putting aside the 
question of adults, I pitied the nursing babies and children. Even with money, it 
was absolutely impossible to buy food at the market.  
(Kwŏn P. T’. 1984: 431-432) 
                                                
23 ‘Ch’onghu-ŭi ‘sik’ ponggong onŭl putŏ pappis-i kŏmŏchinda chŏlmi, pogŏn, yŏmga-ŭi obundo paegŭp 
kaesi 銃後 ‘食’奉公 오늘부터 밥빗이 거머진다 節米, 保健, 廉價의五分搗配給開始’, Maeil sinbo, 26 
March 1942, p.3.  
24 Koku is a Japanese unit for the measurement of grain. One koku is equivalent to approximately 180 litres.    
25 One chak 勺 is equal to eighteen millilitres. 
26 The residue of soybean oil production.  
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Shabshina, a researcher on Korea at the Russian Academy of Sciences, documented her 
daily life from 1941 to 1946 while she lived in Seoul as the wife of the Soviet Vice-
Consul in Japan. In her book, Singminji Chosŏn-eso (In Colonial Korea), she observed 
that maize and millet were distributed to the citizens as staple foods, rice having become 
a rare commodity (Shabshina 1996: 180). The following is an extract that describes the 
food situation for the citizens of Seoul:       
Korean people’s rice consumption per person was one-fifth of the level of 
Japanese people’s before the outbreak of the Pacific War. During the war years, 
the food distributed to Koreans was not sufficient to ease their hunger. What I 
heard from Korean people on countless occasions was that the first word of 
young children learning to speak and the last word of the dying elderly was 
haikyū [rationing]. Rationed rice, which was obtained in exchange for ration 
cards, and more specifically, the rice substitutes, la ted for two weeks at the 
most. Fish, eggs and other food were only given to Japanese people. Vegetable 
rationing in Korea was irregular.          
(Shabshina 1996: 179-180) 
As this extract testifies, substitute foods were no longer mixed with rice, but seem to have 
replaced it entirely during the final stages of the war. The results of a study conducted by 
the district prosecutors of major cities in 1944 revealed that in ten out of the seventeen 
cities surveyed, people’s minimum requirements for staples could only be filled through 
participation in black-market transactions (Yi S. S. 2003a: 297). The food rationing 
programme, originally intended to ease the food shortage, proved impossible to meet this 
goal.   
The Nationwide Food Control System and Farmers’ Food Collections 
As mentioned previously, the government’s total control over staple foods was introduced 
by the promulgation of the Foodstuffs Management Ordinance in August 1943. The 
purpose of the act was articulated as ‘to manage food and to control supply and demand, 
prices, and the distribution of foodstuffs in order to secure the food supply and stabilize 
the national economy’ (Chōsen shokuryō eidan 1945: 10). As the culmination of a 
wartime food programme that had been developing for several years, it brought about a 
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number of transformations in food management strategies (Ibid.: 1). Various rationing 
associations were integrated into the Korean Foodstuffs Company, and earlier local 
versions of control methods were replaced by a unified system (Chŏn K. S. 1990: 123).   
 One of the most remarkable strategies intensified by the law was the food 
collection programme. Compulsory food collection had lready been implemented in 
1941 under the Korean Rice Distribution Ordinance, which authorized provincial 
governors to collect and deliver locally produced rice to deficit areas. The collection 
quotas and other strategies were determined on a yearly basis, taking into consideration 
the state of domestic production, food exports to Japan and imports from abroad. These 
quotas were then published as Food Measures (Shokuryō taisaku食糧対策) (Ibid.: 117). 
The first, 1941 Food Measures (November 1940-October 1941) were issued in October 
1940; the 1942 Measures (November 1941-October 1942) in September 1941; and the 
1943 Measures (November 1942-1943)27 in October 1942 (Yi S. S. 2003b: 105, 107, and 
111). Even though farmers were required to deliver designated amount of rice following 
the food policies, they had not been obligated to sell all their surplus rice (leftover after 
removing the farmers’ own allocation and collection quotas from the total harvest) to the 
government. 
An all-out food collection programme was introduced with the 1943 Measures. It 
prohibited farmers from keeping anything other than a fixed allowance for their own 
consumption. Prior to this, rice collection strategies had been more flexible; it had not 
been illegal for farmers to keep more rice than their consumption allocation. Until 
October 1941, they had even been able to sell surplus ice on the open market as long as 
they had filled their delivery quotas (Yi S. S. 2003b: 107). The Foodstuffs Management 
Ordinance further strengthened the government’s control over food collection. Almost 
every kind of staple and substitute food – rice, barley, naked barley, wheat, millet, food 
starch, (processed) sweet and white potatoes, noodles and bread – was put under 
government control (Chōsen shokuryō eidan 1945: 28). All these agricultural products 
were subject to the control of the compulsory-collection system. The annual grain 
consumption of a household was based on a rationed allowance per head; all the rest of 
                                                
27 Some strategies in the third Measures were abolished when the Foodstuffs Management Ordinance was 
promulgated.  
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the food was collected by the government.  
Such a strategy pushed the already poor farmers towards even greater destitution. 
The majority of Korean agriculture was sustained by tenant farmers, who lived on a 
certain portion of their product which was left to them by their landowners. While high 
inequality in landholding and prevalent tenancy characterized pre-colonial Korea, the 
living standards of a large number of farmers became even more unstable during the 
colonial era. The primary objective of the governmet’s agricultural policy was to obtain 
complete control of the distribution of output so as to maximize the surplus to be 
transferred to Japan, and this was to be achieved by maintaining the landlord system. 
Despite an increase in agricultural productivity, the profits were reaped by a handful of 
landholding Koreans and Japanese, while the peasants suffered the worst effect of 
agricultural commercialization, the global agricultural depression, without any 
government-provided legal protection.28 Between 1925 and 1942, the ratio of owner-
farmers and part-owner-farmers fell from 22 per cent to 17 per cent, and from 33 per cent 
to 24 per cent respectively, while the percentage of landless tenants increased from 44 per 
cent to 55 per cent. Out of the total agricultural population, the proportion of peasants and 
agricultural workers who received payment from owner-farmers or landlords was greater 
than 80 per cent (Higuchi 1998: 14-15).  
The predominance of tenant farmers meant that there was widespread poverty in 
rural communities. The peasantry suffered from a vicious circle of poverty. In general, 
peasant farmers had to give at least half of their crop to the landowner as rent, with 
additional payments made for the water supply, taxes, fertilizer and tools. For example, in 
1938, out of a total harvest of sixteen koku (approximately 2,304 kilograms) of rice, a 
farmer from Yangju in Kyŏnggi Province delivered eleven koku (1,584 kilograms) to his 
landowner and sold three koku (432 kilograms) to secure cash for family expenses. This 
left just two koku of rice to feed the five-person family for the year, equating to about 2.7 
litres each month per person. Despite being a rice producer, only a small amount of rice 
was available for the family. To supplement their rice diet the family ate barley, wheat, 
millet, soybeans and vegetables produced in a dry field. However, there was no way to 
                                                
28 For further details concerning Korean peasantry and agricultural policies, see Shin 1996: 39-53.  
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stretch the provisions until the next harvest. After a while, the farmer had to borrow 30 
yen, approximately a quarter of his yearly income, to buy foods to get over the so-called 
‘barley hump’ (poritkkogae). This was the spring austerity season when all the crops from 
the previous season had been eaten, and poor Korean farmers were confronted with 
starvation. The farmer did not have any reasonable chance of repaying his debt with 
interest at 35 per cent, but there was no other choice f r him when faced with the pressing 
need for food (Higuchi 1998: 18-19). In general, farmers were only able to repay their 
debts after the following year’s harvest, which soon led to further debts being taken on. 
This example illustrates that peasant incomes from far ing were so low that they could 
not satisfy even basic needs, even before wartime food controls began.  
Notwithstanding such difficulties, various measures were developed to carry out 
food collections. The Preliminary Quota System (sajŏn haltangje 事前割 當 制 ), 
established in 1943, was a forceful strategy adopted to bring more state control to food 
collection. The new system was totally different from the earlier food collection 
programmes in which the targets of the collection had been set immediately before the 
harvest season with the consideration of the annual yield estimated. Under the new 
collection programme, the delivery quotas for crops were fixed at the planting stage 
withoutany clear estimate of forthcoming harvests (Yi S. S. 2003b: 115). Moreover, 
achieving the quota imposed on the farmers came before any other consideration, even 
the procurement of food for the farmers’ consumption. In 1944, production allocation was 
additionally imposed on farmers. Farmers’ production activities – from production to 
collection – were put under total state control. This production-allocation project in Korea 
preceded the implementation of the same policies in Japan Proper by one year (Chŏn K. S. 
1993: 174).   
In general, grain quotas were first allocated for each province by the Government-
General, and then sub-divided into counties (kun 郡), districts (myŏn 面), villages 
(purak部落) and aegukpan, down to each farming household. A village consisted of 
several rural aegukpan units, and corresponded to a chŏngdonghoe in a city. A village 
was the base unit that was collectively responsible for meeting the assigned collection 
quota: if a household was unable to fill its quota, the entire village was responsible for 
Wartime and Post-war Systems of Food Rationing 
49  
making it up.29 Led by the leaders of the aegukpan, food collections were carried out 
under the supervision of provincial-government officers and policemen. When the 
delivery date arrived, farmers would bring their quota to the front of the house owned 
by the aegukpan or village leader, and weigh the grain in front of he observers and their 
unit’s members. During the harvest and collection period, village festivals and other 
special events were prohibited (Higuchi 1998: 41).    
In order to stimulate and control farmers’ food collections, each county, district 
and village was also ordered to create a Collection C mmittee (kongch’ul wiwŏnhoe供
出委員會). Comprised of local government officials, policemen and other authority 
figures, the Committee members were not allowed to leave the designated area during 
the collection period. In the event that someone fail d to fill their quota, they had to 
carry out an investigation. When irregularities (such as illegal hoarding) were 
discovered, the Committee was responsible for taking legal action against those 
responsible (Ibid.). As an extension of colonial administration, their responsibilities 
included monitoring group work, threshing grains and encouraging the saving of food 
resources, and they also acted as a watchdog for black-market transactions.30  The brutal 
methods used in promoting vigorous food collection campaigns in each area were 
frequently reported. For instance, in 1942, with the aim of exceeding the quota, 
Hwanghae provincial government carried out a major wheat collection campaign which 
resorted to the use of police force.31 In addition to the use of force in food collections, 
the other activities of the Committees were considere  ‘coercive squeezing’, even by 
district prosecutors (Higuchi 1998: 45).      
Such government efforts produced results. The ratioof rice delivery to production 
continued to increase between 1941 and 1944. In 1943 and 1944, after the collection 
programme had intensified, the ratios of delivery exceeded 60 per cent of total 
                                                
29 ‘Kongch’ul-e purak yŏndae-ŭi hyŏmnyŏk t’ongje-ro paegŭp-ŭl hwakpo供出에 部落連帶의 協力 
統制로 配給을 確保’, Maeil sinbo, 20 October 1942, p.2.  
30 ‘Yanggok kongch’ul wiwŏnhoe kyŏlsŏng 糧穀 供出委員會 結成’, Maeil sinbo, 29 November 1942, p. 
4.  
31 ‘Somaek kongch’ul-e manjŏn yejŏngnyang talsŏng-e hyŏmnyŏk hara 小麥供出에萬全 
予定量達成에協力하라’, Maeil sinbo, 15 August 1942, p.4.  
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production (Table 1-3). Ninety-six per cent of targets were achieved in 1943 and this 
reached 100 per cent in 1944 (Chŏn K. S. 1990: 132).  
Table 1-3: Production, deliveries and the ratio of rice delivery in Korea 1941-1944 (in 
thousand sŏk) 
Years Production (a) Delivery (b) (b)/(a) 
1941 24,886 11,255 45.2% 
1942 15,688 8,750 55.8% 
1943 18,719 1,1957 63.9% 
1944 16,052 9,634 60.0% 
Source: Chŏng K. S. 1998: 128. 
The achievement described above was by no means easily achieved. The 
collection quotas were seemingly so exorbitant that farmers were unable to fill them with 
their own products. A diary kept between 1938 and 1948 by a Confucian scholar, Kim 
Chu-hyŏn, who lived in Changhŭng County in Chŏllanam-do, vividly shows the struggle 
of a small farm owner struggling to fill his quota. Of the 35.5 sŏk (approximately 5,112 
kilograms) of rice plant he was assigned to produce in 1943, he was only able to produce 
29.5 sŏk (4,248 kilograms). Rice collected in the form of a rice plant was part of the 
government’s strategy to prevent free consumption by farmers. From 1939, parts of the 
vital machinery required to process rice, such as the belts, were kept by the government 
(Kwŏn P. T’. 1984: 430). Kim had to borrow the shortfall rom his brother to fill 70 per 
cent of his allocation, the lowest level at which he could avoid trouble with the authorities. 
In 1944, he recorded that the barley quota of 120 sŏk (17,280 kilograms) for his town, 
Wŏnwangji-ri, was so huge that the entire town faced starvation (Kim Y. H. 2000: 111).       
Even though farmers were used to poor diets, the situation usually improved a 
little for a while after the harvest. However, compulsory food collections, which broke 
into the farmers’ desperately needed food resources, led to a major food crisis. Kwŏn 
(1898-1981), a farmer who lived in Kyŏngsang-pukto, described the rough experiences 
caused by food collection:  
In one word, it was a nightmarish experience. Immediat ly after the crop harvest, 
we were forced to deliver our hard-raised products, without being allowed to 
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keep food for ourselves. No grain was left. All that remained for us was radishes, 
dried cabbage leaves, barley flour and gruel made with heat flour. Children’s 
chubby legs became thin, and babies died one after nother because of 
malnutrition. When spring came, women went out to the fields to gather 
Artemisia or shepherd’s purse, and men made straw bags and ropes to be used 
for the food collection.              
(Kwon P. T’. 1984: 427) 
Even Police forces, whch were mobilized to collect food and featured prominently in the 
harsh coercion Koreans experienced under Japanese colonial rule,  recognized that the 
food controls had peasants baked into a corner. A report sent from the department head of 
the economic police in Kyŏngsangnam-do to the chief of the Police Administration 
Bureau in September 1942 highlighted the unreasonable ess of the food policies:  
Small farm households equal approximately 177,000 out of a total of 340,000 
farms in our province. Among these are 6,500 poor families who are employed in 
both farming and wage-labouring, and who are suffering from food shortages 
under the current food controls. Increasingly they are giving up farming, 
especially this autumn, because of a lack of food, an  this affects the state policy 
of stabilization among the rural population. From this point, serious consideration 
should be given to the food supply problem in rural areas. As a result of research 
into the reason behind the serious food shortage in our province, we discovered 
that the major factors were the excessive collection quotas and the impossibility 
of food-circulation in rural communities. The target of collected barley entrusted 
to our province is 441,000 koku [63,500 metric tons] from a production output of 
1,061,000 [152,785 tons]. It is expected that the amount remaining for village 
people after this target has been fulfilled will be short by an estimated 306,200 
koku [44,100 tons], an enormous amount. In addition to this clearly excessive 
quota, the fact that the ban on buying and selling foodstuffs causes baneful 
effects on food supplies in rural areas should not be overlooked. In principle, 
food restriction measures in Korea stipulate that only producers’ surplus grain is 
to be bought and controlled [by the government]…[w]e keenly feel the difficulty 
of putting these principles into practice in the current situation…   
                 (Higuchi 1998: 52)            
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The hardship of farmers was not ignored by the governm nt. Recognizing 
people’s anxieties over food shortages and their unstable financial situations, the 
government introduced subsidy policies, even though the true purpose of them was to 
encourage achievement of the food delivery goals. For example, financial incentives were 
offered to both the actual producers and the collect rs (landowners) of rice from autumn 
1941. For every sŏk (144 kilograms) of rice, 1.0 to 1.6 wŏn (depending on the month 
collected) was given to farmers and 0.5 wŏn (regardless of the point of collection) to 
collectors.32 From 1943 onward, barley family producers also received incentives (Yi S. S. 
2003b: 108, 117). In addition to financial subsidies, some farmers were given necessities, 
such as cotton, soap and alcoholic drinks, under the guise of special rationing (tŭkpae特
配) when good results were achieved in food collections (Kondō 1961: 90; Yi S. S. 
2003b: 119).  
However, such treatment from the government was not enough to stabilize 
farmers’ lives. Most importantly, the proceeds from grain sales to the government were 
not sufficient to support their day-to-day existenc. The price paid for one sŏk 
(approximately 143 kilograms) of unpolished rice by the government was 56 yen in 1943, 
rising to 61.9 yen in 1944. Despite the price rises, the increase did not match general 
inflation in the price of other things. When the prices of other commodities bought by 
farming families are considered, a reasonable price for rice would have been 60.4 yen and 
65.9 respectively (Yi S. S. 2003b: 232). Moreover, fa mers never received all of the 
money, due to an obligatory automatic deduction as p rt of a government savings 
programme. The savings campaign was part of the wartime economic policy to curb 
soaring prices by restricting currency circulation. The contribution ratio for grain 
producers was some ten per cent of their total income in 1940, with slight variations 
depending on the type of food produced, and increased alongside the expansion of the 
financial-incentives programme for farmers. By 1943, the ratio of savings to income 
through the sale of important grains, including rice, barley and wheat, rose by 25 per cent 
(Yi S.S. 2003b: 244). The compulsory savings programme was one of the heaviest 
burdens on the battered small-farm economy during the war years. On a constantly 
                                                
32 The financial-incentives programme for collectors was abolished in 1943.  
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shrinking income, farmers were forced to dedicate themselves to producing only for the 
production quota entrusted to them. Even when they did receive some income, it was 
extremely difficult to acquire the daily commodities needed due to the government’s 
prohibition of free trade.   
The severe food shortage led to anxiety and anti-government feelings among the 
rural population. A classified document sent by the Chief Prosecutor of Hamhŭng Public 
Prosecutor’s Office to the superintending prosecutor of a high court, provides evidence of 
people’s severe hunger and deterioration in public feeling. The report included the 
description of a case where a protected forest was damaged by starving villagers who had 
stripped the pine trees in an attempt to turn the bark into food. He added, ‘[A 
c]onsiderable number of village people have swollen bodies since they feed only on wild 
roots and tree-bark.’ (Hōmukyoku keijika 1942a: 24) He also described the prvalent 
public unrest:   
People are extremely nervous due to the acute food supply shortages and 
continuous drought. Farmers and other citizens’ worries and discontent with the 
government’s food controls are escalating continuously. There are an extremely 
large number of people who disturb the peace out of desperation and are spreading 
rumours. In addition to this, anti-war and anti-government feelings are on the rise...        
(Ibid.: 23) 
People’s dissatisfaction led to aggressive actions being taken against the authorities 
concerned. Between June and July 1942, there were to major public protests against the 
government food collection in the suburbs of Hamhŭng City. Local government officials 
managed to appease hundreds of angry people who were demanding food and even 
threatening the authorities, by distributing one sŏk (approximately 143 kilograms) of rice 
as a temporary measure (Ibid.: 24-25). Coercive food c llection and rationing controls 
were the major reason behind growing public unrest in rural Korea.  
Incomplete Legislation for the Purpose of Efficient Controls 
Cohen revealed that the Japanese were hit harder by the war than their counterparts in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, by showing that Japanese citizens 
Chapter One 
54 
had the lowest relative consumptive power between 1941 and 1944 (1949: 416). The 
suffering of the Japanese civilian, according to him, was due to the Japanese 
government’s lack of an overall wartime economic plan, which eventually led to 
haphazard price controls and an incomplete rationing system (Cohen 1949: 353-354). 
Pauer also pointed out that the Japanese government did ot have detailed plans either for 
the war economy, or for its constituent parts, such as the restrictive rationing controls. 
Plans and measures were developed to respond to specific needs and to overcome 
obstacles that arose from the changing circumstances. The overall purpose of staple 
rationing was to distribute food to the people in need, eliminating the waste of scarce 
food (Pauer 1999: 86, 88).  
These scholars’ arguments hold true with the Japanese government’s methods of 
food control in Korea. As I explained previously, in 1939, when Korea was hit by a 
serious crop failure, Seoul citizens were required to consume coarse grain alongside rice, 
and when mandatory rationing began in May 1940 more than 60 per cent of the staple 
grain ration was coarse grain. Even though coarse gain had been included in rationing 
controls from the very beginning, it was not until several months later that the legal basis 
for this, the Korean Miscellaneous Grain Rationing Control Regulation, was 
established.33  
Many of the directives to place foodstuffs under rationing controls were based on 
temporarily issued administrative orders rather than on clear legal foundations. Beginning 
with staple foods in 1940, an increasing number of fo dstuffs were rationed in rationing 
in Korea: sugar (July 1940), meat (1941), red peppers (1941), bean paste and soy sauce 
(August 1942), and fish and shellfish (September 1943) (Hŏ Y. N. 2000: 298; Kim I. H.  
2006: 86-87). As of June 1943 food items such as wheat flour, sugar, alcoholic drinks, 
vegetable oil, imported fruit, and starch were also being rationed without a legal 
foundation (Yi S. S. 2001: 54). By 1944, fruit, vegetables, condensed and powdered milk, 
cows’ milk for infants and the sick, salt, alcoholic drinks, canned food and agar-agar had 
all been placed under the rationing (Sugiyama 1943: 1 , 17, 25, and 41). Sugiyama, who 
                                                
33 ‘Singnyang sugŭp chojŏng kido zapkok-to paegŭp t’ongje, taemaek, ramaek, somaek, yŏnmaek, taedu 
tŭng 20-il kyuch’ik palp’yo 食糧需給調整企圖 雑穀도配給統制 大麦, 裸麦, 小麦, 燕麦,大豆等 20日規
則發表’, Chosŏn ilbo, 20 July 1940, p.6.   
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published a number of books on the rationing administration, noted that the rationing 
programme implemented in Korea was unsettled compared with Japan, where most 
commodities were controlled under the general purchasing-permit system (1942: 3).  
The colonial government’s lack of firmly established rationing methods and legal 
grounds for its restrictive regulations were a way to enhance control efficiency in its 
colony rather than an administrative failing. In colonial Korea, a rigid governance 
mechanism centred on the colonial governor had beenestablished throughout the years of 
Japanese rule. In some respects the authority of the Governor-General in Korea was 
exercised independently, even from the government in Japan Proper. There was no 
oversight agency to control him since his legal authori y stemmed directly from the 
Japanese Emperor, who neither exerted his authority nor took political responsibility 
despite his centralized sovereignty granted by the Meiji Constitution. Thus, in contrast to 
the separated power structure in Japan, the Governor-General of Korea held the reins of 
the legislative, executive and judicial branches as far as ruling the colony was concerned 
(Henderson 1968: 72-72; Kim N. N. 2003: 36-41). 
This political situation in colonial Korea provided favourable grounds for 
Japanese bureaucrats to promote wartime economic strategies, and was exploited to the 
fullest in driving forward coercive rationing controls. According to Isaka, head of the 
Department of Commerce and Industry under the Governm nt-General, the government 
intentionally avoided legislating policies. As the authority of the Governor-General was 
overwhelmingly strong, it was more convenient for officials to rely on timely orders from 
him, than for them to establish and constantly revis  laws to respond to the changing 
situation (Isaka 1941: 37-38). In Korea, unlike Japan, a rapid, top-down policy decision 
was possible, and administrative orders issued in the name of the Governor-General were 
strictly followed. This is why Korean policies did not follow the exactly same pattern as 
the regulations developed for Japan Proper. Isaka added that such a tactic was one of the 
special features of Korea’s controlled economy, and was the chief reason why the 
implementation of such policies in Korea was a relatively smooth process (Ibid.: 28-29).              
Tight control over the food supply in Korea was an important factor in Japanese 
wartime policy. The primary focus of the Japanese government’s food controls in Korea 
Chapter One 
56 
was specified as: ‘to secure surplus rice by restricting demand for it through every 
possible means, and to export it in order to improve the food supply situation of Imperial 
Japan’ (Kondō 1961: 84). Notwithstanding the deteriorating food situation in Korea and 
the structural vulnerability of the food controls, Korea’s role as the breadbasket of the 
Japanese Empire was maintained under the absolute cn rol of the Government-General. 
After Korea gained its independence as a result of Japan’s defeat in WWII, the colonial 
restrictions were to be removed with Japan’s repatriation from the Korean peninsula. 
However, ironically, the Japanese methods of food controls become instrumental in post-
colonial authorities’ fighting another food crisis in the country. Most importantly, the 
Japanese system of food management introduced underthe p essure of total war became 
the foundations on which South Korean government’s food policies firmly rested later.     
  
 1.2 The Post-war Revival of the Japanese System  
On October 1 between 200 and 300 demonstrators marched through Taegu in 
support of striking workers. Like the strikers, these demonstrators (who appeared 
to be mostly children of all ages) demanded increased rice rations. Sometime that 
day, police killed one of the demonstrators. On the morning of October 2, a crowd, 
variously estimated at 1,000 or 2,000, marched through Taegu bearing the body of 
the demonstrator who had been slain the day before.  
(Cumings 1981: 356) 
Introduction of A Free -market System for Rice  
Following the Japanese surrender in the Second World War on 14 August 1945, control of 
the Korean peninsula south of the 38th parallel was taken by the United States Army 
Military Government in South Korea (USAMGIK), and this situation continued until 
August 1948. As the food situation could be an indicator of the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the US occupation of Korea, the Americans devoted enormous energy to 
pursuing food security for the country. More than 80 per cent of the administration 
undertaken by local governments was related to the coll ction and distribution of food 
(Ch’oe Y. M. 2008: 79-80).  
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Deregulation of the rice market was one of the first economic reforms the US 
military government implemented. On 5 October 1945, the Americans introduced a free-
market system for rice with the promulgation of theG neral Notice of a ‘Free Market for 
Rice’ (Migog-ŭi chayu sijang米穀의自由市場 ). Based on American economic 
assumptions, the occupying forces abolished all the restrictions on the rice market that 
had been established by the Japanese authorities, stating that everybody would be given 
equal opportunity to enjoy his or her fair share of the nation’s wealth (Cumings 1981: 
203). The Americans opposed the colonial system that had forced farmers to sell their 
products to the government. They believed that the major cause of the vigorous black 
market that had emerged within Japan’s controlled economy was the unreasonable 
ceiling-prices system that had prohibited farmers from receiving from the government a 
price that covered production costs at the very least (see Chapter Three). Thus, a base 
price for rice, of 32 yen per bag weight (approximately 54 kilograms), was set, which 
took into consideration former official and black-market prices (USAMGIK 1948: 27). 
Farmers were exempted from their earlier obligation of compulsory rice deliveries to the 
government: they were able to sell it in a free market or to the government and were 
guaranteed to receive at least the minimum price for it. Trading with the government was 
carried out through the Korean Foodstuffs Company (Chosŏn singnyang yŏngdan). This 
was a semi-public organization, established in 1943, which had been responsible for all 
administration concerning staple rationing – from collection, storage and processing to 
transportation and distribution – under the Japanese food control system.  
Yet, the newly established government’s attempt to introduce a free market ended 
in failure, and brought total and long-lasting economic and social chaos to Korea. The 
major reason for this was that there was not enough rice to meet the demand from the 
Korean population when the war ended. During the colonial era, the production and 
distribution of Korean rice had been controlled within the overall economic system of the 
Japanese Empire. Rice produced in Korea was preferentially delivered to Japan, and other 
grains, chiefly millet, were imported from Manchuria to Korea to compensate for the 
grain deficit (see 1.1). For example, in 1945, 50 million sŏk (approximately 7,200,000 
metric tons) of supplementary millet was scheduled to be imported from Manchuria to 
Korea. However, with Japan’s defeat, all its food management programmes were 
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cancelled, including the importation of grain. Thus, in August 1945, there was already an 
estimated shortage of 672,000 sŏk (96,770 tons) of grain for September and October 
(Morita 1964: 118). As of August 1945, the rice kept in Kyŏnggi-do to supply the one 
million citizens of Seoul was sufficient for just six weeks’ worth of rations (Ch’oe Y. M. 
2008: 94).  
 It seems clear that the military government had a proper understanding of the 
seriousness of the food shortage during the initial st ges of the occupation. It was not 
long before the Americans saw the acute shortage of food among Korean people with 
their own eyes. Just ten days after the US troops arrived, a mob of 25,000-30,000 citizens 
who mistakenly thought that rice was to be distributed gathered at a warehouse south-east 
of Seoul. After discovering their mistake, unrest broke out among the people, who set fire 
to the building and demanded food. Fortunately, no o e was injured when an American 
soldier attempted to disperse the crowd by firing ito the air. However, when the people 
gathered again the following day, three were killed by shots fired by American soldiers. 
Official US sources record this incident as the first shots fired by US troops in Korea 
(USAMGIK 1948: 25).   
 On the same day that the troops arrived in Inch’ŏn, the Americans received 
reports of nationwide severe food shortages from the Korean leaders of the Committee 
for the Preparation of Korean Independence (Chosŏn kŏn’guk chunbi wiwŏnhoe朝鮮建
国準備委員會). This Committee had taken control of food rationing from the Japanese 
officials, and had handled food distribution until the Americans arrived (Ibid.: 24; 
Cwiertka forthcoming). A report for the US authorities written by the Japanese 
Government-General in Korea at the end of August 1945 also noted the food problem in 
Korea and emphasized the need to secure food supplies (Morita, quoted in Pak S. J. 2002: 
229).  
 However, this suggestion was not pursued; USAMGIK believed that the 
rice deficit was a temporary problem, and expected it to be resolved when the new crop 
was harvested in October. The Americans thought that an influx of hoarded and newly 
harvested rice onto the free rice market would lower prices, stimulate trade and increase 
production. As far as the Americans were aware, Korea was a rice exporter and produced 
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sufficient rice for its own needs (USAMGIK 1948: 23, 27). The US authorities estimated 
that no further rice deliveries to Japan would take place and that the number of rice 
consumers in Korea would fall since many Japanese pople were being repatriated. In 
view of the fact that they were in the process of democratizing Korea, the Americans also 
did not think it proper to maintain the strict control over rice collection that had been 
practised by the Japanese government. The continuatio  of the Japanese restrictions, 
which had been the object of much hatred for the Koreans, would affect adversely the 
popularity of the Americans and the cooperation received from Koreans. There was a 
further, practical reason behind the deregulation of the rice market: the government did 
not have sufficient personnel to administer the food rationing programme (Ibid. : 26-27). 
As a result of deregulation, the rice market was thrown open to speculators and 
profiteers who took advantage of the post-war economic chaos. Government officials 
engaged in rice speculation alongside wealthy indivduals, depleting the rice available on 
the market. Richard Robinson, a USAMGIK official, reported that a top police official 
had made a private fortune by selling rice secretly delivered to Seoul. He also suggested 
that the rice smuggling that was flourishing between southern Korea and Japan might 
absorb a quarter of the 1945 harvest (Cumings 1981: 204). There was large-scale 
smuggling of rice to Japan: 300 bags (16.2 tons) of rice were sneaked out daily from the 
eastern coast of Korea to Japan, where smugglers received 1,200 yen per bushel on the 
black market (USAMGIK 1948: 46-47). Such shady dealings accelerated the rice-supply 
deficit in Korea.  
Deregulation of the rice market enabled some Korean people to eat more rice. N. 
Merrell Benninghoff, the State Department advisor t General Hodge, reported to 
Washington that the increasing shortage of rice came from consumption linked to an 
‘abnormal flush of freedom’ (Ibid. 1948: 34). Much rice was used for making alcoholic 
drinks and sweets, which had been strictly prohibited under the Japanese government’s 
restrictions. People in the granary sector, such as tho e in Chŏllanam-do, ate rice as a 
daily staple (Meade 1951: 195). The military governme t reported that during the winter 
months of 1945-1946, ‘Koreans consumed or otherwise d posed of 26 ounces [737 
grams] daily per person while their normal consumption was ten ounces [283 grams]. By 
the end of January 1946, more than 40 per cent of the year’s crop had disappeared.’ 
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(USAMGIK 1948: 36-37)  
The reluctance of farmers to sell rice was also noted as a factor which reduced the 
quantity circulating in the market. It was said that ‘a farmer with rice feels his security 
but a farmer with just money is a poor man indeed’ as, due to the inactivity in Korean 
industry, there were not enough consumer goods on the Korean market for farmers to 
spend their hard-earned money on. Furthermore, farmers did not trust the Korean 
Foodstuffs Company since it had been dedicated to taking the Korean farmers’ produce 
and sending it to Japan during the colonial period (Ibi .: 30).  
Perhaps the biggest reason for the farmers’ unwillingness to sell their products to 
the government was the huge gap between the government price and the free-market 
price. The government’s initial plan was to secure rice for distribution to the city 
population through a voluntary deal with the farmers. However, the price set by the 
government, of 32 yen per 54 kilograms, was far below the market price of 70 yen for the 
same amount in Seoul. Few producers wanted to sell their rice to the Korean Foodstuffs 
Company for less than half of the market price. On 23 October the Company raised the 
price to 50 yen, but by 22 November the free-market price had increased to 84 yen, 
reaching 100 yen the following week. The Company again raised its bae price to 80 yen, 
and by 4 December was allowed to pay ‘any reasonable price’. However, the prevailing 
market price kept skipping provocatively ahead of government values (Ibid.: 29).  
The free-market policy led to runaway inflation in the Korean economy. Between 
August 1945 and March 1946, the retail price of one tu (18 litres) of rice in Seoul 
rocketed from 220 yen to 900 yen (Morita 1964: 335). The price at the end of 1945 
equalled the black-market price during the Japanese colonial era (Chosŏn ŭnhaeng 
chosabu 1948: I-242). Table 1-4 shows the wholesale-pric  index of food and grain in 
Seoul between August 1945 and June 1946.  
Table 1-4: Wholesale prices of food and grain in Seoul, August 1945-June 1946 (where 
August 1945 equals 100) 
 Food Grain 
August 1945 100    100 
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October 1945 154.6 68.7 
December 1945 188.7 107.3 
February 1946 238.5 253.4 
April 1946 485.0 442.9 
June 1946 496.7 485.6 
Source: Morita 1964: 335 
Between August 1945 and June 1946, the index price of both food and grain increased 
fivefold in Seoul. Even though price rises continued throughout the period, a rapid 
increase in prices was seen at the end of 1945. In particular, the price of grain, which 
grew moderately between August and December 1945 (from 100 to 107), exploded 
between December 1945 and February 1946 (107 to 253). This was linked to the 
availability of the 1945 harvest which had satisfied consumers for a several months 
before being used up and disappearing from the grain m rkets by the end of 1945. The 
results of a two-month-long free rice market were soaring prices and an acute shortage of 
grain. Faced with an unexpected deterioration in the grain market situation, the US 
military government was forced to drastically switch from a free economy to a controlled 
market system. 
The Grain Collection Programme: The Japanese Apparatus under USAMGIK 
The US authorities’ food rationing programme began with the promulgation of Ordinance 
No. 45, National Rice Collection (Migok sujimnyŏng米穀収集令), on 25 January 1946, 
which was aimed at ‘insuring against wide scale starva ion, malnutrition, disease and 
civil unrest’ (USAMGIK 1948: 43). The basic principle of the food programme was to 
collect rice from producers and distribute it to non-producers within each province. 
Transporting rice outside the province in which it was produced was strictly prohibited 
and interprovincial transactions were carried out under government control.  
 Delivery of farmers’ rice started at the beginning of February 1946. The 
government’s plan was to collect 5.29 million sŏk (approximately 761,040 metric tons) of 
rice, an amount that would be distributed in 2.5-hap (360 grams) daily portions to the 
non-farming population in urban areas until the endof June, when the harvest of summer 
grain usually began. Those belonging to farming households were allowed to keep 67.5 
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kg of rice per person (3 hap or 430 grams per day) for their own consumption (Kim C. S. 
2000: 71). This calculation was based on the average ice crop between 1933 and 1936 in 
Korea. When the food collection was scheduled in Jauary 1946, the government had 
failed to grasp both the volume of rice harvested in the autumn of 1945 and the amount 
that had been consumed prior to that date (Ibid.). However, it seems that the standard 
harvest that the authorities adopted was much larger than the actual harvest of 1945. 
According to statistical data, the Korean rice crop of 1945 totalled 12,850,000 sŏk 
(1,850,400 tons), just 66 per cent of the 19,411,000 sŏk (2,795,184 tons) harvested in 
1936. The crop of 1945 was the poorest it had been in the colonial period (see Table 1-1). 
The harvests of 1946 and 1947 did not improve much: 12,050,000 sŏk (1,735,200 tons) 
and 13,850,000 sŏk (1,994,400 tons) were harvested respectively (see Table 1-5). This 
statement in an official American document issued in 1948 reveals the food situation in 
Korea: ‘The sad fact emerged that Korea was simply not a food surplus country. Even if 
no rice had been smuggled to Japan, and if all hoarded supplies had been brought to the 
market, there still would have been barely enough rice for Korean needs’ (USAMGIK 
1948: 37).       
 It was not until the 1946 food collection programme had been carried out that the 
Americans realized that almost 40 per cent of the ric  harvested in the previous year had 
already been used by the end of January 1946.34 The Rice Collection Programme 
implemented in February proved to be a complete failure: just 680,000 sŏk 
(approximately 97,920 metric tons) were collected during the first few weeks, or 12.4 per 
cent of the collection target (Chosŏn ŭnhaeng chosabu 1948: I-242-I-243). This 
constituted only 45 days’ rations for the non-agricultural population of 6 million, based 
on the initially scheduled daily allocation of 2.5 hap (360 grams) per person. Consuming 
areas, such as Seoul, faced serious food shortages. For example, the 63,000 sŏk (907,200 
tons) of rice collected in Kyŏnggi Province was not enough to supply the citizens of 
Seoul since, under government policy, priority of allocation was to be given to the non-
producing people in Kyŏnggi (Chosŏn ŭnhaeng chosabu 1948: I-243). Therefore, rice for 
the 1.2 million citizens of Seoul was to be collected from other provinces. However, the 
                                                
34 ‘Sinae yanggok wanjǒn paegǔp-ǔn nae-samwǒl siboil put’ǒ 시내 糧穀 완전 配給은 來三月十五日
부터’, Chosǒn ilbo, 13 February 1946. p.2. 
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amount secured during the 42 days of collections from other provinces was only enough 
for 22 days’ supply.35  
In contrast to the ill-fated rice collection programme carried out in February 1946, 
the military government achieved remarkable results in procuring rice in the following 
years: 83 per cent of the scheduled collection was received in the autumn of 1946, and in 
1947 the goal set was almost attained (see Table 1-5).     
Table 1-5: Production volume, collection targets and collected volume of rice in southern 




































Source: Based on Ch’oe Y. M. 2008: 86-87 
The successes were brought about by the rigid enforcement of collecting methods.  
According to the 1946 collection programme issued on 12 August 1946, farmers were 
assigned a pre-determined collection quota, and were allowed to keep back seed grain 
and a basic minimum of 600 hop (85.8 kilograms) of rice per person in the household 
(Song P. Y. 1997: 59). In principle, when there was rice in excess of the farmer’s quota 
plus his allowance, the farmer was free to dispose of it as he wished (USAMGIK 1948: 
57). However, the goal announced by the government was to collect ‘as much as possible’ 
(Song P. Y.  1997: 59; Ch’oe 2008: 88). Having produced favourable results in 1946, the 
strict policy was maintained the following year. The collection for 1947, based on 
National Food Regulation No.6 published on 27 September 1947, stipulated that only 
when the government had announced the completion of the year’s collection could 
farmers who had met their quota sell their rice freely. In December 1947, the authorities 
allowed rice farmers to trade freely in six provinces where the collection quotas had been 
                                                




filled (Chŏn K. S. 1995: 230).     
 The collection targets set by the government were by no means easy to achieve, 
and the prices farmers received from the government for their products were much lower 
than free-market prices, as demonstrated in Table 1-6 below.   
Table 1-6: Free-market and government purchasing prices for rice (per wŏn, 100 litres) 
Years Free-market prices (a) Government prices (b) (b)/(a) (%) 
1945 10.78   1.32 12 % 
1946 65.67 23.84 36 % 
1947 111.92 26.31 23 % 
Source: Nongsusanbu 1978: 209. 
As the table above shows, government purchasing prices rose alongside the increasing 
free-market prices, but there were huge differences between the two. Even in 1946, when 
the gap was relatively small, the government price (23.84 wŏn) was less than 40 per cent 
of the free-market price (65.67 wŏn). If we consider that income from rice accounted for 
76 per cent of Korean farming income between 1945 and 1948, the collection campaigns 
imposed a substantial burden upon farming households (Kim C. H. 2006: 48).  
 A low government purchasing price was part of the US military government’s 
economic policy. Throughout the occupation, fighting i flation was one of the major 
economic goals set by the Americans. In the early post-colonial years, the Korean 
economy suffered from rampant inflation caused by the Japanese government’s policy of 
increasing the money supply to finance the war. Before 1937, the year in which the Sino-
Japanese War began, currency circulation in colonial Korea was relatively stable: if the 
currency issue in 1926 was equal to 100, the index had only risen to 215 in 1937. By 
1945, however, currency circulation had skyrocketed to an index of 2,260 (see Table 3-1 
in Chapter Three). Channelling money into the war industries, the colonial government 
forcibly curbed prices on the general market in order to prevent inflation. As soon as the 
controlled economy was released upon Japan’s defeat, the money previously issued in 
Korea caused a spike in inflation. Between 1945 and1948, the issue of banknotes 
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increased seven-fold, and prices went up by approximately 14-fold (Table 1-7).  
Table 1-7: Index of currency issue, prices and wages in Korea, 1936-1948 (1936 = 100) 
Issue of money 
Years Monthly average 
(one million wŏn) 
Index 
Price index Wage index 
1936   167  100   100  100 
August 1945 6,020 3,597  1,752   293 
December 1945 8,620 5,152  4,359 2,724 
December 1946 16,573 9,904 25,563 11,186 
December 1947 32,342 19,329 58,305 17,088 
December 1948 42,089 25,202 59,162 20,372 
Source: Kim C. S. 1999: 241   
Along with food security, easing the rampant inflation was one of the government’s 
central economic policies. In order to reduce the amount of money in circulation, 
government expenses had to be tightly managed. Controlli g the price of rice was crucial 
since Korea’s economy essentially functioned on a rice standard rather than a gold or 
other monetary standard, and a rise in the price of rice triggered a general rise in prices 
(Cumings 1981: 375; USAMGIK 1948: 45). For this reason, the government maintained 
a policy of paying a much lower rate for rice than was paid on the free market.  
The price policy implemented resembled the strategy of the Japanese government. 
In an earlier part (1.1) of this chapter, I explained that the Japanese government had 
maintained a similar policy towards Korean grain producers with the purpose of 
restricting the money in circulation in order to curb general price increases. Instead of 
paying the market price, the government distributed difficult to obtain commodities as 
rewards when the farmers achieved good results under the food collection scheme. 
Following the Japanese example, the US military government introduced an incentives 
programme to stimulate rice collection. Farmers faced similar difficulties in procuring 
daily necessities in post-colonial Korea as they had previously had under Japanese 
authority. Commodities were scarce and prices constantly soaring. For example, in Seoul 
Chapter One 
66 
between August 1945 and December 1948, the wholesale-price index (August 1945 = 
100) of a case of 2,400 matches jumped from 100 to 1,279, that of socks (100 pairs) to 
14,667, and that of firewood to 3,200 (Chosŏn ŭnhaeng chosabu 1949: IV-165). Under 
the incentives plans of USAMGIK, scarce commodities were bartered in exchange for 
rice between farmers and the government. For example, farmers received cotton and 
hemp cloth, shoes, matches, soap, candles, salt, clothing, kerosene, pots and pans, socks, 
and tools manufactured by government-controlled industries and distributed by the 
Material Control Corporation (USAMGIK 1948: 47-48). Under the authority of the local 
governments, these commodities were also sold to farmers at a cheaper price depending 
on the results of their rice deliveries. For example, between 1945 and 1946 farmers in 
Chŏllanam-do who cooperated with the rice collection programme were allowed to buy 
cotton cloth for between 140 and 220 yen per bolt. Cotton was only otherwise available 
on the black market at a price of around 1,500 yen per bolt (Meade 1951: 194).      
The incentives plans were as not the only colonial method reused by the 
Americans: following Japanese practices, the military government revived the functions 
of the local governments, police forces and civilian organizations. The two former bodies 
chiefly assumed surveillance roles, while the latter undertook practical collections. As 
explained in 1.1, under the Japanese system collecti n allocations were first determined 
for each province, and then for each county, district, village and aegukpan (civilian 
organization). Joint responsibility for the collection quota was imposed on each village. 
Under the American food collection system, quotas were allocated in the same way as 
previously, while the village leaders were assigned various practical functions. They 
collected information beforehand concerning 1) the quantity of rice and other grains 
harvested on each farm; 2) the number of persons in each family unit; 3) the quantity of 
rice possessed by each person; and 4) the amount of rice required for planting the 
following season’s crop. As in the Japanese system, hey were also responsible for the 
practical collection of rice. Failure to comply with his ordinance was punishable for 
officials by discharge, and for rice growers, based upon a decision from a Military 
Occupation Court (USAMGIK 1948: 44). The Korean farme s’ antipathy provoked by 
such food programmes was expressed in a newspaper article: ‘Though the war has ended, 
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they continue to collect rice. I believe that the United States Military Government is 
adopting the policies of Japanese Imperialism (Ibid.: 45). 
The food collection structure changed in 1947 as a result of the farmers’ 
dissatisfaction with its similarity to Japanese collection methods. This time, the collection 
quota was to be determined by a ‘Rice Collection Committee’ (Migok sujip wiwŏnhoe米
穀 収 集 委 員 會) comprised of landlords, owner-farmers, tenant-farmers, farm 
representatives, farming experts and other people we l acquainted with the local situation 
(Yi S. S. 2008: 428). It was stipulated that the organizations were to be established in 
each county, town and village, although the reality was different. Allowing farmers to 
express their opinions concerning rice collections through their committee, the intention 
was to ease farmers’ discontent with the food programme. While an official government 
document considered this system as ‘peculiarly democratic’ (South Korean Interim 
Government, National Economic Board 1948: 4-5), the majority of Committees included 
government officials and policemen, many of whom had been in their positions since the 
colonial era. Thus, in practical terms, the introduction of Rice Collection Committees did 
not change much from the former quota allocation system (Yi S. H. 2005: 28).     
One of the main reasons for many Korean farmers’ unfavourable reception of the 
American food collection system was the use of the police force in its administration. The 
police had been one of the most powerful enforcers of the Japanese food control system; 
due to the coercive nature of the Japanese economic policies, policemen had been reviled 
by Koreans throughout the colonial period. At the decision of USAMGIK, the structure 
and personnel of the colonial police force was maintained and further strengthened under 
the pretext of securing social order from the threat from the Left, which represented a 
challenge to the government’s authority (Cumings 1981: 162-163).  
On 16 January 1946, nine days before the ordinance for the first rice collection 
programme was issued, the Police Departments, which had thus far functioned under the 
supervision of each local governor, became independent bodies (Song P. Y. 1997: 94). 
This reorganization granted the police the same authority as provincial governors. 
Policemen began collecting rice straight away, using harsh measures, especially towards 
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those farmers who were associated with people’s committees or peasant unions. Such 
civilian groups were labelled as communists by the military government. When they did 
not meet quota requirements or refused to deliver rice, the farmers were jailed. For 
Korean farmers, returning the responsibility for food collection to the police was, in the 
words of Cumings, like ‘pouring salt on a festering wound’ (1981: 206, 378). The brutal 
practices exercised by the police during food colletions were a major factor behind the 
outbreak of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, which I will describe later in this chapter.          
Farmers protested against the forced delivery of rice to the government. Just as 
the military government followed the Japanese preced nt, Korean farmers resorted to 
colonial counter-measures too. One of the common actions taken by Korean farmers 
under the colonial government’s rice collection programme was to hide their rice by 
burying it in the ground (USAMGIK 1948: 45). Farmers even went so as far as to burn 
their rice and attack the houses of the local officials supervising the rice collections (Song 
K. J. et al. 2004: 403). In one incident, government trucks moving rice from Ŭisŏng to 
Yŏngyang in Kyŏngsang-pukto were stoned by a thousand Koreans (USAMGIK 1948: 
45). Between 1945 and 1948, more than 60 per cent of farmers’ protests were related to 
food collections (Kim C. H. 2006: 48). As of March 1947, according to an American 
government official, the number of people who had received corporal punishment or had 
fines imposed upon them for resisting rice collections had reached 8,631.36  
However, that is not to say that every attempt to revive the colonial legacy 
resulted in failure. As I have demonstrated in Table 1-5, the second (autumn 1946) and 
third (autumn 1947) rice collections were successful, achieving 82.9 per cent and 98.3 per 
cent of the targets set. One of the key factors in these successes was the central role of the 
New Korea Company (Sinhan kongsa新韓公社) in the rice procurement programme. 
The New Korea Company was established in February 1946 by USAMGIK to supervise 
and control all the land which had previously belonged to the Oriental Development 
Company (Tōyo takushoku kaisha東洋拓殖会社), its colonial predecessor (Yi T. G. 
2002: 81). The Oriental Development Company was a semi-public Japanese enterprise 
                                                
36 ‘Chŏnjaemin-ŭl kukto kŏnsŏl-e misujip purŭngja tasu sŏkpang戰災民을 國都建設에米收集不應者多
數釋放’, Tonga ilbo, 21 March 1947, p. 2 
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established in 1908 when Korea was a protectorate of Japan. With the plausible purpose 
of improving agricultural conditions by settling in Korea, it encouraged Japanese farmers, 
with their superior farming techniques, to move to the Korean peninsula in accordance 
with Japan’s migration policy. Being granted power and privileges by the Government-
General in Korea, the company proceeded to acquire Ko an land, and helped Japanese 
people to settle it, providing highly favourable conditions. By 1930, under the company’s 
guidance and protection, 19,860 Japanese migrants hd been assigned a total of 24,480 
acres of Korean land (Lee H. K. 1969: 281-284).  
 When Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule, the New Korea Company 
took control of the land owned by the former institution, as well as additional land that 
had belonged to some 102,000 Japanese companies and indivi uals, and 19 industrial, 
engineering and mining companies. In terms of arable land, the New Korea Company 
was responsible for the management of 26.8 per cent of all land worked by southern 
farming households, or 13.4 per cent of the total ar ble area (Yi T. G. 2002: 83). After the 
Japanese in managerial positions within the Company h d returned to their own country, 
Koreans filled the roles left open (Cumings 1981: 205), inheriting a highly efficient 
organizational structure. The head office in Seoul was under the direct control of 
USAMGIK. As of 1946, it was supported by six local branches, comprised of between 
eight and twelve district offices. The district offices were divided into 121 cell 
organizations, in which more than 3,300 managers were engaged in supervising tenant 
farmers throughout Korea (Ch’oe Y. M. 2003: 64).   
 In October 1945 the US authorities assigned the New Korea Company to the role 
of rent collector, which made it the most powerful ‘landowner’ in South Korea (Pak S. J.  
2002: 239) and gave it a pivotal role in the food cllection programme. As a government 
agent, the organization was allowed to entice farmers to deliver more grain, even exerting 
pressure on farmers by exploiting its dominance. Many peasants were told that they 
would be given first refusal to buy the land they cultivated when the scheduled disposal 
project was carried out in the near future. Indeed, by the end of the US military 
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occupation, approximately 200,000 chŏngbo37 (approximately 198,347 hectares) of land 
had been sold to 500,000 farming households (Chŏng K. S. 1998: 134). The most 
common way for the Company to stimulate grain colletion was to threaten to deprive 
farmers of their tenancy rights (Ch’oe Y. M. 2008: 92; Song P. Y. 1997: 66).  
 The power of the New Korea Company is revealed in the spectacular results it 
achieved under the grain collection programmes. The tenants of the New Korea Company 
produced much better results than other farmers at the first rice collection programme 
implemented in February 1946. While farmers in general contributed only 19.5 per cent 
in total of the years’ grain collection, farmers belonging to the Company fulfilled 80.5 per 
cent of the collection quota. This fulfilment by the tenants of the Company equalled 95 
per cent of the collective target set exclusively for the New Korea Company (Song P. Y. 
1997: 63). Given that the target of the first rice collection was ill-prepared, without a 
statistical basis, one can say that this achievement resulted from the efficient control of 
the organization. Even after the first collection, they continued to produce good results 
(Table 1-8).  
Table 1-8: Results of the grain collection programmes by tenants of the New Korea 
Company and other farmers, 1946-1947 
 
Success rates (collected volume) for 
tenants of the New Korea Company 
Success rates (collected volume) 
for other farmers 
1946 summer grain 
collection 
81.3 %  
(222,320 sŏk or 31,791.8 tons) 
43.8 %    
(749,990 sŏk or 107,249 tons) 
1946 rice 
collection 
87.5 %  
(1,935,881 sŏk or 276,831 tons) 
82.9 %  
(4,698,611 sŏk or 671,901 tons)  
1947 summer grain 
collection 
101.0 % 
 (115,386 sŏk or 16,500 tons) 
98.2 % 
(956,219 sŏk or 136,739 tons) 
1947 rice 
collection 
101.1 %  
(2,974,991 sŏk or 399,684 tons) 
93.6 %  
(6,174,520 sŏk or 882,956 tons) 
Summer grain: wheat, rye, barley and naked barley 
Source: Based on Yi S. H. 2005: 48-51 
As demonstrated in Table 1-8 above, the fulfilment rate for the quota of tenants of the 
                                                
37 A chŏngbo町歩 is a measurement of area of land which is equal to 0.99 hectare.    
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New Korean Company far exceeded that of the general farming population, even 
surpassing the targets of the two collection programmes in 1947. For the US military 
government, the New Korea Company’s administrative capability and influence over the 
rural population made it one of the most reliable administrative powers in Korea (Ch’oe Y. 
M. 2008: 93).        
Methods to enhance grain collection from the general farming population were 
also employed. One example was the systematic prohibiti n of landowners receiving 
grain from their tenant farmers as rent in kind. Prior to this prohibition, rents had been 
paid either in cash or in rice, depending on the contract between the landowner and the 
tenant. If landowners received grain, they were permitted to keep it for their own 
consumption as long as it was reported to the governm nt. If the grain was insufficient to 
feed the landowner’s household, he was able to receiv  the deficit amount in rations from 
the government. Under this system, however, it was impossible for the government to 
maintain a grasp on false reporting, and such a system was at risk of being used by 
landowners to receive excessive rations of rice. Moreover, many wealthy Koreans, 
including landlords, were deeply involved in the ill gal hoarding and smuggling of rice, 
which destroyed the rice market and led to acute shortages of grain (Ch’oe P. D. 1996: 
112).  
With the aim of improving the efficiency of the food collection, on 23 September 
1946, the ‘Collection of Rice and Other Foodstuffs: Rental Payment Procedures’ 
Regulation (Migok mit kit’a singnyang sujip sojangnyo chibul susok米穀및 기타 食糧
収集小作料支拂手續) was promulgated. Farmers were ordered to deliver grain rent 
payments directly to the government, along with their quotas, and it was prohibited to use 
grain to pay landlords. Landowners received rents from the government in cash, and food 
rations in the same way as the non-farming population (Ch’oe Y. M. 2008: 88). By 
introducing this new system, the government was able to collect more rice than 
previously. However, this caused problems for those very poor peasants who were only 
able to harvest very small quantities of grain and who had, until then, paid rents in cash, 
since the government would only accept grain. To protect these farmers, in 1948 tenant 
Chapter One 
72 
farmers cultivating fewer than 5 tanbo38 (0.3 hectares) of land and owner-farmers 
cultivating fewer than 3 tanbo (03. hectares) were exempted from grain collection (Chŏn 
K. S. 1995: 233). 
The Grain Supply in Urban Areas             
The food collection programme implemented by the US government was primarily 
intended to secure a stable food supply for non-producers (South Korean Interim 
Government, National Economic Board 1948: 30). Inflation, and the rising price of 
foodstuffs, was a serious problem for the urban citizen since the majority were not 
engaged in food production. They were more vulnerabl  than farmers, especially to 
invigorated profiteering by grain sellers and uneven distribution (Yi S. H. 2005: 17-18).  
The spiralling price and disrupted supply of rice brought about by the institution 
of the free-market system in 1945 resulted in an acute shortage of food in the cities. As 
Cumings highlights, the attempted institution of the free market was an ‘unmitigated 
disaster from start to finish’ (1981: 203). This was especially true in cities with large 
populations, such as Seoul. Along with mass repatriation from outside the peninsula when 
the WWII ended, there was a remarkable population boom in the city: between May 1944 
and August 1946, the population of Seoul increased by 240,000 from 901,370 to 
1,141,766, reaching 1,361,444 after another eight months with the addition of a further 
220,000 people (Ch’oe Y. M. 2008: 111-112).  
As explained previously, the first rice collection f February 1946, which was 
initiated to distribute food to the non-farming population, ended in failure. In the midst of 
the spring austerity season, the growing scarcity of rice led to soaring prices. The price 
index of rice in Seoul rocketed from 9.6 to 58.7 between 1945 and 1946 (if the price in 
1947 equalled 100) (Nongnimbu 1978: 207). Many Seoul citizens were forced to pay 300 
wŏn for rice, a price nearly ten times higher than the official price of 38 wŏn. As of 
February 1946, the proportion of school children and company employees for whom 
there were insufficient lunches reached almost 30 per cent. More than a third of salaried 
                                                
38 One tanbo段歩 is equivalent to 0.1 chŏngbo, or 0.09 hectares.     
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workers did not turn up to work as they were searching for rice to feed their families. 
(Ch’oe Y. M. 2008: 107). Civilian ‘Fighting Committees for Rice’ were organized by a 
number of working men who were allegedly ‘ready to die’ to achieve their goals 
(USAMGIK 1948: 47). This is a description from a newspaper of Seoul’s food situation 
in January 1946:  
No matter how much we pay, we cannot buy rice. The problem of rice is becoming 
increasingly serious, and at this rate, a rice riot could be triggered by anything… 39 
The critical shortage of rice caused public protests in Seoul. Beginning on 28 
March 1946, a series of demonstrations took place throughout the city, just two weeks 
after the military government’s announcement that te original goal of ten ounces per day 
per person, due to be distributed from 15 March, could not be realized since not enough 
rice had been collected (USAMGIK 1948: 48-49). On 30 March approximately 3,000 
citizens, including housewives and students from eight towns, met at Seoul City Hall to 
demand rice. The Tonga ilbo newspaper reported on 10 March that ‘there were women 
with faces swollen from starvation, and a mother with a baby on her back who was at a 
loss what to do while she stood by the window of the office of the Department of the 
Economy.’40  On 1 April another popular disturbance began, comprised of several 
thousand hungry housewives, while the old one continued in front of Seoul City Hall 
from dawn until dusk.41 Even though the protests were not violent, such incidents 
demonstrate that public order was threatened by the shortage of food. In response to the 
public demand for rice, on 24 April 1946, the government promulgated the Special Rice 
Ordinance for Seoul City (Sŏulsi-e kwanhan tŭkpyŏl migokpŏp 서울시에 관한 
특별미곡법) (Anonymous: 1946). This permitted Seoul citizens to go to other provinces 
to buy rice; they were able to purchase up to the ration of two hop (approximately 285 
grams) per person until 15 October 1946, when the new harvest began. Similar 
                                                
39 ‘Ssal panip paegŭp hwakpo-rŭl mokp’yo쌀 반입 배급 확보를 목표’, Chosŏn ilbo, 10 January 1946, p. 
2.  
40 ‘Turŏnna! Ssal tallanŭn ausŏng sori! Ŏje-to samch’ŏn chŏngmin-i tto sich’ŏng-e swaedo t’anwŏn 
들엇나! 쌀 달라는 아우성 소리! 어제도 三千町民이 또 市廳에 殺到嘆願’, Tonga ilbo, 31 March 1946, 
p. 2.    
41 ‘Kigŭn! Sssal dao ssal, ŏje-do sich’ŏng-e soaedoghan simin 飢饉! 쌀 다오 쌀, 어제도市廳에 쇄도한 
시민’, Tonga ilbo, 2 April 1946, p. 2.   
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permission was given to the citizens of Pusan on 20 May 1946 (Pak S. J. 2002: 227). The 
government’s exceptional arrangements for these two big cities highlight the seriousness 
of the rice shortage in urban areas.  
However, the food shortages were not limited to Seoul and Pusan; discontent with 
the rice deficit in Taegu triggered the ‘First of October Incident’ (the so-called Autumn 
Harvest Uprisings), which took place on 1 October 1946. Following the rail workers’ 
strike which took place on 23 September 1946 in Pusan, between 200 and 300 
demonstrators marched on the city calling for an increase in rice rations. After one of the 
protesters was killed by police, the demonstration quickly escalated into a riot, and spread 
throughout southern Korea, in both urban and rural a eas. During the three months of 
strikes, more than 200 policemen and an estimated 1,000 people were killed (Cumings 
1981: 356, 379). The protestors’ anger was directed towards local officials, landlords and 
the wealthy who hoarded rice; the police force, which had continuously used violent and 
harsh measures to oppress the public since the colonial era; and the US military 
government (Ibid.: 357, 367). People called for refo m, including higher wages, better 
working conditions in factories, and the freedom to form unions. However, demand for 
rice was at the core of the conflict between the military government and the Korean 
public. When a local office was seized by angry farmers, the records of grain collections 
were the first objects destroyed. In Seoul, workers ar ested for involvement in the strike 
at the Yongsan rail yards in September were forced to pledge not to strike or to associate 
with communist groups; those who refused were fired an  denied rice rations (Ibid.: 355, 
368). Food was the very thing that the majority of Koreans desperately needed. 
Accordingly, food rations became an effective means of control for the government.  
Having a profound strategic importance in securing social order in Korea, the 
military government considered food control to be a crucial national policy, and adopted 
carefully designed schemes that revitalized the earlier Japanese system. As discussed 
previously, the methods of rice collection established by the Japanese colonial 
government were reused for the US military governmet’s rice collection programme. In 
addition, colonial-era food-rationing mechanisms were also maintained.  
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This continuity is evidenced by the central role played by the Korean Commodity 
Company (Chosŏn saenghwalp’um yŏngdan朝鮮生活品營團), successor to the Korean 
Foodstuffs Company, in the operation of state food management under the USAMGIK. 
As explained earlier, the Korean Foodstuffs Company had played a central role in the 
Japanese staple food-rationing system. The reorganization of this colonial institution was 
one of the first administrative actions carried outby the American authorities, even ahead 
of the re-establishment of the local governments (Wŏn Y. S. 1948: 47-48). On 10 
September 1945, just two days after the military government arrived Korea, 
organizational reform began, including the reassignme t of personnel and the 
reorganization of departments. The operations, financial conditions, and activities of the 
organization were extensively researched (Pu M. S. 2003: 11), and on February 1946 the 
name of the organization was changed from the Korean Foodstuffs Company to the 
Korean Commodity Company.   
After the difficulties experienced by the government during the first rice 
collection, further organizational arrangements were made. In order to facilitate the 
operation of food management, in May 1946 the Nation l Economic Board (Chungang 
kyŏngje wiwŏnhoe中央経済委員會) and the National Food Administration (Singnyang 
haengjŏngch’ŏ 食糧行政處) were newly created. The former was responsible for the 
overall coordination and evaluation of the food collection and distribution programme, 
and the latter was in charge of planning details, such as the establishment of grain 
collection quotas for each province (USAMGIK 1948: 55-56). In line with the policies 
established by these organizations, in April 1946 the Korean Commodity Company was 
renamed the Food Section (Singnyangkwa食糧課) and was incorporated under the 
National Food Administration. The branches of the Food Section functioned as local 
administrative units under the name of the Provincial Food Service (To singnyang samuso
道食糧事務所). Alongside the New Korea Company and the Federation of Financial 
Associations (Kŭmyung chohap yŏnhaphoe金融組合連合会), major credit societies 
created in the colonial era, the Provincial Food Servic  was authorized by the government 
to control commodities (Meade 1951: 195-196).  
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The Provincial Food Service was entrusted with the actual operation of rice 
collection, storage, processing (polishing and packing) and delivery from producing areas 
to consuming areas, as well as with rationing for general consumers. In each locality, 
rationing was supported by smaller branch offices and distribution points. For example, 
in Seoul in May 1947, there were 206 distribution points under the supervision of nine 
branch offices. On average, the rations for 1,201 households, or 6,826 citizens, were 
entrusted to four or five employees at each distribu ion point (Wŏn Y. S. 1948: 87).  
Despite this well-organized distribution channel, food rationing did not proceed 
smoothly due to the shortage of supply. During the first distribution of rations on 7 
January 1946, 2,600 sacks (approximately 208 metric tons) of rice, 7,000 sŏk (966 tons) 
of barley and other grains, and 1,200 bags of wheat flour were distributed to the citizens 
of Seoul. Households with more than five family memb rs were allowed to buy eight 
kilograms of rice, but this was accompanied by a government warning that ‘rations shall 
not be continuously provided’.42 The Seoul government managed to secure 4,000 sŏk 
(576 tons) of rice on 31 January 1946, in the run up to the Lunar New Year holiday, and 
announced that it would distribute 3,000 sŏk (432 tons) to the people. Families of more 
than five people were limited to one mal (144 kilograms) of rice, and those of less than 
five people were given five sŭng (72 kilograms).43 On 20 February, as an emergency 
measure to ease the pressing food shortage, the government announced that it would 
provide one sŭng (14.5 kilograms) of rice per person from a newly procured 2,000 sŏk 
(28 tons) of rice.44 In the newspapers cited above, it is not clearly stated how long the 
rations were to last or the daily allowance per person. However, if we consider the staple 
supply per person per day between April 1946 and February 1947 as demonstrated in 
Table 1-9 below, we may surmise that the daily allowance of rice per capita was most 
probably one hop (143 grams), and that a ten-day supply staple was provided per ration.  
On 11 March 1946, four days before the scheduled start of regular rationing of 
                                                
42 ‘Migok, sŏkt’an kyunbae 米穀, 石炭均配’, Tonga ilbo, 7 January 1946, p.2.  
43 ‘Kujŏng-e paengmi imsi paegŭp oin isang-e p’yŏnggyun iltu 舊正에 白米臨時配給 五人以上에 平均一
斗’, Tonga ilbo, 2 February 1946, p.2.  
44 ‘Yŏngdan-sŏ hwakpo han ‘ssal’ ichŏnsŏk 營團서確保한 ‘쌀’ 二千石’, Tonga ilbo, 20 February 1946, 
p.2.   
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two hop (approximately 285 grams) of rice per person, the Seoul city government 
announced that the initial plan could not be realizd. The 60,000 bags (480 tons) of rice 
procured would last for only ten days if the daily ration of 2 hop (286 grams) was 
distributed to all citizens.45 Once again, rice rationing was temporarily implemented on a 
rotational basis. Citizens received five days’ rations within a pre-determined period. For 
example, rationing for the residents of Chongno and Tongdaemun ward took place 
between 19 and 29 March, and in Yongsan and Yŏngdŭnp’o ward between 26 March and 
5 April.46 The quantity of prepared rice was announced daily via radio broadcast or 
newspaper. The maximum daily ration for a person was two hop (285 grams), but this 
came with the warning ‘not to expect two h p of rice to be available every day’.47 The 
lack of rice prevented the US military government from providing sufficient rice to Seoul 
citizens and from implementing a stable rationing programme. From April 1946, daily 
rice rationing per capita decreased by one hop (143 grams) (see Table 1-9). This put 
rations at a lower level than the daily ration Koreans had received from the Japanese 
authorities during the final years of the WWII.  
Table 1-9: Contents of staple-food rations in Seoul, April 1946-February 1947 
Period 
Daily ration per 
person 
Period Daily ration per person 
8-17 Apr 1946 1 hop rice 5-14 Sep 1946 
1 hop wheat, 120g 
wheat flour 
18-27 Apr 1946 1 hop rice 15-24 Sep 1946 
0.5 hop wheat, 120g 
wheat flour, and 0.5 hop 
maize 
28 Apr-7 May 1946 1 hop rice 25 Sep-5 Oct 1946 
0.5 hop wheat, 120g 
wheat flour, and 0.5 hop 
maize 
8-17 May 1946 1 hop rice 6-15 Oct 1946 
1 hop wheat, 120g 
wheat flour 
18-27 May 1946  1 hop rice 16-25 Oct 1946 
1 hop wheat, 120g 
wheat flour, 3 hop 
barley 
                                                
45 ‘Kunjŏng changgwan taeri Swich’ŭ, Sŏul singnyang sajŏng-ŭl palp’yo군정장관대리 쉬츠, 서울 
식량사정을 발표’, Sŏul inmun서울인문, 11 March 1946. Electric document, available at 
http://db.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=dh_002_1946_03_09 010 (accessed 3 July 2012). 
46 ‘Ssal’ ibŏn-en kkok paegŭp 쌀 이번엔 꼭 배급’, Chosŏn ilbo,13 March 1946, p.2.  
47 ‘Maeil chunda kidae malla매일 준다 기대 말라’, Chosŏn ilbo 14 March 1946, p.2. 
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28 May-6 June 1946 1 hop rice 26 Oct-5 Nov 1946 
120g wheat flour, 1 hop 
wheat, 0.3 hop rice or 
barley 
7-16 June 1946 180g wheat flour  6-15 Nov 1946 
60g wheat flour, 1.5 hop 
wheat, 0.3 hop barley  
17-26 June  1946 120g wheat flour 16-25 Nov 1946 
1.8 hop wheat, 0.5 hop 
rice or noodles  
1 hop rice, 1.3 hop  
wheat 
27 June-6 July 1946 
0.5 hop rice, 100g 
wheat flour 
26 Nov-5 Dec 1946 
2.5 hop wheat, 1 hop 
wheat flour 
1 hop rice, 1.3 hop 
wheat flour 
7-16 July 1946 180g wheat flour 6-15 Dec 1946 
1.5 hop wheat flour, 
wheat, barley or noodles 
17-26 July 1946 120g wheat flour 16-25 Dec 1946 
0.5 hop rice, 1 hop 
wheat, 0.5 hop wheat 
flour 
27 July-5 Aug 1946 
0.5 hop rice, 100g 
wheat flour 
26 Dec 1946-5 Jan 
1947 
1 hop rice, 1.5 hop other  
6-15 Aug 1946 1.5 hop maize 6-15 Jan 1947 
0.5 hop rice, 1.3 hop 
other 
16-25 Aug 1946 
60g wheat flour, 1 
hop maize 
16-25 Jan 1947 
1.3 hop rice, 1.2 hop 
other 
26 Aug-4 Sep 1946 
1 hop wheat flour, 1 
hop maize 
26 Jan-12 Feb 1947 
1.4 hop rice, 1.1 hop 
other 
Source: Headquarters United States Army Military Government in Korea 1947, quoted in Ch’oe Y. 
M. 2008: 116 
As shown in Table 1-9, between April and July of 1946, Seoul citizens were given one 
hop (143 grams) of rice as their staple. This shortage of rice was due to the failure of the 
first rice collection programme of February 1946. Given that the goal set by the 
government was 2.5 hop (360 grams) per person when the collection campaign was 
launched, the ration distribution during the first half of the year fell short by half of the 
target. It was not until the end of November 1946, after the harvest, that rice again 
became available through rationing for Seoul citizens. During periods when rice was not 
being distributed, the major substitute rations were wheat flour and other grains.  
 The deficit of staple food was supplemented by food donations from the 
Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA). As part of US aid policy, the 
GARIOA programme was designed to supply relief items, such as food resources, 
clothing, medical supplies and fuel, to countries that had been occupied by US enemies 
Wartime and Post-war Systems of Food Rationing 
79  
during the WWII. Between 1945 and 1948, $409,393,000 worth of aid goods were 
provided to Korea. Of that, the value of foodstuffs equalled $170,427,000, accounting for 
42 per cent of the total donation (Yi T. G. 2002: 68). The volume of grain donated was 
equal to 179,540 metric tons in 1946, 442,193 in 1947, and 2,550,000 in 1948 (Kim C. S. 
2000: 98). This food was chiefly used to ease the ric shortage in urban areas. For 
example, between May 1946 and March 1947, 827,000 sŏk (119,088 tons) of wheat, 
wheat flour, barley and maize were delivered to Seoul to feed citizens suffering from the 
rice shortage (Wŏn Y. S. 1948: 90). In 1946, when the shortage of rice was at its most 
serious, grain donated to Korea by the programme mentioned above constituted 55 per 
cent of the total amount distributed to the US occupation zone (Kim C. S. 2000: 98). 
Between December 1945 and November 1946, approximately 36 per cent (6.9 billion 
people) of Koreans in the American occupation zone rec ived staple food rations. In the 
space of one year, from December 1946 to November 1947, this ratio increased to 43 per 
cent (8.5 billion), reaching 48 per cent (9.6 billion) in the following year (Kim C. S. 
2000: 98; Song K. J. et al. 2004: 393)  
The Maintenance of Food Controls by the South Korean Government  
On 9 October 1948, the South Korean government promulgated the Grain Purchasing Act 
(Yanggok maeippŏp糧穀買入法). This was the first measure for the state control of food 
resources passed by the government established on 15 August 1948. Being modelled on 
the US government’s food control policies, the act stipulated stricter state control over 
staple foods. Establishing rice and barley family grains as government-controlled grains, 
the act permitted the government to purchase farmers’ ntire harvests, bar their 
consumption allowances and seed grain. While farmers who had filled their quotas were 
allowed to sell their products on a free market under the US government, the Foodstuffs 
Purchasing Act did not permit any form of free trans ction. Strict punishments were set 
for violations of the regulations: smuggling carried a minimum punishment of one year’s 
imprisonment and a maximum punishment of the death penalty (Yi S. S. 2008: 432-433).    
 The administrative organization and methods of food c llection adopted by the 
military government remained largely intact. Soon after the promulgation of the 
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Foodstuffs Purchasing Act, the National Food Administration was put under the control 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Nongnimbu農林部), and renamed the 
Bureau of Food Administration (Yangjŏngguk糧政局). On 10 November 1948, the Food 
Section was renamed the Korean Foodstuffs Public Corporation (Taehan singnyang 
kongsa大韓食糧公社). This Company was abolished a year later, and its role of 
collecting, delivering, storing and hulling of grain was entrusted to the Federation of 
Financial Associations (Nongsusanbu 1978: 218, 222). Following the example of the US 
authorities’ Rice collection committees, ‘Grain committees’ (Yanggok taech’aek 
wiwŏnhoe糧穀対策委員會), comprised of landlords, owner-farmers and other p ople, 
were created and assumed a similar role. Food was collected in almost exactly the same 
manner. Quotas were first determined by the central authorities and then subdivided 
further by the local authorities. Grain was collected by civilian groups and delivered to 
the Korean Food Company (Kim S. B. 2000: 155).   
 The Korean government’s first attempt to collect ri e resulted in failure. The goal 
set by the government was to collect 7.5 million sŏk (approximately 1,080,000 metric 
tons) of rice, or 48.4 per cent of the years’ harvest, aiming at a daily ration of three hop 
(430 grams) per capita for the urban population. The target was 2.34 million sŏk (336,960 
tons) more, or 45 per cent higher than that of the previous year. However, just 32 per cent 
of the target volume was achieved between autumn and 31 December 1948, and only 41 
per cent had been collected by the end of January 1949. Despite a presidential special 
order in February to take firm measures to achieve the collection goal, the end result was 
just 3.39 million sŏk (488,160 tons), or 51 per cent of the target (Kim S. B. 2000: 156-
158).  
 One of the main reasons for the failure was the government’s pricing policy. As I 
have shown in Table 1-7, Korea was still suffering from rampant post-war inflation in 
1948, and the currency circulation created by transactions between the government and 
farmers at harvest time could further aggravate inflation. Thus, following the precedent 
set by the US authorities, the Korean government set a low-price policy for government 
rice, paying a rate that was even lower than production costs. While the production costs 
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calculated by local producers ranged from 2,500 wŏn to 3,800 wŏn per straw bag (80 
kilograms), the government purchased rice at a cost of approximately 1,880 wŏn, which 
included 1,200 wŏn in cash, a yard of cotton and one-third of a bag of fertilizer (Kim S. B. 
2000: 156). Unlike the supplementary goods that farmers had been given by the US 
military government as an incentive to meet production goals, the supplies provided by 
the Korean government were a part of the payment for heir products. However, it was 
not uncommon for farmers to fail to receive these goods in kind as they came from 
abroad. When there were delays in shipments from abroad, they had no choice but to wait, 
holding onto the ‘exchange coupon’ issued by the government (Kim C. S. 2000: 165).    
 Farmers were uncooperative regarding food collection, and levelled clear 
criticisms at the government. Their dissatisfaction is clearly shown in the quote below 
from a meeting held by the Minister for Agriculture and Forestry:  
This situation [food collection] will bring subversion to the agricultural country 
of Korea. We farmers are also part of the Korean natio . We cannot help but be 
against the government, and our irritations are about to boil over. Even though 
we disagreed, we participated in the separate election for South Korea. The 
reason for this was that we had hoped for land reform and the abolition of food 
collection from the new government… 
   (Chosŏn ilbo, 7 September 1948, quoted in Kim S. B. 2000: 145)    
The government faced tremendous opposition from farmers, and was forced to make 
changes to the food control policy. Most significantly, it was impossible to carry out a 
full-scale food control system since the collected rice was far below the necessary 
quantities needed to maintain the food-rationing system. 
 From April 1949, general rationing, which had thus far aimed to feed the entire 
non-farming population, was replaced by a new rationing scheme which had limited 
recipients. Temporarily allowing the free sale of grain, the government announced that it 
was going to reduce the number of ration recipients from 7,140,000 to 2,892,000 (Kim C. 
S. 2000: 180). Under this scheme only certain people were eligible for rations: the poor, 
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government employees (i.e. public workers, policemen, firemen, the military, members of 
the Diet, and teachers), workers in ‘priority industries’ (i.e. coal mining, the railways, 
shipping, maintaining the electricity supply and steel manufacturing), patients in hospitals, 
and those in orphanages. For these people, a daily ration of between 2.5 (358 grams) and 
5 hop (715 grams) was provided.48 For example, in Seoul, the new rationing scheme 
began on 14 April 1949, when 912,000 citizens belonging to the specified groups 
received an average of two h p (285 grams) of grain (1.2 hop of rice and 0.8 hop of other 
grain) per day. Fifteen days’ worth of rations was di tributed twice a month.49 By 
implementing the new rationing system, the number of people who received a staple 
ration nationwide fell from 8,413,532 to 4,756,685 between August 1948 and August 
1949 (Kim C. S. 2000: 179).  
 A free-market system for selling rice was officially established on 16 February 
1950, with the promulgation of the Grain Management Law (Yanggok kwallipŏp糧穀管
理法). This policy marked the turning point in Korean grain management policy from 
‘full-scale state control’ (chŏnmyŏn t’ongje全面統制) to ‘control concurrent with free 
trade’ (t’ongje, chayu pyŏnghaeng統制,自由平行) (Kim S. B. 2000: 160). The act 
stipulated that the maximum quantity of rice the government could collect was one-third 
of total annual production: the remaining two-thirds were to be sold on the free market. 
This did not necessarily mean that the government’s i tervention in the rice market was 
reduced; the act included many articles that allowed the government to engage 
considerably in the direct and indirect control of the price and distribution of food 
resources. A wide range of foodstuffs, including rice, barley, soybeans, red beans, Italian 
millet, sorghum, maize and buckwheat, were put under state control. Exports, imports and 
processing (hulling, milling and brewing) were only possible with government 
permission. The act provided the government with the authority to control prices, not just 
those paid to farmers but those of the free market as well. Moreover, the government was 
able to impose restrictions on the consumption of foodstuffs by regulating sales, 
                                                
48 ‘Kungmin-ŭi siksaenghwal-e iltae pisang 국민의 식생활에 일대 비상’, Tonga ilbo, 22 March 1949. p.2.   
49 ‘P’aran-ŭi yanggok chungjŏm paegŭp taesang sŏnjŏng kongjŏng파란의 양곡중점배급대상 선정 공정’, 
Tonga ilbo, 16 April 1949. p.2.  
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processing and restaurant operations whenever such action was considered necessary 
(Kim P. T’. 2004: 83-84). In terms of the abolition f a compulsory grain collection, the 
Grain Management Law was a notable transformation that he Korean government 
achieved during the initial days of its establishment. However, this act provided the 
government with enormous power to keep a tight gripon Korean food consumption for 
decades to come. For example, the Grain Management Law served as the bedrock for the 
rice-saving campaigns vigorously encouraged by the government in the 1970s (see 7.2). 
The overall tone of the USAMGIK’s food policies, the government’s rigid control over 
people’s food consumption originated from the Japanese colonial authorities, was 
maintained.       
 One of the reasons behind the South Korean government’s determination to 
inherit the American food strategy at an early stage was the vulnerability of the Korean 
market. Korean grain markets had shrunk dramatically and had their proper functions 
removed when the wartime Japanese government consolidated state control of grain 
distribution. Moreover in post-colonial Korea, wealthy profiteers complicated the market 
through illegal hoarding and smuggling. Around the ime of the establishment of the 
Korean government, there were frequent discussions among Korean politicians about the 
introduction of a free-market system; however, the weakness of the market economy 
prevented the introduction of a free-market system for grain (Kim S. B. 2000: 145-146).  
  A more crucial factor in the Korean government’s preservation of its control over 
the grain market was a demand from the US government that the system of distribution 
control be retained. As explained earlier in this section, maintaining social order through 
a steady food supply was one of the major goals set by the US military government 
during its occupation. After the transfer of sovereignty to the South Korean government, 
the Americans believed that the distribution policy was essential to keep Korean society 
stable. For the Americans, Korea was ‘the one area of the world where the United States 
and the Soviet Union confronted one another in direct challenge, without the intervention 
of any third power’.50 They wanted Korea to be an anti-communist base in north-east 
Asia to help stem Soviet-inspired communism. The Americans believed that it was 
                                                
50 Robert T. Olivier, in the foreword to American Military Government in Korea, quoted in Meade 1951. 
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essential to maintain food security by means of state food control in order for there to be 
social order and economic stability (Kim S. B. 2000: 147).    
 This American political aim had a great influence on the food policy of the South 
Korean government. For example, in response to an appeal for economic assistance from 
Korean President Rhee Syngman (1948-1960) in September 1948, the American 
authorities requested that the Korean government retain the programme for the collection 
and rationing of rice (Kim S. B. 2000: 147-148; Yi T. G. 2002: 171). The Korean 
government gave in to US government demands and maintained the food policy. In 
December 1948 an Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Agreement was 
concluded between the two governments on the conditi  that the Korean government 
continued to implement grain control programmes (Yi T. G. 2002: 170-171). The ECA 
was a US government agency set up in 1948 to administer the Marshall Plan (officially 
the European Recovery Programme), an American aid programme which supported and 
helped to rebuild European economies after the WWII in order to prevent the spread of 
Soviet communism. Replacing GARIOA aid, the ECA programme provided the South 
Korean government with $116 billion worth of aid supplies, including raw materials, fuel, 
fertilizer, textiles and food resources, in 1949 alone (Ibid.: 212). While the majority of 
supplies provided through the GARIOA programme were consumer items, the ECA 
programme provided long-term aid to reconstruct the Korean economy. Under this 
programme, major economic development projects, such as the ‘Five Year Plan for 
Industrial Reconstruction’ (Sanŏp puhŭng 5kaenyŏn kyehoek産業復興 5個年計劃) and 
the ‘Plan for the Mobilization of Materials’ (Multong kyehoek物動計画), were launched 
by the Korean government. Even though these projects were aborted due to the outbreak 
of the Korean War (1950-1953), the aid programme continued thereafter under different 
names (Yi T. G. 2002: 173-176, 213). The initial background to the resurrection of the 
Japanese food-rationing system in the US occupation zone was the post-colonial food 
crisis. However, it was without a doubt, the conscious political and economic strategies of 
the Korean and US governments which strengthened centralized state control over the 
food distribution system that was to be maintained for decades to come.           
 The effectiveness of the control methods was the prominent reason for the 
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American authorities’ reuse of the Japanese machinery i  managing food rationing in 
post-colonial Korea. The focus of the US military government’s economic policy in 
Korea was on the stabilization and maintenance of the status quo rather than on 
development. Considering its occupation of Korea as an ‘interim step’, the Americans 
concentrated their efforts on tackling pressing problems rather than taking a broad and 
comprehensive view (Kim C. S. 1996: 100; Liem 1949: 80). In this context, reuse of the 
Japanese administrative system was the most practical solution for the Americans (Meade 
1951: 74-76). Under the American authorities’ policy, the Japanese system of food 
controls was recycled as a solution to maintain social order of post-colonial Korean 
society.  
 More importantly, the intricate international political circumstances surrounding 
the Korean peninsula and economic context of the country were vital factor behind the 
maintaining of the Japanese wartime methods in liberated Korea. Once resurrected by the 
US military government, the colonial structure of state food control was further 
reinforced by the South Korean authorities under th influence of the US economic 
assistance programme for the country. The legal frame originating from the colonial 
administration set the overall tone for Korean government food policies to be 
implemented for decades to come, providing the governm nt with vast powers of control 
over the distribution and consumption of food. In short, the colonial legacy of centralized 
state controls over food was inherited in by Korean authorities under the economic and 
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As Henderson described the Japanese style of rule over Korea as a ‘stern, centralized, 
bureaucratic administration without constitutional or popular restraint’, centralized 
administration was one of the principle features of Imperial Japan’s control over its 
colonies (1968: 73). A rigid governance mechanism centred on the Governor-General 
who had the overwhelmingly strong authority, was crucial in exercising the colonial 
government’s food controls in Korea, as I discussed in 1.1. 
Yet repression and coercion were not the only measur s that Imperial Japan 
adopted to control its people. The administrative effici ncy was integrated into a high-
quality penetrating ruling structure, especially after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese 
War (1937). Just as the authorities in Japan Proper ensured the Japanese individuals’ 
conformity with the framework of an officialdom-centred governance structure by 
integrating them into the numerous hierarchical civilian associations, similar ruling 
methods were employed in Korea (Braibanti 1948: 136; Garon 1997: 5). In order to 
secure public support for the war, the Japanese government ran war mobilization 
campaigns in Korea, making huge efforts to organize c vilian groups. Originally set up 
for the spiritual indoctrination of the people, these groups became an extension of the 
nation and, as such, an effective tool for the state o use. Under the state’s growing 
authoritarianism and militarism, they assumed a broad range of practical functions in 
implementing war policies, including operating the official food-rationing system, their 
major role in urban areas. The mass organizations were an integral part of the Japanese 
wartime food management programme.  
After the decolonization of Korea, the civilian organizations’ function as a 
rationing administration was revived under the US military government’s rationing 
programme. It was further reinforced by the Korean government which used them as 
official food rationing channels, and to provide disciplinary control over the nation in 
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pursuit of the national goal of constructing an anti-communist country. For several 
decades after their creation, these mass associations continued to draw the attention of the 
government, which sought to reach into the lives of its people and increase disciplinary 
power over the populace in order to implement state policies and mobilize the masses for 
economic and political purposes.  
This chapter aims to describe how the Japanese systm of civilian organizations 
functioned as a rationing institution, remained intact in post-colonial society under 
another state food-rationing system, and was exploited as a political means to support 
anti-communist efforts during the Cold War. My focus will be on urban areas. Civilian 
associations also existed in rural areas, but food rationing was chiefly implemented in the 
cities. In the first section of this chapter, I will document the central role of civilian 
associations in the food-rationing system of the wartime Japanese government. In the 
following section, I will show that their function remained unchanged under the US 
occupation authorities’ food management system, and that these groups were strategically 
strengthened by the Korean government for the political purposes. The goal of this 
chapter is to illuminate the economic and political factors which contributed to retaining 
the wartime colonial legacy in post-colonial Korea.   
2.1  Aegukpan  
The Rise of Civilian Organizations Supporting the Wartime Japanese Government 
The mission of the leaders of the aikokuhan51 is truly important in rationing 
daily necessities…a smooth rationing operation shall on y be achieved 
when there is consumer cooperation led by the heads of the aikokuhan. The 
rationing procedure requires even greater efficiency from the perspective of 
national economy than it does from an individual one. It is crucial to 
enhance the organizational strengths of each aikokuhan and their 
activities… More and more, the current [war] situation requires the 
enthusiasm and the strength to help each other which stems from the 
intimate cooperation of the leaders of the aikokuhan. The strength coming 
                                                
51 Japanese reading of aegukpan.  
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up from the bottom of society is the very kernel of the National Total 
Mobilization Movement, and will become the driving force behind 
bringing a bright future to East Asia. Without the consolidation and 
advancement of each cell organization, town associati ns cannot function 
fully.       
                         (Keijōfu sōmubu kokumin sōryokuka 1942: 118) 
Civilian organizations, the so-called ‘patriotic units’ (aegukpan愛国班), were created 
with the purpose of implementing Japan’s war campaigns. They were the cell 
organizations of the Korean Federation for the Total Mobilization of the National Spirit 
(Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō Chōsen renmei国民精神総動員運動朝鮮連盟 ), 
established on 7 July 1938 as the lead organization responsible for implementing the 
National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō国民精神総動
員運動) in Korea. The Movement was the Korean version of the wartime national 
mobilization movement of the same name formed in 1937 in Japan by the Konoe 
Fumimarō cabinet (1937-1939 and 1940-1941). In 1940 the move ent in Korea was 
renewed in parallel with the acceleration of the Japanese campaign, which was operating 
under the new name of the New Order Movement (Shintaisei undō新体制運動) and run 
by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei yokusankai大政翼賛会), the fascist 
organization in power in Japan. In October 1940, the name of the national movement and 
the central administration in Korea were changed to the National Total Mobilization 
Movement (Kokumin sōryoku undō 国民総力運動 ) and the Korean Federation for 
National Total Mobilization Movement (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei国民総力運動
朝鮮連盟).52  
The first step for the movement was to set up a natio wide organizational network. 
Setting its ultimate goals as ‘national unity’ (kǒguk ilch’i 擧國一致 ), ‘loyalty and 
patriotism’ (chinch’ung poguk盡忠報國), and ‘untiring patience’ (kyǒnin chigu堅忍持
久 ), forming a network of unified organizations was fundamental to promoting the 
                                                
52 Hereafter I will use the term ‘Korean Federation’ instead of the ‘Korean Federation for the Total 
Mobilization of the National Spirit’ and the ‘Korean Federation for National Total Mobilization’ in the 
body of the text.  
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national movement. The Governor-General’s Secretary for Political Affairs Ōno 
Rokuichirō led the formation of the central organization, with important Korean citizens, 
such as Yun Ch’i-ho (1865-1945), also involved (Chōsen sōtokufu 1940: 126-128). At the 
same time as the establishment of the Korean Federation, sub-organizations were rapidly 
created, along with jurisdictional administrative subdivisions: the Korean Federation 
provided the top level of the structure, with provincial federations (to yǒnnmaeng道連
盟 ) organized beneath it. The provincial federations were divided into city/county 
federations (pu/gun yǒnnmaeng府郡連盟) and further into town federations (chŏngdong 
yǒnnmaeng町洞連盟).53 Comprised of ten to twenty neighbouring households, aegukpan 
units were established under each ‘town association’ (chŏngdonghoe町洞會). 54  Some 
aegukpan were formed in offices, schools, factories and companies, but the 
overwhelming majority of the units were based in resid ntial areas. Chart 2-1 shows a 
representation of the Korean Federation in Seoul City.   










     (Chōsen sōtokufu 1940: 65) 
                                                
53 Town federations were known as both ‘c ō renmei町連盟’ and ‘dō renmei洞連盟’.  
54  ‘Ilman isang-ǔi aegukpan injǒphan sibo naeji ipho-ro chojik ch’ongdongwǒn undong-ǔi 
silch’ǒnmang一萬以上의愛国班 隣接한十戸乃至廿戶로組織 總動員運動의實踐網’, Chosǒn ilbo朝
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The government gave the highest priority to building up a solid aegukpan network 
that encompassed the entire Korean population (Kim Y. H. 2002: 237). The purpose of 
aegukpan units was to ensure the Korean people’s integral cooperation with the 
implementation of state wartime policies.55 What colonial authorities specifically had in 
mind was the spiritual education of Koreans in order to build a cooperative attitude 
towards the government’s mobilization campaigns. It anticipated that the Korean 
populace would not happily submit to the coercive controls of the government. Therefore, 
it was necessary to induce people’s willing cooperation with state policies in order to 
strengthen the war footing (Kim Y. H. 2002: 237; Yi C. M. 2004: 415). The government 
found a solution to the issue of mass education by setting three major goals: ‘to found a 
national political ideology’ (kukch’e kwannyŏm myŏngjing国体観念明徴), ‘to cultivate 
the idea of imperial subjects’ (hwangguk sinmin ŭisik simhwa皇国臣民意識深化), and 
‘to foster a greater understanding of the nation’s situation’ (siguk insik ch’ŏlchŏ時局認識
徹底) (Chōsen sōtokufu 1940: 31). With the aim of achieving these goals, a nationwide 
network of aegukpan was quickly created. The number of units reached approximately 
280,000 within just three months of movement’s beginnings in July 1938, and by 
December 1939, had expanded to 334,000 nationwide (Yi C. M. 2004: 417-418; 
Kokumin seishin sōdōin Chōsen remmei jimukyoku 1940: 24). At the beginning of 1939, 
there were more than 10,000 aegukpan units in Seoul alone (Yi C. M. 2004: 440). A well-
organized network of aegukpan was an integral part of the National Spiritual 
Mobilization Movement as they were the ‘executive instruments’ (silch’ŏn chojik實践組
織) that put the state’s strategies into action (Kim Y. M. 2005: 63). 
Originally set up with the purpose of spiritually indoctrinating the Korean 
populace, the aegukpan assumed a wide range of practical functions in imple enting the 
government’s wartime policies. Nearly every kind of mobilization project organized by 
the government was carried out at the level of the aegukpan unit. Responsibilities 
entrusted to the civilian groups included labour and material mobilization, thrift 
                                                
55 ‘Min’ga sipho-ro aegukpan chŏngsin tongwŏn chungang chibang-ŭi chojik taegang民家十戸로 愛国班 
精神動員中央地方의 組織大綱’, Chosǒn ilbo, 21 July 1938, p.3.     
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campaigns, campaigns for increased productivity (especially in rural areas), and 
encouraging the conscription of Korean men into the Japanese armed forces, as well as 
the operation of the rationing schemes for essential commodities (Chōsen sōtokufu 1940: 
50). All these tasks were coordinated and carried out by the aegukpan, which acted as the 
basic unit for sanctions and took collective responsibility for each other under the 
command of a group leader.   
The system of town associations and aegukpan was modelled after the Japanese 
‘block associations’ (chōnaikai 町 内 会 ) and their sub-divisions, ‘neighbourhood 
associations’ (tonarigumi隣組). Tonarigumi can be traced back to the ‘five-man bands’ 
(goningumi五人組) forcibly formed by the Tokugawa regime in the Edo Period (1600-
1867) for the purpose of creating collective responsibility for tax paying. The leader of 
each band was obligated to make sure that the people they were responsible for lived 
frugally and industriously so that their taxes could be paid (Braibanti 1948: 140).  
The Japanese government’s project to intensify the us of chōnaikai and 
tonarigumi for the promotion of the wartime nationalist movement was formulated to 
intentionally happen at the same time as the inauguration of the Imperial Rule Assistance 
Association. On 11 September 1940, the Minister of H me Affairs officially ordered the 
reorganization of the block associations and, two weeks later, issued separate instructions 
for enhancing the tonarigumi network. The reorganization of the tonarigumi was an 
integral part of the Japanese war mobilization movement (Braibanti 1948: 141-142). As 
was the case with the aegukpan, the original role envisaged by the government for the 
tonarigumi was the spiritual indoctrination of its citizens, but they soon assumed similar 
responsibilities, including the administration of food rationing in the cities (Cwiertka 
2010b). In terms of their function as agencies bridging the gap between the wartime 
Japanese government and the ordinary people, the civilian associations in Japan and 
Korea were quite similar to each other.   
Despite these similarities, the organizations in Korea were more bureaucratic in 
nature, acting as an extension of the administrative organization. This was due to the 
different development of the civilian groups in these two countries. Even though they 
both originated from groups formed compulsorily by the authorities, between the Meiji 
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Era (1868-1912) and the 1920s the chōnaikai and tonarigumi had existed as autonomous 
communities led by the citizens for the purposes of elf-help, having few links with the 
government. Before being put under government control, they had been run by ordinary 
people in pursuit of a better life. Their activities were purely based on community 
benefits, such as having a vaccination against dysentery every year, setting up outdoor 
lighting in their towns at nights to deter theft, decorating their shopping streets to increase 
business success, and organizing community events, such as sporting festivals (Araki 
1938: 10-11). As autonomous communities led by civilians, these groups became highly 
active after calamities, such as the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and the Great Kantō 
Earthquake (1923). This is illustrated by the fact that in 1923 there were approximately 
600 chōnaikai in Tokyo, a figure that had increased to 1,400 by 1933 (Ibid.: 8).  
In contrast to Japan, the civilian organizations in Korea had been designed and 
developed for political purposes under the leadership of the government from the very 
beginning. In 1916, for example, Seoul City governme t introduced the System of Town 
Representatives (chŏngch’ongdaeje町總代制) to make use of civilians’ assistance in 
handling the considerably increased administration after the reorganization of the city in 
1914. It selected more than 100 ‘town representatives’ (ch’ongdae總代 ) and other 
members (fewer than five people per leader) from the citizens, based on their town of 
residence. Despite being ordinary civilians, they were entrusted with a wide range of 
administration-related tasks by the local government. For example, they disseminated 
newly passed laws among the people, and encouraged them to pay their taxes punctually 
and to report house moves and other changes in family status to the local government as 
required under the Family Registration Law (Kosekihō戸籍法) (Sŏ H. J. 2001: 117-118). 
The civilian associations led by town representatives continued to function until Korea’s 
liberation from Japanese rule in 1945. None of the representatives, however, were 
officially recognized by the government or paid for their work. In principle, basic 
financial support was provided by the city governmet; however, this was far from the 
reality (Sǒ H. J. 2001: 124).           
The function of the civilian organizations was reinforced in 1933 with the 
promulgation of the Seoul City Town Association Regulations (Keijōfu chōdōkai kisoku
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京城府町洞会規則). During the sixteen years under the former system, support from 
civilian organizations had become increasingly important to the city government (Sǒ H. J.  
2001: 125). Therefore, the authorities intended to further enhance organizational 
performance by encouraging cooperation from more people. The regulations ordered the 
enlargement of the groups by setting up town associati ns, each of which was to include 
a board, with more members, led by the ch’ongdae, and the creation of sub-divisions 
under each town association to enhance operational cap bility. Along with administrative 
support for local government, activities for the improvement of community life (i.e., the 
enhancement of living conditions) were emphasized (Kim Y. M. 2005: 36). The civilian 
groups were allowed to collect money from citizens for activities in the form of a 
membership fee.  
Supported by the authorities, town associations increased their activities, 
especially their administrative support for local government. For example, Samp’ant’ong 
town association in Seoul handled the delivery of 377 official documents to and from the 
government and other public offices in 1934; Wŏnnam-dong town association handled 
422 during the space of a year between 1934 and 1935; and Tangju-dong town 
association handled 450 during eighteen months of 1934 and 1935. On top the 
administrative tasks, these town associations were involved in a variety of community 
activities. For example, Samp’ant’ong town association purchased some land and gave it 
to the Seoul government in order to build a road in their town. Educational activities, 
such as lectures for spiritual education and cooking classes for housewives, were also 
held using the money collected from the people (Anonymous 1936: 30-32). These 
examples show that the rise of civilian groups in Korea was largely a result of the 
government strategy to incorporate civilian groups into administrative organizations. 
Their activities became important to community lives in some ways; however, they never 
escaped from the influence of the authorities. When t  war mobilization campaign was 
launched, the network of civilian groups was mobilized as part of the national movement 
to sustain the war efforts. As of 1938, there were approximately 260 town associations in 
Seoul (Kim Y. M. 2005: 33).  
Well-functioning civilian groups in Korea were praised and held up as models by 
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the government in Japan. In Japan, the renaming of the National Spiritual Mobilization 
Movement as the New Order Movement in 1940 was large y due to the failure of the 
former. Highlighting the failure of the campaign in Japan as a bad example, the Korean 
Federation emphasized the importance of maintaining the pace of the national campaign 
in Korea (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen remmei 1945: 43-44). The politicized features of the 
town associations were fully transmitted to their subdivisions, the aegukpan. In the name 
of autonomy, the government expanded and consolidated its political influence through 
the nationwide network of civilian groups.  
Implementing War Policies through the Aegukpan 
As explained previously, the purpose behind the establi hment of the aegukpan was to 
ensure people’s cooperation with the implementation of state wartime policies. To 
achieve this, it was important for the government to be able to convey directives and 
information to the people. One of the methods of communication used by the government 
was through official publications, such as the monthly periodical Sōdōin 総動員 (Total 
Mobilization).56 Written in Japanese, it was chiefly aimed at middle-class leaders, the 
heads of town associations and aegukpan leaders, who functioned as the links between 
the higher-level organizations and their subordinate bodies and members. Kawashima, the 
chief director of the Korean Federation, clarified ts objectives in the first issue, published 
in July 1939:     
The content of the official magazine, Sōdōin, covers essential information for all 
the people at each level of the organization. In particular, I hope that the leaders of 
the town/village [associations] and at the a gukpan level utilize it for their own 
education as well as for that of their members. 
(Kawashima 1939: 3)   
Sōdōin disseminated government regulations and provided practical advice on 
how to put them into practice. Detailed action plans, determined by the Korean 
Federation and called ‘agreement agenda’ (mōshiawase jikō申し合わせ事項), were to 
be carried out by the general populace in the form f onthly campaigns. For example, 
                                                
56 It was renamed Kokumin sōryoku国民総力（National Total Mobilization) from November 1940.   
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the goals set for the austerity campaign of August 1941 were to not drink alcoholic drinks 
during the daytime; to refrain from extravagant dressing and wasteful spending; to collect 
waste materials; and to not send flowers to each other (Anonymous 1941f: 88). The aims 
for September 1941 were to participate in an air-raid drill; to not circulate false rumours; 
to save rice; and to encourage the use of vacant ground for vegetable gardening (Ibid.). 
The magazine also included economic information. For example, articles in the July 1940 
issue dealt with the problem of wartime inflation, the need to buy state bonds, and the 
newly established restrictive regulations concerning price controls (Mizuta 1940: 33-37). 
In October 1939, the circulation of Sōdōin totalled 2,050 in Seoul, 460 in P’yŏngyang, 
345 in Mokp’o, 326 in Inchǒn, 244 in Taegu, and 206 in Pusan (Anonymous 1939d: 88-
91).  
In addition to educating middle-class leaders, the government devoted efforts to 
diffusing its directives among the general public. With the aim of it circulating among 
ordinary aegukpan members, the Korean Federation issued another official publication in 
1940 called Saebyǒk (Dawn), which was written in simple Korean. It was soon followed 
by a Japanese language version, Aikokuhan 愛国班 (Patriotic Units). Targeting the 
leaders of aegukpan and ordinary members, the Korean Federation published 350,000 
copies of these publications in 1940 (Yi C. M. 2004: 418), and this had increased to 
430,000 by 1942 (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen remmei 1945: 123). 
Another method of communication was the ‘circulating bulletin board’ 
(hoeramp’an 回覧板 ) which was passed around aegukpan members. Seoul City 
government sent out hoeramp’an three times a month until the Maeil sinbo newspaper 
took over the role of the board in March 1945 due to the shortage of paper.57 Along with 
the prevalence of the word ‘aegukpan’, the term ‘hoeramp’an’ quickly became a 
household name. Even though they were not actually hoeramp’an, a variety of campaigns 
were promoted among the aegukpan by borrowing the name. For example, during 1943 
and 1944 the Maeil sinbo newspaper serialized articles that provided detailed guidelines 
for frugal living under the title of the ‘Circulating bulletin board for decisive battle daily 
                                                
57 ‘Sinmun-ŭl t’onghae palp’yo puyŏnmaeng-ŭi aegukpan hoeramp’an parhaeng chungji新聞을通해發表 
府聯盟의愛国班回覽板發行中止’, Maeil sinbo毎日申報, 26 February 1945, p.2.  
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life’ (Kyǒlchǒn saenghwal hoeramp’an決戰生活回覧板).         
The most effective method adopted by the government to disseminate directives 
was the monthly meeting. After policies were made by the Korean Federation, they were 
channelled to the people through regular meetings held by each echelon (Anonymous 
1942d: 123). In order to systematically transmit information, the sectional meetings were 
scheduled beforehand. For example, in Seoul, the leaders of town associations (or wards) 
gathered on the third day of each month, the heads of the aegukpan on the fifth day and 
ordinary aegukpan members on the seventh day (Hizuka 1941: 120). By arranging 
meeting dates that followed the organizational structure, top-down directives were 
efficiently delivered from the Korean Federation to the members of the cell organizations.    
There was a strong emphasis on the ‘regular patriotic meetings’ (aeguk 
pansanghoe愛國班常會),58 the lowest-level meetings of representatives of ordinary 
households. The authorities considered the pansanghoe to be the most important channel 
for the transmission of policies from the top to the general populace (sangŭi hadal上意
下達) and for conveying the practical situation of the people to the government (hasang 
sangt’ong下狀上通) (Hizuka 1941: 111). Therefore, at least one person fr m each 
household was required to attend the monthly meetings. Guidelines were set out by the 
Korean Federation so that the meeting was carried out in a uniform order. According to 
the standards, the meetings started at the same time (8 p.m. in the summer and 7 p.m. in 
the winter) with an announcement via a nationwide radio broadcast following a fixed 
pattern. The agenda of the meetings of the Seoul City Federation followed the format 
below:  
1) Opening of the meeting  
2) Kyūjō yōhai59 
3) Silent prayer (for national glory and fortune in war) 
4) Announcement of the agreement agendum  
5) Reports 
                                                
58 I use the term ‘pansanghoe’ to refer to the ‘aeguk pansanghoe’.  
59 Performing a salutation in the direction of the Imperial Palace in Japan.  
Chapter Two 
98 
6) Lectures (on the National Total Mobilization Movement, wartime measures, 
air-defence drill, the situation of industries and the economy, hygiene and the 
reform of daily life)  
7) Kōkoku shinmin seishi60  
8) Close of the meeting  
(Kokumin sōryoku Keijō remmei 1940: 69-70) 
With or without the use of the radio, people were advised to hold meetings following the 
set procedure, at in the houses of the unit leaders or ordinary members, or even outdoors 
when other suitable venues were unavailable (Hizuka 1941: 121-122). To avoid wasting 
time and money, they were discouraged from preparing a y snacks other than tea and 
from meeting for longer than two hours. Of the parts of the meeting, the announcement of 
the monthly agendum was the most important, as various state policies to be carried out 
by the people were transmitted within it. In order to ensure the smooth transmission of 
information, the government advised people to discus  items calmly, and not to complain 
or oppose the regulations for opposition’s sake (Anonymous 1942b: 97).       
Full responsibility for leading the meeting successfully and smoothly rested with 
the unit leaders (panjang班長). When they delivered the instructions from the higher 
organizations, they had to translate the literary Japanese into simple Korean so as to 
ensure people fully understood them (Kawagishi 1941: 9). Although a representative 
from every household had to attend the unit meetings, not everybody could easily 
comprehend the state policies due to their differing ages, sexes and levels of education. 
The panjang had to deliver a variety of directives to these peopl  in an efficient way, 
using understandable terms, and ensure that they were put into practice by each member. 
The leaders were also instructed to lead various discussions and lectures, on topics such 
as government announcements, the reports of activities and studies, and on personal 
experiences, which were intended to prevent people from complaining, grumbling and 
chatting during the meetings (Anonymous 1942b: 97). 
In addition to supervising monthly meetings, all the missions assigned to the 
aegukpan were led by the panjang. The monthly ceremony held on the first day of each 
                                                
60 Chanting of the oath of imperial subjects. This was decreed by the seventh Governor-General in Korea, 
Minami Jiro (1936-1941), in October 1937. It was recit d publicly in all schools and at other organizational 
meetings.   
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month to honour the Japanese state-religion of Shinto, labour mobilization, the collection 
of waste, the arrangement of support for the families of soldiers at the front, and the 
organization of (food) saving campaigns were managed and driven by the panjang in 
each unit. Despite being ordinary citizens, the panjang were key players who took the 
lead in disseminating state directives and mobilizing labour and material resources from 
their own groups.    
  Despite such important jobs being entrusted to the aegukpan, their management 
was riddled with problems, which centred on the role f the panjang. Discord between 
the panjang and unit members was widespread. On the one hand, some unit leaders’ 
sense of superiority over their members became problematic. The domineering attitudes 
of some leaders towards their unit members caused growing frustration among ordinary 
members (Satō 1942: 32). On the other hand, some people, particularly intellectuals in 
urban areas, were indifferent towards their panjang, as well as towards the activities of 
the aegukpan itself. They believed that the panjang were people of leisure, and that 
educated people would never accept such a role (Matsumoto 1942: 19). These contrasting 
problems resulted in inadequate cooperation between the members of units. 
Another problem was that where women took the lead in aegukpan affairs, men 
were distanced from the unit’s activities. The majority of aegukpan were led by women. 
One of the main reasons for the women’s central role was their relative availability for 
participation in daytime air-defence training, one of the major aegukpan activities, and 
one which required a commander to lead the people at a time when most men were at 
work (Ibid.: 20). Women’s activity outside the home also resulted in some undesirable 
responses from Korean men. Through the successive centuries of Chosŏn Korea (1392-
1910), Korean women’s social activities had generally been banned under the strict 
regulations of Confucianism that rigidly divided betw en the male and female spheres. 61   
Even though adherence to such Confucian ideas had we kened by the end of nineteenth 
century, in Korea deeply rooted social values did not change easily. As a result, the 
activities of the aegukpan came to be considered as sundry women’s work, and in turn, 
resulted in men’s reluctance to become involved in unit activities.  
                                                
61 For a detailed account of Confucianism and Korean women’s life in Chosŏn Korea, see Yoo 2008: 15-33.     
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Such a situation was a cause of serious concern for the government, since the cell 
organization’s support through its cooperative relationship was a key element in the 
success of the national campaign. Encouraging men’s involvement in their unit activities 
was a frequent topic dealt with in Sōdōin. In various articles, the government called for 
strengthened cooperation between unit members, regardl ss of the gender of the leader. 
One of them, for instance, praised the energetic activities of women, proclaiming that 
they received ‘baptism in the name of the nation at w r’, and argued that if an aegukpan 
was led by a woman, it was acceptable for her to seek advice from her husband (Ibid.: 21). 
The government repeatedly exhorted men to participae in their unit’s activities, such as 
attending monthly meetings, and called for a change to the prevalent thought that 
aegukpan affairs were nothing but women’s work.62 In July 1941, President of the Korean 
Federation Kawagishi developed a plan to revitalize the female-oriented pansanghoe. He 
ordered husbands to attend the monthly meetings, adding that it was ultimately preferable 
that they accompany their wives. Moreover, he expressly commanded the replacement of 
female panjang with men, with the exception of instances where having a female leader 
was unavoidable. In exchange, he encouraged the setting up of special meetings for 
women, especially in urban areas, in order to promote campaigns for the improvement of 
daily life (Anonymous 1941a: 61).  
Despite the central organization’s directives, in practice, the activities of the 
aegukpan remained chiefly in the hands of female panjang. For example, the Japanese 
scholar Higuchi illustrated in his research that the activities of aegukpan in Yŏngdŭngp’o 
in Seoul, were further invigorated after women took ver as panjang from male leaders. 
The number of units also increased: between December 1940 and August 1941, their 
number grew from 80 to 120. By the end of 1942, approximately 70 per cent of the 
aegukpan in Seoul were led by women (Higuchi 1994: 121).  
Many examples of female panjang and their unit activities were reported in the 
government-controlled magazines. As well as emphasizing their intellect and excellence 
in homemaking, articles in the magazines illustrated female leaders’ earnest efforts and 
                                                
62 ‘Ilche ch’amjŏn-ŭi kago-ro sil saenghwal-ŭl chasuk chagye pu-eso aegukpan-ege silch’ŏn o yogang-ŭl 
chisi一齊參戰의覺悟로 實生活을自肅自戒 府에서愛国班에게 實踐五要項을指示’, Chosǒn ilbo, 28 
July 1940, p.2.  
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successful unit activities. For example, an article n Sōdōin introduced the panjang of 
Che-il-gu unit in Tangnaeyŏm-chŏng town in Seoul as a model leader. In spite of her own 
financial difficulties due to her husband’s illness, her outstanding exploits as group leader 
brought success in her unit’s activities. When air-r id training took place, she led them by 
wearing mompe63 made from recycled waste, and hardily carried on (Anonymous 1941d: 
86-87). Recognizing the essential role of women in the aegukpan, the Seoul government 
ordered the appointment of housewives as assistant le ders of aegukpan units; as of 
August 1941, there were more than 1,100 women acting as assistant leaders (Anonymous 
1941c: 74-75). With or without the title of leader or assistant leader, many Korean women 
took on leadership roles during air-raid drills and labour mobilizations organized by their 
aegukpan (Hoshino 1942: 28-29).     
The Food Rationing Programme and the Growing Authority of the Aegukpan Leaders  
An important event that put the aegukpan at the core of community life in urban Korea 
was food rationing, which began in 1940. Beginning with staple foods (rice and other 
grains), various foodstuffs and daily commodities were put under rationing controls. Even 
though rationing was under the supervision of the government, the practical 
administration of it was almost entirely entrusted o town associations and aegukpan. For 
example, under the staple-rationing system in Seoul, responsibility for issuing and 
distributing purchasing permits to individual households was in the hands of these 
civilian groups. When staple food rationing began in May 1940 in Seoul, approximately 
60 per cent of the population belonged to the distribution scheme managed by the town 
associations and aegukpan; from 1942, all citizens had to acquire purchasing permits 
through these organizations (see 1.1). As the food situation deteriorated, an increasing 
number of foodstuffs were included in the rationing controls. In Seoul, by 1943, the free 
trade of meat, fresh fish, chillies, fruit, vegetables, condensed and powdered milk, cows’ 
milk for infants and the sick, salt, and alcoholic drinks had been replaced by a ration 
                                                
63 Mompe are coarsely made pantaloons originating from peasant work clothes worn in north-eastern Japan 
in the Edo period; they had become the home-front uniform by the time of the Pacific War in Japan. In 
Korea, the colonial government coerced people into wearing mompe, especially for air-raid drills, due to the 
freedom of movement they provided. For a detailed account of state regulations on women’s clothing in 
colonial Korea, see An T’. Y. 2007.        
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permit system (Sugiyama 1943: 14, 17, 20, 25, and 41; Yi S. S. 2001: 59). These 
foodstuffs could only be officially obtained with ration permits issued by the town 
associations and distributed by the leaders of eachaegukpan.   
 The panjang, who acted as end-distributors for the rationing system, were closely 
involved in the administration of various rationing controls and had significant influence 
over their management. As explained in 1.1, there were variations in the rationing 
methods for foodstuffs and daily commodities depending upon the supply situation and 
the administrative capabilities of the local governments. On the one hand, foodstuffs 
consumed by everybody on a daily basis were rationed according to a previously set daily 
allowance. For example, under the staple rationing programme in Seoul, citizens were 
given two to five days’ rations at once, which contai ed a daily allowance of three hop 
(430 grams) of grain, including rice and others, per rson.64 On the other hand, another 
type of rationing met the specific needs of certain people, for example providing milk for 
infants. When requests for extraordinary commodities arose, the panjang played an 
important role in the rationing administration. For example, in order to acquire specific 
foodstuffs for infants and the sick, individuals were required to provide a certificate that 
proved the mothers’ inability to breastfeed or sickness from the doctor. It was only once 
the leader of the aegukpan had accepted a person’s application, after checking the actual 
condition of the applicant, that the applicant could be issued with a purchasing permit by 
the leader of the town association (Sugiyama 1943: 18-19). The panjang had a lot of 
power to control rationing. 
The influence of the panjang was also exemplified in their control of the meat 
rationing programme. The programme took the form of a rotating schedule based on the 
registration of the size of each household at the distribution stations. Meat could be 
purchased twice a month per household on a designated day, with the allowance set 
according to family size: 50 grams for a household of up to four members, and 100 grams 
for up to nine people. Under this scheme, ration cards, on which the number of family 
members in each household was recorded by the panjang, were shared between the unit’s 
                                                
64 ‘Iril 2500-sŏk pu singnyang chohab-i paegŭp一日 2500石 府食糧組合이配給’, Chosǒn ilbo, 3 May 
1940, p.2.  
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households (ten households per ration card). After a family received their ration, the card 
was passed to the next household. The ration cards were kept under the strict supervision 
of the unit leaders, and could not be reissued. The panjang was the only person with the 
authority to correct the contents of the ration card when there was a change in the number 
of family members or when households moved in or out of the area (Sugiyama 1943: 41).  
 In addition to their involvement with rationing, the panjang were allowed to store 
food resources. In waging a long war, the government recognized the growing importance 
of securing emergency provisions for its people. The Seoul City government distributed 
canned food in 1942, the production and supply of which had thus far strictly been 
prioritized for feeding the troops in the field. The government decided to distribute the 
food to the leaders of each aegukpan and have them store it as emergency supplies for 
their unit members. Needless to say, in principle, th  food was not to be consumed unless 
in an emergency situation and with official permission; however, it is noteworthy that the 
government left the distribution of the food to thediscretion of the panjang. Thus, it was 
possible for the unit leaders to distribute the emergency provisions as rations 
(Anonymous 1942a: 48). The wartime scarcity of food resources boosted the unit leader’s 
degree of control over the survival of the people for whom they were responsible.    
  The increasing power of the aegukpan leaders paralleled the expansion of the 
rationing programmes. During the complex and chaotic process of rationing, panjang 
were entrusted with making arbitrary decisions in the name of proper and fair distribution, 
taking people’s individual circumstances into consideration. This was especially true of 
the irregular rationing of daily necessities when their supply was insufficient to evenly 
distribute them to all members of the patriotic unit. The programme of cotton distribution 
in Korea introduced in June 1940 in Seoul provides a good example of the malpractices 
of the panjang. At first, ration cards valid for one year were issued, taking into 
consideration the population of Seoul, and were distributed upon request. However, it 
soon became clear that it was impossible to supply cotton in the quantities required, 
owing to the increasingly deteriorating production capacity. Despite the supply deficiency, 
demand did not fall as the purchasing permits were valid for a relatively long period. The 
imbalance between supply and demand led to price hikes, and induced serious 
distribution malpractices by suppliers, including illegal hoarding and diversion to the 
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black market. To address this situation, the governm nt amended the rationing system the 
following year; this time, considering monthly supply quantities, it distributed the 
‘correct’ number of ration cards, restricting customers’ demand as much as possible. Yet, 
a great number of people were left with purchasing permits for cotton rations distributed 
the previous year. As a result, the rationing system gave the unit leaders considerable 
freedom to distribute supplies. Some leaders held lotteries to select the recipients, while 
others distributed them to those most in need (Nishiwaki 1941: 31-32). In any event, it 
was the leaders who had the power to select the recipients. They could give the 
purchasing permits to their friends and relatives, or they could choose to keep them for 
themselves instead.     
The rationing of rubber shoes bore many similarities o that of cotton. With regard 
to shoes, the size of each individual’s feet needed to be considered as well as the supply 
situation, making it very difficult to distribute the right sized shoes to everyone. If 
someone received a ration card for an ill-fitting size of rubber shoes in the lottery, he/she 
could either give it to another member or return it to he unit leader. This situation led to 
widespread irregularities: ration cards frequently disappeared from the rationing channels 
without record and eventually appeared on the black market (Ibid.).  
It was not uncommon for the unit leaders’ privileged position in the distribution 
system to be exploited.  For example, according to one Keizai chian nippō経済治安日報
(Daily Report on Economy and Security), written by the economic police, the leader of 
an aegukpan in Yŏngdŭngp’o town, Seoul, was arrested by the police for keeping 
purchasing permits for cotton, towels and rubber shoe  for his own consumption instead 
of distributing them to his unit members (Hōmukyoku keijika 1942b: 136-137). Common 
malpractices included adding non-existent persons t ration cards and receiving ‘extra’ 
rations by using additional ration books (Hōmukyoku keijika 1942b: 280). These 
irregularities were largely responsible for the alleged ‘ghost population’ of 150,000 in 
Seoul in 1944 (Mitsui 1944: 22). Within two years of the introduction of the rationing 
system in 1940, approximately 1,000 cases of ‘favouritism rationing’ (chŏngsil paegŭp情
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實配給) by aegukpan leaders had been recorded by the police.65 The abuse of power by 
aegukpan leaders was one of the critical malpractices that undermined the rationing 
programme. 
Despite the crimes committed by the panjang, the rationing mechanism 
strengthened the power of the unit leaders as this was the most effective way to ensure 
that unit members cooperated with their leaders and took part in unit activities.  For 
example, the maternity cotton-rationing system, which began in August 1942 in Seoul, 
adopted an exceptional distributional method: the panjang were entrusted with issuing the 
purchasing permits for it. The unit leaders had already played an important role in 
keeping, approving and distributing ration cards; however, the authority to issue 
purchasing permits had, until then, belonged to the leaders of the town associations. An 
official of Seoul City government stated that such a decision would strengthen solidarity 
among aegukpan members by giving extensive power to the unit leaders (Keijōfu 
sōmubu kokumin sōryokuka 1942: 218). This example shows that p njang empowerment 
in the rationing administration was boosted by the authorities, which sought to enhance 
political integration by deeply embedding the function of the aegukpan as a rationing 
institution into the everyday lives of the people. Given that a study conducted by the 
Government-General in 1942 revealed that the ratio of cotton supply to minimum 
demand was just 24 per cent in 1942 in Korea (Yi 1992, quoted in Yi S. S. 2003a: 288), it 
seems plausible that this strategy worked.    
The strategic rationing programme, including the aegukpan leaders’ 
empowerment, tied people’s daily lives to their aegukpan’s activities. In particular, food 
rationing was cleverly exploited to control and mobilize civilians. An example of this is 
that control over food rationing provided leaders with the absolute authority to compel 
unit members to attend the pansanghoe. At a round-table talk of aegukpan leaders 
organized by the Seoul City Federation in May 1941, Ms Hwang, the panjang of the 24th 
aegukpan in Changsajŏng town, and Mr Kim, in charge of the Tongsagu unit i  
Chunghakchŏng  town, proudly reported the rules of their unit;  
                                                
65 ‘Chŏngsil karinŭn aegukpanjang  paeimchwoi-ro tanho ŏmbŏl kakto kyŏnje kyŏngch’al kwajang hoeŭi-
eso kyŏlchŏng情實가리는 애국반장 배임죄로 단호 엄벌 각도 경제 경찰 과장회의에서 결정’, Maeil 
sinbo, 8 February 1942, p.2.  
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The attendance of my unit is very good. I have arranged that grain will not be sold 
to people who present ration cards without my seal of approval. My members 
always attend because participating in meetings is clo ely tied to a variety of 
rationing controls, including staple food. I check the movements of each family 
member…If they do not come [to meetings] before eight o’clock, there is a fine of 
ten sen66 per person…the collected money is used for buying necessary items, such 
as a ladder for air-defence drills.  
    (Nagashima et al. 1941: 13, 15) 
 
In my unit, I have made it a rule to place my seal on the grain ration cards after 
checking members’ attendance at the regular meeting on the seventh day of the 
month. Without the seal, people are not allowed to buy their staple foods. This 
means that if they do not come to the meeting, it is impossible to acquire grain 
since they do not have the approval. Even if they come to my home later and ask 
for my seal, I will not give it to them and tell them that ‘because you did not come 
to the meeting, you must content yourself with eating substitute foods for a few 
more days.’ To avoid treating them too severely, I allow them to buy food the next 
day. So, people attend well.    
           (Nagashima et al. 1941: 16) 
Such practices were even institutionalized in some provinces. In September 1941, the 
Hamhŭng Provincial Federation for Total National Mobilization reported that after it 
established a regulation to halt staple rationing when people did not participate in their 
monthly meetings, there was a much higher attendance rate (Anonymous 1941b: 75). 
Holding deteriorating food resources in pledge, the leaders of the aegukpan and the 
authorities exercised great power over civilians.   
The right of town associations to handle purchasing permits was used as a weapon 
to force people to pay the membership fee. Even thoug  the collection of money for 
membership had been allowed by the government since 1933, as explained previously it 
was not mandatory to contribute money to support the activities of the town associations 
and aegukpan. However, in practice, many citizens were coerced into contributing to 
these organizations. When people failed to pay the membership fee, the distribution of 
                                                
66 Sen is Japanese for chŏn 錢, a unit of Korean currency. One chŏn is 0.01 wŏn.      
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ration cards for necessities, including staple foods, cotton, sugar, towels and petroleum, 
was halted.67  
In principle, the local governments prohibited town associations and aegukpan 
from imposing restrictions on the issue of purchasing permits to people who did not pay. 
However, in reality, the government gave implicit approval to such malpractices, since it 
entrusted almost full responsibility for the management of commodities’ rationing to the 
town associations and aegukpan (Kim Y. M. 2005: 73). Realistically, the rationing 
systems were not able to function without the involvement of these civilian groups. 
Therefore, the stance taken by the government was to support the activities of town 
associations and aegukpan, rather than discourage them from collecting money: the 
government encouraged citizens to pay their membership fees.68  
 Indeed, the supporting role of these organizations was essential to the 
government’s control and mobilization of the population. For example, as explained in 
1.1, the staple food rationing programme in Seoul began with a population survey, and 
was maintained by relying on information collected by each aegukpan leader. A clear 
grasp of the size of each household and the population movements within the city was 
important in distributing accurate quantities of food to each rationing point, as well as in 
preparing ration cards. It was the responsibility of the aegukpan leaders to check the 
movement of people in and out of the area and to report the information to the 
government on a regular basis. Keeping up with current events and understanding the 
changes occurring in individual households was only possible with the help of the 
aegukpan leaders, who were closely involved in people’s daily lives. The information 
collected by these group leaders was an important source for the government for various 
war campaigns as well as for the surveillance of its population (Ibid.: 75).       
State supervision of the movements of the population increased from May 1942 
with the announcement by the Japanese government of the establishment of conscription 
in Korea. Upon the decision of the central governmet, the Government-General in Korea 
                                                
67  ‘Chŏnghoebi chingsu-ro munje wannap annŭ dago paegŭpp’yo palgŭb-ŭl kŏjŏl 町會費徴収로 문제 
완납않는다고 배급표 발급을 거절’, Maeil sinbo, 4 October 1941, p.2.  
68 ‘Chŏnghoebi chingsu-ro munje wannap annŭ dago paegŭpp’yo palgŭb-ŭl kŏjŏl 町會費徴収로 문제 
완납않는다고 배급표 발급을 거절’, Maeil sinbo, 4 October 1941, p.2. .  
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immediately began to take preparatory action, including the development of a committee 
for the conscription programme, before its actual implementation in 1944 (Anonymous 
1942c: 25). At the same time, it set up an official resident registration system in order to 
ease the enlistment of Korean men in the Japanese arm d services. Under National 
Registration (kungmin tǔngnok國民登録) all men between the ages of sixteen and 40 
who lived in Korea were obliged to be officially registered.69  
In parallel with the central government’s actions, the municipal authorities introduced 
executive measures. For example, in 1943, the Seoul City government created the Town 
Register Book (chǒngjǒkpu 町籍符), which was to be chiefly administered by town 
associations and aegukpan. All movements of the citizens, including births and deaths in 
their households, were to be recorded in the book by their aegukpan leaders, and this 
information was conveyed to the city government (Kim Y. M. 2005: 73). The government 
encouraged registration by setting up a week-long promotion campaign in August 1943.  
Judge Kaneko of the Seoul District Court argued that town association staff needed to use 
the term ‘family register’ (hojǒk戸籍) with the citizens as much as possible. Even thoug 
the registration procedure was entrusted to the aegukpan leaders, he stated, it would help 
to put the importance of registration into people’s heads.70 The result of such efforts was 
revealed in an interview with a surviving former colonial Korean citizen. When the 83 
year-old interviewee heard the word ‘town association’, it was the registration of moving 
in and out that first came into her head (Sǒ H. J. 2001: 139). Needless to say, the 
registration administration was successful because it was closely tied to food rationing. In 
essence, the Town Register Book was a ‘rationing led er’ and became the most powerful 
means of controlling and mobilizing the people (Kim Y. M. 2005: 73).  
Aegukpan in Literature   
The aegukpan were one of the central subjects of propaganda literature, the mainstream 
genre during the first half of the 1940s. To reshape Koreans into loyal subjects of the 
Japanese Empire through education, the colonial authorities had strengthened their 
                                                
69 ‘Ch’ŏngjangnyŏn-ŭi kungmin tŭngnok青壯年의国民登録’, Mael sinbo, 22 September 1943, p.1.   
70 ‘Hojŏk, kiryu chŏngbi-e aegukpanjang hyŏmnyŏk yomang戸籍, 寄留整備에愛国班長協力要望’,  
Maeil sinbo, 8 August 1943, p.3.     
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control over the Korean language and the publication of literary works from the end of 
1930s. Once almost all Korean newspapers and periodicals had disappeared from 
circulation, the genre of National Literature (kungmin munhak國民文學) surfaced, with 
strong backing from the colonial authorities. As a means of spiritual education, seven 
purposes were set for it: ‘‘clarification of the ideology of national polity’(kukch’e 
kwannyǒm-ǔi myǒngjing国體観念의明徴); ‘raising the national spirit’ (kungmin ǔisig-ǔi 
angyang 國民意識의昻揚); ‘boosting national morale’ (kungmin sagi-ǔi 
chinhǔng 國民士氣의振興); ‘cooperating with national policy’ (kukch’aeg-eǔi 
hyǒmnyǒk 國策에의協力); ‘establishing the leading theory of culture’ (chidojǒk munhwa 
iron-ǔi surip指圖的文化理論의樹立); ‘culturally integrating Japan and Korea’ (naesǒn 
munhwa-ǔi chonghap内鮮文化의綜合); and ‘developing the national culture’ (kungmin 
munhwa-ǔi kǒnsǒl) (Im C. G. 2002: 65). As clearly demonstrated by these aims, literary 
works were used as a political tool by the Japanese colonial authorities, and Korean 
writers’ literary activities were directed to fulfil the state’s political purpose.  
In line with the state’s strategies, literary works that aimed to convince Koreans of 
Japan’s right to wage war, and that encouraged the nation’s support of the war, were 
published one after the other. In so-called home-front literature (hubang munhak後防文
學), the Korean woman’s pivotal role as an imperial ctizen was particularly emphasized. 
She fulfilled her mission by working hard as a membr of an aegukpan and by willingly 
sending off her husband and sons to the battlefield.  
Seiryō-ri kaiwai 清涼里界隈 (Ch’ŏngnyang-ni Neighbourhood), written by the 
pro-Japanese Korean writer Chǒng In-t’aek (1909-?), was a typical home-front novel. It 
was written in Japanese and published in the first edition of National Literature71 in 1941. 
The story featured a young couple shortly after their move to Seiryō-ri (Ch’ŏngnyang-ni), 
an impoverished area of Seoul. The plot revolved around the neighbour’s boy who cut off 
his own finger to save his sick mother; however, the focus was on the protagonist’s wife, 
                                                
71 The monthly magazine National Literature was published from November 1941 until May 1945 as a 
nominal consolidation of the two Korean literary magazines Munjang文章  and Inmun p’yǒngnon人文評
論. The citation of Chŏng’s novel in this thesis is from Chōsen kokumin bungakushū朝鮮国民文学集
published in 1943 by Chōsen bunjin kyōkai朝鮮文人協会 in Tokyo.    
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the leader of the aegukpan. At first, the young couple did not fit into their community. 
Their assimilation with the neighbours began after the wife assumed the role of the 
aegukpan leader. Her character, which was depicted as being somewhat selfish in the 
initial part of the novel, became more altruistic as a result of her experiences as a panjang. 
Chŏng expressed the wife’s avidity for the role of unit leader thus;  
Another chance to get close to them [the neighbours] came up. My wife was 
recommended for the position of the leader of the aikokuhan of X unit in X ward 
Seiryō-ri. Apparently, she rejected the suggestion at firs since it was an undeserved 
honour for her. Eventually, she accepted based on the reasons that she had received 
a secondary education and was young and without children. Another reason, that 
she was unaware of, was that it was a stopgap measure to fill the vacant position 
due to the former male leader’s sudden move to the city centre. According to her, 
she accepted the honourable duty with a light heart and a slightly pretentious 
feeling. As a practical matter, however, the responibility of the task was quite 
heavy and a slapdash performance was not acceptable. Panicking, she soon began 
to diligently attend meetings, frequently visiting her members’ houses, and 
devouring Kokumin sōryoku and Aikokuhan. Amazed at this different side to her 
character, I watched her growth with satisfaction.   
(Chŏng I. T’. 1943: 92-93) 
An unexpected event, taking on the role of the panjang, served as an important turning 
point that integrated the newcomers into community life. As the leader of her unit, she 
became the type of a person who made efforts to complete her missions. The process she 
underwent was described as a ‘growth’ by the narrator. Through the wife’s efforts, the 
author intended to show the importance of national solidarity and the desirable attitude of 
wartime civilians who made serious efforts to follow the state’s guidance. As time 
progressed, the woman in the story began to act her part as a panjang admirably.  
She came back home exhausted almost every day. Sometimes her return was even 
later than mine when I was late from work. In this area, the kairanban [circulating 
bulletin board] did not work since the majority of people could not read. Therefore, 
all the directives from the chōdōkai [town association] had to be verbally delivered 
to the people by my wife … people’s lack of understanding of the air defence 
promoted by the government prevented her work from being done. She was 
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assailed by questions and complaints wherever she went. According to her, she was 
tired out by going from door to door explaining the current emergency situation of 
the nation and the need for air-defence drills…however, no matter how tired she 
was the day before, she had always regained her vigour by the next morning, and 
was ready to deal with the challenging tasks of her unit. 
(Ibid.: 99-100)  
The role of panjang changed the wife’s life and her character. She came to devote her 
efforts with a spirit of self-sacrifice, and in turn, accomplished the mission of making her 
own unit a successfully functioning aegukpan. By describing her endeavours and the 
results, the novel attempted to glorify the activities of the aegukpan, providing the moral 
of the story. 
Another example that dealt with aegukpan activities was Changmi-ŭi chip 薔薇의 
집(The House of Roses), written by Ch’oe Chŏng-hŭi (1920-1990) and published in the 
monthly magazine Taedonga 大東亜 (Great East Asia) in 1942. This novel is classified as 
a broadcast novel (pangsong sosŏl) as it was originally intended for radio broadcast. 
Radio broadcasting was continuously supported by the colonial government from the 
beginning of regular broadcasting in Korea by the Keijō Broadcast Company in 1927. 
Due to the efficiency of broadcasting in disseminating information across a broad area 
simultaneously, the government intended for Koreans to be educated by radio broadcasts 
(Sǒ C. G. 2006: 528). During the first half of the 1940s especially, radio broadcasting was 
used to disseminate Imperial Japan’s war propaganda mong the general populace. 72 
After its initial announcement on the airwaves, the contents, including novels and 
speeches by government officials, were redelivered to the people through various 
magazines for the edification of the masses (Ibid.: 537-538).  
Changmi-ŭi chip was written to inspire aegukpan activity by creating an idealized 
model of the unit leader. The author gave much space to the description of the heroine, 
Sŏngnye, and her enthusiasm for housework. She was a humble, obedient and good 
housewife who put her knowledge gained through modern education into practice in 
                                                
72 For an account on the role of radio broadcasting in supporting Japanese assimilation policy in Korea 
between 1924 and 1937, see Robinson 1998.   
Chapter Two 
112 
housekeeping. Despite her modesty, she spoke out posi ively about aegukpan and 
eventually became the leader of her unit. The novel also dealt with the real issue of 
aegukpan operations, the communication difficulties between the administrative side and 
unit members, which were frequently discussed in government-controlled periodicals. 
The novel suggested that the best way of resolving d sputes was the method used by 
Sŏngnye, the role model idealized by the author.  
Sŏngnye had never attended aegukpan [meetings] herself while she had hired a 
domestic servant…When she participated [in the meeting] personally after firing 
the servant, she realized for the first time that it had been wrong to send the 
servant instead of going herself. She felt keenly that all the people, including the 
head of the ward and the aegukpan and unit members, needed to improve [the 
way they communicated with each other]. Sŏngnye frequently expressed her 
opinion [in the meetings]. Even though she disliked speaking in public, she could 
not endure the indiscreet behaviour of unit members. Furthermore, it was not 
uncommon for the leaders of the ward, her unit, or even the chŏngch’onghae73 to 
reply nastily towards ordinary member’s questions when the people could not 
understand what they had been told. The administrators merely mechanically 
repeated the state directives delivered from the higher levels. In such 
circumstances, Sŏngnye insisted that someone had to explain why people were 
subjected to saving and contributing money to buying state bonds. She stated that 
few women [who attended their meetings] understood he aims and the purpose of 
their meetings since they stayed at home most of the time and had lost the sense 
of dedication to their own nation and the war effort. She said that these were the 
reasons for the troubles among unit members: they were orried about whether 
their money would be returned or not in the future f om the government. 
Members even threatened panjang, saying they would not attend air-defence drills 
if panjang did not distribute them ration cards for rubber shoes. Those members 
were the very people who were not to be blamed, but rather to be explained why 
saving and air-defence training were necessary.     
(Ch’oe 1942: 148-149)  
We meet the epitomized panjang through Sǒngnye’s behaviour at the unit meeting. By 
                                                
73 The leaders of the town associations. 
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painting a desirable portrait of a citizen who willingly contributes to the government war 
efforts with a clear sense of nationhood, the propaganda literature aimed to re-shape 
colonial Koreans into members of truly ‘patriotic units’ serving Imperial Japan.  
The aegukpan facilitated communication between the wartime Japanese 
government and the general population in its colonies. Originally set up for the spiritual 
education of the people, aegukpan became an indispensable administrative tool for the 
Japanese government. Their important role was describ d by the Korean Federation in the 
following:  
Defensive measures against invasions of the enemy are implemented by the 
aegukpan unit. It also functions effectively as a rationing and labour mobilization 
unit. Government research is also conducted via the egukpan. The campaigns for 
austerity and the selling of government bonds are also carried out by the 
aegukpan unit. Without the aegukpan, it would be impossible to fight these major 
wars. 
(Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 1945, quoted after Yi C. M. 2004: 450)       
There is little doubt that the food-rationing system was one of the major factors that 
enhanced the ability of the aegukpan as a political organization to carry out war-
supporting programmes. According to an official document written by the Japanese Army, 
despite the consistent efforts of the colonial government, 77 per cent of the Korean 
population did not have a sense of nation (kukka kwannyŏm國家觀念) until the first half 
of the 1930s (Ch’oe Y. R. 1994: 43). However, by the first half of the 1940s, the well-
disciplined behaviour of Koreans in implementing war mobilization programmes was 
viewed with astonishment by the Japanese (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 1945: 52). 
It seems reasonable that such a change was closely related to the fact that the citizens’ 
attendance at unit meetings suddenly increased around the time when staple food 
rationing began to be distributed through their aegukpan leaders (Yi C. M. 2004: 442). 
The power of the aegukpan as political organizations intensified alongside th expansion 
of the food rationing programme (Higuchi 1994: 122; Kim Y. M. 2005: 73-74).    
Integrating the mass organizations with the wartime food rationing channels, 
essential to daily existence to everyone, was an important factor in ensuring people’s 
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cooperation with state war mobilization campaign as well as in heightening the efficiency 
of food management administration. It is no wonder that the highly efficient colonial 
system of aegukpan was resurrected by the US military government together with the 
Japanese food rationing programme in post-colonial Korea after 1945.   
 
2.2  From Aegukpan to Kungminban  
It should be borne in mind that the initial incentive for the restoration of the system of 
civilian organizations in post-colonial Korea was not just the food shortage but the rivalry 
between the US military government and the Korean leftist groups represented by the 
Korean People’s Republic (Chosŏn inmin konghwaguk朝鮮人民共和國)74 and its local 
branches ‘people’s committees’ (inmin wiwŏnhoe人民委員會). Along with the latter, 
Korean people any person opposing the post-colonial authorities were labeled as 
communists or leftists at that time. As a means to ease the living difficulties of Koreans, 
the colonial system of civilian organizations drew attention from the Americans and the 
Korean leftist groups, both of which wanted to gain public support. They sought to 
stabilize people’s economic lives by utilizing the ighly effective organizational system 
as the basic unit of consumption. The two powers confronted each other over control of 
the civilian groups, and the struggle strengthened the system of civilian organizations. 
This political atmosphere in Korea was also important in stimulating the Americans to 
reuse the civilian associations in food rationing. The quasi-governmental mass 
organizations created by the colonial government experienced a resurgence amid the 
intricate economic and political atmosphere of post-colonial Korea.   
The Re-emergence of Civilian Groups amid the Political Struggle in Decolonized Korea   
The reorganization of town associations and their sub-organizations aegukpan, which had 
performed an important role in administering food rationing under the Japanese wartime 
authorities, was called for by the Korean people thmselves relatively early in 
decolonized Korea. The Korean people reformed these groups not led by any strategic 
                                                
74 Hereafter KPR.  
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command, but rather with the aim of self-help in an effort to resolve the social disorders 
and economic chaos, chiefly responsible for the establi hment of a free market in rice by 
Americans (see 1.2). The need to reactivate the function of the civilian associations was 
expressed by some newspaper articles:      
No matter by whose hand the system of aegukpan was made or what the political 
purpose of it was…it is necessary to make an effectiv  use the pervasive 
organizations for our own purpose. There would be no more ethnic 
discrimination or evil customs of bureaucracy in the rationing system if using the 
aegukpan… [t]here is little doubt [that the aegukpan system] would be an 
effective means to curb prices if necessities were s cured to some extent. 
 (Seoul sinmun, 28 November 1945, quoted in Kim H. C. 2007: 295) 
Given that the Japanese colonial government made considerable achievements 
[in its administration] in adeptly exploiting town associations, we should 
definitely reform [the organizations], and lay the foundations for building our 
future society.  
 (Taejung ilbo 16 February 1946, quoted in Kim Y. M. 2005: 84) 
In pursuit of these goals, Seoul citizens reformed their town associations. For example, in 
September 1945, the people of Tongbu town established a new community group, based 
on the earlier town association, with the purpose of ‘keeping up with the new era of 
Korea’, and organized educational programmes for its members, such as lectures on 
Korean history and Han’gŭl (the Korean alphabet) (Kim Y. M. 2005: 87). On 2 October 
1945, nearly 100 Kye-dong town residents gathered to reform their town association, re-
electing group leaders who had caused widespread anger among the people in the 
colonial era for their role in an extension of the colonial authorities’ harsh repression. In 
November 1945, residents in Aenggunam town renamed th ir organization the ‘People’s 
Autonomous Association’ (Inmin chach’ihoe) and replaced the leaders and staff, who had, 
until then, been Japanese people (Ibid.: 87-88). While t e reformation of some town 
associations was purely driven by a locally determined need for autonomy, as described 
above, others were reformed under the influence of pe ple’s committees, which I will 
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describe below.   
 The emergence of ‘cooperatives’ (hyŏptong chohap協同組合) during the winter 
of 1945-46 greatly contributed to the revival of the town associations and aegukpan in 
city areas. The purpose of the cooperatives was to es ablish a collective purchasing 
system by reorganizing citizens into town associations in order to ease the hardships 
caused by the shortages of commodities and soaring p ces, which had been deteriorating 
since the autumn of 1945 (Ibid.: 102). For the urban population especially, cooperatives 
were a practical solution that made use of their autonomy to acquire daily commodities in 
the midst of an increasingly worsening commodity supply situation, for which the 
USAMGIK did not seem to have a clear economic plan.    
 Cooperatives were organized by people’s committees, th  grass-roots leftist inmin 
wiwŏnhoe groups that had spontaneously mushroomed throughout t e country shortly 
after Korea’s liberation. The Seoul People’s Committee was especially active in 
expanding cooperative associations, carrying out an important role in supplying daily 
commodities to the people in Seoul. It called for citizens to group themselves into town 
associations and then participate in cooperatives, emphasizing that those who became 
cooperative members were able to buy commodities at lower prices. The promotion took 
the form of a campaign called the ‘Cooperative Movement’ (Hyŏptong chohap undong協
同組合運動) (Ibid.: 104). All citizens were entitled to join the collective purchasing 
scheme as long as they organized their town associations into cooperative units and 
announced their participation in the network to the Seoul People’s Committee.75  
 In order to make the group purchases, in December 1945, the so-called 
Department of People’s Livelihood (Minsaengbu民生部) was created within the Seoul 
People’s Committee. This was a special section, responsible for purchasing and 
distributing commodities. After receiving orders, it used its vast purchasing power to buy 
commodities. The purchased commodities were first dstributed to each town association, 
and then were further divided up for individual households by the aegukpan. The prices 
                                                
75 ‘Kakchong sobi chohab-e saengp’il mulcha-rŭl paegŭp各種消費組合에 生必物資를配給’, 9 
December 1945, Chayu sinmun自由新聞, p.2.   
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of goods bought through cooperatives were half the respective market prices. Between 
December 1945 and January 1946, for example, foodstuffs such as dried anchovies 
(myŏlch’i) , soy sauce and soybean paste, and clothing were bought through the Seoul 
People’s Committee, and distributed to people at rel iv ly low prices (Kim Y. M. 2005: 
103). The success of cooperatives in Seoul increased th ir recognition, and gave 
momentum to their spread to other areas. In January 1946, the National Federation of 
Cooperative Associations was officially established. As of June 1946, there were 121 
cooperatives in the southern part of Korea. Seoul, with 53 cooperatives, had the greatest 
concentration (Ibid.: 104). The ‘Cooperative Movement’, led by the People’s Committee, 
was an important facilitator in regrouping the Korean people into the civilian groups 
created by the Japanese government.        
 The resurrection of town associations and egukpan is particularly interesting in 
light of the fact that the Korean leftists who invigorated these remnants of the colonial 
system had strong anti-Japanese sentiments. Many of them were former anti-Japanese 
activists, and strongly insisted on social reform in post-colonial Korea to eradicate the 
vestiges of Japanese imperialism (Cumings 1981: 88). For example, the head of the Seoul 
People’s Committee, Ch’oe Wŏn-t’aek, urged the Seoul municipal government to change 
the Japanese-style names of wards and towns in the ci y immediately after Korea’s 
liberation, a proposal that was accepted by the govrnment the following year (Kim Y. M. 
2005: 83). The People’s Committees were also highly negative about town associations 
and aegukpan, since these groups embodied the controlling power of the colonial system 
over the Korean population.76 The leaders of the aegukpan were particularly disliked 
among liberated Koreans (Anonymous 1948), to the ext nt that they were included in the 
group of pro-Japanese collaborators who were to be prosecuted when the punishment of 
pro-Japanese Koreans became a political issue in 1948.77 
                                                
76 ‘Inmindang, kunjŏngch’ŏng-e mulka anjŏng kin’gŭp taech’aek kŏnŭi 인민당, 군정청에 
물가안정긴급대책 건의’, Chunngang sinmun중앙신문 12 Decebmer 1945. Electric document, available 
at http://db.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=dh_001_1945_12 2_0050 (accessed 5 July 2012). 
77 Along with the approval of the Anti-Traitor Law (Panminjok haengwi ch’ǒbǒlpǒp 반민족행위처벌법) 
on 7 September 1948, an investigation was initiated by a special committee to uncover national traitors and 
collaborators. However, the American authorities, who relied heavily on the former Japanese administrative 
structure and previous Korean employees of the Governm nt-General to carry out the Korean occupation 
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 Despite their negative view of Japanese practices, a ignificant reason for the 
Korean Left’s strengthening of civilian groups was that they had it in mind to use them to 
build their own nation. This project was led by theKPR, the country’s leading group of 
people’s committees. The KPR was created two days’ prior to the arrival of the 
USAMGIK in Korea with the aim of taking steps towards establishing an independent 
Korean government. The Korean leftists did not want their country to be occupied by a 
foreign power, including America, and wanted to establish complete autonomy and 
independence for Korea (Cumings 1981: 86, 88-89). By the time the US troops arrived, 
the KPR had already created a loosely structured government, supported by the general 
populace and the provincial people’s committees, which performed both legislative and 
executive functions (Meade 1951: 75). Even though they were not recognized by the 
Americans, the Left had a nationwide network of peopl ’s committees organizationally 
incorporating the town associations and aegukpan, which were known as ‘town people’s 
committees’ (chŏng inmin wiwŏnhoe) and ‘people’s committees’ respectively (Kim Y. M.
2005: 85). The Korean leftists sought to gain public support by providing people with a 
useful source for commodities through the resurrection of the highly efficient civilian 
organizations.   
 It seems that the strategy to integrate the general populace through the promotion 
of cooperatives was fairly successful. For example, on 3 January 1946, 300,000 citizens 
from 270 town associations met to participate in a political gathering organized by the 
Seoul People’s Committee and the Seoul City Federation of Town Associations (Sŏul-si 
chŏng yŏnhaphoe서울市町連合會), the organization for the representatives of town 
associations chiefly led by leftist sympathizers (Ibid.: 109). If we consider that the 
estimated total number of town associations in Seoul at the time was 280, almost every 
town association was under the influence of the Korean Left (Ibid.: 89).  
 The growing influence of the KPR and people’s committees over the populace 
was of great concern for the Americans, who were occupying the southern part of Korea 
                                                                                                                                       
administration, refused to actively handle the issue. Bowing to the Korean government’s request to halt t e 
uprooting of collaborators, the committee was dismantled within a year of its establishment. As a result, 
only a handful of former collaborators were punished. See De Ceuster 2001: 207-215. 
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with the major political purpose of blocking the spread of communism in the peninsula 
(Cumings 1981: 136-137). Despite the fact that the people’s committees took the form of 
locally originating autonomous organizations, the US military government considered 
them to be communist groups. This was due to the fact that many of the groups’ leaders 
had colonial experience in social and political movements influenced by communism and 
socialism, including peasant protests, labour movements and the rather more radical Red 
Peasant Movement.78 Moreover, by the time the US troops arrived in Korea, grass-roots 
groups led by former communists had blossomed through t the country. To the 
Americans, the KPR represented a challenge to theirauthority and an illegal attempt to 
usurp power on the part of a minority communist element (Meade 1951: 76). The KPR’s 
control of the people’s committees posed a serious threat to political stability in the 
American occupation zone.79  
 Moreover, the major food crisis caused by the free ric  market policy was a 
practical problem that had to be solved to maintain peace and order in the country. As 
explained in 1.2, the military government was unable to implement any measures to 
tackle the food shortage in cities until the beginning of 1946. An official American 
document reported that the shortage of rice in Seoul was serious, and the military 
government was openly criticized in all newspapers for its irresolute policies (G-2 
Weekly Summary #22, 12 February 1946, quoted in KimY. M. 2005: 100). In a survey of 
640 Seoul citizens carried out by Americans in April 1946, more than 40 percent of 
respondents replied that the administrative ability of the military government was worse 
than that of the Japanese Government-General in Korea, and highlighted the destitution 
brought on by the impractical economic policies of the USAMGIK as the major reason 
for this (G-2 Weekly Summary #22, 12 February 1946, Ibid.: 101). The failure of the rice 
policy led to a clear decline in popular support, especially in the cities. Many public 
demonstrations calling for rice in Seoul in 1946, such as those illustrated in 1.2, were 
organized by town associations or aegukpan. The associations became units for 
                                                
78 Examples of the activities of Red Peasant Movement during colonial era, see 4.1.  
79 Many Korean scholars argue that the deregulation of the rice market by the USAMGIK was a political 
strategy to weaken the influence of the KPR over th Korean population, since the KPR had successfully 
controlled food distribution until the US troops arrived in Korea. For example, see Ch’oe P. D. 1996 and 
Pak S. J. 2002.    
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expressing group dissatisfaction with the American authorities (Kim Y. M. 2005: 111-
112). For the USAMGIK, turning public support the government by resolving the food 
shortage was not just a solution to the political struggle with the Korean leftist groups, 
but also a way to vindicate their occupation of Korea.    
 In January 1946, the Americans stepped up their administrative efforts with the 
creation of ‘Consumers’ Cooperatives’ (obi chohap消費組合), which were formed to 
ease the difficulties of procuring commodities for Seoul citizens. These cooperatives 
formed a group purchasing scheme similar to that of the people’s committees’ 
cooperatives. In a meeting of the Provincial Governors in February 1946, it was decided 
to establish Consumers’ Cooperatives in each city or county, district and township. In 
Seoul, in order to oppose the cooperatives of the Seoul People’s Committee, the military 
government encouraged the leaders of the town associ tions who did not belong to 
committee to organize a new federation, the ‘Hansŏng80  City Federation of Town 
Associations’ (Hansŏng-si chŏng yŏnhaphoe漢城市町連合會).81 They introduced a 
collective purchasing system, almost identical to that of the Seoul People’s Committee. 
The military government supported the activities of this organization, allowing it to 
establish an office in Seoul City Hall (Kim Y. M. 2005: 130-131). While the Cooperative 
Movement of the People’s Committees was carried out by the general populace, the 
organization of Consumers’ Cooperatives was extensiv ly backed by the government. 
 By October 1947, the military government had gained complete control of the 
town associations in Seoul and had reorganized the civilian groups into quasi-
governmental organizations. This began with an administrative order in June 1946 to 
abolish all town association federations which had thus far taken the lead in collective 
acts, even against the government.82 The authorities dispatched employees of Seoul City
government to the offices of each town association to put them under the control of the 
Seoul City government. By providing practical solutions to deal with high prices in urban 
                                                
80 Another name for Seoul.  
81 ‘Hansŏng-si chŏngyŏn sinbalchok漢城市町聯 新發足’, Tonga ilbo東亜日報, 24 January 1946, p.2.  
82 ‘Pullidoen chŏng yŏnhaphoe-to t’ongil Kyŏngsŏng-bu chŏnghoe ch’ongyŏnhaphoe kyŏlsŏng分離된町
聯合會도統一 京城府町會總聯合會結成’, Tonga ilbo, 7 June 1946, p.2. 
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areas, the authorities were able to turn civilian organizations to quasi-governmental 
organizations. Among such governmental projects, making use of the groups in food-
rationing administration was one of the most important factors which strengthened the 
function of civilian groups. The Americans never overlooked the fact that these 
organizations had been an extremely efficient part of he Japanese food distribution 
system prior to 1945.    
The Revival of the Aegukpan under the Food Rationing Programme of the USAMGIK  
The military government’s rationing control over staple foods began in January 1946 with 
the promulgation of the National Rice Collection (Migok sijangnyŏng米穀市場令) that 
allowed the government to coercively collect rice from producers. The government rice 
collection did not begin until February 1946, but price rises and the shortage of rice had 
already become a serious problem in city areas by the end of 1945. In January 1946, the 
military government was compelled to launch staple food rationing to address the acute 
food shortage in Seoul, despite the fact that there was neither sufficient rice nor the time 
to design a rationing scheme. In this situation, the ability of the civilian groups developed 
by the Japanese government to operate a rationing scheme was to prove highly important.  
 During the early stage, the USAMGIK food rationing programme was almost 
completely reliant on the roles of those civilian groups. The first staple food rationing 
scheme for Seoul citizens was run on 7 January 1946. Although the food to be rationed 
had already been distributed to the rationing points several days previously, the 
authorities were not able to launch the rationing distribution because they did not have a 
grasp of the size of the city’s population.83 Under the Japanese food management 
programme, the volumes of food to be secured from producing areas and delivered to 
each rationing point had been determined by the population of the entire city and each 
township. However, the military government’s rationing scheme was far from ideal: in 
the face of a serious food supply shortage in the city, the authorities had to distribute the 
food collected without the fundamental studies which had to be undertaken prior to 
carrying out food rationing. The authorities called for citizens to report the number of 
                                                
83 ‘Migok, sŏkt’an kyunbae米穀,石炭均配’, Tonga ilbo, 7 January 1946, p.2. 
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family members in their household to their aegukpan leaders when they were given food. 
It was considerably different from the Japanese food rationing programme which had 
been launched after elaborate preparations, including various surveys, in collaboration 
with the government officials and police force. In contrast to this, the role of aegukpan 
leaders became overwhelmingly important, as emphasized by the head of the Department 
of Economy in Seoul City: ‘In the current situation, only the population data collected by 
the aegukpan leaders shall be the accurate criterion [for food rationing ]…’.84 
 As was the case under Japanese rule, the leaders of town associations and 
aegukpan were provided with considerable authority to issue and distribute purchasing 
permits to their members. The first staple food rationing was implemented using 2,600 
bags of rice (approximately 210 metric tons), 1,200 sacks of wheat flour, and 7,000 sŏk 
(1,010 tons) of other grains secured by the Seoul City government. Allowances were 
determined based on the size of the family: eight kilograms for a household with less than 
five members.85 In principle, the earlier ration books used under the Japanese rationing 
system were reused. Modification of the number of household members recorded in the 
ration books was only permitted by the leaders of the town associations and aegukpan. 
For those who did not have ration books, certification (chŭngmyŏng 証明), as part of 
which the size of the family was recorded, was provided by the leaders of the civilian 
associations. Certification and ration books were treated equally.86 The important role of 
the leaders of these civilian groups in the rationing programme was emphasized by the 
government again and again during food rationing periods. For example, prior to another 
grain distribution in March 1946, Seoul City government announced that food was only 
available to those with ration books or certificates authorized by the leaders of the town 
associations.87  
 The responsibilities of the leaders of the town associations and aegukpan were not 
limited to authorizing purchasing permits, but included a wide range of food rationing 
                                                
84 ‘Yanggog-ŭn ikkŏnman pagŭp chiji糧穀은있건만 配給遲遲’, Ton' ilbo, 6 January 1946, p.2.  
85 ‘Migok, sŏkt’an kyunbae米穀,石炭均配’, Tonga ilbo, 7 January 1946, p.2. 
86 ‘Singnyang poyu-k’o sanŭn’gŏn maejŏm食糧보유코 사는건 매점’, Chayu sinmun, 8 January 1946, p.2.   
87 ‘Maeil chunda kidae malla매일 준다 기대 말라’, Chosŏn ilbo, 14 March 1946, p.2; ‘‘Ssal’ ibŏn-enŭn 
kkok paegŭp쌀 이번에는 꼭 배급’, Chosŏn ilbo, 13 March 1946, p.2. 
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administration duties. For example, when rations were delivered to rationing stations, 
distributors were obliged to report the details of rationing, including the total volume of 
the delivery, prices and rationing days, to them. The heads of town associations also 
carried out inspections and checked distributors’ books to ensure that foods were 
distributed properly.88  
 The special programme of rice distribution introduced in April 1946 also testified 
to the essential role played by the leaders of the town associations and aegukpan. In order 
to lessen the growing public discontents with the worsening food supply in Seoul, 
notwithstanding food rationing, the government temporarily lifted the ban on the personal 
purchase and delivery of rice from other provinces into Seoul by promulgating the 
Special Rice Ordinance for Seoul City (Sŏulsi-e kwanhan t’ŭkpyŏl migokpŏp). Under this 
ordinance, people were allowed to buy rice within te limit of the daily allowance of two 
hap (approximately 285 grams) per person, in exchange for written permission from the 
leaders of the town associations and aegukpan, who were in charge of the administration 
of this programme. Since the aegukpan leaders knew the most about their members’ 
families, they were able to check whether the applications submitted by the people were 
correct or not. Only applicants approved by the aegukpan leaders received permission, 
which was issued in the name of the leaders of the town associations (or wards) 
(Anonymous 1946).     
 Despite their civilian status, the leaders of town associations and aegukpan were 
given enormous powers, not only to manage the rationing administration but to exercise 
police control over civilians. On 13 January 1946, Seoul City Governor Yi and US 
Commander Wilson appealed to Seoul citizens to notify their aegukpan leaders of 
neighbours with surplus rice, and announced the government’s plan to buy the rice at a 
price of 750 wŏn per sŏk (144 kilograms) for rationing to Seoul citizens.89 In reality, the 
appeal was a coercive rice collection using the power of the town associations and 
aegukpan. The following day, Commander Wilson ordered the leaders of the town 
                                                
88 ‘Yŏngdan-sŏ hwakpohan ‘ssal’ ichŏnsŏk 營團서確保한 ‘쌀’二千石’, Tonga ilbo, 20 February 1946, p.2; 
‘Maeil chunda kidae malla매일 준다 기대 말라’,Chosŏn ilbo, 14 March 1946, p.2. 
89 ‘Sŏul simin-e ko handa서울시민에 고한다’, Chosŏn ilbo, 15 January 1946, p.2.   
Chapter Two 
124 
associations to collect a ‘quota’ of 80 to 85 sŏk of rice per town association within two 
weeks, and gave them the authority to use police force when needed.90   
 It is no wonder that such a food rationing mechanism created favourable 
circumstances for the growth of distribution malpractices among the civilian leaders, and 
provided them with plenty of opportunities to take advantage of the system. Their 
privileged position of issuing and controlling purchasing permits created a massive ‘ghost 
population’ (yuryŏng in’gu幽霊人口) in Seoul: there were an estimated 203,000 ‘ghost 
citizens’ between April 1947 and April 1948 (Ch’oe Y. M. 2008: 124). There were various 
ways of creating a ‘ghost’. For example, the leader of an aegukpan in Tonam-dong town 
in Seoul was caught by the police receiving 21 people’s grain rations illegally by using 
previous unit members’ ration books which should have been destroyed after they had left 
the town.91 Many citizens were guilty of creating the ghost population, not just the 
leaders of the aegukpan. People who moved to Seoul from the countryside, for instance, 
recorded all their family members, including those living in their hometowns, on their 
ration books. Family members who lived separately included the names of their parents 
on their ration books as if they lived with them. Many who were repatriated from abroad 
or the northern part of Korea when the country was liberated from colonial rule could 
easily fabricate their family, as the American authorities did not have any official records 
of their family status (Ch’oe Y. M. 2008: 119-120). Through such false reporting, people 
were able to secure far more than their entitlement. The misdistribution of foodstuffs 
became established practice in the southern half of the Korean peninsula during the 
second half of the 1940s, and the leaders of the town associations and aegukpan played a 
critical role in the majority of these operations.     
 A number of measures were introduced by the governm nt to counter the 
misdistribution of scarce food resources. For example, in February 1947, the military 
government introduced a system of citizen registration (chumin tŭngnokche住民登録制) 
to eliminate the ‘ghost population’, starting in Seoul and Kyŏnggi Province (Kim Y. M. 
                                                
90 ‘ Iju hu myŏn ch’aegim chigo chodal二週後면責任지고調達’, Tonga ilbo, 15 January 1946, p.2.  
91 ‘Pujŏng paegŭp padŭn suhyŏngja-ka sanggo不正配給받은 受刑者가上告’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun京郷
新聞, 2 February 1948, p.2.  
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2005: 150). The registration coincided with preparations for a new food rationing scheme 
that was scheduled to be put into effect on 1 April 1947. A major change in the new 
rationing system was that every individual citizen was to have his or her own ration book 
instead one shared by the whole household. By introducing a personal ration-book system, 
the authorities sought to remedy the widespread irregularities in rationing that chiefly 
came from the abuse of family-unit ration books.92 The registration was carried out by the 
leaders of the aegukpan and town associations. Only those who completed th citizenship 
registration were issued with the individually prepared ration books needed to buy staple 
foods from April.93 For this reason, registration progressed rapidly: it took just two 
months to complete the registration of more than one million Seoul citizens and distribute 
the new ration cards. People were required to show t eir registration card (tŭngnokp’yo
登録票) along with their ration book when they went to collect their rations (Kim Y. M. 
2005: 151-152, 156).  
    The registration, accompanied by the new rationing scheme, enabled the 
government to eradicate the ghost population. Shortly after completion of the registration, 
Seoul City government set up special groups, Food Inspection Teams (singnyang 
sach’altae食糧査察隊), consisting of policemen, government employees, and people 
from town associations and the Korean Commodity Company (Chosǒn saenghwalp’um 
yǒngdan朝鮮生活品營團), the semi-public organization responsible for grain r tioning. 
They went from house to house between 5 a.m. and 9 a.m. checking the status of the 
families against their registration with the town associations, in their ration books, and as 
actual residents. Through the investigation launched on 1 May 1947, Seoul City 
government were able to uncover a huge proportion of the ghost population. For example, 
950 ghosts were discovered in just one town associati n, and 570 false ration books were 
confiscated (Ibid.: 159). During fifteen days in March 1948, more than 2,000 public 
servants were mobilized for a surveillance task led by the City Government and the 
National Food Administration (Singnyang haengjŏngch’ŏ食糧行政處), the government 
                                                
92 ‘Sinjang ch’ejung-to tŭngnok nam Chosŏn kongminjŭng-ŭl parhaeng身長 體重도 登錄 남조선 
公民證을 발행’, Chayu sinmun, 12 February  1947, p.2.   
93 ‘Yuryŏng in’gu ŏpsaegojŏ kaeinbyŏl t’ongjangje silsi유령인구 없애고저 개인별 통장제 실시’, Chayu 
sinmun, 12 February 1947, p.2.    
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institution in charge of planning the food rationing operation. Organized into pairs, they 
picked out the ‘ghosts’ from the people through door-t -door investigations between 7 
p.m. and 7 a.m. (Ibid.: 161). On the first day alone, 986 ghosts were found in 1,816 
households. In one aegukpan in Hoehyŏn-dong, ten out of eleven households had 
‘unseen’ family members, amounting to 61 additional rations.94  
 It goes without saying that all these government efforts were aimed at reinforcing 
the food-rationing system itself. But at the same ti e, such administrative action was part 
of state measures seeking to curb the excesses of the civilian organizations in rationing 
operations. The Director of Public Prosecutions clearly stated that the leaders of town 
associations and the people directly involving rationing were the main culprits behind the 
widespread malpractices in food rationing, and that strong measures would be taken 
against them.95 Indeed, the ‘ghost’-hunting projects were carried out by the whole town 
association as a unit, and where ‘ghosts’ were discovered, the whole aegukpan, including 
its leader, was forced to take responsibility.96 ‘Ghost’-hunting projects were carried out 
continuously by the South Korean government after its establishment in August 1948. 
Despite the persistent efforts of the authorities to curb the irregularities caused by group 
leaders, they continued under the food-rationing system in which the unit leaders 
remained closely involved.    
Staying a Central Player in the Food-Rationing System in South Korea  
A major revision of the food-rationing system was made by the South Korean 
government in April 1949, several months after the American authorities passed power 
over to the Koreans. Despite the initial plan to maintain the food rationing programme 
following the control policies of the US military government, the new government’s first 
rice collection in autumn 1948 collected less than lf of its target volume. The Korean 
government was compelled to change its food rationing programme, which had thus far 
                                                
94 ‘‘Ch’uryŏnaen yuryŏng in’gu’ ch’ŏnnal-e ŏmnŭn  i 900-yŏmyŏng‘추려낸 幽靈人口’ 첫날에 없는 이 
900여명’ Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 20 March 1948, p.2. 
95 ‘Tojŏn, migok pujŏng paegŭpcha sagichoe-ro ch’ŏdan盗電·米糓不正配給者 詐欺罪로處斷’, Tonga 
ilbo, 16 December 1947, p.2.   
96 ‘Yuryŏng in’gu pan chŏnch’e-ŭi ch’aegim幽靈人口  班全體의 責任’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 13 January 
1949, p.4 
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aimed to feed the entire non-farming population, so that it only provided rice to 
government-selected groups of people. Under the new rationing scheme, approximately 
60 per cent of Seoul citizens who had thus far receiv d rations were forced to buy grain 
on the free market. Those who received rations were those who worked for state 
institutions and in priority industries, and the poor (see 1.2).     
 The problem with the new rationing scheme was that t ere was a wide difference 
between the price of rice sold on the free market and that rationed by the government. 
Due to the persistent inflation after decolonization, Korean authorities had to stick to a 
low-price policy following the US military government’s economic strategy. This was 
especially important when the money supply rapidly increased after the harvest due to the 
release of rice onto the market – this was the chief factor aggravating an already serious 
inflation situation (Kim C. S. 2000: 184). In order to control the money supply, the 
Korean government distributed rationed rice at relatively low prices: between March and 
September 1949, the price of government rice was between a quarter and a half of that of 
free market rice (Ibid.: 185).  
 Under the revised rationing scheme outlined above people who excluded from the 
official appointments of rationing recipients had to use the free rice market. If we 
consider that the daily consumption of rice per person in 1947 was 2.5 hap 
(approximately 360 grams) (in cities) and the per capita ration distribution of rice 
between December 1948 and February 1949 was 2.1 to 2.2 hop (300-315 grams) (the 
national average), it seems plausible that the use of the free market to compensate for the 
rice shortage was indispensable to many Koreans (Ibid.: 101, 182). However, needless to 
say, the economical way to purchase rice was throug rationing. Moreover, the price of 
free-market rice continued to rise due to the unstable free market situation in Korea. For 
example, the price of 20 litres of rice rose from 1,715 wŏn to 5,380 wŏn between March 
1946 and June 1950 (Ibid.: 184). Naturally, few peopl  wanted to purchase their food on 
the free market and the new food rationing scheme caused dispute among the people over 
rationing recipients.   
 Despite this situation, government standards for the selection of rationing subjects 
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were rather vague, and practical determination of the ration receivers was entrusted to the 
leaders of the aegukpan. Excluding the absolute rules for occupation, such as the 
inclusion of government employees, the number of ‘the poor’ who were to be given 
rations was decided by the leaders of the aegukpan from a pre-assigned number of rations 
per unit. In principle, priority was to be given to the poorest unit members, and a decision 
regarding who these people were was made during discussions at the monthly meetings.97 
However, in most cases, selections were made by the leaders of the aegukpan alone, 
without consulting the other members.98 For example, in April 1949, the Kyŏnghyang 
sinmun newspaper reported that leaders favoured their friends and relatives when 
selecting rationing subjects. With the unit leaders’ approval, the wealthy, those who 
owned even factories or who were affluent enough to aff rd a family car received 
rationing, while the poor who were in desperate need of cheaper government rice were 
excluded from the rationing lists.99         
 Towards the end of 1949 and during the first half of the 1950s, staple food 
rationing in Korea was particularly unstable owing to unstable market and social 
circumstances. In December 1949, Seoul City governmnt further reduced the number of 
ration receivers by 38,000, or a third, from the leve  of the first revision in April 1949.100 
Two months later, the city government announced yet another new rationing plan for 
1,000,000 Seoul citizens, with a daily allowance of 1.5 (approximately 215 grams) hap 
per person;101 however, the number of people who actually received government rice 
totalled just 700,000 citizens.102 The chaos caused by the Korean War which broke out in 
June 1950 was in addition to the already unstable free rice market situation in the country. 
In October 1950, everyone in war-torn Seoul was given a daily allocation of 1.4 hap (200 
                                                
97 ‘P’aran-ŭi yanggok chungjŏm paegŭp taesang sŏnjŏng kongjŏng hara波瀾의糧糓重點配給 
對象選定公正하라’, Tonga ilbo, 16 April 1949, p.2. 
98 ‘Hwoengsŏl susŏl 횡설수설’, Tonga ilbo, 28 April 1949, p.2.  
99 ‘P’at’an manŭn chungjŏm paegŭp破綻많은 重點配給’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun. 29 April 1949, p.2.  
100 ‘Ch’ojung-pae taesangja sŏnjŏng-e kŭk kollan超重配對象者選定에極困難’, Tonga ilbo, 23 November 
1949, p.2.     
101 ‘Puja-nŭn chewoe hago paengmanmyŏng-e haru ilhapojak富者는除外하고百萬名에 하루一合五勺’, 
Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 25 February 1950, p.2.   
102 ‘Ssal kokka chojŏng pangdo ŏmna쌀 穀價調整方途없나’, Tonga ilbo, 17 June 1950, p.2.   
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grams) of free rice from the government as a temporary aid measure.103 In March 1951, a 
general food rationing programme for the whole population, with a daily allowance of 1.5 
hap (215 grams) of grain per person, was introduced in the 23 cities and townships that 
had a population of more than 40,000, but it did not last long. 104         
 The power of the leaders of the town associations a d aegukpan continued to 
increase. Ever since the colonial food-rationing system had been instituted, their authority 
to control food rationing had been the source of their power over people; now, due to the 
increasingly unstable rationing system, their malpractices grew ever more significant.105     
The high-handed money collections, which became espcially serious during the 1950s, 
testify to this. The donations were collected by the aegukpan leaders for their town 
associations. Fundraising activities were ostensibly prohibited by the government; 
however, collections were carried out through the organizations, and were an open 
secret106 in South Korean society (Kim C. S. 2000: 190). Even during the Korean War, 
citizens were coerced into contributing money in the form of a membership fee for town 
associations under the threat of being refused rations (Kim Y. M. 2005: 179-180). In 
Pusan, a city at the southern tip of the Korean peninsula, where most of the population 
retreated during the Korean War, refugees also receiv d food rationing via town 
associations. Notwithstanding the difficulties of being forced to lead the lives of refugees, 
people were required to pay the membership fee for the town associations to which they 
temporarily belonged.107 Moreover there were various kinds of donation thatpeople were 
urged to give.108 The money collected from approximately 300 town associations in Seoul 
                                                
103 ‘Kŭmil put’ŏ yanggok paegŭp kaesi irin iriltang irhapsajak-ŭl musang punbae今日부터糧穀配給開始 
一人一日當一合四勺을 무상 분배’, Tonga ilbo, 6 October 1950, p.2.    
104 ‘Miga chojŏl toena? Ssal paegŭp silsi siŭp hwakchŏng米價調節되나? 쌀 配給実實施 市邑確定’,  
Tonga ilbo, 23 February 1951, p.2. .  
105 ‘Toksinjad ŭl-e ‘ib’-i set? Tongdaesindongmindŭl cho banjang-ŭl pinan獨身者들에 ‘입’이 셋? 東大新
洞民들組班長을非難’, Tonga ilbo, 19 May 1952, p.2.  
106 The money contributed by citizens was an important source of political capital for Syngman Rhee, the 
first president of South Korea. For a detailed account f Rhee’s raising and use of political funds, see
Chŏng P. J. 2000.  
107  ‘P’inanmin kuho-lan hŏkkuhoman purŭji malgo tonghoebi tŭng pudam chŏkke mot hao避難民救護란 
헛口號 만 부르지말고 洞會会等費 負擔적게못하오’, Tonga ilbo, 10 March 1951, p.2.  
108 In 1950s Korea, there was a wide range of state-involved right-wing mass organizations such as The 
Korean Young People’s Association and the Korean Women’s Association. In the name of ‘anti-communist 
groups’ this kind of associations were organized within town associations, and were dependent on the 
money collected from citizens for their activities (Kim H. C. 2007: 61; Yun C. N. 2010 89, 91)        
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during 1950 amounted to 800,000,000 wŏn. Town associations in Chŏlla-pukto had 93 
different donation programmes, with 1,600,000,000 wŏn of money collected from 
citizens in the year prior to the outbreak of the Korean War (Kim H. C. 2007: 305). It was 
not only the system of food distribution and the concept of civilian groups being 
entrusted with rationing that remained as colonial legacies, utilized by the USAMGIK 
and further strengthened by the South Korean governm nt, but also the power of the 
aegukpan and their leaders.   
The use of Kungminban in Constructing an Anti-communist Country 
It is obvious that the principal reason for strengthening the colonial system of civilian 
organizations was their effectiveness in operating the food control system in post-colonial 
Korea. However, the role that these mass organizations played in strengthening the 
governance of the authorities should not be underestimated when we consider the support 
they were given, and this contributed to the post-clonial continuation of Japanese 
practices. As explained in 2.1 and previously in this section, the civilian groups fulfilled 
an important role in state control over the population hrough their close involvement in 
resident registration under both the colonial Japanese government and the US occupation. 
Being a by-product of the food-rationing system, the power structure established within 
the civilian groups was tactically utilized by the authorities to control and monitor the 
nation. In South Korea, a country founded during the rise of the Cold War, the civilian 
organizations were politicized for use in the ideological confrontation on the Korean 
peninsula.       
 In 1948, the newly-established Korean government rsurrected the organizational 
framework of the Japanese system of aegukpan for a political purpose. Succeeding the 
USAMGIK, Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), president of the First Republic of South Korea 
(1948-1960), upheld the country’s national identity as a rigid anti-communist nation 
throughout his administration. In the context of the escalating politics of the Cold War, 
the Rhee regime carried out a series of anti-communist campaigns that wielded repressive 
power over the populace in the name of national security against its enemy, North Korea 
(Moon 2005: 24-25). The campaigns resembled the Japanese colonial authorities’ war 
The Administration of Food Rationing by Civilian Organizations 
131  
mobilization campaigns. Encompassing entire regions through the organizational network, 
various campaigns were organized by the authorities under the flag of anti-communism. 
With their growing importance as a well-organized civilian network, the aegukpan were 
incorporated into the political mass mobilization led by the South Korean government. 
      The reorganization of the aegukpan was led by the ‘National Society’ 
(Kungminhoe國民會), a nationwide network of followers of Rhee, created in 1946. In 
the wake of the Yŏ-Sun Incident,109  the National Society launched the ‘National 
Movement’ (kungmin undong國民 運 動 ) in December 1948, which used ‘the 
dissemination of anti-communist thought’ (pan’gong sasang chŏn’gae 反共思想展開), 
‘organizing the anti-communist nations’ (pan’gong kungmin chojik反共國民組織), and 
‘practicing anti-communist society’ (pan’gong sahoe silch’ŏn 反共社会實践) as its 
slogans (Kang H. S. 2009: 48). The National Movement integrated and strengthened 
various mass campaigns sporadically implemented in post-colonial Korea, such as the 
New Daily Life Movement (Sinsaenghwal undong新生活運動), which was led by local 
governments and called for thrift and the improvement of the daily diet (Kim H. C. 2004: 
74). As the end-organizations responsible for carrying out the Movement’s aims, the 
aegukpan were renamed ‘national units’ (kungminban國民班),110 and organizationally 
integrated under the National Society’s local branches. 
 The organizational structure and operational method of the kungminban was 
remarkably similar to that of its colonial predecessor. As with the compulsory 
membership of the aegukpan, all citizens were compelled to participate in the 
kungminban. 111  Detailed ‘Operation Regulations for Aegukpan’ (aegukpan unyŏng 
sech’ik愛國班運営細則) announced by Seoul City government in May 1949 stipulated 
                                                
109 A mass revolt occurred in Yŏsu and Sunch’ŏn villages in South Chŏlla province in October 1948 led by 
more than 2,000 left-wing Korean soldiers who were protesting against the South Korean government. This
incident defined the anti-communist political atmosphere of Rhee’s regime. For a detailed account of anti-
government guerrilla conflicts around 1950 in South Korea, see Cumings 1997: 237-290.      
110 Even after the name kungminban was introduced, the term aegukpan was still widely used.    
111 ‘Yi Y ŏng-jin Ch’ungch’ŏngnam-do chisa, kungmin undong-kwa chibang chach’i munje tŭng-e taehae 
tamhwa-rŭl palp’yo李寧鎭 충청남도지사 국민운동과 지방자치문제 등에 대해 담화를 발표’, 
Tongbang sinmun동방신문, 4 September 1949.  Electric document, available at 
http://db.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_014_1949_09_03_0080 (accessed 1 December 2011). 
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specific guidelines concerning the operation of kungminban. For example, the group 
meetings (pansanghoe班常會), originally instituted by the Japanese government to 
systematically transmit government policies, were revived. The regular meetings of the 
kungminban leaders led by the town associations were also convened on the first day of 
each month and followed by those of the ordinary people of each kungminban on the 
third day, with police officers in attendance. To strengthen the function of the 
kungminban, the Regulations limited the size of each unit to fewer than ten households, 
making them smaller than the earlier aegukpan which had each included ten to fifteen 
households.112 As of July 1949, there were 19,338 kungminban units in Seoul.113      
   One of the key objectives behind the government’s creation of the kungminban 
network was to implement the ‘lodging report’ (yusukkye留宿屆) programme, a system 
for surveillance of the citizens. The implementation of this programme is a clear example 
which demonstrates that South Korean authorities appropriated civilian groups originally 
served a functional purpose of food management for maintaining an anti-communist 
system of the country. Under the programme, the kungminban became a unit for mutual 
surveillance, with civilians required to keep an eye on each other. As part of the National 
Movement, this started in Seoul in June 1949 (Kim Y. M. 2005: 171), and by 1950, had 
expanded throughout the country to further increase public security after the outbreak of 
the Korean War in June.114 Its purpose was specified as ‘preventing traitors’ activities 
from breaking the peace of society by keeping watch on the transient population’.115 The 
‘traitors’ were communists and other left-wing elements. The yusukkye system required 
the reporting of guests or other visitors (including relatives) who stayed overnight outside 
their own kungminban units. Both the visitors and the visited had to report their 
                                                
112‘Sŏul-si yusukkye sech’ik palp’yo, panjanghoe-e kyŏngch’algwan imsŏk, 15-il put’ŏ siryŏng-ŭro 
silsi 서울시留宿屆 세칙 발표, 반장회에 경찰관 임석, 15일부터 시령으로實施’, Chayu sinmun, 17 
May 1949, p.2. 
113 ‘Pan chaep’yŏnsŏng wallyo班재편성완료’,  Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 22 July 1949, p.2.  
114 ‘Ch’ian-ŭn chŏngsang sangt’ae yusukkye chŏn’guk-chŏk ŭro silsi治安은正常狀態  留宿屆全國的
으로實施’, Tonga ilbo, 13 October 1950, p.2; ‘Yusukkye chunsu hara留宿屆 준수하라’, Tonga ilbo, 3 
December 1950, p.2.   
115  ‘Sŏul-si kyŏngch’alguk, ch’ian yuji-rŭl wihae aegukpan-ŭl chaep’yŏnsŏng서울시 경찰국 치안유지를 
위해 애국반을 재편성’, Yŏnhap sinmun연합신문 8 April 1949. Electric document, available at  
http://db.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_011_1949_04_07_0090 (accessed  6 December 2011). 
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movements to their own kungminban leaders within 24 hours of the visit.116 Even though 
many politicians criticized the system, saying that it was a violation of civil liberties and 
caused division among the citizens,117  the yusukkye system was justified by the 
government in the name of eradicating communists.     
  The leaders of the kungminban were entrusted with major responsibility in the 
operation of the yusukkye system. They functioned as de facto sub-organizations of the 
police, fulfilling a surveillance role. All reports from their members were submitted to the 
police through the unit leaders (Kim Y. M. 2005: 174). The leaders were ordered by the 
government to pay special attention to the movements of unit members. They had to 
follow the movements of each individual in their unit at all times, and submit up-to-date 
lists of their members to the town associations and the police. Also, they were obligated 
to ensure that people obeyed the rules of reporting by frequently visiting their houses.118 
For example, a kungminban leader in Hoehyŏn-dong town in Seoul visited his members’ 
houses in the early morning to check on them, and found four families that had broken 
the rules of reporting.119 When unreported ‘strangers’ were found within their areas, they 
had to report them to the police immediately. According to a police report, in August 
1949 alone, the number of Seoul citizens who violated he reporting duties reached 
almost 36,800 (Kim Y. M. 2005: 175).   
 The yusukkye reports included detailed personal information about their subjects, 
including the place of family registration, their current address, occupation, age, 
destination or place of lodging, the date, the time of departure and arrival, and the reason 
for their movement. Through the reports, the police were able to follow the minutiae of 
the everyday lives and movements of the citizens. A newspaper article revealed this detail 
                                                
116 ‘Sŏul-si yusukkye sech’ik palp’yo, panjanghoe-e kyŏngch’algwan imsŏk, 15-il put’ŏ siryŏng-ŭro 
silsi 서울시留宿屆 세칙 발표, 반장회에 경찰관 임석, 15일부터 시령으로實施’ Chayu sinmun, 17 May 
1949, p. 2. 
117  ‘Chungbae, yusukkye munje tŭng sojangguk ŭiwŏn-kwa chwadam重配, 留宿屆 문제 등 少將國議員
과座談’ Chosŏn chungang ilbo조선중앙일보 6 May 1949. Electric document, available at 
http://db.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_012_1949_05_03_0010 (accessed 6 December 2011).  
118  ‘Sŏul-si yusukkye sech’ik palp’yo, panjanghoe-e kyŏngch’algwan imsŏk, 15-il put’ŏ siryŏng-ŭro 
silsi 서울시留宿屆 세칙 발표, 반장회에 경찰관 임석, 15일부터 시령으로實施’ Chayu sinmun, 17 May 
1949, p.2. 




by describing the first day’s yusukkye reports submitted to a police stand in Namdaemun 
samga town in Seoul.  
Reports began to be brought around 10 p.m. on the 25th [July 1949]. By 9 a.m. 
the next morning, 28 reports had arrived. There were various reasons for 
people leaving their houses. For example, there wer students who were going 
home for the holidays, a mother from the countryside going to see her 
daughter who had given birth to a baby, a man who was going home to the 
country to participate in an arranged marriage meeting, and even a wife from a 
remote place a long way from Seoul going to see her husband who was 
attending a public trial for his anti-government acivities… Policeman Chang 
said, ‘who can tell that there are not any subversis among them?…Using the 
reports, we shall identify suspicious people in cooperation with the aegukpan 
leaders...’  
(Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 27 July 1949, quoted in Kim Y. M. 2005: 174)    
 Even though legal action against the violators of reporting was the job of the 
police, as seen in the quotation above, the yusukkye system was operated almost entirely 
by the unit leaders. Using the network of kungminban, the government was able to 
monitor the people more effectively than it could through the police system. The 
yusukkye system was maintained until the end of the 1950s, along with strengthened 
surveillance, to prevent the infiltration of communism from North Korea. We can surmise 
that such a surveillance system would not have worked so well without the unit leaders’ 
power over their members, which had originally come from their role in rationing control. 
The legacy of the colonial system, created and modified primarily for the purpose of food 
rationing, was incorporated into the state surveillance of Korean citizens.   
 According to Cwiertka’s description, in post-war Japan persistent efforts by the 
US occupying forces to dissolve the tonarigumi, a Japanese version of aegukpan 
organization, were ‘a mission doomed to fail’. Despite the recognition by Americans that 
tonarigumi were a feudalistic institution used by the wartime Japanese authorities as a 
political tool to control the people, they remained closely involved in the Japanese food-
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rationing system after 1945. This was the reason behind the continuous function of the 
civilian organization in post-war Japan, constituting the central feature of the everyday 
lives of urban citizens (Cwiertka 2010b).  
 The same held true for decolonized Korea, except for the fact that the USAMGIK 
did not try to dismantle the mass organizations in its occupation zone. Adoption of the 
colonial apparatus was standard operating procedure in the civil affairs of the USAMGIK. 
The Americans considered it not only logical but also practical to reuse the Japanese 
system in tackling a range of problems in decolonized Korea (Meade 1951: 76). The 
Japanese system of civilian associations was strength ed within the framework of the 
US authorities’ food rationing programme, also modelle  after colonial mechanisms, and 
was inherited by the South Korean government as part of the institutional framework of 
the food management system. The civilian groups were further reinforced for surveillance 
purposes in the hostile relationship between South and North Korea. In short, the food 
shortage in post-colonial Korea was an important fac or in bequeathing the wartime 
Japanese legacy to Korean society. It provided continuity between colonial and post-
colonial Korea by supporting the revival of war tools, originally devised for Imperial 
Japan, for yet another ideological conflict between North Korea.  
 On 6 April 1964, a 60 year-old woman, Yi Sŏn-nye, who had been an aegukpan 
leader for 30 years in Ahyŏn-1-dong town, was given an award by Seoul City for he  
exemplary service. A newspaper ran an article about the woman, quoting her as saying: 
‘[w]hen I was instructed by the [Japanese] governmet to collect brassware,120 I 
hinted to people to conceal things in their houses…’ [Under the South Korean 
government’s grain rationing scheme,] [t]his hoary-headed leader had a skirmish with 
one of her members for the first time, ‘A housewife visited me, and complained that I 
had not given her a purchasing permit.’ She adds that t e problem was that food 
rationing was only for 29 per cent of the entire population at that time… The 
achievements of Yi recorded by the town association of Ahyŏn-1-dong include 
‘reporting to the town association immediately when someone faced difficulty in her 
                                                
120 Traditional Korean tableware. During the war years, it was collected by the colonial government to 
convert into war munitions.   
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area so that the office was able to handle problems quickly…reporting the 
movements of people who moved in and out without fulfilling the administrative 
requirements …she has cooperated with the administrative tasks of the town 
association for 30 years.’ 121         
Even now, regular pansanghoe unit meetings are still conducted led by unit leaders 
depending on the locality. Even though the terms aegukpan and kungminban have lost 
their original connotations, and are no longer linked with food rationing and 
government’s surveillance programme, the system of civilian groups still continue to 
exist. At the neighbourhood meetings, people discuss various subjects related to their 
community lives and public issues, such as elections. Civilian groups compromised of 
neighbouring households in contemporary Korea keep th  colonial legacy alive.     
 
                                                
121 ‘Mubosu 30-yŏn yŏ panjangnim kwi mit-en ŏnŭdŏt hŭin mŏri 무보수 30년여반장님 귀밑엔 어느덧 




Chapter Three  
Beyond State Control: the Black Market 
 
In the previous chapters, I have documented the stat ’s institutional apparatuses devised 
to control food distribution. This chapter deals with the black market, a different aspect of 
the economic phenomena that emerged under the controlled economic system, and 
focuses on the drawbacks of state control and the invigorated underground economy that 
resulted from it.   
The term black market covers all economic activities that involved attempts to 
avoid the state economic controls that were put in place to ensure a more adequate and 
equal distribution of scarce commodities and to prevent inflation, and the physical spaces 
where people engaged in such activities (Clinard 1952: 2; Griffiths 2002: 825). In 
research into the black market of wartime Japan, Scherer stated that ‘the very moment the 
government pressed free-market flows into a rigid cast of fixed prices and controlled 
distribution, new channels circumventing the official ones evolved’ (1999: 121). Even 
though the black market had unexpected consequences, which those in authority were 
anxious to suppress, its existence must be considered when examining the controlled 
structure of food distribution. As a ‘mirror’ of the actual implementation of state 
regulations and people’s mundane struggle to live by avoiding the controls, an analysis of 
the black market significantly enhances our understanding of the whole operational 
mechanism of the controlled economy.  
 Although some studies have been carried out into food controls in Korea in the 
1940s and 1950s, largely from the political economic and economic perspectives, thus far 
surprisingly little attention has been given to theblack market.122 This seems to be due to 
                                                
122 Except for the very few scholars who have focused on the black market as a research subject (i.e., Yi S. 
S.  2003a), the vast majority of researchers who have examined the economic perspective of colonial Korea 
go no further than providing several examples of black-marketeering. For example, in Kwŏn’s 43-page 
chapter on the Japanese controlled wartime economy, less than two pages are devoted to dealing with the 
black-market activities of colonial Koreans. See Kwŏn P. T’.1984: 432, 444-445.  
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the lack of sources and systematic information on the black market. Owing to the hidden 
nature of criminal activities, it is difficult to extrapolate the scope of black marketeering 
and establish how it worked alongside the increasingly restrictive regulations.   
The sources used for the study of the black market of colonial Korea in the first 
section of this chapter include official documents Keiezai chian nippō 経済治安日報 
(Daily Rreport of Economic Security), edited by thePolice Affairs Bureau, and the Keizai 
jōhō 経済情報 (Economic Information) reports, written by the Legal Affairs Bureau. 
Most of these documents were considered strictly confidential. They reveal individual 
cases of economic crime with detailed descriptions f people’s criminal behaviours and 
the authorities’ actions against such irregularities. This information was shared among 
government officials so that they could understand the context of economic crimes in 
order to help prevent them. The information revealed sheds useful light on the evasive 
aspects of the controlled economy of Japanese colonial government. 
The majority of this chapter deals with black-market phenomena in colonial 
Korea, due to a lack of sufficient original material and the fragmented information found 
in the extremely limited preceding studies on the black market in post-colonial Korea. In 
addition to the lack of documentation regarding the black market, the dearth of research 
materials, especially economic statistics, for the initial years of liberated Korea is the 
greatest obstacle for researchers (Kim C. S. 2000: 87; Chu S. K. 1951: 53-55). Therefore, 
in my examination of the black market in post-colonial Korea which will be dealt with in 
the second section, I will document the roles of significant players who made great 
contributions to the invigorated black market in post-colonial society through a 
representation of their malpractices. Hopefully, by examining the black market, which 
was central to the daily life of the civilian population, this chapter will contribute to 
delineating the dynamic nature of mundane daily life under the framework of rigid state 
economic controls.  
The Japanese Wartime Controlled Economy and Price Increases  
People could not survive without it [the black market]. I heard a story about a judge 
at Kanggyŏng District Court from my brother-in-law who worked for the post 
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office in Kanggyŏng town. Out of the principle of obedience to the law as a judge, 
he divided his ration distribution into thirty packs since, if he ate it haphazardly, he 
might run short later on. Despite his thrifty efforts, the monthly ration only lasted 
25 days. In the end, he had no choice but to buy the missing grain for a much 
higher price through an unofficial channel. It was definitely impossible to survive 
only on official rations. 
(Hŏ Y. N. 2006: 126) 
Rationing and price controls were an integral part of the Japanese economic mobilization 
project throughout Japan’s all-out war years, which began with the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1937. Theoretically, these control schemes were designed to achieve two 
goals, to combat high inflation and to ensure the ad quate and even distribution of scarce 
resources, with the ultimate intention of maximizing the use of materials necessary for 
conducting a war (Bentley 1998: 19; Clinard 1952: 2). However, Japan’s economic 
controls failed in both these aims, and eventually led to the creation of an invigorated 
black market in which things were traded at exorbitantly high prices to the detriment of 
the rationing system. Before discussing the black-market phenomena, I will begin by 
considering the construction of the wartime controlled economic system and the price 
control programmes that, along with rationing, accelerated wartime inflation and had a 
great influence upon the thriving black market.    
With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Korea was designated as Japan’s 
‘advance military supply base’ and, through the development of its own industries, was to 
play an economic supporting role for the Japanese military forces in Manchuria (Eckert 
1996: 12). With its top priority being to meet increasing military demands from Japan, 
massive industrialization projects were implemented in Korea. As part of these 
development projects, great efforts were devoted to the expansion of war-related 
industries. Total industrial production was valued at approximately 200 million yen in 
1921, and was still less than 300 million yen a decade later, but by 1937, it had reached 
one billion yen, and had grown to two billion yen by 1943. While industrial production 
accounted for only fifteen per cent of Korea’s total economic output in 1921, between 
1936 and 1943, this grew to 40 per cent (Eckert 1996: 13).  
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Government efforts to concentrate the supply of imported raw materials in war-
related industries were implemented with the promulgation of the Temporary Act on 
Imports and Exports (Yushutsunyūhin tō ni kansuru rinji sochi ni kansuru hōritsu 輸出入
品等ニ関スル臨時措置ニ関スル法律 ) in September 1937. Despite the rapid 
industrialization, Korean industries were heavily dependent upon raw materials imported 
from Japan: 75 per cent of the 150 important materils needed in industry came from 
Japan (Kim, I. H. 2004: 151). From the latter half of the 1930s, however, their 
importation became increasing difficult. This was partly due to the expansion of heavy 
industry in Japan Proper in preparation for war,123 but was also linked to the Japanese 
central government’s difficulty in ensuring a stable supply of imported materials, owing 
to its international political situation.124 In the context of decreasing material supplies 
from Japan, the colonial authorities in Korea had to take measures to ensure the 
preferential supply of deficit materials to munitions production. Initially declaring the 
state’s controlling authority over the distribution f materials such as iron, steel, coal and 
heavy fuel oil, the power of the Temporary Act on Imports and Exports gradually 
expanded to cover a wider range of controlled materials. As of 1938, 32 kinds of 
industrial materials were allocated to meet, in order of priority, military demand, quasi-
military demand, and civilian demand, under the control of the Governor-General (Kim, I. 
H. 2000: 338, 341-342).  
The process of military-focused industrialization led to an overall decline in 
production for civilian consumption. This imbalance of supply and demand in civilian 
goods was the initial reason for the general rise in prices in Korea. Even though the 
predominance of light industries, such as those producing textiles, food, ceramics, lumber 
and printing, did not change after 1937, the majority of their production was shifted to 
meet specific war needs (Eckert 1996: 13). Even thoug  the statistics show that 
                                                
123 The output of heavy industries (i.e., metal and metal r fining, machinery, tools, shipbuilding, aircraft 
building and chemical production) in Japan Proper accounted for 73 per cent of total industrial output in 
1942, while in 1930 it had accounted for just 38 per cent (Cohen 1949: 1).  
124 Japan antagonized the US and Britain by concluding a military alliance with Germany and Italy in 1937. 
As a series of sanctions were taken against Japan by the US and the British, Japan’s overseas assets were 
frozen and raw materials imports were prohibited. For example, in 1940 the US notified Japan of the 
abandonment of the 1937 Commerce Treaty, and imposed an mbargo on the importation of machinery and 
scrap iron and steel (Ikeda 1966: 81).    
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agricultural production continued to constitute around 50 per cent of total domestic 
production until the first half of the 1940s (Yi, T. K. 2002: 25), the production of food 
resources for civilian consumption decreased considerably. For example, as of 1944, 70 
per cent of beef output was appropriated for military consumption. Foodstuffs were not 
the only consumer items that were controlled: most of the raw fibres produced in Korea 
were used for the production of military supplies (Yokeno 1947: 61). A study carried out 
by the Korean Government-General in 1942 revealed that the supplies of cotton met just 
24 per cent of minimum civilian demand, those of towels only 40 per cent, those of jika-
tabi125 met just 60 per cent, and of underclothes only 66 per cent (Yi S. S. 2003a: 288). 
The concentration of limited material resources on war production opened up a huge gap 
between supply and demand in civilian necessities. This absolute shortfall in supply led 
to price increases.  
An overissue of currency was the second factor which fanned the flames of 
inflation. As a way to cover war expenses, the colonial government increased the money 
supply. This fundraising mechanism to boost the armament industries was created with 
the enactment of the Temporary Act of Funding (Rinji shikin chōtatsuhō 臨時資金調達
法 ) in October 1937. With this legal foundation, the colonial authorities constantly 
brought out new issues of currency, funnelling it into the military-related industries. Table 
3-1 shows the index of currency issues and prices in Korea between 1926 and 1944.  
Table 3-1: The currency issues and price indices in Korea, 1926-1944 (1926 = 100)   
Years Currency issue-index Price index  
1926  100.0 100.0 
1930   98.5 (-16.3) 77.3 (-12.8) 
1935  188.2 (+17.7) 76.8 (+10.6) 
1936  195.7 (+4.0) 81.5 (+6.2) 
1937  215.1 (+9.9) 88.1 (+8.1) 
1938  309.4 (+43.8) 101.3 (+15.0) 
1939  362.4 (+17.2) 117.2 (+15.6) 
                                                
125 A type of Japanese outdoor footwear.  
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1940 517.8 (+42.9) 133.6 (+13.8) 
1941 634.4 (+22.5) 132.6 (-0.7) 
1942 815.0 (+28.5) 142.4 (+7.4) 
1943 1102.0 (+35.2) 158.4 (+11.2) 
1944 2259.1 (+105.0) 177.6 (+12.1) 
Based on Kim T. U. 1995: 100.  
( ) = growth rate over previous years 
While the currency remained stable between 1926 and 1930, an increase is shown during 
the first half of the 1930s. After 1937, when Japan began to push through full-scale 
resource mobilization to increase military production, there was an especially marked rise 
in currency issues: if the issue of 1926 equalled 100, the index of 1937 equalled 215; 
however, this rocketed to 1,102 by 1943, and further gr w to 2,259 in 1944. The statistics 
show that the enormous expense of the war was dealtwith by additional currency issues 
in Korea. Such rampant currency inflation triggered price rises.      
An important point to be noted here is that the government imposed a system of 
ceiling prices on a vast range of commodities in order to curb the inflation brought on by 
the monetary policy. However, as Korean scholars have pointed out, the colonial 
government’s pricing policy was apt to be unreasonable nd unrealistic. For instance, the 
economist Kwŏn Pyǒng-t’ak argued that a price rise of 8.3 times was ntural during the 
eight-year period between 1936 and 1944, when it is considered that currency circulation 
skyrocketed 21 times between the same period. (1984: 440). Yet, the officially calculated 
index of wholesale prices in 1944, using 1936 as a base (100), was 241, and for retail 
prices equalled 226 in Seoul. More specifically, the index for grain was 186, for other 
foodstuffs was 266, and for textiles was 238. According to government data, however, 
there was only a two-and-a-half-fold increase in foodstuffs and twofold increase in the 
cost of other commodities during this eight-year period (Hŏ Y. N. 2000: 303-304).  
In reality, soaring prices seem to have been much more serious than the data 
demonstrated by the government. A 1937 article in apopular magazine testifies to the 
actual situation regarding prices in Seoul. On top of a gradual rise in general prices which 
had started at the beginning of the 1930s, it notes that prices had soared in a record-
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breaking manner since 1931, especially from the end of 1936. According to a survey 
conducted by the Korean Bank, the general level of prices in December 1936 was 28 per 
cent higher than in the previous month. For example, th  price of sesame oil and sugar 
grew by between 80 and 90 per cent in just one month (Han P. Y. 1937: 86). In March 
1938 the Maeil sinbo newspaper reported that the prices of nearly all commodities, 
including rice, barley, cotton and ceramics, had grown by between 10 and 60 per cent 
from those of the previous year (Hŏ Y. N. 2000: 304). These examples show that the 
official prices controlled by price regulations were artificially low and did not reflect 
effective prices determined by supply and demand. Government measures to enforce the 
low price policy, which was originally supposed to curb inflation, eventually created 
illegal trade channels through which civilians were forced to pay much higher prices, 
while traders earned more than through legitimate markets. As the state’s struggle for the 
control and allocation of scarce commodities intensified, the black market grew ever 
larger.   
Moral Persuasion to Secure Wartime Economic Order  
Garon noted that nationalistic appeals to its people were a feature of the Japanese 
government’s campaigns to manage its society for several decades after the end of the 
nineteenth century. In particular, while the country was at war, the Japanese authorities 
aggressively used moral sense based on patriotism to enforce compliance with 
administrative regulations and to regulate people’s b haviour (Garon 1997: 13-15). From 
the end of the 1930s, when Japan entered the so-called total war era, the colonial 
government in Korea used moral persuasion, grounded in the totalitarian economic view, 
to mobilize the entire nation’s economic strength. To put it plainly, the authorities 
promoted a new morality in order to make people contribute to the country’s war efforts.   
Economic morality (kyŏngje todŏk 經済道徳) and business ethics (ang todŏk 商
道徳) became buzzwords around 1940, once the government’s conomic control was 
strengthened. The new concept of economic morality was grounded in the highly 
centralized economic system which was increasingly emphasized by the wartime 
government. As part of the concept, the economic structure that promoted individualism 
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and liberalism was sharply criticized for its detrimental effect on social interest and on the 
country’s development. It entailed a shift in purpose for commercial activities, from 
financial incentives, which had dominated the capitalis  economy, towards public interest 
(kongik共益) in supporting the nation and the war effort. The Japanese authorities had no 
intention of nationalizing all industries in the country; however, they sought to put them 
under state control by transforming them into cooperative organizations in order to ensure 
that they contributed to the country. The new vision of business ethics saw each economic 
sector functioning for the purpose of national proserity, mirroring the relationship 
between cells and an organic body. Only then were individual economic activities 
acceptable (Misawa 1944: 77-78).  
The new economic morality advocated by the Japanese authorities was based on 
the idea of nationalism. Rampant nationalism in Japan surged as the Imperial Japanese 
Army, a right-wing nationalist group, rose to political prominence in the 1930s. The 
Army gained political influence due to the Manchurian Incident (1931), and then more 
amid the increasing dissatisfaction of the Japanese people with the previous civilian 
bureaucracy, which had failed to efficiently control the economy and had shown 
administrative incapability (Matsusaka 1996: 129-130; Yanaga 1940: 126-127). The 
Army’s ideology was characterized as nationalistic, expansionist and socialistic, as well 
as anti-capitalistic, anti-individualistic, anti-factional and anti-communistic (Yanaga 
1940: 128). It was rooted in Marxism, which had arrived in Japan in the 1920s in the 
form of criticism of capitalism and the free market economy and an adoration of planned 
economics (Nakamura 1999: 10). The Army was not the only group that believed some 
form of socialistic economic structure was superior to the capitalist economic system. 
Many economists and politicians believed that Japanese capitalism had reached a point 
where its liquidation was only a question of time. Influential politicians advocated 
revolutionary national socialistic reconstruction ad the expansion of the Japanese 
territory through military force (Nakamura 1999: 11). Naturally, the political focus 
shifted from a capitalist economic system based on individualism and free enterprise to a 
centrally planned economy that contributed to the sate.   
The government’s direct control of business activities was consolidated by the 
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passing of the Tenets of the New Order in regard to Ec nomy (keizai shintaisei yōkō 経
済新体制要綱), which was endorsed by Konoe Fumimarō’s cabinet on 7 December 1940 
in Japan. It outlined a central economic policy within the doctrine of the ‘New Order’ 
(shintaisei 新体制 ) proclaimed by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei 
yokusankai大政翼賛会). Led by Konoe, this fascist organization had become the most 
powerful party in Japanese politics by 1940 (Nakamura 1999: 16). The new economic 
policy postulated that companies would best serve the public interest under centralized 
state economic controls, blatantly rejecting the profit-motivated capitalist system. It 
repositioned companies as one of the components of the national economy to be 
controlled within the state’s comprehensive economic plans for ensuring national defence. 
Emphasizing the new moral principles of ‘putting priority upon public interests (kōeki 
yūsen公益優先)’ and ‘discharging one’s duty for the sake of the country (shokubun bōkō
職分奉公)’, the policy authorized state intervention in themanagement and operation of 
business activities (Misawa 1944: 81-82).  
In fact, the concept revealed in the Tenets of the New Order in regard to Economy 
was relatively constrained compared to the tentative version which had faced opposition 
from Japan’s business community. The original plan ticipated the drastic 
transformation of corporations into government-led cooperative organizations based on 
the notion that companies were production units whose goal was to achieve targets set by 
the state. Seeking to change corporate goals from the pursuit of profits to production 
increases, especially in munitions production, it proposed that the owners and directors of 
companies should be separated from the management. Faced with intense opposition 
from the business community, the government eventually established a relatively 
moderate economic reform programme (Nakamura 1999: 15-16). However, the 
government’s real intention of intervening in companies’ operational management soon 
materialized through subsequent restrictive measures brought in under the Business 
Licence Act (kigyō kyokarei企業許可令) in 1941 and the Business Reorganization Act 
(Kigyō seibirei企業整備令) in 1942. These acts aimed to restrict the creation of new 
businesses through a licensing system and to consolidate and reorganize companies in 
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order to concentrate scarce material resources in mil tary industries. Through these acts, 
medium and small-sized firms were forced to close. Most of the workers from these 
companies were transferred to munitions factories.    
Economic reconstruction based on the idea of the New Order was soon applied to 
economic policy in colonial Korea. The Business Licen e Act and Business 
Reorganization Act came into effect in Korea at almost the same time as in Japan. In 
order to shift labour power from civilian industries to war industries, many companies 
were forced to close down or change their businesses. According to Tamura, the director 
of the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a wide range of industries, including 
textiles, shipping and electricity, were reorganized by the government. He illustrated this 
with the radical reduction in the number of small transportation firms, from 263 to just 
nineteen by 1944, adding that any mention of the number of business closures and 
changes caused by state policies was officially prohibited (Tamura 1944: 281-282). The 
production of important material resources was streamlined to improve efficiency. For 
example, by 1944, the number of authorized mines had fallen from 300 to 50 in Kangwŏn 
Province. Workers in less-productive mines were sent to the selected 50 mines to 
maximize the efficiency of the workforce and production (Ibid.: 285). Furthermore, the 
opening of new businesses was also strictly limited. Only 50 per cent of the 
approximately 4,000 licence applicants were given prmission to start their businesses 
between December 1941 and March 1944 (Ibid.: 283).  
Production activities were not the only sphere affected by the totalitarian view of 
economic morality: merchants and individual shopkeeers were also required to change 
their way of thinking of their designated roles to fi  in with the new ideology. Dispelling 
the fallacy of pushing for their own business interests, they were instead compelled 
merely to be faithful in the performance of their duties, providing a smooth and even 
distribution of goods from producers to consumers (Eguchi 1940: 80). In other words, 
their social status as businessmen was reduced to tha  of salaried workers, and their 
income was purely a commission for distributing social property, rather than a personal 
profit (Tamura 1941: 40).  
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In pursuit of establishing the new economic morality among the people, the 
government carried out various mass campaigns. For example, in August 1941, the Week 
for the Improvement of New Business Morals (sin sangŏp todŏk hwangnip chugan新商
業道徳確立週間 ) was set up by the government.126 Obedience to the Law Week 
(chunbŏp kangjo chugan遵法強調週間) was run between 6 and 16 November 1942, and 
8 and 18 November 1943.127 Through street marches and public lectures, the authorities 
urged the civilian population to establish the new morality of pursuing the public interest 
as the top priority, rooting out conventional commercialism based on a free economic 
structure.  
Special organizations were created to carry out these campaigns. In 1940, the 
Government-General ordered the establishment of a nationwide Council for Economic 
Control Cooperation (Kyŏngje t’ongje hyŏmnyŏkhoe經済統制協力會) in order to place 
people within supervision frameworks and to strengthen the enforcement of economic 
regulations.128 Composed of local members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
and other government officials, through mass campaigns this organization called for 
people to cooperate with the nation’s war policies and obey the regulations.129 In some 
areas, shopkeepers were also included the Council’s branches so that they could share 
information, such as newly developed price regulations, and keep an eye on each other to 
prevent illegal business activity (Hōmukyoku keijika 1941: 44). These organized efforts 
by the authorities were intended to enforce compliance with the multiplicative economic 
regulations and the strengthened state controls that accompanied the extension of the war.  
 
                                                
126 ‘Sin sangŏp todŏk hwangnip chugan新商業道德確立週間’, Maeil sinbo毎日申報, 20 August 1941, 
p.1.      
127 ‘Chunbŏp kangjo undong遵法强調運動’, Maeil sinbo, 6 November 1942, p. 4; ‘Ch’onghu saenghwal 
anjŏng-e chunbŏp kangjo undong chwadamhoe銃後生活安定에遵法强調運動座談會’,  Maeil sinbo, 10 
November 1943, p.2. 
128 ‘Kyŏngje t’ongje hyŏmnyŏk hoeŭi yŏllak chungang kigwan-do sŏlch’i 經済統制協力會議 連絡中央機
関도設置’, Tonga ilbo東亜日報, 11 May 1940, p.4.   
129 ‘Amch’wiin-ŭl pangji k’ojŏ kyŏngje t’ongje hyŏmnyŏkhoe kyŏlsŏng yuwŏliril Pusan sangŭi-eso 闇取引
을防止코저 經濟統制協力會結成 六月一日 釜山商議에서’, Tonga ilbo, 21 May 1940, p.4. 
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The Price Control Programmes  
The promulgation of the Profiteering Restriction Regulation (Bōr ikōi tō torishimari 
kisoku暴利行為等取締規則) on 21 July 1938 marked the beginning of the government’s 
control of the prices of commodities bought by general consumers. It evolved from the 
Restriction Regulations against Profiteering Busineses (Bōri o mokuti to suru baibai no 
torishimari ni kansuru ken暴利を目的とする売買の取締に関する件) enacted in May 
1937, which banned the hoarding of iron and steel for industrial use. The first amendment 
in August 1937 expanded the scope of the control to 26 items, and was followed by a 
second revision in 1938 which outlawed the hoarding of and profiteering from 29 kinds 
of daily necessities (Hŏ Y. N. 2000: 295-296). Soon after the second revision, a price-
indication programme was launched as the first step towards a price-curbing policy. 
Establishing the 29 items – including rice, barley, sugar, eggs, matches and clothing – for 
which prices were to be monitored, the authorities ordered sellers to label items with the 
‘proper’ prices and other information, such as the number of items per package and the 
date they were priced. In addition to making this information available to customers, the 
sellers were required to submit lists of their products and the price of each to the 
government.130  
This initial attempt at price regulation was less than successful. Even though the 
authorities monitored 29 kinds of important commodities to prevent sellers from 
profiteering from them, there was no clear standard fo  pricing at all, and the prices were 
entirely entrusted to the principled judgement of the sellers. After making an inspection 
of a local shopping area, for example, a government official from Kyŏnggi Province 
reported that the reason for the failure of the system was the difficulty of setting the 
prices.131 The amorphous situation caused by the price regulation was described thus: 
‘[O]n the one hand, shop keepers were hesitant of putting price tags on, wondering if they 
were making excessive profits or not….on the other hand, customers were doubtful of 
                                                
130 ‘Chunbi-nŭn toeŏnnŭn’ga isipkujong mulka p’yosi準備는되엇는가 二十九種物価表示’, Maeil sinbo, 
27 July 1938, p.2.   
131 ‘Sangjŏmga-ŭi kagyŏk p’yosi taech’e sŏngjŏk ‘pyŏng’ iha商店街의價格表示 大體成績「丙」以下’,  
Maeil sinbo, 31 July 1938. p.2.  
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whether the prices indicated on the goods were legal or not...’ 132  
After the failure of the price control programme, there was a greater awareness of 
the need to establish ceiling prices in order to more comprehensively curb price rises. In 
August 1938, the Korean Price Committee (Chosŏn mulka wiwŏnhoe朝鮮物價委員會) 
was formed with the aim of establishing official prices for items traded at markets. With 
Japanese Governo-General’s Secretary for Political Aff irs Ōno as the leader, five sub-
organizations in charge of textiles, foodstuffs, metals, fuel and other items, were set up 
under the Committee (Hŏ Y. N. 2000: 307). Provincial Price Committees（To mulka 
wiwŏnhoe道物價委員會) were also formed under the local governments to control 
prices in each locality. The central Committee was entrusted with determining ‘fair 
prices’ (kongjŏng kagyŏk公正價格) for commodities, based on research into the basic 
cost and additional expenses incurred for each item. The fair price was the maximum 
price at which sellers could sell their products. When there were difficulties in 
determining fair prices immediately, a temporary price was adopted, known as a ‘stopped 
price’ (chŏngji kagyŏk停止價格) or an ‘agreed price’ (hyŏbŭi kagyŏk協議價格). Under 
the former scheme, prices were determined by a price-f eeze on the basis of the price on a 
specific date; under the latter, prices were decided by agreements between the producers 
and the dealers, under the supervision of the governm nt. When fair prices were finally 
determined for items traded at stopped or agreed prices, the temporary prices were 
abolished (Fujimoto 1944: 337-338). Fundamentally, the local branches’ pricing 
administrations followed the lead organization’s decision, but they were sometimes able 
to set local prices which took into consideration the supply cost and context in their 
regions.133 
Still more detailed stipulations concerning price regulations were made with the 
establishment of the Korean Goods Selling Price Ordinance (Chōsen buppin hanbai 
kakaku torishimari kisoku 朝鮮物品販売価格取締規則) in October 1938. According to 
                                                
132‘Saero puch’in chŏnggap’yo-e ŭi hŭrin kurŭm! 새로붓친定価表에의흐린구름!’, Maeil sinbo, 28 July 
1938, p.2. 
133  ‘Chungang mulka wiwŏnhoe-wa pyŏnghaeng chibang mulka chojŏng pangch’im中央物價委員會와 
倂行 地方物價調整方針’, Maeil sinbo, 1 September 1938, p.2. 
Chapter Three 
150 
this ordinance, the objectives of the government’s price controls and the prices set were 
formulated by official notifications issued by the Governor-General or by the provincial 
governors. Trading at prices lower than those determined was allowed, but sales 
transactions at prices exceeding the official ceiling prices were strictly prohibited. Both 
the sellers and buyers who violated the regulations were subject to a prison term of up to 
one year or a fine of up to 5,000 wŏn.134 Compared with the earlier penalties based on the 
Restriction Regulation on Profiteering, which were a maximum of three months in prison 
or a 100 wŏn fine, the punishments were much harsher (Hŏ Y. N. 2000: 308).    
The price control policy reached its peak with the enactment of the Price Control 
Ordinance (kakaku tō tōseirei価格等統制令) or ‘9-18 Stop Ordinance’ (9-18 teishirei停
止令) enacted on 27 October 1939. Encompassing prices for a broad range of products 
and services, including transportation, storage, insurance, processing, and rent costs, the 
act prohibited any price increases above the level prevailing on 18 September 1939 (Hŏ Y. 
N. 2000: 309). As explained above, the government’s i ention to set maximum prices 
had already been established by the creation of the Kor an Price Committee in 1938. 
However, price fixing did not progress as expected at first because an immense amount of 
time and effort was required to set prices for every single commodity on the market. Most 
importantly, faced with the rocketing prices of materials day by day, the government 
needed to take emergency measures to comprehensively and firmly freeze prices 
(Fujimoto 1944: 340).  
Initially the price-freezing policy was implemented with the intention of 
withdrawing it after one year. During the period of enforcement, the government planned 
to replace the temporarily stopped prices with fair prices.135  Nevertheless, the 
government’s original plan to repeal the ordinance after one year was postponed 
repeatedly. Due to the difficulty of determining prices, the government had no choice but 
to stick with the frozen prices. Moreover, there was a fear that prices would rocket when 
                                                
134 ‘Wibanja-nŭn ŏmbŏl! Illy ŏn iha chingyŏk, och’ŏnwŏn iha pŏlgŭm sangga chasuk chagye 
ch’okchin違反者는厳罰!一年이하징역, 五千원이하벌금 商街自粛自戒促進’,  Maeil sinbo, 13 
October 1938, p.2.  
135 ‘Kagyŏk insang chŏngjiryŏng purwŏn, puryŏng-ŭl kongp’o価格引上停止令不遠・府令을公布’ Maeil 
sinbo, 4 October 1939, p.3. 
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the price-fixing system was eliminated amid increasing supply shortages.136 As a result, 
the price-freezing policy remained effective until the end of the war and the range of 
items covered by it expanded. For example, in the first revision in 1940, the prices of 
fabrics, metallic products and perishable foodstuff, such as fish, fruit and vegetables, 
were included.137 Charges for repairs, entrance to attractions (theatres, exhibitions and 
recreation grounds, etc.), accommodation, and advertisements on public transport were 
frozen at the level of 11 August 1941 by the second revision of the Act in September 
1941.138 In July 1943, the Hwanghae-do provincial government fixed official medical 
treatment fees under the Price Control Ordinance.139 The ceiling price system was a 
powerful method of wartime price stabilization. By 1945, the authorities had drastically 
consolidated state control of prices by expanding the breadth of the regulation.  
However, practical enforcement of the Japanese pricing policies was enormously 
difficult. First, the government’s semi-controlled technique of price regulation affected 
the prices of commodities. Under the price-indication programme implemented in 1938, 
explained previously in this section, the authorities simply ordered sellers to indicate the 
prices arbitrarily determined by them, without elucidating detailed regulations to enforce 
the low-price policy, and this failed to achieve a result. Rather, contrary to the initial aim 
of preventing a price hike, the programme created an air of anxiety about soaring prices. 
It raised the prices of commodities by encouraging both sellers and buyers hoard and buy 
more than they needed, as people feared possible prce rises in the near future. Moreover, 
some sellers set extravagant prices for certain items, such as iron, rubber and cotton, as 
the prices of these items were outside of government onitoring. Taking advantage of a 
widespread rumour of soaring prices across a broad range of consumer goods, and vague 
concerns about such a situation, sellers set extravagant prices for their products, which 
led to a general rise in prices.140 
                                                
136 ‘Kuilp’al chŏngji kagyŏk kihan-ŭl yŏn’gi kagyŏk tŭng t’ongjeryŏng-ŭl kaejŏng kwangbŏmwi kongjŏng 
kagyŏk chedo kyugyŏk oep’um-e to chŏnban-chŏk ŭro! 九一八停止価格期限을延期 価格等統制令을 
改正 廣範圍公定價格制定 規格外品에도全般的으로!’, Maeil sinbo, 27 August 1940, p.3.  
137 Ibid.  
138 ‘P’arilil chŏngjiryŏng kongp’o八一一停止令公布’, Maeil sinbo, 4 September 1941, p.1. 
139 ‘Ŭisa chinch’allyo Hwanghae-do esŏ kyŏlchŏng in’ga醫師診察料 黃海道에서決定認可’, Maeil sinbo, 
27 July 1943, p.4. 
140 ‘Sangjǒmga-ǔi kagyǒk p’yǒsi taech’e ‘pyǒng’ iha Kyǒnggi-do Sanǒpkwa-ǔi naesa kyǒlgwa商店街의價
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Even after the implementation of the price freeze, consumer goods outside of 
government control were a major problem. In particular, problems surrounding perishable 
foodstuffs, such as seafood, fruit and vegetables, plagued the price policy. It was not until 
November 1940, a year after the 9-18 Stop Ordinance came into effect, that ceiling prices 
for these products were established, due to the seesawing supplies of them. Until the 
ceiling prices were finally fixed, the fluctuating values of these foodstuffs pushed up the 
prices of other basic commodities (Kakunaga 1940: 16). 
The second problem with the government system of price regulation was price 
setting. The authorities did not establish a standardized method for price setting. For the 
sellers, it was critical that the prices set properly reflected the production costs so that 
their businesses remained profitable. In addition, there were many conditions to be 
considered when the prices were set, such as the distribution margin of products and the 
size of the companies involved, as these affected th  production costs. Despite the 
importance of price setting, the government prices w re fixed in an ‘extremely expedient 
manner’ without utilizing standardized computational methods (Ibid.: 13). In most cases, 
production costs were determined by simply taking a average of costs based on the 
reports from some sellers, or by directly borrowing the reported costs calculated by 
specific companies, without any corrections. The only principle taken into account in the 
final decision on the sales price was to raise the calculated prices slightly in consideration 
of small business owners, as their production costs were relatively higher than those of 
big firms. Kakunaga, head of the department of price oordination under the 
Government-General, and one of those involved in fixi g prices, stated that the lack of a 
standardized method for cost calculation was the major reason for the incorrect ‘fair 
prices’ set by the government. He admitted that he did not know how to answer the 
questions from people who wanted know how the system of price setting worked (Ibid.: 
14-15).      
Roughly calculated official prices caused various problems in practical business 
transactions. Records of meetings between businessmen and government officers to 
                                                                                                                                       
格表示 大體「丙」以下 京畿道産業課의内査結果’, Maeil sinbo, 31 July 1938, p.2. 
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discuss the pricing policies reveal that there were issues with impractical prices for a 
wide range of products. Shopkeepers argued, for instance, that the fixed price for dried 
udon was too low, while that of wheat flour was unusually expensive due to the high 
price of wheat flour that had prevailed at the time of the price freeze (Jōsetsu senji keizai 
konwakai 1941: 71, 74). Another example was the across-the-board fixed price for sushi. 
In general, the prices for each variety of sushi differed depending on the type or the 
quality of seafood used. Despite such a widespread pr ctice, a fixed-price programme 
was adopted; fifteen sen141 per piece and 70 sen for a dish of assorted sushi, regardless of 
the items included (Jōsetsu senji keizai konwakai 1941: 95).  
Moreover, distributors were forced to continue with unprofitable businesses. This 
was particularly true of the grain sellers operating u der the distribution system in Seoul: 
compared to the relatively high wholesale price that retailers had to pay for their 
deliveries, the regulated retail price was unnaturally low. Highlighting this problem, one 
newspaper article argued that there was an urgent ned to adjust wholesale prices, to 
eliminate the handling charges for the rationing associations that wholesaled the rice to 
retailers, or to nationalize all distribution stations. Otherwise, according to the article, it 
was the general public who would be left to deal with the ‘secret of measurement’, the 
practice of short-weight selling that was openly carried out by grain distributors.142  
The other problem concerning pricing decisions was that prices were fixed 
without taking into consideration the cost of transportation from the place of origin. For 
example, the fixed retail prices for some foodstuff, such as salted pollack, were lower 
than the original production cost plus shipping charges (Jōsetsu senji keizai konwakai 
1941: 125). It was not uncommon for local textile sellers, who were most exposed to 
import costs, to implore the government to amend the unreasonably low prices. In 
addition to the burden of escalating import prices, they had to bear the delivery charges 
from the ports of importation, and many of them were forced to sell their products to 
                                                
141 One sen 銭 is 0.01 yen.   
142 ‘Paegǔmmang-ǔi p’yori yangmyǒn son bonǔn ssajǒn-ǔi nonggan akp’ye kyojǒng-en hyǒn paegǔp 
kagyǒg-ǔi chaegǒmt’o-ga p’iryo配給網의表裏両面 損보는싸전의 弄奸 悪弊矯正엔 現配給價格의 
再檢討가 必要’, Chosǒn ilbo朝鮮日報, 30 May 1940, p.2.  
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customers at prices even lower than their costs.143   
The third flaw in the government’s price control prog amme was the complexity 
of putting the regulations into operation. Commodities varied vastly in terms of size and 
sales units. A regulation could not simply state that it determined the price of certain 
types of things; rather, regulations had to be specifically defined and segmented so as to 
cover all types of commodities and prevent violations. To enhance the administrative 
efficiency of price setting, the authorities made efforts to standardize the sizes and sales 
units of products as much as possible. However, it was impossible to set rules to cover 
everything on the market, and many items remained non-standardized. The prices of these 
items were controlled under a special category of ‘permitted prices’ (hŏga kagyŏk許可價
格). For newly developed products that first came to market after the price freezing 
programme was implemented, a ‘new product price’ (sinjep’um kagyŏk新製品價格) was 
given. Such a complex management system further slowed the progress of the price 
fixing administration, which already lagged behind i  price setting for existing goods. 
Every product in the shops had to be labelled with the price system it belonged to. Tags 
for ‘公’(fair), ‘協’(agreed), ‘停’(frozen), ‘許’(permitted), and ‘新’(new) had to be placed 
alongside the prices.144   
In addition to the already intricate pricing systems, the price regulations changed 
frequently with the strategic purpose of promoting the supply of deficit commodities to 
the market. However, such tactics further confused llers. The fair price system for 
laundry soap offers an example of the complexity of the regulation system with which 
sellers had to be familiar. In May 1940, the Korean Price Committee slightly reduced the 
price of soap by setting the fair price for it as eighteen chŏn 145  per 100 
momme146( approximately 375 grams) of soap and nine chŏn per 50 momme (188 grams), 
                                                
143 ‘Ibaengmyŏng yŏ sangin sojip t’ongje kyŏngje chirŭi mundap二百名餘商人招集 統制經濟質疑問答’, 
Chosŏn ilbo朝鮮日報, 26 January 1939, p.3; ‘Mitchimyŏ p’algin ŏgul kongjŏng kagyŏg-i sa on kap poda 
chŏgŏ밑지고 팔긴억울 공정가격이 사온 값보다 적어’,  Tonga ilbo, 13 April 1939, p.3. 
144 ‘Kagyŏk p’yosi-nŭn myŏngnyo hi ŭnnik maesŏk hamyŏn chŏbŏl 價格表示는 明瞭히 隱匿賣惜하면 
處罰’, Tonga ilbo, 5 August 1940, p.2.  
145 One chǒn錢 is 0.01 wǒn.   
146A Japanese unit of weight. 1 momme ≒ 3.75 grams.   
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down from an earlier price of eighteen chŏn per 95 momme. The purpose of cutting the 
price was to ease the shortage of soap by encouraging sellers to release more onto the 
market. The authorities gave three-month extensions t  shopkeepers to let them sell off 
their stocks of the previous-sized soap for the same money as they had received before. If 
the sellers had not sold all of their 95 momme soap within the timeframe, they were no 
longer allowed to charge the previous price after the deadline. Since the earlier 95 
momme products were smaller than the new standardized 100 momme products, they 
were only allowed to charge nine chŏn for 95 momme of soap after this.147 This meant 
that if the sellers did not hear of the new regulations and obey them, they either received 
almost half the previous income from their products, or became black marketeers and 
violated price regulations.  
The continuous stream of amendments to the Act was one of the biggest problems 
in the enforcement of price controls, and was a contentious issue with the people. Even 
the government officials who had to enforce compliance with the regulations considered 
them ‘complex and labyrinthine’ (Anonymous 1940a: 762; Anonymous 1940b: 758). 
Moreover, although sellers wanted to follow the latest regulations directly affecting their 
businesses, such information was not easily obtained by individual shopkeepers; the 
source for such knowledge was the government gazette, which had a limited circulation 
among the general population (Jōsetsu senji keizai konwakai 1941: 91). However, 
ignorance of the regulations was unacceptable. The gov rnment principle was that once a 
restriction had been disseminated in the official gazette, it was soon enforced on the basis 
that everybody knew of it (Fujimoto 1944: 339).   
The Policing of the Wartime Economic Order by the Economic Police  
Notwithstanding such unrealistic aspects, the authorities employed various measures to 
implement the price policies. In terms of the enforceability of the regulations, the police 
force was the most powerful instrument among a multitude of techniques developed by 
the colonial government to ensure economic order. A special police force, the economic 
                                                
147 ‘Set’ak pinu kongka kyŏlchŏng paengmun kyugyŏg-ŭl sipp’alchŏn, osimmun kyugyŏkp’um kujŏn ibil 
mulka wiwŏnhoe ch’onghoe-esŏ kyŏlchŏng洗濯비비 公價決定 百匁規格을 十八錢, 五十匁規格品 九錢 
卄日物價委員會 總會에서決定’, Tonga ilbo, 21 May 1940, p.2.   
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police (kyŏngje kyǒngch’al經濟警察), was established in November 1938, a few months 
after the introduction of the failed price indication programme (Kim, S. B. 1997: 105). 
The significant role of the economic police in implementing wartime economic policies is 
explained here by the head of the Police Administration Bureau (Kyŏngmuguk 警務局): 
State controls over the distribution, consumption, export and import of important 
materials and their prices have been increasingly strengthened. In a short period, a 
wide range of restrictive regulations have been promulgated and put into effect. In 
accordance with the government regulations, it is our most urgent priority to make 
certain that the regulations are enforced through surveillance, the prevention of 
crimes, and arrests where necessary. … [T]o put it simply, the economic police 
stand for the operation of state power (kenryoku sayō権力作用) to maintain the 
new economic order that the country needs.   
 (Anonymous 1940b: 758, emphasis added) 
As noted in the quotation above, the economic police were created with the special 
mission of enforcing economic regulations. The lead organization of the economic police, 
the Economic Police Section (Kyŏngje kyŏngch’algye經濟警察係) was created within 
the Department of Police Administration (Kyŏngmugwa 警務課 ) under the Police 
Administration Bureau. A staff of 565 was recruited for its administration (Kim, S. B. 
1997: 111). During its initial days, the activities of the economic police were concentrated 
in commercialized city areas, where the law enforcement operation was considered more 
necessary than in the countryside. Ninety-five economic policemen were assigned to 
Kyŏnggi Province, which included Seoul, and 64 police officers were sent to 
Kyŏngsangnam-do, where Pusan, another large city, was loc ted.148  
The police had a broad range of responsibilities for enforcing economic regulations, 
as well as an administrative function. The tasks of the economic police identified at a 
meeting of the Provincial Economic Police Department in 1942 show that the police 
                                                
148  ‘Kyŏngnam kyŏngje kyŏngch’al kŭnil chung insŏn paech’i yejŏng ch’ong yuksipsamyŏng-ŭi chinyong 
(Pusan) 慶南 經濟警察 近日中 人選配置豫定 總六十四名의 陣容(釜山)’  Tonga ilbo, 13 November 
1938, p.4.  
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played a significant role in implementing economic policies.        
A. Economic police operations to cope with the current war situation 
a. To intensify the crack-down on deliberate crime  
b. To control illegal activity carried out by retail sellers 
c. To monitor illegal hoarding and profiteering  
d. To regulate people who spread false rumours about the economic situation or 
who disturb the economic order 
e. To conduct thorough research and to collect information  
f. To secure daily necessities and to direct and monitor rationing, including:    
i)    Seizing control of the rationing administration   
ii)  Supervision of the rationing of controlled commodities  
iii)  Regulation of material consumption 
B. To increase discipline among police officers 
C. To educate about the economic police 
D. To intensify police patrols and information gathering  
E. To prevent crime through educational activities 
F. To strengthen oversight and maintain rigid control over the distribution of 
controlled materials 
G. To participate in organizations controlling rationing  
H. To conduct research on trends in economic associati ns 
I. To administer the Company Permission Ordinance 
J. To assist in the recovery of metals 
K. To prevent the drain of materials from Korea to Japan (by the implementation 
of the textiles rationing programme in Japan)  
L. To carry out research into the movements of small and medium-sized 
manufacturers  
M. To collect, deliver and supervise essential commdities 
      (Kuksa p’yǒnch’an wiwǒnhoe 1978: 32-33) 
The overriding task of the economic police was to ensure the smooth implementation of 
nearly all the crucial wartime economic regulations involving rationing and price controls. 
The police were involved in the whole process of rationing. For example, the police force 
played a significant role in food collection, exercising its legitimate power (see 1.1). The 
police also assumed administrative tasks in food distribution. For example, as a member 
of the Korean Central Alcoholic Drinks Rationing Association, the police were involved 
in the overall distributional planning for alcoholic drinks for export, domestic 
consumption, and military use (Sugiyama 1943: 22). Among the responsibilities entrusted 
to the economic police, control over distributors was particularly emphasized (Chōsen 
sōtokufu keimukyoku 1941: 21), since the broad range of restrictive regulations 




Initially, police efforts were focused on the mass education of business owners, 
and this involved providing advice, giving cautions, and warning against infringements 
through various public lectures, rather than taking forceful action (Anonymous 1940b: 
758). Even though the police force had been created with the purpose of enforcing 
regulations, it was difficult for the general populace to immediately understand, and 
comply with, many complicated laws.149 In the first year after its establishment, the 
economic police organized more than 60,000 lectures and disseminated various business 
guidelines in line with the newly enforced laws to people throughout Korea (Chōsen 
sōtokufu keimukyoku 1941: 27).  
With the promulgation of the 9-18 Stop Ordinance in October 1939 and the 
beginning of food rationing in Seoul in May 1940 as turning points, the strength of the 
economic police force grew rapidly. In order to enforce the intensified price and rationing 
controls, it was important to consolidate the power of the force. During the year after the 
creation of the police in 1938, 21 different economic acts were developed and then 
implemented by the police. By January 1940, the number of laws the economic police 
were responsible for enforcing had increased to 44 (Hattori 1940: 24), and had further 
grown to 96 by March 1941 (Chōsen sōtokufu keimukyoku 1941: 23). To cover the 
increased police administration, between 1939 and 1940 1,093 additional personnel were 
assigned to the economic police.150 The nature of police activities also changed as a result 
of the strengthened state controls. The earlier police policy of ‘gentle educational 
principles’ (mion-chŏk chido chuŭi微温的指導主義) shifted to a principle of ‘arrests and 
strict suppression’ (kŏmgŏ tanap chuŭi 検挙斷壓主義) after the issuance of a special 
order from the Governor-General shortly after the promulgation of the 9-18 Stop 
                                                
149 ‘Kyŏngje kyŏngch’al silsi-ŭi manjŏn kido unyong-ŭi cheil tan’gye-ro ch’wiji-ŭi chuji ch’ŏlchŏ-e 
churyŏk經濟警察實施의万全企圖 運用의第一段階로趣旨의周知徹底에注力’, Tonga ilbo, 13 
November 1938, p.2.  
150 ‘Kyŏngje kyŏngch’al taejŭngwŏn migoksang kangje chosa munje-nŭn samwŏl chung silsi經濟警察大
増員 米穀商強制調査問題는三月중 實施’, Tonga ilbo, 7 January 1940, p.2; ‘Kyŏngjekwa sŏlch’i-nŭn 
t’ongje-ŭi manjŏn kido, Mihashi kyŏngmugukchang tamhwa經警課設置는 統制의 萬全企圖 三橋警務
局長談’, Maeil sinbo, 4 February 1940, p.2.   
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Ordinance.151  
Granted legitimate control, the economic police force vigorously extended its 
powers of supervision and law enforcement. For example, in May 1940, a few days 
before the beginning of staple-food rationing in Seoul, the Department of the Economic 
Police in Kyŏnggi Province summoned grain distributors and instructed them in the 
detailed principles of operation, such as not selling food to those without purchasing 
permits, placing seals on ration cards whenever grain w s sold, and not holding up the 
distribution of grain for any reason.152 With government officials, the police also had to 
patrol the 800 distribution points for commodities in the city, to oversee the sellers’ 
rationing and to check their books.153  
Police controls to counter the violation of economic regulations intensified. For 
example, in December 1939, there was a major year-end crack-down on illegal 
transactions at grocery and miscellaneous-items shops in Seoul. Police surveillance was 
focused on shopkeepers’ price labels and profiteering based on the officially frozen 
prices.154 Food and alcohol sold at bars and cafés was also subject to police regulation. 
After an intensive investigation into the prices of individual dishes, police officers 
ordered vendors to drop those prices which were thoug t to be unreasonably expensive. 
When people disobeyed police orders they were severely punished.155 Buyers were also 
subject to police regulation: an investigation by the Chongno police discovered a retailer 
in Seoul who was paying more than the ‘fair price’ for rice.156 Such regulation activities 
were sometimes carried out undercover. Shortly after the government policy of 
strengthening police controls was announced, Kyŏngsang-pukto provincial government 
introduced a new operational principle. The provincial governor ordered the 100 newly 
                                                
151 ‘Kyŏngje sabŏm ch’ŏlchŏ chŏkpar-ŭl ch’ongdok, chujisa hoeŭi-e kangjo經濟事犯徹底摘發을 総督, 
知事會議에 強調’, Chosŏn ilbo, 2 November 1939, p.2.  
152 ‘Ŏpcha hoch’ul chisi paegŭp sanghwang-ŭl ŏmjung ch’wich’e業者呼出指示 配給状況을嚴重取締’, 
Chosŏn ilbo, 2 May 1940, p.2.  
153 ‘Kamsidae-rŭl chojik paegŭp changbu imgŏm監視隊를組織 配給帳簿臨検’, Chosŏn ilbo, 2 May 1940, 
p.2.   
154 ‘Semal sangjŏmga-e amhaengŏsa ch’ulto! 歳末商店街 에 闇行御史 출두!’, Chosŏn ilbo, 12 December 
1939, p.2.   
155 ‘T’ ŏmuni ŏpsi pissan yangju ch’wich’e터무니업시비싼洋酒取締’, Chosŏn ilbo, 14 December 1939, 
p.2. 
156  ‘Kongjŏngga musi migoksang yusi公正価無視米穀商諭示’, Chosŏn ilbo, 14 December 1939, p.2.  
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employed police officers to work in plain clothes instead police uniform, in order to 
improve their ability to regulate the markets.157  
Punishments for illegal actions became increasingly harsh. From April 1940, the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor in Seoul increased the penalties for violations of price 
control regulations. Individuals selling products a prices higher than the officially fixed 
values were subject to a penalty of ‘the profit plus twice the excess sum’, much more than 
the earlier fine of ‘the excess sum’. In addition t this, imprisonment, which had not thus 
far been adopted, came to be imposed on offenders (Yamazawa 1940: 4). In terms of 
sheer legal potency, the police force expanded continuously as the country’s economic 
controls were strengthened.       
Despite such efforts to fight economic crime, however, the legal force of the 
economic police seems to have been relatively ineffective. In December 1939, a 
newspaper article reported that there was a considerable growth in the number of 
economic criminals, while non-economic crimes, such as thought crimes, were in decline, 
reflecting the economic disorder in the country.158 Police statistics testify to the increasing 
wave of economic crime. While the criminals violating economic regulations accounted 
for 26.2 per cent of total criminals in 1941, the ratio rose to 28.5 per cent in 1942, and to 
31.5 per cent in 1943 (see Table 3-2).     
Table 3-2: The numbers of persons prosecuted for ecnomic and other crimes in Korea, 
1941-1943 
 
Source: Hōmukyoku keijika 1943: 8 
It was not just the proportion of economic crimes out f total crimes, but the 
                                                
157 ‘Kyŏgnje kyŏngch’al  kigu hwakch’ung ‘kwa’-rŭl sinsŏl paegyŏmyŏng chŭngwŏn經済經警機構擴充 
‘課’를新設 百餘名増員’, Tonga ilbo, 15 February 1940, p.4. 
158‘Kyŏngjebŏm sangdang chŭngga經済犯상당増加’, Chosŏn ilbo, 27 December 1939, p.2.  
Year Economic criminals Other criminals 
1941 16,688 (26.2%) 46,928 (73.8%) 
1942 17,347 (28.5%) 43,515 (71.5%) 
1943  (January-June)  9,918 (31.5%) 21,678 (68.5%) 
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numbers of cases that rose too. According to Hattori, chief of the Economic Police 
Department, the number of economic crimes in 1940 equalled 56,921, up from 16,340 in 
1939. Moreover, between the two years, the ratio and the number of arrests, the most 
severe punishment, increased sharply, while lenient s ences of ‘release on caution’ fell: 
the former rose from 2.2 per cent (357 cases) to 37 per cent (14,990 cases), and the latter 
declined from 96 per cent (15,727 cases) to 73 per cent (41,931 cases) (Hattori 1941: 22-
25).  
The rise in economic crime illustrates the magnitude of the black market in the 
country. The vast majority of economic offenders were arrested for infractions of the 
Price Control Ordinance and the Profiteering Restriction Regulation, which prohibited the 
selling of products at prices higher than the officially fixed ones. Between November 
1938 and October 1941, the number of criminals who committed offences under those 
two laws totalled 71,522, accounting for 86.7 per cent of all economic crime 
(Hōmukyoku keijika 1943: 244-247).  
Price studies conducted by the colonial government several months after the 
enactment of the 9-18 Stop Ordinance in October 1939 reveal that state efforts to control 
prices had not had an impact. In the first half of 1940 in Chŏllanam-do, the prices of 
almost all necessities continued to grow, despite the officially frozen prices: commodities 
were traded at 2.5 per cent to 130 per cent higher than the officially frozen prices. The 
results of a survey in Chŏlla-pukto in the same period noted that the prices of important 
daily commodities had more than doubled between 1937 and 1940. The reports describe 
the soaring prices for some goods, such as cotton and leather shoes, as ‘out of control’ 
(Kakunaga 1940: 3-4). Notwithstanding police suppression, the black market loomed 
larger with the extension of economic regulations. Black-market activities became 
established practice among Korean people, undermining the economic control structure 
of the government.  
Greed and Desperation within the Ill-constructed Control System   
Attempts to subvert the controls were made in each l yer of the price and rationing 
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programmes. Malpractices by the people involved in the distribution of commodities 
were one of major factors which upset the rationing system. This was especially true of 
the distribution of rice, the staple component of the Korean diet. Inter-provincial 
transportation of rice from surplus to deficit areas was first determined by local 
authorities; practical deliveries were then entrusted to the provincial rationing 
associations, composed of grain sellers and government officers (see 1.1). Mishandling 
by association members who exploited their advantageous positions was not infrequent. 
For example, in 1940, members of the Seoul Food Rationing Association and their 
employees were apprehended for illegally hoarding rice and barley for their own 
consumption.159 Another instance of fraud was committed by a member of staff at the 
Korean Rice Market Company, one of the central organizations in charge of the 
distribution and import/export of rice. The staff me ber stole rice by reusing requisition 
slips that should have been destroyed after one use, and sold it on the black market 
(Hōmukyoku keijika 1943: 20).  
Foodstuffs were not the only plunder taken by authorized people. During the first 
half of 1944, 33 people involved in the rationing administration, including government 
officials, were arrested for embezzling cotton, rubber shoes, socks, rice and metal by 
forging paperwork (Kenjikyoku 1944, quoted in Chang 2001: 241). A local government 
employee in Hwanghae-do was caught by the police for fabricating purchasing permits 
for cotton and for demanding bribes from cotton sellers (Hōmukyoku keijika 1942b: 152).     
 The frauds committed by the leaders of the civilian ‘town associations’ 
(chŏngdonghoe) and their sub-organizations, ‘patriotic units’ (aegukpan), which were 
part of the official distribution system, also made a mockery of the rationing controls. 
While in principle the rationing programme was managed under the supervision of the 
government, the leaders of these civilian groups were ntrusted with important 
responsibilities: purchasing permits were issued by the chŏngdonghoe leaders, and were 
then distributed to the individual households by the aegukpan. As increasing number of 
foodstuffs were included in the rationing controls, the aegukpan leaders’ increasing 
                                                
159‘Paegŭp chohabwŏn-i yangmi pujŏng maejang 배급조합원이 양미부정매장’, Chosŏn ilbo, 18 April 
1940, p.2. 
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power was particularly frequently abused, and led to widespread irregularities. Using 
their privileged positions, many aegukpan leaders kept ration cards and commodities for 
their own consumption, or gave them to their friends and relatives, instead distributing 
them to unit members. Goods diverted from official hannels of distribution were traded 
illegally on the black market. Embezzlement by aegukpan leaders was one of the chronic 
malpractices that existed under every rationing scheme (see 2.1). 
Another flaw in the state system of economic control was caused by the fact that 
sellers functioned as distributors. In principle, their businesses were under the strict 
control of the price and rationing regulations; however, just as essential commodity 
rationing was managed by civilian-group leaders, the practical handling of scarce 
commodities was entrusted to the sellers at each distribution station. Such a situation 
gave the sellers plenty of opportunity to illegally hoard rationed goods and engage in 
black-market transactions. As mentioned previously, much of the economic police’s 
attention was focused upon the extensive evasion of regulations by distributors. It is no 
exaggeration to say that one of the primary objectiv s of the establishment of the 
economic police in 1938 was to observe and enforce p i  regulations among distributors 
(Hattori 1941:27). Despite widespread criticism of sellers for their selfish pursuit of 
egoistical interests, especially from the viewpoint of the state-centred business ethics 
promoted under the strictly controlled economy, theflagrant black marketeering of 
individual shopkeepers and merchants continued to grow (Yamazawa 1940: 181-182).                   
During the initial stage of implementing the economic regulations, sellers’ 
misdemeanours were not very serious. However, it was common for people to fall foul of 
the law because they were unaware of the existence of the regulations. Even if their 
activities were calculated violations, they simply made efforts to ensure that their 
irregularities were not discovered by the authorities, rather than aggressively fabricating 
their books and deceiving inspectors.160 For example, one of the prevalent malpractices 
among grain sellers was to give preferential treatmnt to bulk purchasers over ration-card 
users in order to make more profit, as I explained in 1.1. It was also common to force 
                                                
160 ‘Kyŏngje kyŏngch’al-ŭi wiban kyŏnghyang akchil, kŏaekpŏm-i chŏmjŭng經濟警察의違反傾向 悪質, 
巨額犯이漸增’, Tonga ilbo, 23 June 1940, p.2 
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customers to buy unnecessary additional items (Tamur  1941: 39-41). 
However, as rationing and price controls intensified, malpractices became far 
more sophisticated. A report by the Bureau of Police Administration included plenty of 
more flagrant and aggressive cases. For instance, producers incorrectly labelled products, 
those in bottles or cans, which were not subject to inspection, to make them look like 
higher quality items or a completely different product.161 Tokuda, the Seoul District 
Prosecutor, also testified to the deceitful nature of the economic crimes, which was 
exemplified by some of the cases he handled. For example, a rubber-shoemaker increased 
his output by secretly adding used or low-quality rubber in new rubber shoes and selling 
the surplus new rubber under the counter. Shady actions by sellers, such as increasing the 
weight of firewood by pouring water over it, and tie-in sales that forced consumers to buy 
additional unwanted items, were common practice (Tokuda 1942: 96).  
There were many types of artfully planned illegal tr nsactions. The most common 
method of fraud was cash trading or the selling of things for prices higher than those 
specified in law. Although such practices were well known to the economic police, it was 
nearly impossible for them to detect every instance since such crimes were committed on 
a small scale. As long as the sellers and buyers reached mutual agreements, and their 
accounts were expertly doctored, they were able to successfully escape police 
surveillance. This was especially true in small, privately owned shops. Allegedly, the cash 
and cheques used for ‘additional’ payments flooded the pockets of the black marketeers 
(yami162p’ae) who hung around the tea shops in Chongno District, he busiest commercial 
area in Seoul (Yu O. T’ 1940: 167). 
Money also changed hands illegally through more sophisticated methods, such as 
counterfeit contracts between buyers. People would draw up double contracts, one of 
which would be quickly cancelled, in order for money to be given to the shopkeepers in 
the form of a penalty payment. In such cases, the transactions appeared to be legitimate as 
                                                
161 ‘Kyŏngje kyŏngch’al-ŭi wiban kyŏnghyang akchil, kŏaekpŏm-i chŏmjŭng經濟警察의違反傾向 悪質, 
巨額犯이漸增’, Tonga ilbo, 23 June 1940, p.2. 
162 Yami stands for both ‘black market’ (yami ichi) and ‘black-market trading’ (yami torihiki), from the 
original meaning of ‘darkness’ in Japanese. Along with the Korean word amsijang (black market) and 
amgŏrae (black marketeering), it was commonly used in colonial Korea.   
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actual products were traded at the officially fixed prices (Ibid.).   
Other forms of fraud fell into the category of bullying. For example, sellers would 
refuse to hand over all the products for which they ad been paid: that is, if a purchaser 
paid one hundred wŏn for ten items, the fair price of which was ten wŏn each, the seller 
would only provide eight. Sellers would also often sell perished or damaged commodities. 
Most customers had no choice but to tolerate such unjust treatment, since the sellers had 
the power to refuse to serve them in the future (Ibid.).   
Shopkeepers were not the only people to subvert the economic controls; pedlars 
also engaged in shady deals, escaping police surveillance. Pedlars were one of the most 
troublesome groups over which the economic police had to exercise control. The police 
monitored illegal transactions made by shopkeepers by perpetually patrolling their shops, 
but it was extremely difficult to keep an eye on the itinerant trading of pedlars. The police 
conceded that it was absolutely impossible to exercis  control over their illegal 
transactions, describing them as ‘[j]ust like flies around the table, pedlars immediately 
disappear when they are swept away, but soon reappear from nowhere (Hōmukyoku 
keijika 1943: 64). At first, the government denied r cognition of the pedlars’ commercial 
activities; however, it had no other alternative but to allow the pervasive humble retailers 
to continue their businesses. In 1942, the police in Seoul reluctantly introduced a 
certification system to permit some of them to continue their businesses on the condition 
that they wore green armbands on their left arms as a sign of legitimacy. Consumers were 
advised to check whether the sellers were certified an  obedient to the official pricing 
regulations before shopping at their stalls.163 
As I have explained in 1.1, in colonial Korea there was a top-down governance 
structure under the absolute power of the Government-G eral, and coercive economic 
policies were imposed one after another to respond t  obstacles arising from the changing 
economic conditions, even without clear legal grounds. The flexibility of policy 
implementation that relied on the centralized power of the colonial authorities was one of 
                                                
163 ‘Yami maemae p’anŭn saram-to mipkŏniwa sanŭn saram put’ŏ chalmot 야미매매 파는사람도 
밉거니와 사는사람부터잘못’, Maeil sinbo, 28 October 1942, p.2.    
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the special features of the controlled economy in Korea, and was considered by the 
authorities as one of the main reasons for the smooth running of the economic controls.  
 However, on a practical level, such an expedient implementation of economic 
polices destroyed people’s livelihoods. For instance, when Seoul City government 
launched the grain distribution system in 1940, it appointed 167 grain merchants 
throughout the city as official grain distributors.164 The number of distribution stations 
increased to 778 in 1941 as the rationing programme was revised,165 and fell to 212 in 
1943.166 Since the free trade of grain was prohibited, many grain sellers excluded from 
official appointments lost their jobs. There were protests against such an aggressive 
administration: In 1940 in Taejŏn City, 69 former grain retailers, who had been excluded 
from selection for the seventeen grain distributor p sitions available, protested against the 
domineering administration, and asked the government to permit their businesses to 
continue.167 A similar protest against the local government hadpreviously been organized 
by seventeen grain millers in Hamgyŏng-namdo in May 1940.168 When the nationwide 
grain-rationing system was established in 1943, only 1,400 grain dealers out of a total of 
15,400 were subsumed under the Korean Foodstuffs Company as official distributors 
throughout the country (Kwŏn P. T’. 1984: 430).        
The disruption to rice dealers who were forced to change their businesses in 
Inch’ŏn City offers another example of the difficulties peo le faced as a result of the food 
control policies. In the wake of the government’s encouragement to eat wheat-based 
foods as a substitute for rice, they began to produce noodles and imported noodle-making 
machines from Japan. At first, the change in busines  seemed to have been a success as 
they received many orders from Manchuria, even before the machines arrived from 
                                                
164 ‘Singnyang-ǔi wǒnhwal mokp’yo Kyǒngsǒngbu singnyang paegǔp chohab-ǔl kyǒlsǒng puyun-i kamdok 
食糧의円滑目標 京城府食糧配給組合을結成 府尹이監督’, Tonga ilbo, 30 January 1940, p.3. 
165  ‘Singnyang paegǔp ch’ŏlbyǒkchin chagil, Kyǒngsǒng yanggok paegǔp chohap t’ansaeng  食糧配給鐵
壁陣 昨日, 京城糧穀配給組合誕生’, Maeil sinbo, 13 December 1941, p.2.  
166‘Puyŏng singnyang paegŭpso sawŏl put’ŏ ilche kaejŏm 府営食糧配給所四月부터開店’, Maiel sinbo, 
24 March 1943, p.2.  
167 ‘Urido changsa-rŭl hage Taejŏn-ŭi pichijŏng misang, pu-e hoso 우리도장사를하게 大田의 
非指定米商, 府에呼訴’,Chosŏn ilbo, 2 March 1940, p.3. 
168 ‘T’ongje chohab-e chewoedoen chŏngmi ŏpchadŭl kwŏlgi 통제조합에 제외된 정미업자들 궐기’, 
Chosŏn ilbo, 13 May 1940, p.3.  
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Japan; however, their new businesses were soon disbanded due to a sudden government 
embargo on wheat-based exports from the country.169  
The government was well aware that its controlling policies had led to massive 
job losses and recognized the need for continuous and c reful observation of the situation, 
since it was likely to cause growing social unrest. Even though the open mention of 
unemployment caused by economic regulation was strictly prohibited, data were 
continuously collected by the economic police (Kim S. B. 1997: 120). However, it seems 
that there was little the administrators were able to do about the problem.170 At best, the 
authorities encouraged the ‘survivors’ of state economic controls to be sympathetic to 
those who had lost their jobs (Hōmukyoku keijika 1943: 65). Yet, sympathy could not 
ease the economic hardship people faced. Scherer stated hat the Japanese economic 
control system created ‘a whole new field of criminal activities and mobilized criminal 
energies in otherwise law-abiding citizens’, pointing out that ‘the consequence of the 
government’s agitation for a war on people’s lives was grave difficulties in making their 
livings’ (Scherer 1999: 120-121). For those affected, desperate need was a more powerful 
motivator for illegal economic activities than greed. People were required to accept 
sacrifices for the sake of the country.  
The situation of authorized distributors was somewhat better than that of the 
unemployed, since they were at least able to continue their businesses. However, most 
shopkeepers had to reduce the scale of their business, as they were only able to open on 
rationing day. According to a former local government official from Nonsan county in 
Ch’ungch’ŏngnam-do, in the 1940s only a few shops survived the forced shut-down 
ordinance that was part of the Business Reorganization Act. Business was conducted on 
just one or two days a month (Hŏ Y. N. 2006: 127). Black marketeering was part of the
daily struggle for those trying to make ends meets in he wartime economy.   
                                                
169 ‘Chigŏp chŏnhwanhan misang maekpun kŭmsu-ro pimyŏng 職業轉換한米商 麥粉禁輸로悲鳴’, 
Chosŏn ilbo, 8 May 1940, p.3.   
170 The unemployed in Japan Proper were supported by money from the government and from those local 
businessmen who were allowed to continue their busines . This money from the businessmen was known 
as part of ‘sharing the sacrifice’ (Tamura 1944: 285). However, little is known about the administrative 
measures in place for the Korean people.  
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The Black Market in Wartime  
As state control over prices and rationing became stricter, more and more commodities 
became harder to obtain through official distribution channels, and this led to an 
invigorated black market. In June 1940, a month after the food rationing programme 
began in Seoul, the first survey of black-market prices was conducted among 55 
housewives. Although a broad range of daily commodities – from foodstuffs and clothing 
to firewood – was available on the black market during the early 1940s, the average price 
was no more than 1.2 times higher than official prices.171 However, by 1944 the gap 
between the two prices had dramatically increased, as Table 3-3 indicates.  
Table 3-3: Price index of foodstuffs on the black market, June 1944, Seoul (based on the 
assumption that the official price was equal to 1) 
 
Source: Chosŏn kŏmch’al yobo (6): 24-26, quoted in Chang S. 2001: 243
As Table 3-3 reveals, Seoul citizens had to pay betwe n three and fifteen times the 
official price for food on the black market. The shortage of rice was particularly severe. 
                                                
171 ‘Kyŏngsŏng amsijang-ŭi chŏngch’e 京城闇市場의 정체’ Maeil sinbo, 26 September 1940, p.4 
172 A clear wine made by filtering the grain out of the fermented liquid.  
Foodstuffs Price index of black market  
White rice 12 times higher  
Small beans 11 times higher 
Sesame seeds 15 times higher 
Sweet potatoes 5  times higher 
White potatoes 5.5 times higher 
Apples  8  times higher 
Beef 3.5 times higher 
Pork  3.3 times higher 
Eggs 4 times higher 
Dried pollack 4.5 times higher 
Sugar 10.5 times higher 
Chŏngju172 4 times higher 
Rice cake 10 times higher 
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The black-market price of rice, already 12 times higher in June 1944, continued to 
increase thereafter. Using the official price of June 1945 as a basis (5.1 yen), the black-
market price for one tu (approximately eighteen litres) of rice was 22 times more 
expensive (110 yen) in December 1944, 39 times more expensive (200 yen) in March 
1945, and soared to 98 times more expensive (500 yen) in June 1945 (Chosŏn ŭnhaeng 
chosabu 1949: I-113).  
Such an extraordinarily high price for rice on the black market meant that 
procuring it through official rationing became increasingly difficult. When staple-food 
rationing began in May 1940, Seoul citizens were permitted three hop (approximately 
430 grams) of rice, mixed with other grains, per person per day. However, by 1941, the 
allowance for adults had fallen to 2.3 hop (330 grams) by 1943, and the actual ration 
distribution was even smaller than these standard allow nces, as I have explained in 1.1. 
In a survey conducted by the government in 1944 among citizens in seventeen major 
Korean cities, people in ten cities noted that rice was the item which could not be 
obtained in the minimum quantities required without using the black market (Chosŏn 
kŏmch’al yobo, August, 1944, quoted in Yi S. S. 2003a: 297). Under such a circumstance, 
participating in illegal transactions was unavoidable for the majority of Koreans.   
The deficient food supply and increasing demand led to the proliferation of the 
black market throughout the country. Keizai jōhō (Economic Information), a serialized 
report on economic trends written by local public prosecutors, highlighted the acute food 
shortages and invigorated black-market transactions in colonial Korea. This was 
especially true of reports in the ninth edition, which analysed the economic crimes that 
had occurred during the first half of 1943 and described the increase in illegal practices in 
each locality. Nine out of eleven reports pointed out that the majority of offences related 
to foodstuffs, especially grain (rice). For example, the report from the Haeju office stated 
that grain was the item most traded on the black market, as well as subject to the most 
distribution malpractices (Hōmukyoku keijika 1943: 108, 115). The report from 
Ch’ŏngjin described how the black market had become an open secret and was 
entrenched in everyday life, noting that the prominent reason for this was the shortage of 
food (Ibid.: 54, 95). According to the Taejŏn office, the majority of profiteering 
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concerned the sale of rice, with the illegally procured grain usually delivered to big cities, 
such as Seoul, by rail or road freight (Ibid.:  366). 
As less food was available through legitimate channels and things began to be 
traded at fantastic prices, people resorted to barter to meet their needs. The report from 
Sinŭiju office in the above-mentioned document identified more than a dozen separate 
forms of barter: providing labour on the condition f receiving grain, fuel, clothing or 
alcoholic drinks in lieu of wages; city dwellers exchanging daily commodities for grain 
from farmers; mining industry managers exchanging rce for petrol; sellers or restaurant 
owners trading rationed (or illegally hoarded) alcoholic beverages with farmers for 
firewood or grain, and so on (Ibid.: 105-106). Barter transactions were subject to strict 
control by the authorities since they disturbed rationing controls and affected the value of 
currency. However, once this form of transaction was established, it could not be 
eradicated, especially when it was so hard to obtain much needed items, despite paying 
steep prices for them.  
Widespread barter transactions stimulated farmers’ hoarding of foodstuffs, which 
were generally used as the currency of exchange. Farmers were neither permitted to keep 
more grain than their allowance nor to trade personally; however, they devised a variety 
of ways to conceal grain. In 1944, for instance, allegedly 70 per cent of the households in 
Haeman County in Chŏllanam-do successfully hid half of their crop, escaping the 
government’s coercive food collection scheme (Kim 198 , quoted in Shin 1994: 1602). A 
Japanese researcher working for the Government-General at the time reported that there 
were 98 different ways in which grain had been hidden by Korean peasants (Higuchi 
1998: 182-183). The methods discovered to be used by the farmers in Chŏllanam-do 
were:    
a. Covering the paddy with grasses near a river in the mountains   
b. Hiding it in the toilet 
c. Mixing it with chaff 
d. Covering it with fallen leaves in the garden  
e. Concealing it under compost 
f. Putting white rice in the bottom of containers and covering it with other grains  
g. Leaving foodstuffs with people not engaged in farming  
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h. Concealing it in a bamboo grove 
i. Covering it with branches in mountainous areas 
j. Concealing it in the gap between the roof and the ceiling  
k. Burying food containers in the ground and piling firewood on top   
(Hōmukyoku keijika 1942b: 379) 
The secretive, but not unusual, farm families’ work after successfully hiding the 
grain was vividly described by a Korean farmer called Kwŏn (1898-1981) who lived in 
Kyŏngsang-pukto:  
People hulled [grain] in a mortar, usually during the dark of night so that they could 
avoid surveillance. We used to hear the sound of husking barley from many houses 
on sultry summer nights. Usually this was done by women, but sometimes the men 
helped them. The work had to be finished quickly so that they were not caught, 
even by their neighbours. Barley chaff and wheat brn were obtained in this way … 
        (Kwŏn P. T’. 1984: 430)  
Foodstuffs withheld by farmers were then transported to the cities and bartered on 
the black market for daily necessities, such as matches (Yi S. S. 2003b: 278). Farmers’ 
trips to urban areas with their products were not uncommon, but the major direction of 
traffic was in the opposite direction: from the cities to the countryside. For example, 
Seoul citizens flowed out of the city from intercity bus terminals and major train stations: 
Kyŏngsŏng, Ch’ŏngnyangni and Yŏngdŭngp’o stations crawled with people smuggling 
foodstuffs between the city and suburban areas, especially at weekends and on holidays. 
Notwithstanding the dangers of arrest under the intnsive surveillance of the economic 
police, they carried grain under their clothes and o  their backs, as if the sacks were 
babies.173 The rigorous police crack-down on illegal deliveries was also abused by crafty 
black marketeers. In 1943, for example, a man dressed as a policeman confiscated 
smuggled rice in the suburbs of Seoul until he was c ught by a real police officer 
(Hōmukyoku keijika 1943: 19-20), and similar cases were f equently discovered 
throughout the country.  
                                                
173 ‘Singnyang munje-wa kungmin-ŭi pansŏng 食糧問題와國民의反省’,  Maeil sinbo, 24 December 1942, 
p. 1; ‘Paengmi milbanip isibip chŏkpal 白米密搬入二十叺摘發’, Maeil sinbo, 22 September 1943, p.2.    
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As the war entered its final stages, black-market activities became common in 
daily life. Illegal transactions thus far concealed from the public eye came into the open. 
By 1945, individual black markets could be found throughout Seoul, including one of 
substantial size in the township of Hwawŏnjŏng.174 Due to the thriving business at the 
market, a widespread rumour abounded that within the marketplace the breaking of 
official prices was no longer illegal and that peopl  were free to buy and sell whatever 
they wanted. This groundless rumour attracted several hundred citizens to the market. 
The boom in business did not last long as a thorough investigation was soon implemented 
by Seoul’s district prosecutors. Surprisingly, the two masterminds behind the scheme 
were the only people arrested. It was impossible for the prosecutors to apprehend the rest 
of the many black-market participants. All they could do to those gathered was to give an 
order to disperse, and exhort them not to resort to illegal transactions by appealing to 
their moral sense. Prosecutor Itō made a definitive statement: ‘[i]f a [large] black market 
like that of Hwawŏnjŏng was tolerated, efficient control over illegal trading might be 
possible, temporarily restraining the rise of illegal markets elsewhere. However, there is 
no doubt that another type of black market would emerge … No black market can be 
allowed…’.175 Eventually, knowledge that the rumour was false spread and the black 
market was not legalized under the structure of the controlled economy. However, this 
incident shows that the prevalence of black markets wa  beyond the control of the 
authorities. Black marketeering became a part of their everyday lives.  
The Japanese control methods – of pricing and rationing - originally implemented 
with the aim of ensuring the fair distribution of limited foods and preventing price 
increases, were unable to achieve their goals. Instead, the badly designed price-regulation 
and rationing system led to the subversion of official distribution channels. Moreover, a 
control mechanism that forced dedication and self-sacrifice on ordinary people in order to 
support the Japanese Empire at war was unacceptable. The outcome of Japan’s ill-fated 
controlled wartime economy in its colony was a flourishing black market. 
                                                
174 Present-day Yegwan-dong in Chung-gu, Seoul. 
175 ‘Amsijan-ŭn chŏltae purhŏ ch’onghu kyŏngje chilsŏ hwakpo-e toŭisim-ŭl katcha闇市場은 절대不許 
銃後經済秩序確保에 道義心을 갖자’, Maeil sinbo, 3 June 1945, p.2. 
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Escaping State Control after the Liberation    
The establishment of the free rice market in October 1945 by the US military government, 
which occupied the southern half of liberated Korea f om 1945 to 1948, caused economic 
chaos in the occupation zone for many years to come. In an effort to handle the acute 
food shortages and inflationary price increases, within a few months of the free trade 
policy for rice being implemented, the Americans reintroduced mandatory food rationing 
modelled after the Japanese wartime food management system. The state’s overall control 
of staple distribution was maintained until February 1950 when the free trading of rice 
was partly legitimized by the South Korean governmet. The colonial food-rationing 
system remained almost completely intact for five years after Korea’s liberation from 
Japanese rule (See 1.2).  
It goes without saying that the extensive evasion of regulations which inevitably 
accompanied the Japanese control system dominated the lives of the Korean people. 
During the first years after independence, the Koreans suffered from both serious food 
shortages under the unstable food-rationing system and inflation. In such circumstances, 
the influence of the black market loomed ever larger. While the official price for twenty 
litres of rice increased from 186 wŏn to 229 wŏn between December 1946 and June 1948, 
the price on the illegal market rose from 880 wŏn to 1,870 wŏn in the same period (Song 
K. J. et al. 2004: 407). The worse the food shortage, the more rice was delivered to the 
black market, widening the gap between official andblack-market prices.  
The low price paid by the government to farmers under the rice collection 
programme was the biggest factor in farmers diverting heir rice from official channels to 
the underground market. The estimated proportion of rice traded on the black market 
compared to total production grew from thirteen to fifteen per cent in 1946, to 29.4 per 
cent in 1947, and 24 per cent in 1948 (Kim C. S. 2000: 103). As of 1947, farmers’ 
earnings from the above-mentioned 29.4 per cent of black-market rice sales constituted 
67.9 per cent of their total sales income from rice(Chosŏn ŭnhaeng chosabu 1949: I-8). 
This profitable business on the black-market transactions was due to the wide gap 
between the prices paid by the US military governmet and those available on the black 
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market: the ratio of the former to the latter was ju t 12 per cent in 1945, 36 per cent in 
1946, and 23 per cent in 1947 (see Table 1-6 in 1.2). The price policy of the South Korean 
government, which established in August 1948, was little different from that of the 
Americans. In 1948 and 1949, the cash farmers were able to receive from the government 
for their rice did not cover production costs. Producers were able to earn far more by 
trading on the black market.  
Compelled to turn in their hard-won harvests to the authorities, farmers hid their 
crops by resorting to the colonial counter-measures that they had used in the past, and 
sold them at illegal markets (USAMGIK 1948: 45). For example, of the shady dealings of 
rice between farmers and the people in Seoul, where the majority of citizens were 
suffering from an acute shortage of rice, the Tonga ilbo newspaper of February 1946 
observed that ‘[d]espite the authorities’ severe punishment policy for illegal trading, there 
are mad scrambles to buy smuggled rice from farmers, no matter what the price, at each 
arrival of the train from the countryside into major train stations [in Seoul], including 
Kyŏngsŏng Station…’176 Illegal trading took place continually between theproducers and 
consumers in cities. Sometimes rice delivered from the countryside was bought by black-
market dealers and stored in warehouses where huge volumes of rice collected through 
illegal methods were stockpiled. In many cases, such ri e was not released onto the 
market until the price had risen.177        
There was also widespread corruption within the food-rationing system that began 
in January 1946. People attempted to divert scarce food resources and participated in 
illegal trading in pursuit of their own interests. The most common irregularity was 
misdistribution by those involved in the rationing administration. As happened in the 
colonial era, sellers manipulated their books,178 illegally hoarded rice for their own 
                                                
176 ‘Singnyang-ŭi kin’gŭp sangt’ae chayu  pan-ch’urib-ŭi chamjŏng-chŏk choch’ŏ-ka p’iryo食糧緊急狀態
自由搬出入의暫定的措置處가 必要’, Tonga ilbo, 16 February 1946, p.1  
177 ‘Radium’ ch’ajŏ nokesso. Kyŏnggwan-ŭi yojŏng ch’ulip ŏmgŭm‘라디움’ 찾어놓겠소. 警官의 料亭出
入嚴禁’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun京郷新聞, 27 April 1949, p.2.   
178  ‘Changbu-rŭl hŏwi chaksŏngk’o paegŭp ssal-ŭl hoengnyŏng 帳簿를虛 코僞作成  配給쌀을橫領’, 
Tonga ilbo, 11 December 1947, p. 2; ‘Ssal paegŭpso t’aeban-i pujŏng쌀 配給所의 殆半이 不正’, 
Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 16 December 1947, p.2.   
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consumption,179 mixed low-quality rice with high-quality rice so that they could charge a 
higher price,180 and sold short measures to customers.181  
Usually, these dubious activities were conducted on a small scale by individual 
shopkeepers who were trying to make a little bit of extra income, but it was not 
uncommon to find instances of systematic corruption. Crimes committed by employees 
of the Korean Foodstuffs Public Corporation (Taehan singnyang kongsa大韓食糧公社) 
were frequently reported in the press. The Company was the successor to the Korean 
Foodstuffs Company, which had played a significant role in food rationing since its 
creation in 1943 by the colonial government. Under the US military government and 
Korean authorities’ policy of reusing the Japanese food control system, by 1949, the 
organization had expanded to include 7,300 employees throughout the country who 
directly ran distribution stations and local grain shops through management contracts 
(Kim S. B. 2000: 154). In one example of corrupt practice in August 1948, the leader of 
the Inch’ŏn branch embezzled 68 bags (5.4 metric tons) of rice and 130 bags of barley 
(10.5 tons) after falsely reporting a fire.182 Also in 1948, the head of the Kohŭng branch 
in Chollanam-do was arrested by the police for misappropriation of 1,000 bags (80 tons) 
of rice.183 The mass fraud of those directly involved in distributing rations was a chronic 
problem which reduced the supply of rice for ration recipients, instead increased the huge 
‘ghost population’ which I discussed in 2.2. Together with people’s deep-rooted dislike of 
the Korean Foodstuff Public Company due to the image of the Japanese colonial 
government’s coercive food collection, the malpractices of the employees was one of the 
most important reasons for its dissolution in October 1949.184   
Another unmistakable flaw in the food-rationing system in liberated Korea was 
                                                
179 ‘Pujŏng paegŭpsowŏn不正配給所員’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 28 January 1947, p.2.    
180 ‘Kuksanmi-e yangssal sŏngnŭn paegŭpso國產米에洋쌀섞는配給所’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun. 31 August 
1948, p.2.   
181  ‘Mal sogin ssal changsu Ŏm Yun-sŏp tŭng-ŭl kŏmgŏ말속인 쌀장수 엄윤섭 등을 검거’, Tonga ilbo, 
19 August 1949, p.2.  
182 ‘Hwajae-e pingja yŏngdanmi hoengnyŏng火災에憑藉 營團米橫領’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 24 August 
1948, p.2.  
183 ‘Chŏnyŏ kama mŏgŭn yanggok p’yŏnch’wibŏm kŏmgŏ천여가마 먹은 양곡 편취범 검거’, Chosŏn 
ilbo, 12 September 1948, p.2.  
184 ‘Yi taet’ongnyŏng t’ŭkpyŏl tamhwa李大統領特別談話’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 30 October 1949, p.2.  
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official corruption. Government-employee corruption scandals concerning the economic 
administration occurred so often that it was said by the Koreans that, ‘[w]e had been 
squeezed by the Japanese people and large landowners during the colonial era, under the 
US occupation we were exploited by government workers...’ (Kim C. S. 2000: 88). The 
injustice caused by public employees was widespread both under the US military 
administration and the South Korean government. An article in the Seoul sinmun 
newspaper called for the government to correct the wrongdoings in the rationing 
administration, arguing that the food control system was tainted by its corruption and 
irregularities.185 Government officials exercised their privileges in the allocation of grain 
to favour their friends and relatives, stole from collected foodstuffs, and diverted 
commodities, such as cotton, which were intended to be distributed to peasants as part 
payment for their products or as a supplement to their income.186 Cases of bribery 
involving public servants and commodity distributors were frequently reported in the 
press.187  
Charged with enforcing compliance with economic regulations, the police also 
engaged in unlawful behaviour, making a mockery of the food control system. In 1949 
for instance, the police chief in Kyǒnggi-do diverted 30 bags (2.4 tons) of rice, 125 bags 
of barley (10 tons), and some firewood in collusion with illegitimate sellers and sold them 
on the black market in Seoul.188 Many policemen were accused of keeping or reselling 
rice confiscated from citizens.189 During just twelve months spanning 1946 and 1947, 
2,857 government employees were found to be involved in 503 corruption cases. 190 
It might be true that the privileged could not resist the temptation to exploit their 
power, but in the media there were frequent discussion  that argued that such widespread 
                                                
185 ‘Ch’ugok sumae nonjaeng: mamyŏng秋穀收買論争: 馬鳴’, Sŏul sinmun 서울신문 7 September 1948. 
Electric document, available at h tp://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_008_1948_09_07_0030 
(accessed on 25 February 2012) 
186  ‘Ch’uguk maeib-ŭi wonhwal-ŭl wihayŏ秋糓買入의圓滑을爲하여’, Tonga ilbo, 30 October 1949, p.1.   
187 ‘Tokchik kwalli Kang U-hyŏng kongmoja-wa hamke songch’ŏng瀆職官吏姜禹馨 共謀者와함께送廳’, 
Tonga ilbo, 1 May 1947, p.2.   
188 ‘Chŏn Yangp’yŏng kyŏngch’al sŏjang Kim Ki-ok kiso 金前楊平警察署長 基玉起訴’, Tonga ilbo, 10 
February 1949, p. 2.   
189 ‘Kingnyanggo-ŭi pot’ongi ssal食糧苦의 보통이쌀’,Tonga ilbo, 23 March 1946, p.2.  
190 ‘ Kwalli- ŭi pŏmjoe pangjich’aeg-ŭro ssal ojak t’ŭkpae hara 의官吏 犯罪防止策으로 쌀 
五勺特配하라’,Tonga ilbo, 23 November 1947, p.4.   
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embezzlement by government workers resulted from their meagre earnings. As of 1948, 
for example, the monthly income of a civil servant was between 3,000 wŏn and a 
maximum of 5,000 wŏn. Given that the black-market price of rice (eight kilograms) was 
1,500 wŏn in August 1948191 and 1,900 wŏn by January 1950,192 their salaries do not 
seem to have been high enough to support family life. The price situation of post-colonial 
Korea more clearly reveals the hardships they might have faced. If the price index in 
1936 was 100, the wholesale price index of November 1949 had grown to 108,000. 
Specifically, the price index for cotton was 392,800, for firewood was 392,800, for rice 
was 77,700, and for newspapers was 30,000. Despite such price rises, the increase in the 
wages index, during same period, was relatively low: for teachers it was 28,545, for 
salaried workers it was 23,846, and for government employees it was just 19,000.193 
Government employees could not live on just their legitimate incomes, instead they were 
forced to sell their properties or turn to corrupt practices (Liem 1949: 79).   
The government’s low-wage policy for public servants was part of a hedge against 
inflation. As discussed in 1-2, inflation had annoyed the post-war authorities of Korea, 
and a wide range of economic policies were established to handle the problem. However, 
the post-colonial authorities recruited so many employees194 that the size of their salaries 
was severely limited. In the year after Korea’s liberation, the size of the police force 
nearly doubled in the US occupation zone: the number of policemen increased from 
20,000 for the entire Korean peninsula to 25,000 in just the south (Cumings 1981: 166). 
By 1953, the South Korean government was employing three times as many officials in 
its half of the peninsula as the Japanese had during their rule over its entirety (Henderson 
1968: 161). Despite the ordinary people’s dissatisfction with the salary policy for 
                                                
191 ‘Orŭnŭn ssal kap오르는 쌀값’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 3 August 1948, p.2.   
192 ‘Paekpan p’anmae-rŭl ŏmgŭm ttŏk, yŏt tŭng-do mandŭlji mot handa sigyŏng-sŏ chŏlmi ch’ŏlchŏ-rŭl 
sidal白飯販賣를嚴禁 떡,엿等도만들지못한다 市警서 節米徹底를 시시’, Tonga ilbo, 14 January 1950, 
p.2.   
193 ‘Singnyang, ŭiryo, yŏllyo tŭng-ŭi mulkachisu-wa minsaeng식량·의료·연료 등의 물가지수와 민생’, 
Kukto sinmun 국도신문, 24 December 1949.  Electric document, available at 
http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_015_1949_12_24_0060 
 (accessed on 26 July  2012) 
194 Cumings explains that the reason for this policy was to enhance the government’s control over social 
disorder, and especially to weaken the strength of e Korean left in the US occupation zone. See Cumings 
1981: 158-169.   
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government employees, due to it being the principal factor behind the widespread official 
corruption,195 the authorities maintained their stance, arguing that higher wages would 
cause inflation.196 The US military government’s policy of low salaries for government 
workers, inherited by the South Korean government with its establishment in 1948, was 
criticized by Koreans as one of the major failures of its administration (Liem 1949: 79).   
As a counter-measure against their jobbery, a special food rationing scheme, in 
which some public workers were entitled to receive more rations than other citizens, was 
introduced in 1947 by the US authorities. For example, employees who worked for 
government organizations and policemen were entitled to extra ration with a maximum of 
2.5 hop (approximately 360 grams) as a daily ration (Kim C. S. 2000: 95). This system of 
special ration was maintained by the South Korean government. Even when the ration 
population was drastically reduced in April 1949 due to the failure of the Korean 
government’s rice collection, they were still able to remain within the list of rationing 
recipients, as I explained in 1.2. However, the scheme was not successful enough to 
eradicate widespread malpractice. Government employees’ continuously abused their 
positions of power, took advantage of the system, and participated in illegal activities. 
The authorities’ policy to curb inflation by limiting people’s salaries forced them to 
participate in the black market more and more, and eventually led to further serious 
inflation (Liem 1949: 79).   
The black market, which grew steadily from a flaw in the Japanese wartime food 
policy and loomed larger as it became established in mainstream society, offers a concrete 
example of how the centralized food controls affected and changed the everyday lives of 
the people. It was inevitable that the black market continued to dominate the lives of 
people in liberated Korea while the Japanese economic system remained intact. As I have 
discussed in the closing paragraphs of section 1.2, the US government’s reuse of the 
Japanese administrative apparatus in its occupation zone was a practical and convenient 
decision. However, this caused further deterioration in the food situation in post-colonial 
                                                
195 ‘Choejŏ saenghwal pojang-ŭi kŏnŭi 의最低生活保障 建議’, Tonga ilbo, 29 October 1948, p.1; 
‘Kwan’gongni saenghwal munje官公吏生活問題’, Tonga ilbo, 3 February 1949, p.2.    
196 ‘Ch’wijik haesŏ ton pŏlla就職해서돈벌라’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 31 January 1947, p.2  
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Korea. The ill-constructed food control system, accompanied by its unavoidable by-
product – the black market – was revived under the framework of the US authorities’ 
controlled economy, and inherited by the South Korean government. Food became scarce 
in official distribution channels, instead changing hands in shady ways which offered vast 
opportunities for profiteering. Out of greed or desp ration, a growing number of people 
engaged in illegal transactions, and black markets flourished during the first years of 
liberated Korea. The invigorated black market in post-colonial Korea was a colonial 
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Garon uses the term ‘social management’ to describe the modern Japanese authorities’ 
disciplinary mechanism that interfered in the daily lives of the people in order to regulate 
and transform their behaviour for the purpose of maintaining social order. Parallel with a 
repressive governance system, the Japanese government used the distinctive 
administrative apparatus to mobilize its people in numerous state projects. Through 
various campaigns to improve daily life, the governme t persuaded people to internalize 
appropriate values, such as diligence and thrift, in order to achieve the country’s political 
and economic goals (Garon 1997: 5-7, 13). National movements for the improvement of 
daily life, initially designed by reformers of Meiji  Japan (1868-1912) as part of modern 
nation-building projects to make the country stronger and wealthier, were intensified 
during the wars in which Japan participated during the first half of the twentieth century.  
As in Japan, colonial Korea the improvement of daily life was a highly political 
project. Reforming the eating habits of Koreans wasone of the various Japanese reform 
projects aimed at reordering and controlling Korean society throughout the colonial 
occupation.197 The colonial authorities had intervened in the everyday diet of Koreans 
more intensively since the early 1930s, at a point when Korean society was especially 
politically and economically unstable (Miyamoto 1998: 21). The Japanese methods to 
improve daily life of colonial Koreans provided a fundamental basis for wartime 
mobilization campaign during the World War II, and even for yet another war campaign 
in post-colonial Korea.  
This chapter deals with the government campaigns carried out in the name of 
improving daily life between the 1930s and the 1950s in Korea. In the first part, I will 
                                                
197 For example, in 1920 the Japanese government launched the Local Improvement Campaign (Chihō 
kairyō undō地方改良運動), an earlier version of the Rural Revitalization Campaign which will be dealt in 
the first section of this chapter. For details of the colonial government’s reorganization of Korean rural 
society through the Local Improvement Campaign, see Kim Y. H. 1996, Yi H. N. 1998, and Yun H. D. 
2004.   
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demonstrate the colonial government’s penetration into the daily lives of the Korean 
people through the Rural Revitalization Campaign (Nōson shinkō undō 農村振興運
動),198 which unfolded on a massive scale, and was eventually absorbed by the fully 
fledged mobilization campaign for war in 1940. I will document how the colonial 
authorities effectively used the improvement campaign to regulate the diet of the people 
on the home front. In the second part, I will explore the Japanese wartime methods to 
reform the wartime daily life of civilians was revived by the South Korean government’s 
Wartime Daily Life Improvement launched faced with the Korean War (1951-1953). This 
chapter will argue that the campaigns for the improvement of daily life, through which 
the government interfered in people’s everyday lives to a great degree, were a political 
tool used to regulate food consumption in society, specially in the time of war.  
4.1 The Daily Life Improvement Campaigns  
From the Rural Revitalization Campaign to the National Total Mobilization Movement 
The Rural Revitalization Campaign (RCC) initiated in 1932 by the Governor-General in 
Korea, Ugaki Kazushige (1931-1936), was one of key policies implemented by the 
Japanese authorities in colonial Korea. The aim of it was to resolve an economic crisis 
and morally educating the population (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 1945: 49). The 
primary stimulus for the implementation of the RRC was the extraordinary poverty that 
had prevailed in rural Korea since the latter half of the 1920s. Both the Japanese 
government’s rice-importation policy and the collapse of the global markets caused by 
the Great Depression of 1929 severely affected Korean agriculture. As discussed in 1.1, 
the Programme for the Increase of Rice Production (Sanmai zōshoku keikaku産米増殖計
画), launched in Korea in 1920, was intended to develop the colony as a major rice 
supplier for the Japanese people. However, it was not long before the food policy 
disrupted Japanese agriculture. Hit by the rising imports of food from its colony, by the 
mid-1920s, the Japanese rice market was oversupplied, leading to a fall in prices, and 
Japanese farmers were protesting strongly against the government’s agricultural 
                                                
198 The full name of this movement is the ‘Rural, Mountai  and Fishing Villages Revitalization Campaign 
(Nōsangyoson shinkō undō農山漁村振興運動)’, but I refer to this movement as simply the Rural 
Revitalization Campaign as the focus of this study is on rural areas.   
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development programme in Korea. To protect domestic agriculture, the Japanese 
government gradually reduced rice imports from Korea and, in 1934, completely 
suspended the Programme for the Increase of Rice Production (Johnston 1953: 58).  
Reduced exports of rice, which accounted for 70 per cent of the value of total 
agricultural production in 1935 Korea, had devastating consequences for farming-
household economy (Shin 1996: 69). According to a government investigation, as of 
1931 more than 75 per cent, or 1,733,000 farming households, were in private debt to 
another individual (loans from credit and government organizations were excluded). The 
total amount of debt equalled more than 101,113,000 yen, with an average debt per 
farming household of 58.34 yen. For example, in Kyŏngsangman-do, one of the most 
commercialized granary areas in Korea, the highest d bt recorded for a peasant was 
22,000 yen, which was far beyond the power of a peasant farmer to recover (Lee H. K. 
1936: 234). Two-thirds of farming households had debts which amounted to more than 
one-third of their annual income, leading to the destruction of the rural household 
economy and widespread starvation, expressed as ‘starving hell’ by one newspaper (Shin 
and Han 2000: 78). The catalyst for the colonial government’s implementation of the 
RRC was the urgent need to rebuild the battered farm economy of Korea.  
Another significant reason behind the launch of the RRC was the combustible 
political climate, which had arisen due to the growth of numerous social organizations, 
such as tenant unions, in 1920s rural society. Notwithstanding the colonial authorities’ 
fear of the spread of socialist thought, their political actions prevailed in rural areas in the 
late 1920s, led by radical Korean nationalists and communists. For example, the ‘Red 
Peasant Union’ (Chŏksaek nongmin chohap赤色農民組合) was an active network of 
communist peasants who protested against the Japanese imperialistic and feudal 
democratic system (Kanamori 1985: 158-159). In addition to becoming involved in 
tenancy disputes, they often confronted local governm nts, decrying tax policy and the 
officials’ interference in village affairs, such asin night schools where people were taught 
radical ideology such as Marxism. Moreover, their slogans, frequently promoted, were 
‘anti-colonialism’ and ‘for the national liberation of Korea’ (Shin 1996: 76-77). To 
combat the threat to administrative order, the colonial government had to take action to 
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increase its control over the spirit of the people, in a way that directed people’s attention 
away from political issues and towards more personal aff irs (Chi S. G. 1984: 121-123; 
Shin and Han 2000: 73-74). Thus, it was in this economic and political context that the 
campaign for the improvement of daily life was implemented.   
The RRC started by building an extensive network. The logic behind this was that 
a well-structured organization would allow the authorities to reach the local population 
more easily and facilitate the enforcement of disciplinary power over their daily lives. 
The lead organization of the campaign, the Rural Revitalization Committee (Nongch’on 
chinhŭng wiwŏnhoe農村振興委員會), was established under the Government-General 
in September 1932. With Minister of State Affairs as its leader, the Committee included 
ten bureau chiefs, seventeen local government agents and other officials. Local branches 
were created in all provincial, county (kun) and district (myŏm) government offices 
(Yahiro 1983: 17). Sub-groups were also formed in villages (purak), and were further 
divided into individual units. Comprised of approximately five households from each 
neighbourhood, the basic-unit rural revitalization committees each had a leader and 
specialists to lead people in the various development projects (Kim Y. H. 1996: 62, 67). 
This network of RRC gave the government the power to become directly involved in 
each farming household’s domestic affairs and to prvide detailed guidance on the 
handling of household finances, as I will show in the following paragraph. 
Pre-existing rural civilian groups, such as farmers’ as ociations that were part of 
the Korean Credit Association (Kŭmyung chohap金融組合), were also mobilized to 
carry out various RRC projects. The Korean Credit Association was established in 1907 
under the special protection of the colonial governme t, and functioned as a link between 
the government and farmers, facilitating credit for farmers and government-led 
agricultural development programmes.199 By 1933, there were 685 credit associations, 
with one million members throughout the country, and these organizations became the 
basis of the implementation of RRC (Shin and Han 2000: 86).  
                                                
199 For further details concerning the functions of the Korean Credit Association and the transformation of 
Korean rural society, see Yi K. N. 2001 and Yi K. N. 2002.     
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The RRC began with comprehensive investigations into farming households’ 
financial situations. This was to select the ‘rehabilit tion households’(kaengsaeng nongga
更生農家) that were to be the main objects of focus for the government’s direct guidance. 
Details of domestic financial situations, including the sizes of the family workforces, side 
businesses (puŏp 副業) the families were engaged in, the farming situation and the 
families’ financial circumstances (debts and savings) were collected. Specifics, such as 
spending on foodstuffs, including salt, sugar, fish, meat, grains and alcoholic drinks, and 
on fuel, medical care, education, and ceremonial occasions were also researched (Inoue 
2007: 268-269). From among those studied, selected households were put under 
government supervision, and participated in various programmes to benefit their financial 
situations by improving their daily lives. Between 1933 and 1940, the scope of the 
campaign expanded continuously: the number of farming households included increased 
from 51,705 households in 2,277 villages to 746,930 households in 33,306 villages, 
representing more than 80 per cent of the total number of villages in the country 
(Matsumoto 1998: 166; Kim Y. H. 1996: 67).    
While many RRC programmes were carried out by the five-household groups, the 
selected households were under the special management of the government. Taking into 
consideration their current financial situations and estimated expenditure in years to come, 
they were directed to develop five-year or ten-year pl ns for income and expenditure 
(Yahiro 1983: 12).  The plans were made in accordance with the three objectives of the 
RRC – ensuring sufficient food, eliminating debts, and balancing household income and 
expenditure. With ‘regeneration through one’s own efforts’ (charyŏk kaengsaeng自力更
生) and the ‘self-sufficiency’ (chagŭp chajok自給自足) of farm life as their major 
principles, the plans included drawing up repayment schedules, creating subsidiary 
businesses to increase incomes, reforming daily practices and eliminating wasteful 
expenditure to save money (Ibid.: 37) 
Detailed advice on how to achieve the goals was provided by members of the 
rural revitalization committees or by specially trained ‘mainstays’ (chunggyŏn inmul中堅
人物) who were trained as instructors for the programme. B tween 1936 and 1940, 
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approximately 9,600 local people were trained at 148 training institutions throughout the 
country on a minimum of a one-month to a maximum of a one-year leadership 
programme (Shine and Han 1999: 87). Led by these people, for example, farmers were 
encouraged to cultivate fruit in order to save their food budget, to make and wear straw 
sandals instead buying rubber shoes, to weave clothto refrain from buying textiles, to 
make compost, and to save money (Yahiro 1983: 36-37). All the guidance was tailored to 
fit the circumstances of each household. For example, when a target volume for 
composting was set for a certain household, the number of farm animals owned, from 
which the basic ingredients were produced, was considered first. The farmers’ work 
experience was also taken into account. With such consideration of all the variables, goals 
were set and re-adjusted every year. When the instructors gave advice on the raising of 
livestock, the economic situation of each farming household was taken into consideration 
to ensure that the farmers could afford to feed the animals (Ibid.: 8, 38). The 
achievements of each household were regularly report d to the government.    
The government’s efforts to regulate the household economy were not limited to 
the guidance of instructors and committee members, but in 1934 expanded the sphere of 
its control over the lives of people through the legislation of the Family Rites Standards 
(kajŏng ŭire chunch’ik家庭儀礼準則). In the name of breaking outdated customs and 
abolishing empty formalities, the government standardized the procedure for family 
ceremonies – weddings, funerals, and ancestral worship – and urged people to curtail 
expenditure on these events (Chōsen sōtokufu gakumukyoku shakaika 1938: 36). For the 
Japanese authorities, the costly family rituals in Korea were seen as one of the most 
seriously evil customs, and the financial burden on K rean households caused by family 
ceremonies was frequently highlighted as problematic. Allegedly, it was not uncommon 
for Korean farmers sell their oxen or even their land to find the money needed for the 
ceremonies (Miyamoto 1998: 22, 25). To eradicate such practices, the Government-
General established the Family Rites Standards and ordered a special order to provincial 
governors to enforce compliance with the standardized regulations. It also established the 
Division of Rites (ŭiryebu 儀礼部 ) in the Kyŏnghagwŏn 經學院, a Confucian 
educational institution, to demonstrate model rituals to people (Chōsen sōtokufu 
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gakumukyoku shakaika 1938: 36-37). Ensuring compliance with the ‘Family Rites 
Standards’ was a typical example of the activities on the agenda of the daily life 
improvement, along with various other campaigns promoted under the RRC.  
While the primary aim of the RRC was to create economic revitalization of rural 
society, it does not necessarily mean that the project attached importance only to the 
material side. Governor-General Ugaki stressed the spiritual aspects – ‘to value labour’ 
(kŭllo aeho勤労愛好), of ‘self-reliance and self-help’ (chaju charip自主自立), and of 
‘gratitude [for the country]’ (poŭn kamsa報恩感謝) – as other key parts of the campaign 
(Chōsen sōtokufu nōrinkyoku 1940: 2). He set improving both the material wealth and 
the morale of the country as his high-priority tasks while ruling Korea. He considered that 
the failure of the earlier colonial administration in Korea had resulted from a policy of 
overemphasis on production and a neglect of the spiritual education of the Korean people 
(Shin and Han 2000: 79). As a means to stabilize social unrest in his colony, Ugaki 
believed that the spiritual improvement of the peopl  was pivotal, along with creating 
economic vitality, and he emphasized the importance of moral persuasion in the 
economic revitalization programmes. The RRC is an excellent example of the sorts of 
projects in which his ideas were embedded.  
The spiritual education advocated by Ugaki originated from the morality of 
Tokugawa era, which emphasized the virtues of diligence, thrift and self-reliance as the 
keys to escaping poverty (Garon 1997: 31). This ideology was upheld by Meiji reformers, 
and was central to the rural development project, one of Meiji Japan’s various 
modernization projects, and was also embodied in social policy to deal with destitution. 
In the face of widespread poverty in Japan after th Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), 
Japanese bureaucrats vigorously promoted the moral education of the people to teach 
them how to fight poverty by developing their own industries rather than relying on the 
government’s support. Combining the value of diligenc  for both self-betterment and the 
country’s prosperity, the authorities spurred on the Japanese population to improve their 
economic lives, emphasizing saving and austerity (Hiratsuka 1989: 90-91).  
To inculcate Koreans with the spirit of thriftiness, not only for personal profit but 
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for the benefit of the country, was highly important to achieving the goal of ‘harmony 
between Japan and Korea’ (naisen yūwa内鮮融和) advocated by Ugaki. This was the 
slogan for the policy of ‘assimilation’ (dōka同化),  the Japan’s ultimate goal of colonial 
administration. The aim of the policy was to transform the Korean people into diligent, 
loyal, law-abiding ‘imperial peoples’(kōmin皇民), imbued with same values, bearing the 
same responsibilities, and sharing the same lifestyles as the Japanese (Peattie 1984: 40). 
In this respect, the RRC was one of the most important policies of the colonial 
administration. 
As part of the RRC, spiritual enhancement was called for by the government, 
especially during the Week of Spiritual Awakening (seishin sakkō shūkan精神作興週間). 
Launched in November 1931, this special campaign took place every year, giving people 
goals to achieve. For example, during the week of 7 t  13 November 1937, the following 
daily tasks were set: 1) visit Shinto shrines and learn kokutai ideology200; 2) value labour 
and work hard; 3) reform daily life, reflect on oneself and exercise caution; 4) enhance 
one’s spirit of self-control and endurance, and recognize the (war) situation (of the 
country); 5) carry out social duties (kongdŏk sirhaeng公徳實行) and give service to the 
benefit of the public interest (konggong pongsa公共奉仕); 6) respect elderly people, take 
care of young children, and promote health; 8) feelgratitude (for the country) (Chōsen 
sōtokufu gakumukyoku shakaika 1938: 134-135). Such spiritual indoctrination 
campaigns were promoted in parallel with the RRC (Inoue 2007: 270).       
Through these spiritual indoctrination and economic revitalization projects, the 
colonial authorities greatly increased their ability to reach into and manage the everyday 
lives of the common people. Governor-General Ugaki was enthusiastic about the RRC, 
and sometimes made personal tours of inspection in local areas to check on the status of 
achievements.201 One government official said of this: ‘Now, the politics of the Governor-
General have even penetrated into the ‘kitchens [an extremely private sphere]’ of the 
poor’ (Yahiro 1983: 11). As Minami Jirō, who took office after Ugaki in 1938, stated, no 
                                                
200 See 6.1 for a more detailed account on the Japanese kokutai ideology.  
201 ‘Ugaki ch’ongdok kwiimdam 宇垣総督帰任談’, Tonga ilbo東亜日報, 1 July 1933, p.1.  
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other colonial policies had thus far enabled the government to interfere so directly in the 
everyday affairs of the general populace as the RRC (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 
1945: 84). The web of connection between the governm nt and the people, created during 
the implementation of the RRC, changed the Japanese gov rnment’s control mechanism 
over its colonial subjects. It enabled the colonial authorities to penetrate and effectively 
manage the everyday life of the Korean people instead of relying exclusively on the 
power of repression (Shin and Han 2000: 93). Most importantly, it served as an important 
basis for the wartime improvement of daily life campaigns, which began in 1938 and 
intensified with the deterioration of wartime shortages of commodities.           
In October 1940, the RRC was renamed the ‘Rural andMountain Village 
Production Campaign to Support the Country’ (Nōsanson seisan hōkoku undō 農山村生
産報国運動 ), and was absorbed into the National Total Mobilization Movement 
(Kokumin sōryoku undō 国民総力運動 ), a full-scale war mobilization campaign. 
Coincidentally launched at the same time as the NewOrder Movement in Japan Proper in 
1940, the war campaign combined all kinds of movements active in Korea at the time. 
With the ‘creation of an advanced defence state’ (kodo kukpang kukka kŏnsŏl高度國防
國家建設) as the end-game, the ‘expansion of productivity’ (saengsannyŏk hwakch’ung
生産力拡充) was positioned as one of its three major aims, along with the ‘unification of 
thought’ (sasang t’ongil 思 想 統 一 ) and ‘thorough national drilling’ (kungmin 
ch’onghullyŏn國民總訓練) (Matsumoto 1998: 212). Under the framework of thefull-
scale war campaign, farmers’ production activities were duly outlined as a part of the war 
mobilization projects.  
As the war mobilization movement began, the rural development policy changed 
direction completely: the previous purpose of the rural campaign, stabilizing the 
livelihood of the rural population, was replaced by the ‘pursuit of production expansion 
to support the nation’ (saenghwal poguk生活報國) (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 
1945: 52). On the road to the construction of a newpolitical and economic order, within 
the concept of the Japanese ‘New Order’ that insisted on totalitarian state control over all 
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material and human resources,202 the pursuit of individual prosperity was emphatically 
denied. The colonial authorities insisted that the op rational method and principle behind 
the RRC, of providing guidance to individual households to improve their own living 
conditions based on ‘individualism’, should be abolished. Instead, the focus of rural 
development policy was shifted to production for the public interest. As part of this, the 
role of rural communities as a unit of production, in terms of the efficiency of its labour 
force and its productivity, came to be based on the ideology of Japanese totalitarianism 
(Anonymous 1941e: 69-70).   
In accordance with this fundamental principle, in December 1940 the government 
ordered the drawing up of ‘village-plans’ (purak kyehoek部落計画), these were three-
year production plans for each village that focused only on production increases. With 
villages as the basic unit, each farming household’s cultivated acreage, forms of 
cultivation and crop yields were included in the plans, and were reported to the 
government through the organizational network which had been used for RRC. However, 
now, the information collected had nothing to do with the economic vitality of farming 
households. The data were used as the basis for nati nal projects for increasing food 
production as well as for setting targets for the food collection programmes designed 
within the nationwide system of food rationing which began in 1940 (Matsumoto 1998: 
217-219). That is, the efficient organizational struc ure originally set up for the purpose of 
improving the economic situation of farmers was diverted to the benefit of the war 
mobilization campaign.   
By 1940, all rural revitalization committees in provincial governments, counties, 
districts and villages had been turned into local br nches of the Korean Federation for 
National Total Mobilization (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei国民総力朝鮮連盟), the 
lead war mobilization organization. The smallest groups, comprised of five households, 
were reorganized into ‘patriotic units’ (aegukpan愛國班) of five to ten households each 
(Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 1945: 50-51). Use of the pre-existing organizations 
was the principal factor in the successful and rapid creation of a network of civilian 
groups for war campaigns, as mentioned in 2.1. As the basic unit of village life for rural 
                                                
202 For details on economic policies within the framework of the ‘New Order’ doctrine, see Chapter Three.   
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people, communities were transformed into ‘administered mass organizations’, as the 
Korean scholar Moon described the civilian groups (Moon 2005: 22-23). The groups 
carried out a wide range of tasks for war mobilization projects, including the campaigns 
for the improvement of daily life.  
The Improvement of the Daily Diet for the Purposes of All-out War  
The improvement of daily life was ranked as one of the major goals of the Japanese 
government’s war campaigns. In waging total war, into which Japan was plunged from 
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1937) until 1945, all available national resources, 
not just war munitions, were mobilized towards the winning of the war. The country’s 
fighting strength depended on how well and to what extent all of its resources were 
mobilized by restricting civilian consumption (Cwiertka 2006a: 115-116). Thus, in 1938, 
under the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō国民
精神総動員運動), an earlier version of the National Total Mobilization Movement, the 
authorities introduced a broad range of projects to control the everyday lives of its people, 
agitating for the improvement (kaesŏn 改善), reform (swaesin刷新), and innovation 
(hyŏksin革新) of daily life.  
Following the launch of the war campaign in 1938, the Korean Federation for the 
National Spirit Mobilization203 established 21 goals, including the ‘improvement of daily 
life’. The proper management of the daily life of a civilian was of particular importance 
for securing material resources, as well as for maintaining the spiritual discipline of the 
people. The aims of the wartime improvement of daily life campaign are outlined below:  
In order to win the holy war, it is important to secure military supplies through 
reducing [civilian] consumption, thrift and saving, and an expansion of 
production… [a]t the same time, the stabilization of life by establishing the 
standards for people’s daily lives, which have become increasingly hard due to 
                                                
203 When the name of the war campaign changed from the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement to the 
National Total Mobilization Movement in 1940, the name of the lead organization also changed from the 
Korean Federation for the National Spiritual Mobilization to the Korean Federation for National Total 
Mobilization. Hereafter, I will call this organization ‘Korean Federation’ in the main text.     
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the current circumstances [the Sino-Japanese War], is crucial for keeping people’s 
spirits up and maintaining good health…  
(Anonymous 1938a: 5) 
While practicing economy in everyday life, maintaining one’s health was also 
emphasized as an important part of the wartime improvement of daily life campaign. This 
suggests that it was not just materials but also manpower that was considered an 
important resource to be mobilized to increase the fighting strength of the country. Health 
care came to be considered as the improvement of daily life, a crucial strategy for the 
Japan’s war campaign.   
The importance of efficient health maintenance was frequently emphasized 
through the publication of dietary guidelines. For example, in January 1939, the Korean 
Federation announced ‘Guidelines for the improvement of national life in a time of 
national emergency’ (pisangsi kungmin saenghwal kaesŏn an非常時國民生活改善案). 
Comprised of five categories – clothing, eating, housing, amenities and social morale – it 
provided practical advice on how to achieve substantial savings in daily life. Concerning 
eating, four principles were set down:  
a. To have simple meals focusing on the enhancement of health and nutrition 
b. To give thanks before meals and have meals together at the same table and at 
the same time204 
c. To simplify parties for ceremonial occasions ande tertaining and refrain from 
creating excitement 
d. To cultivate the habit of serving tea to guests to abolish the practice of offering 
alcoholic drinks (in Korean households) 
(Anonymous 1938b: 13) 
As is made clear in the first point above, the authori ies emphasized the nutritional 
aspects of the diet, along with the rationalization of eating, as part of the wartime 
campaign. In Korea, the ideas of nutrition and dietary rationalization had been introduced 
from the end of nineteenth century, coincidently with the launch of home economics 
education for women. Home Economics developed within e frame of Japan’s nation-
                                                
204 Traditionally, the time and space for home eaten mals in the Korean household was segregated by sex 
and age, thus, not all family members shared the eating space and dining table. A more detailed explanatio  
about this custom will be followed in 6.1    
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centred educational principles which aimed at training Korean women as loyal Japanese 
subjects who had modern but humble living practices to erve to the country. From the 
end of 1930s, the scientific aspects of diet were indispensable in implementing Japan’s 
austerity policy for its efficiency in economics and ourishment – it enabled people to eat 
the most nutritious food for the lowest possible cost and lowest quantity of food. 205  
The Korean scholar An T’ae-yun stated that the promotion of the nutritional 
knowledge in diet was limited to urban housewives (2006b: 62). Certainly, nutritional 
science was new knowledge at that time, and the level of rural women’s school education, 
through which women had the opportunity to learn such things, was much lower than that 
of urban women. As of 1936, the rate of female prima y school enrolment in rural areas 
was 9.6 per cent, while in cities it was 34.5 per cnt (Kim S. J. 2006: 503). However, in 
practice, the nutritional aspect of diet was emphasized as an important component in the 
improvement of diet in rural people, if not as much as for educated city dwellers. 
Economically efficient nourishment was crucially important for the enhancement of 
health and the prevention of disease, which directly affected the productivity of the rural 
people who accounted for approximately 80 per cent of Korean population (Chang S. H. 
1941b: 28). At that time, the decline in health caused by malnutrition among Korean 
people was a serious problem. By 1941, the mortality rate among children under the age 
of ten had reached 30 per cent. The chief reason for this was said to be maternal 
malnutrition during pregnancy. Poor nutrition was al o responsible for an estimated 
40,000 tuberculosis patients throughout the country and the low life expectancy of 
Koreans, which was less than 40 years (Chang S. H. 1941a: 133-134). In light of the 
increasing demand for wartime labour, the improvement of rural diet relying on the 
scientific solution was indispensable for the colonial government.  
Kajŏng chiu 家庭之友 (Home’s Companion), the official magazine of the 
Women’s Association (puinhoe婦人會), is an excellent source that shows that what was 
the authorities’ campaigns of dietary improvement in rural areas was like. The Women’s 
Association was a sub-group of the Korean Credit Association, the government-linked 
                                                
205 Details on the development of home economics and politicisation of it will be discussed in Chapter Six 
of this study.    
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finance agency that, as previously mentioned, had been utilized for many kinds of the 
government’s rural projects including the RRC. As a emi-official organization for rural 
women, the Women’s Association had engaged in various rural development programmes 
and in the RRC since the 1930s.206 Aimed at more than 120,000 members in around 4,000 
associations throughout the country, the monthly magazine Kajŏng chiu was intended to 
act as a text book, and included wide-ranging practic l information to help rationalize 
farming practices and reform daily life (Inoue 2000: 34-35).  
For example, the magazine serialized various cookery columns, entitled 
‘Nongch’on yori農村料理’ (Rural cooking), ‘Sin yŏngyang kangjwa新營養講座’ (New 
nutrition lecture), and ‘Sin yŏngyang dokpon新營養読本 ’ (New nutrition reader). 
Through these articles, nutritional knowledge and recipes using cheap and readily 
available ingredients were regularly introduced. Most f the articles were written and 
edited by prominent Korean women educators, such as Pang Sin-yŏng 方信榮(1890-
1977)207 and Son Chŏng-gyu孫貞圭 (1896-?).208 Even though it was difficult to bring 
about a scientific transformation all at once in rural home-cooked meals, the magazine 
helped to improve nutrition by using available ingredients and adopting nutritional 
knowledge in everyday meal preparation (Chang S. H. 1941b: 28).     
In order to teach rural women how to prepare the most nutritious food at the 
lowest possible cost, cooking methods, the nutritional information of foodstuffs, and the 
function of important nutrients, such as carbohydrates, proteins and vitamins, were 
published frequently in the cookery columns. For example, as an economical way of 
consuming protein, cheap fish (i.e., anchovies and sardines) and bean curd were 
recommended instead of expensive meat (Pang S. Y.1939a: 40-41; Pang S. Y. 1939b: 33-
36). Instructions were also given for cooking techniques that offered better nutritional 
intake. The columns encouraged the reduction of boiling times for vegetables to avoid 
                                                
206 See Arimatsu 2006 for an account of the colonial government’s policy toward rural Korean women and 
the roles of the Women’s Association.   
207 One of the most prominent educators of home economics in Korea.  For detailed account of her 
educational activities, see 6. 2. 
208 Son was a teacher of Keijō Higher Normal School for seventeen years since 1922, and was involved in 
the government-supported daily life improvement camp igns since the end of the 1930s. She wrote the first 
text book of housework (kasa家事) for middle schools in decolonized Korea in 1949. 
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destroying their nutrients, the careful boiling and consumption of offal, fish heads and 
even bones, and the use of every last crumb, including the skins of carrots, potatoes and 
radishes (Pang S. Y. 1939b: 36; Anonymous 1939a: 40). In order to absorb sufficient 
quantities of a variety of nutrients, it was advised that people should eat a broad ranging 
diet (Pang S. Y. 1939b: 36). Such dietary advice was provided through cartoons, as shown 
below.  
Figure 4-1: A cartoon entitled ‘Pursuit of nutrition’ in Kajŏng chiu magazine (April, 
1939) 
   
 For example, a 1941 article called ‘Nongch’on yŏngyang kaesŏn-ŭi silche 農村
營養改善의 實際’ (The reality of the improvement of nutrition in rural areas), provided 
detailed advice about how to improve family meals in a nutritionally-appropriate way. It 
was suggested that 1600 kilo calories, two-thirds of an adult male’s daily calorie 
requirement, should come from staple foods, with the remaining 800 kilo calories coming 
from other foodstuffs. By eating three hop and three chak (approximately 320 grams) of 
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grain, it was possible to consume 32 grams of protein out of the total daily requirement of 
80 grams. The remaining 48 grams of protein were to be supplied from side dishes 
(Chang S. H. 1941b: 28-29). Such instructions were accompanied by example meal plans, 
as shown in Table 4-1.  
 Table 4-1: A sample daily menu (to be served with staples) and ingredients, as suggested 
in Hantō no hikeri magazine209 
Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
Bean paste soup 
Soybean paste, 40 grams 
Chinese cabbage, 40 grams 
Anchovies, 40 grams 
White (or sweet) potatoes, 80 
grams  
Kimch’i210 
Grilled fish or meat, 6 grams 
Boiled potatoes, 80 grams 
Kimch’i 
Soup 
Meat, 50 grams 
Beans, 40 grams 
White potatoes, 30 grams 
Vegetables, 30 grams 
Kimch’i  
Source: Chang S. H. 1941b: 28-29.  
  As mentioned previously, the purpose of Kajŏng chiu was its practical use as an 
educational tool for rural women. In the reports of l cal associations, which were 
frequently featured in the magazine, it was reported that many group leaders got their 
members together to read the magazine so that they could effectively disseminate the 
dietary advice and other information to them (Anonymous 1937: 60; Son C. H. 1938: 15). 
However, in practical terms, it is hard to imagine that rural housewives were able to 
prepare meals in the ways suggested in the magazine. To follow the meal planning 
demonstrated in the magazine, housewives would haved to understand the nutritional 
requirements of each family member, calculate all the nutritional values of the foodstuffs 
and weigh every single ingredient in order to prepa proper family meals.  
 The impracticality of the dietary instructions was ctually pointed out in a 
suggestion made by a local association leader to the publisher of Kajŏng chiu. When she 
had held a cooking class using the recipes featured in the magazine, her members had 
                                                
209 From May 1941, Kajŏng chiu was renamed Hantō no hikari 半島の光 (The Light of the Peninsula).  
210 A traditional fermented Korean dish generally made with Chinese cabbage and a variety of condiments, 
such as chilli powder, spring onions, garlic, ginger and salt.     
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complained that the dishes were too ‘extravagant’ to be prepared in farming households 
(Yamane 1937: 33). The dishes which received unfavourable comments from her 
members were:  
a. Steamed cucumber (cucumber, meat, leek, garlic, unripe chilli pepper, salt, 
ground sesame seeds, sesame oil, pepper and soy sauce)
b. Young radish jangach’i211 (young radishes, chilli peppers, leek, salt, ground 
sesame seeds, garlic, soy sauce and oil) 
c. White potato jangach’i (white potatoes, beef, leek and soy sauce) 
d. Courgette namul212 (courgette, meat, red peppers, salt, oil, ground sesame 
seeds and chilli powder) 
e. An egg dish (eggs, pork, beansprouts, leek, peas, salt, sesame oil and pepper) 
f. A bean curd dish (bean curd, eggs, leek, wheat flour, salt and sesame oil) 
g. Pan-fried aubergine (aubergine, sugar and soy sauce) 
(Son C. G. 1937: 26-30)  
One reason why these dishes were unsuitable for home-cooked meals might have been 
the expensive ingredients used. Three (a, c, and d) of the seven dishes shown above 
include meat products which were difficult to obtain for the majority of rural people.  
 The actual state of home-cooked meals in farming households was very different 
to that represented by the meal suggestions. For example, a diet survey of 3,010 Korean 
households carried out in 1939 by Professor Takai from Keijō Imperial University 
revealed that approximately 30 per cent of Korean people, including growing children, 
did not consume any animal protein in a year. According to the survey, for more than five 
per cent of Koreans kimch’i was the only accompaniment to staples (Takai 1940: 7 ). 
Another study of more than 100 farming households in Talli village, in Ulsan, 
Kyŏngsangmam-do, carried out by a research team from Tkyo Imperial University 
found similar results. The study showed that during July and August 1936, 96 per cent of 
the nutrients consumed by those surveyed came from grain, while the daily intake of 
animal products was almost zero (Chōsen nōson shakai eisei chōsakai 1940: 96-97). 
                                                
211 Jangach’i is a fermented food made with various kinds of vegetables and stored in soybean sauce, 
soybean paste or red pepper paste.   
212 Namul, one of the basic side dishes eaten by Koreans, is made with vegetables. The vegetables are 
sometimes served raw, sometimes fried lightly in oil, or sometimes slightly boiled, but are always well 
seasoned.   
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Despite a variety of efforts to improve rural diets to make them more scientifically 
nutritious, these survey results suggest that the nutritional information and instructive 
recipes provided were irrelevant to the actual everyday diets of village people. 
         While rather theoretical advice for meal preparation was a regular feature in 
women’s magazines, it was the government’s production policy that actually significantly 
affected and contributed to shaping the everyday diets of rural Koreans. The changes to 
the crops cultivated in Oesamni village in Kyŏnggi-do, brought about by the 
government’s food collection programme, offer a case in point. Comprised of 335 
villagers in 59 households, the rural village had a rel tively small paddy field, where the 
rice crop was raised, compared to the acreage of dry fields. In accordance with the 
implementation of the ‘village plans’ programme of 1940, production targets and a 
collection quota were set for the village. While th actual average yield of rice crop per 
household was 162 sŭng (approximately 232 kilograms),213 when the plan was made the 
production targets set for three years were, respectively, 400 sŭng (572 kilograms) in 
1942, 410 sŭng (572 kilograms) in 1943, and 420 sŭng (586 kilograms) in 1944 per 
household. In order to achieve the targets for rice collection, people had to reduce their 
own consumption and increase the yield of barley, which became a substitute for their 
rice staple (Yi K. N. 2004: 809-810). However, the increase in barley production 
inevitably accompanied a reduction in the yields of other crops, since the acreage of the 
dry field was limited. Therefore, the production of s ybeans, which was next to barley in 
terms of yield in the village, was restricted. Soybeans hold a very important place in the 
Korean diet. They are cooked with rice or other grains, and used as the raw materials for 
making soy sauce, soybean paste, and bean curd. As mentioned previously, the 
consumption of bean curd was frequently encouraged by ieticians as a cost-effective 
source of protein. However, notwithstanding such advice, it became increasingly difficult 
for the villages to eat bean curd because of the gov rnment’s food policies.  
The more state control over agricultural production was intensified, the more 
production was concentrated on what the government n eded. Part of Oesamni village’s 
                                                
213 One sŭng 升 is equivalent to approximately eighteen litres or 1.43 kilograms.  
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arable field was turned over to cotton production fr important military supplies. The 
cultivation of sweet and white potatoes, the raw materi ls for making alcohol to be used 
with imported gasoline, was also promoted under the production plans directed by the 
government (Yi K. N. 2004: 812). It goes without saying that such wartime programmes 
greatly changed agricultural production, which thus far had supported the villagers’ diet. 
The example of Oesamni village demonstrates that the wartime diet of rural people was 
by no means improved; rather, it became poorer as st te control over agricultural 
production was strengthened.     
The state management of production was not the only factor which regulated the 
diet of the farming population. Like the numerous food-saving campaigns implemented 
in the cities, there were calls to save food resources in rural areas too. As seen in the case 
of Oesamni village, securing rice production was the most important aspect of the war 
mobilization campaign. Although Korea’s role as rice supplier for Japan had once ended 
by the mid-1930s, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War it again assumed 
responsibility for providing rice to feed the people in Japan Proper. To secure an adequate 
supply of rice for the Japanese people, the colonial authorities devoted concerted efforts 
to controlling rice consumption in Korea.  
The many kinds of rice-saving campaigns were frequently included in the reports 
from the local women’s associations in Kajŏng chiu. They formed the basis for many of 
the regular activities of women’s associations throughout the country. For example, each 
household was required to collect a spoonful of rice per person three times a day in rice 
sacks or jars distributed by the associations (Anonymous 1939c: 14). The collected rice 
was then brought to the regular meetings of their associations, or collected by the local 
leaders, and sold collectively. The money was deposited with the Credit Association to be 
used to finance the war effort. In addition to the regular saving schemes, rice was also 
collected for special purposes. A women’s association in P’yŏngan-pukto set aside a 
special week for saving rice in 1938, when housewivs collected four spoonfuls of rice a 
day. Money obtained from the sale of the rice was donated to the country as a National 
Defence Donation to the Imperial Army (Son C. H. 1938: 16). 
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As the rationale to pursue an increase in production capacity, the Japanese 
government persistently urged for the reform of the daily practices of Koreans, labelling 
them ‘evil’. In order to reduce food consumption, the Korean people’s ‘extravagant’ 
eating habits were frequently highlighted as bad practices that needed to be corrected by 
the Japanese authorities. For instance, in 1943, the Hwanghae-do local government set 
the goal of ‘trying to correct the Korean people’s bad habit of eating too much’ as one of 
its dietary guidelines, which was announced though the Chŏnsi nongmin tokpon戰時農
民読本(Wartime Farmers’ Reader), a book issued to provide advice to the public on how 
to lead a frugal life (Hwanghae-do nongjŏnggwa 1943: 60-61). The reason for this 
perception that Koreans over-ate is presumed to be due to the monotony of the side dishes 
eaten as part of the diet, and the extremely high reliance on staple foods for energy intake, 
which mentioned previously in this section. However, in terms of calorie intake, it seems 
this Japanese observation was not true. According to a research team at Tokyo Imperial 
University, as of 1936, a farmer’s daily calorific intake in Talli village equalled 2,996 kilo 
calories. This was lower than that of the Chinese and Japanese: the Chinese consumed 
3,461 calories214 and the Japanese 3,400215 (Chōsen nōson shakai eisei chōsakai 1940: 
44-45, 91).    
Notwithstanding the actual circumstances, the ‘wasteful’ eating habits of Korean 
people were frequently included in government’s guidelines to improve daily life. For 
example, Standards of Daily Life in the situation of Emergency (Pisangsi saenghwal 
kijun yangsik 非常時生活基準様式 ) established in 1938 included agenda to 1)obey th 
principle of having simple meals; 2) set only one bowl of soup and kimch’i as side dishes 
at breakfast; and 3) cook staple foods less than twice per day, and have cold dishes at 
lunch (Chōsen sōtokufu 1938, quoted in Ch’oe Y. R. 1994: 79-80).  
Farmers eating and drinking between meals (these snack were known as kansik間
食) was another example of bad practice according to the Japanese. In rural Korea k nsik 
was traditionally prepared by richer farmers for the peasants and wage-workers for during 
                                                
214 During 1922 and 1925, 1,070 farmers in six localities were studied.  
215 During 1917 and 1924, per adult in Japan Proper.    
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or after work, especially when there was collaborative work during the busy farming 
season. Eating snacks during a break or after the day’s work together was valuable for the 
peasants and workers, who usually lived on a frugal diet. According to the Japanese 
scholar Matsumoto, in this way kansik functioned as income redistribution in rural 
society (1998: 172). Moreover, it was an important motivator for working hard and for 
enhancing the spirit of teamwork that the colonial government sought to encourage. 
However, the colonial authorities saw the practice as a waste of time, money and farmers’ 
labour, and prohibited it in the name of the ban on entertainment and the consumption of 
alcoholic drinks. Instead, farm workers were expected to provide their own meals (Yi K. 
N. 2004: 824-825). Even when the government’s control of the diet went against the 
concept of Japanese totalitarianism, their inconsistent policy was justified in the context 
of wartime austerity policy. What people were required to do in the name of improvement 
was to live frugally and dedicate their surplus to the country.      
It is difficult to establish to what extent the colonial government’s efforts to 
reform the eating practices of Koreans by promoting hriftiness eased the food shortages 
farmers faced as a result of state food controls. For example, scholars report that some 
farmers in Japan during the first half of the 1940s had plenty of food because they were 
able to grow what they needed, even though this requir d tremendous effort due to labour 
shortages and other difficulties. They consumed more rice than before, and enjoyed 
greater comfort by selling the food at higher prices to the urban population who were 
suffering severely from the food shortages.216 Similarly, Korean farmers engaged in 
illegal trading with city dwellers who journeyed into the countryside with money or 
goods to barter for food, as I have illustrated in Chapter Three.  
However, it seems clear that not all Korean farmers were able to make a decent 
living by selling their farming products and making savings. This is what one researcher 
who conducted a diet survey in 1940 had to say about the dietary conditions in one 
farming village:  
I felt so sad to hear that a woman, who represented herself as a notable person, 
                                                
216 For example, see Cwiertka 2006a: 130-131 and Scherer 1999: 110-111.  
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stated at a meeting to discuss rural problems that,‘The problem is that Korean 
farmers consume too much rice these days. We need to ncourage them to eat 
barley with rice’… Today, Korean farmers are, in fact, at risk of starvation…My 
survey of a farm village near Taegu revealed that tere are, surprisingly, 43 kinds 
of roots of grasses and [bark of] trees eaten by farmers… [t]hey make kaetŏk 217 
by combining mugwort, white potatoes, grasses, and powdered barley or 
wheat…Normally, this ‘special’ food is not eaten until the first month [in the 
lunar calendar] of the new year [after the harvested foods of the previous year 
have been completely eaten up]. However, even before the first month, farmers 
who have been hit by famine or who are in extreme poverty are forced to eat this 
food.  
(Im C. S. 1940: 30)            
The testimony above clearly reveals that the call for the improvement of diet, which was 
vigorously disseminated all over the country, was completely divorced from reality. 
Moreover, many farmers bore a heavy burden on the home front as food producers 
without enough food for themselves. The situation of several villages hit by drought and 
food damage in 1939 in Kyŏngsangnam-do, Chollanam-do, and Ch’ungch’ŏngnam-do 
was covered by journalists for the Chosŏn ilbo newspaper in 1940:    
Since last autumn, [the farmers in a village in Kyŏngsangman-do] have eaten 
porridge made with buckwheat and the roots of grasses. In order to overcome this 
unprecedented disaster, they have borne the lowest standard of living, saving rice 
to the utmost and eating a breakfast made with the bark of trees.  
(Pyŏn Y. G. 1940: 39)  
To save rice, city dwellers are encouraged by the government to eat 70 per cent 
polished rice instead of white rice, and more of other grains, such as barley, beans, 
and red beans. Despite being the people who cultivate rice with their own hands, 
the farmers [in a village of Chŏllanam-do] hardly see the rice; they eat gruel 
made with dried mugwort and grasses, barley flour, millet and buckwheat… 
(Ch’oe I. S. 1940: 40)    
There are 117 households in [Namsŏn] village [in Ch’ungch’ŏngnam-do] 
                                                
217 Steamed cakes.  
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including two landlords, sixteen part-owner farmers, and 99 tenants….even when 
they get a good harvest it is impossible to secure s fficient food for all the village 
people. Therefore they are accustomed to having to overcome the barley hump. 
Since early autumn, people have begun to devote all heir efforts to collecting the 
leaves of soya and red beans, chestnuts, and edible wild plants.   
(Yu I. C. 1940: 43) 
The reports from the farming villages above were made in spring 1940, a few months 
after the serious crop failure; thus it is an exaggeration to say that farmers always bore 
such severe hardship. However, as the war progressed, th  government requisitioned 
more and more of what the farmers produced, leaving less and less food for their own 
consumption. In such a situation, the people in farming villages could not think much 
beyond survival, let alone of improving home-cooked meals using knowledge of the 
nutrient value of foodstuffs. The wartime campaign for the improvement of daily life was 
another name for the austerity programme that supported the country’s war efforts.    
Michel Foucault stated that the supervision of details, the smallest fragments of 
everyday life, is linked with discipline – in the general formula for domination – to 
provide the holder with power (1991: 137, 140). Forthe colonial authorities, managing 
the everyday lives of the Korean populace was a political tool used to reorder colonial 
society for the purpose of stabilizing the colonial administration. Under the name of the 
improvement of daily life, the government created a ense organizational network which 
connected the state and ordinary people, and effectively used ‘surveillance’ and 
‘normalization’, the two greatest instruments of disciplinary power, to control the Korean 
people’s daily lives (Foucault 1991: 184).  
Although the improvement of wartime diet called forby the Japanese government 
was in fact nothing but the curtailment of food consumption, the campaign was a 
significant and logical supporter of the wartime food management programme. The 
intricate connection between state power, war mobilizat on and daily life of people led to 
a revival of the wartime improvement of daily life movement by the South Korean 




4.2 The Daily Life Improvement Campaigns Recycled in 1951 
The Korean War and the Reform of Wartime Daily Life   
The Korean War, which broke out in June 1950 and ended with an armistice in July 1953, 
greatly damaged Korean society. During the three-year conflict, 1,998,966 Koreans were 
killed or injured, including 990,968 civilians (Yi T. G. 2000: 258). The war devastated an 
economy that had previously been showing signs of recovery from an inflationary spiral 
that had occurred after the country’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. 
Between January and May 1950, money issues fell by 20 per cent, and the long-standing 
upward trend in prices took a downward turn: the rat  of price increases on previous 
months was fifteen per cent in January 1950, 6.1 per cent in March, and just 1.1 per cent 
in April. In May, prices had fallen by 4.4 per cent (Ibid.: 202). The cost of the physical 
damage caused by the war, the destruction of major industries, the social infrastructure 
and buildings, had reached three billion US dollars. This was equivalent to two years’ 
total national income at that time. The damage devastated the country and left more than 
12 per cent of Korean people homeless (Ibid.: 249, 55 and 258). 
  However, the human casualties and astronomical material damage were not the 
only outcomes of the Korean War. The war significantly established the relationship 
between the authorities and the Korean people, providing the South Korean government 
with a powerful incentive to control the daily lives of the people in pursuit of total 
mobilization for the war effort. The Korean government’s mobilization campaign, carried 
out in the name of the wartime improvement of daily life, marked the revival of the 
Japanese campaign during the Second World War that required Korean people to aid the 
nation’s war effort, both materially and morally, bpracticing austerity in their everyday 
lives.  
On 2 August 1951, in an attempt to encourage austerity and increase social 
discipline, the Ministry of Social Affairs issued ‘Practical Guidelines for the Daily Life of 
the Population in Wartime’ (Chǒnsi kungmin saenghwal silch’ǒn yogang戰時國民生活
實践要綱 ). They were issued approximately one month after th  discussion of an 
armistice began between the Soviets and the UN, the allied powers of North and South 
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Korea respectively (Cumings 2010: 31). By this time, combat command had been 
completely handed over to the UN force and, in practic l terms, the South Korean 
government had taken a step back from the war. Even though the fighting continued, the 
conflict was limited to areas near to the 38th parallel of the Korean peninsula, which 
remains a militarized border between the two Koreas today. With the relative stabilization 
of the front, the South Korean authorities set about reorganizing the social order and 
managing people on the home front so that they could s pport the war, both materially 
and spiritually (Mun S. S. 1999: 45-46).218 Most important and urgent was the recovery 
of the country’s economy in order to finance the huge war expenses. As of 1950, state 
expenditure was 2.8 times the country’s total income, of which more than 80 per cent was 
spent on the war (Yi T.G. 2000: 204). Placed in this s tuation, the South Korean 
government officially launched a mass campaign to mobilize the population behind the 
war effort by actively implementing austerity policies.   
The authorities’ intention behind the establishment of the ‘Practical Guidelines for 
the Daily Life of the Population in Wartime’ was announced in the following way:   
Ever since the 6.25 Incident [the Korean War], brave Korean soldiers have been 
fighting, sacrificing themselves with the righteous UN forces to secure the country 
and the peace of mankind in this holy anti-communist war. Contemporary war is total 
war which requires the citizens on the home front t brace themselves to face the war, 
and to stay in tune with the battles on the front line. We must return to a war footing, 
both materially and spiritually, and militarize life on the home front. Only when we 
are armed at home, shall we be victorious and save face in front of the fallen patriots 
and soldiers on the battlefield. Accordingly, we have established some basic 
provisions for daily life for the citizens at war, and we call for them to be put into 
practice… 
(Ch’ongmuch’ŏ 1951: 169)      
The day-to-day lives of citizens were regarded as acritical component in mobilizing for 
the war effort. Taking the position that militarizing the home front was as essential as 
                                                
218 Mun Sang-sǒk  states that the South Korean government strengthed the state’s repressive power and 
administrative infrastructure to mobilize social resources from July 1951. For example, in his research, he 
illustrated the power of the national police increas d greatly between 1950 and 1951 (Mun 1999: 49, 65).   
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fighting on the front line, the government stressed that people’s lives had to be tightly 
controlled in order to achieve victory in the war. Similarly to the Japanese colonial 
authorities, the South Korean government called on the nation to brace itself for war, and 
to wholeheartedly cooperate with state economic policies by reforming living practices. 
As clearly expressed above, the Korean people were required to return to the frugal 
wartime lives that they had been urged to follow during the final years of the Japanese 
occupation. The only difference this time was that people were encouraged to practice 
economy to serve their own country, not the Japanese Empire. Thus, the issue of 
reforming the daily lives of the Korean populace once again drew governmental attention 
as a significant component in sustaining the Korean W r. 
The Guidelines were developed for the implementation of an austerity programme. 
They comprised practical advice on how to economize on all aspects of food, clothing 
and shelter, along with points on ‘inculcating national morale’ (kungmin todǒk國民道徳), 
‘wartime moderation’ (chǒnsi chǒlche 戰時節制), and ‘conquering evil customs’ 
(p’yepung kyojǒng弊風矯正). With regard to food, the following agenda was set.219  
Food  
A. Principles 
a. Value nutrition and hygiene, and to simplify meals to fit with the wartime 
economy and life  
b. Cut waste in eating to the utmost, and to cooperate with the state’s economic 
policies     
B. Practical points  
a. Save rice and eat other grains [barley] with rice   
b. Eat simple meals, obeying the principle of ‘one bowl of soup’ and ‘one side 
dish’  
c. Have a ‘no beef day’ and a ‘no alcoholic beverags day’ 
d. Do not drink alcoholic drinks during the day 
e. Have fixed mealtimes 
f. Correct children’s picky eating 
g. Do not waste food by preparing more than necessary  
h. Eschew drinks parties as much as possible 
i. Prepare one’s own packed lunches (applies to government officials, salaried 
workers and labourers)  
                                                
219 For the rest of the Guidelines, see Appendix II.  




All in all, we can find many similarities between the above guidelines and the campaign 
agenda stressed by the Japanese government during Korea’s colonial era. Beginning with 
reducing the consumption of rice, alcoholic drinks and meat, the guidelines were intended 
to conserve food resources by simplifying meals. Korean eating habits that had also been 
criticized as bad practice by the colonial governmet, such as offering many side dishes 
and the separation of eating by the sexes and ages of family members, were again 
prohibited despite the fact that following the guidel nes was entirely voluntary. The 
authorities appealed to the patriotism and morality of the Korean nation to obey these 
stipulations (see Appendix I). However, after a few months, the guidelines were 
incorporated into the Wartime Daily Life Improvement Campaign (Chŏnsi saenghwal 
kaesŏn undong戰時生活改善運動), and were made legally binding.  
With the proclamation of the Wartime Daily Life Improvement Act (Chǒnsi 
saenghwal kaesǒnpǒp戰時生活改善法)220 on 18 November 1951, the government was 
handed unprecedented power to control the everyday lives of the Korean people. The act 
introduced a series of compulsory regulations aimed at ‘increasing the national morale of 
the people in times of war through the innovation and simplification of daily life’ 
(Taehanmin’guk chŏngbu kongboch’ŏ 1951: 1). In order to bring the management of 
restaurants under control, it prohibited the selling of alcoholic beverages in restaurants 
before 5 p.m. and the operation of high-class Korean restaurants without permission by 
presidential order. Singing, dancing and the employment of women for the purposes of 
entertainment at restaurants were prohibited. Sumptary regulations were also introduced. 
The government was able to regulate the import, production, sale, and even wearing of 
luxury clothes, whenever such actions were considered necessary. In addition the act 
stipulated the setting up of a Wartime Daily Life Improvement Committee (Chǒnsi 
saenghwal kaesǒn wiwǒnhoe戰時生活改善委員會),221 which played a central role 
throughout the 1950s in coordinating and driving various austerity projects in the name of 
the wartime improvement of daily life (Ibid.). 
                                                
220 Hereafter the WDLI Act. 
221 Hereafter the WDLI Committee.  
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Ten days after the issuance of the act, the WDLI Committee was constituted under 
the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Minister and Vice-Minister of Social Affairs were 
appointed as the organization’s leader and vice-leader respectively, and six sub-
committees, moral (toŭi 道義), ceremonial (ŭirye 儀礼), clothing (ŭibok 衣服), food 
(ŭmsik飲食), shelter (chut’aek住宅) and surveillance (kamsi監視), were set up.222 The 
establishment of local branches followed. Committees for the Promotion of Wartime 
Daily Life (Chǒnsi saenghwal ch’ǒkchin wiwǒnhoe戰時生活促進委員會) were formed 
within the local government jurisdictions of cities and provinces throughout Korea.223 In 
Taegu city, for instance, the Committee comprised the city’s mayor, department heads and 
police chiefs.224  Mobilizing this nationwide network of committees, the WDLI 
Committee took the lead in implementing full-scale campaigns to encourage frugality by 
changing the consumption patterns of the Korean people.  
Prominent among the WDLI Committee’s activities was the control of restaurants. 
As the fact that the WDLI Act included many regulations affecting restaurants shows, 
restricting the activity of eating establishments and the amount of food and drink sold in 
them was integral to reforming the eating habits of the Korean people. The popularization 
of eateries in Korea began during the colonial era with the flow of Japanese migrants who 
wanted to maintain a Japanese lifestyle (Cwiertka 2010a: 31), but this trend had escalated 
after the country’s liberation. For example, the number of high-class restaurants grew 
from ten to 55 between August 1945 and February 1947, and, in Seoul alone, the number 
of female entertainers working at such restaurants increased from 500 to 1,300 between 
August 1945 and December 1948.225 As of August, 1947, more than 3,300 establishments 
                                                
222 ‘Sahoebu, chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn wiwŏnhoe chojik 사회부, 전시생활개선위원회조직’, Seoul 
sinmun서울신문, 1 December 1951. Electric document, available at 
http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_023_1951_11_28_0040 (accessed 20 June 2012)  
223 ‘Sahoebu, chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn undong silch’ŏn kyehoek chunbi사회부, 
전시생활개선운동실천계획준비’,Taegu maeil대구매일, 12 June 1952. Electric document, available at 
http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_025_1952_06_07_0070 (accessed 20 June 2012) 
224 ‘Taegu-si, chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn Taegu-si ch’ojik wiwŏnhoe chojik 대구시, 전시생활개선 
대구시조직위원회 조직’, Taegu mael, 15 June 1952. Electric document, available at  
http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_025_1952_06_14_0100 (accessed 20 June 2012).   
225  ‘Kuksa-nŭn tadan hande yuhŭngga man-ŭn pŏnch’ang nŭnŭni yorijip naonŭni yudubunmyŏn 는國事  
多端한데 遊興街만은 繁盛느느니 料理집 나나나나油頭粉面’, Tonga ilbo, 29 January 1946, p.2; 
‘Sudo-ŭi hyangangmyŏn imo chŏmo haebang hu nŭ ŭngŏs-ŭn ŭmsikchŏm ppun首都의 享樂面 이이 
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serving food and drink were operating in the capital. 226 The ubiquitous presence of 
restaurants, cafes, bars and eating houses, and people’s expenditure on eating and 
drinking at such places, was highlighted as a significant drain on people’s resources.  
A more serious problem was the fact that a large number of eateries operated 
without authorization. For example, as of 1946, there were 400 eateries without licences 
in Ponjŏng town in Seoul, in addition to a corresponding number of authorized 
establishments.227 In 1949, the proportion of cafes, bars and eateries illegally operating in 
Seoul was more than twenty per cent of the total number of establishments.228  
While the majority of illegal businesses were small-scale and owned by those 
repatriated after the country’s liberation, they were a serious concern for the government 
as food and drink consumed in them was beyond the control of the state. As discussed in 
2.1, in the years following Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule, the shortage of rice 
remained a major problem, and its consumption was strictly controlled through food 
rationing schemes. Reviving this colonial precedent, the authorities in post-colonial 
Korea implemented various restrictive measures to curb rice consumption. For example, 
prohibitions of unlicensed brewing using rice,229 the sale and consumption of alcoholic 
drinks during the daytime,230 and the consumption of pure white rice231 were repeatedly 
imposed by the authorities. Even though the governmnt devoted much effort to 
enforcing compliance with the regulations, not every business operator obeyed them, and 
                                                                                                                                       
저이 解放後에 느는것은 飮食店뿐’, Tonga ilbo, 12 February 1947, p.2; ‘Saenghwal sukchŏng-ŭi 
p’iryo 생생생생생 필필’, Tonga ilbo, 7 December 1948, p.1.   
226 ‘Ŭmsikchŏm-e ch’ŏlt’oeryŏng ch’iral-ŭl chŏngbi kyehoek 飲食店에 鐵槌令 七割을整備計劃 ’, Tonga 
ilbo, 31 August 1947, p.2.  
227 ‘Ŭmsikchŏm nŏmu mant’a Ponjŏng-sŏ ch’wich’e飮食店너무만타 본정서 취체’, Tonga ilbo, 29 
January 1946, p.2.   
228 ‘Sŏul sinae ŭnsikchŏm-ŭi hyŏnhwang서울시내飮食店의현황’, Sŏul sinmun, 7 November 1949. 
Electric document, available at http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_015_1949_11_06_0080 
(accessed 20 July 2012) 
229‘Yangju-e chŏngjiryŏng soju man-ŭn cheoe釀酒에停止令燒酒만은 除外’,  Tonga ilbo, 22 March 1946, 
p.2; ‘Milchu sŏnghaeng-ŭro ilban pudam kajung, yangjo kŭmjiryŏng narin  hu-ŭi chibang 
tongt’ae密酒盛行으로一般負擔過重 釀造禁止令나린后의 地方動態’, Tonga ilbo, 21 November 1946, 
p.2.   
230  ‘Nassul-ŭn kŭmdan낮술은 禁斷’, Tonga ilbo, 29 March 1949, p.2; ‘Saenghwal kaesŏnan silsi 
yoryŏng kyŏlchŏng生活改善案實施要領決定’, Tonga ilbo, 15 April 1950, p.2.     
231 ‘Yangjŏng maesang-esŏ sobi ŏkche-ro chŏnhwan!糧政買上에서消費抑制로轉換!’, Kyŏnghyang 
sinmun京鄕新聞, 22 March 1949, p.4.    
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the unauthorized eateries were especially unlikely to follow the rules.232  For the 
government, such infractions were a serious obstacle to controlling the consumption of 
scarce food resources.  
In the name of the improvement of daily life, the government sought to tighten its 
grip on restaurant management and to reduce the number of eateries. From 1 December 
1951, the day that the WDLI Act came into effect, there was a one-week crack-down on 
restaurant operations, coordinated by the WDLI Committee. As the head regulatory group, 
officials from the Ministries of Health, National Defence, Home Affairs and Justice were 
appointed, and local surveillance groups were organized. They forced closures of high-
class restaurants, monitored restaurants arguing for environmental health, and detected 
instances of non-compliance with regulations based on the WDLI Act.233  
The restrictions imposed on restaurant management included time restrictions for 
the sale of alcohol and maximum prices for foods and beverages sold in shops, largely 
recycling the measures implemented under the Japanese controlled economic system. 
Alcoholic drinks were only allowed to be offered betw en 5 p.m. and 11 p.m. The prices 
of more than 60 dishes categorized as Korean, Western and Chinese, were fixed by order 
of the government. Ceiling prices for both alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks - tea, coffee, 
milk and cocoa - were set, ranging from 500 wŏn to 1,100 wŏn. Rice mixed with other 
grains (in a ratio of at least 30 per cent) was set a  the standard staple food. The quantities 
of alcoholic drinks allowed per capita were also stipulated: the allowance for chŏngju234 
was up to two hap (approximately 360 millilitres), for soju235 and whisky up to one hap 
(180 millilitres), and for t’akchu236 and beer up to five hap (900 millilitres). Furthermore, 
the style in which meals were served was also determin d. Under these regulations, it was 
illegal to offer set meals of more than three dishes p r person.237 Those who broke the 
                                                
232 ‘Sarinju-e kyŏngjong sinae yojŏng, ŭmsikchŏm, tan’gug-esŏ ilche kŏmsaek殺人酒에警鍾 內市 料亭, 
飮食店 當局에서一齊檢索’, Tonga ilbo, 2 February 1946, p.2; ‘Kŏllyodŭn p’unggibŏm Chongno-sŏ 
p’alsipch’ilgŏn chŏkpal걸려든風紀犯 鍾路署서 八七件摘發’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 15 December 1946, 
p.3. 
233 ‘Imsi haptong kŏmch’altae chojik臨時合同檢察隊組織’, Tonga ilbo, 27 November 1951, p.2.   
234 A clear wine made by separately filtering the fermnted wine from the grain.  
235 A strong distilled alcoholic drink made from grain or potatoes. 
236 A milky, sweet alcoholic beverage made from rice. Also known as makŏlli .  
237 ‘Kogŭp yojŏng p’yeji muhŏga ŭmsikchŏm tansok kanghwa高級料亭廢止無許可飮食店團束强化’, 
Tonga ilbo, 2 December 1951, p.2.   
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regulations faced a maximum fine of 500,000 wŏn or a misdemeanour imprisonment 
under the WDLI Act.238 
While the government’s initial focus was on controlling the restaurant industry, by 
May 1952, state control had expanded to the general populace after the Cabinet’s 
agreement that the rules of operation be based on the WDLI Act. In addition, restrictions 
on food consumption and expenditure on eating out, and policies to save rice, such as the 
prohibition of confectionary production using rice, were strengthened. The government 
urged people to limit the number of side dishes served at home to less than two.239 
Echoing the Japanese war mobilization campaign, the rules of operation set the 
framework for public campaigns. Setting the first day of every month as ‘The day for the 
Improvement of Spiritual Life’ (kungmin chŏngsin saenghwal kaeson il國民精神生活改
善日 ), various campaigns were developed by local authorities led by the central 
government. The goal set for the campaigns was to improve national morale and 
encourage citizens to practice frugality.240 In order to effectively disseminate state orders 
and campaign agendas, the mobilization of the people using the kungminban 國民班 
(national units) and the purak 部落 (village) network was ordered depending on 
localities. The kungminban were the successors of the a gukpan 愛國班 (‘patriotic 
units’), civilian units created in 1938 by the Japanese government, which had assumed 
various administrative functions to support war camp igns until 1945. A village was the 
basic unit in the rural community on which the colonial authorities particularly focused 
when increasing wartime productivity, as explained in 2.2. The civilian groups, initially 
created for carrying out the Japanese war mobilization programmes during the World War 
II was reused by the Korean government for the purpose of putting state war policies into 
effect under the pressure of the Korean War.     
In accordance with the establishment of the rules of operation, the government 
actively organized projects to reorder the wartime daily life of civilians. From June 1952, 
                                                
238 ‘Imsi haptong kŏmch’altae chojik臨時合同檢察隊組織’, Tonga ilbo, 27 November 1951, p.2.  
239 ‘Chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏnpŏp sihaeng sech’ik 23-il kungmu hoeŭi t’onggwa戰時生活改善法施行細則 
23日 國務會議通過’, Tonga ilbo, 25 May 1952, p.2.   
240  ‘Chŏnsi saenghwal-lo kaesŏn, kungmu hoeŭi yogang-ŭl kyŏlchŏng戰時生活로改善, 國務會議要綱을 
決定’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 26 May 1952, p.2.   
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the authorities began a three-month campaign to improve daily life in twenty major cities. 
Through public lectures, radio broadcasts, street parades, posters and banners, people 
were charged with eliminating wastefulness in all aspects of clothing, food and shelter.241  
In addition to state-led public education, various special campaigns were designed 
by the private sector. For example, in March 1952, a meeting took place between 
government officials from the Bureau of Public Information (Kongboch’ŏ), police 
officers, and the leaders of the Restaurant Associati n (Ŭmsikchŏm hyŏphoe) and 
Teahouse Association (Tabang hyŏphoe). As a way to spiritually educate the people on 
the home front, the leaders of the Restaurant and Teahouse Associations agreed to play 
military songs three times a day and put war slogans on the walls of hotels, restaurants 
and teahouses throughout the country.242 Public competitions were organized to create the 
slogans used in the national campaigns. For instance, i  a contest organized by the police 
in 1953, a motto designed by a female student that said ‘Let’s patronize homemade 
products, let’s reject luxuries’ was selected.243 Such contests were held regularly, and the 
selected slogans were spread to the general populace through the meetings of the 
kungminban and village units.  
 It was only on 5 November 1963, ten years after th Armistice Agreement was 
signed between North and South Korea, that the WDLI Act was officially abolished 
(Taehanmin’guk chŏngbu kongboch’ŏ: 1963). This legal foundation, originally designed 
to ensure people lived thriftily and to improve national morale for sustaining the state’s 
war efforts, remained in effect long after the war ended. For instance, even in 1957, four 
year after the armistice, the WDLI Committee continued to exist, leading improvement 
campaigns, such as ‘The week of the Improvement of Daily Life in Wartime’.244 
Repeatedly evoking the image of war and the vulnerability of the country, the 
government continuously involved itself in people’s lives and encouraged them to 
practice economy in daily life. It was because reforming living practices of the people 
                                                
241 ‘Chŏnsi kungmin saenghwal ch’okchin chugan sŏlch’i 戰時國民生活 促進週間設置’, Kyŏnghyang 
sinmun, 2 June 1952, p.2.   
242 ‘Tabang-sŏ kun’ga leko-t’ŭ 다방서 군가레코-트’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 19 March 1952, p.2.   
243 ‘Sigyŏng mojip p’yoŏ ipsŏn市警募集 標語入選 ’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 11 February 1953, p.2.  
244 ‘Saenghwal kaesŏn wiwŏnhoe-rŭl kaech’oe生活改善委員會를開催’, Chosŏn ilbo朝鮮日報, 12 June 
1957, p.2.  
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was a significant component in managing the post-war country.  
The Post-war Reconstruction of South Korea and the N w Daily Life Campaign  
In 1954, the Wartime Daily Life Improvement Campaign was renewed as the New Daily 
Life Campaign (Sinsaenghwal undong新生活運動). Largely relying upon the framework 
constructed during the wartime saving campaigns, the matter of improving day-to-day 
living was repositioned as a post-war reconstruction project. The authorities argued for 
the need for an extensive modification of people’s daily practices. In order to move the 
whole society towards modernization and the development of the country, the Korean 
authorities encouraged morality and thrift among the nation (Chŏng H. J. 2004: 97-98).   
First and foremost, the authorities sought to use a mass campaign to improve the 
situation of the nation’s economy, which had deteriorated during the Korean War. The 
prospectus written by officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs, which remained the 
leading force in the national campaign throughout the 1950s, clearly shows that the chief 
objective of the campaign was the nation’s economic reconstruction.  
The New Daily Life Campaign requires strength of will to lead one’s life in this 
way and a determined attitude towards everyday life…Fundamental principles 
and goals must be set to establish a steady economic structure…[i]t is vital that 
we review our daily practices with consideration of regional differences before 
launching an initiative. The government must take firm steps to stabilize the new 
political and economic order and turn an inflationary situation into deflation by 
introducing a system of appropriate taxation, a savings programme, state bonds 
and a lottery… [T]o curb prices, to tighten import controls, to encourage the use 
of domestic products and to stimulate an increase in production are integral parts 
of the austerity policy…    
(Pogŏn sahoebu Punyŏguk in 1956, quoted in Chŏng H. J. 2004: 98-99)        
As clearly demonstrated above, the New Daily Life Campaign set concrete goals and 
methods for reforming daily life. Positioning morality and thrift as integral parts of 
improvement, the introduction into everyday life of rationalization based on scientific 
concepts was set as one of the major goals. The following end goals were set for the New 
Chapter Four 
214 
Daily Life Campaign.  
Establishing morality (toŭi hwangnip道義確立) 
Building good character, training to be a good citizen (kongmin公民),245 mental 
preparation, understanding the concept of equality, the transformation of [bad] 
customs  
Reconstruction and recovery (kǒnsǒl puhŭng建設復興) 
Respect for creativity, development of resources, honing of skills, cooperation and 
solidarity, austerity in living 
Scientific living (kwahak saenghwal科學生活) 
Breaking of bad customs, health and welfare, rationl zation of clothing, 
rationalization of eating habits, rationalization of shelter  
(Pogǒn sahoebu 1987: 76) 
Based on these three goals, codes of conduct for practicing rationality in daily life were 
established for both urban and rural living.  
Five guidelines for living an austere urban life
a. To pay attention to the time  
b. To conserve goods 
c. To simplify wedding ceremonies 
d. To abstain from drinking alcoholic drinks during the day  
e. To use imported tobacco in moderation 
Five guidelines for rationalizing rural living  
a. To pay attention to the time  
b. To devote oneself to economic self-reliance 
c. To simplify ancestral ritual ceremonies  
d. To improve environmental hygiene  
e. To increase the love of one’s hometown 
(Pogǒn sahoebu 1987: 75-77) 
While the New Daily Life Campaign was designed for the purpose of the post-war 
reconstruction of Korea, the ‘improved living’ presented by the authorities differed little 
from the components of WDLI campaigns, which originated from the Japanese version of 
war campaigns. That is, the framework of improvement advocated by the Japanese 
colonial government, a fundamentally good part of the campaign agenda, remained. The 
objectives shown above regarding dietary reform had been prominent components of the 
                                                
245 Literally, a ‘public person’. 
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colonial campaign for the improvement of daily life.   
 One demonstrable similarity between the Japanese colonial improvement of daily 
life campaign and the Korean campaign is the administrat ve effort made to standardize 
family ritual ceremonies. In 4.1, I explained that the Japanese government regarded the 
Korean traditional family rites, which often involved large amounts of consumption, as 
wasteful. With the establishment of the Family Rites Standards in 1934, the colonial 
government exhorted Korean people to observe modified familial ceremonies under the 
Rural Revitalization Campaign. Even after the Campaign was absorbed into a major war 
campaign, the agenda remained one of the austerity programmes of the Japanese colonial 
government. For the Korean authorities, as the above-quoted guidelines reveal, the costly 
tradition of familial rituals was also seen as one f the major obstacles to rationalizing the 
daily life of the nation. In 1956, by the WDLI Committee, the Ritual Standards (ŭirye 
kyubŏm 儀礼規範) were developed. These guidelines set out the rules for weddings, 
funerals and ancestral memorials, and even filled in the details, such as providing 
standard formats for wedding invitations (Pogǒn sahoebu chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn 
wiwŏnhoe 1958: 3, 19). At first, the stipulations were not binding, but in 1969 the Ritual 
Standards were given legal force by a presidential decree, undergoing several revisions 
during the 1980s. Between 1973 and 1976, for example, the number of violation of this 
regulation reached 2,268 cases (Ko W. 2006: 214). Throughout the 50-year 
implementation of the state-led campaigns, the Korean people’s deeply rooted family 
rituals underwent a gradual process of rationalization.   
The Role of the Women’s Bureau in Establishing the New Daily Life    
While the WDLI Committee was crucial in implementation of the state’s austerity 
campaigns, the Punyŏguk婦女局 (Women’s Bureau) was also one of the leading forces 
in driving the government’s improvement of daily life campaigns. The Women’ Bureau, 
created on 14 September 1946 under the Ministry of Health and Welfare,246 was the first 
governmental organization exclusively for the administration of matters related to women 
                                                
246 Due to governmental reorganization, the Women’s Burea  transferred to the authority of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs in 1948 and, in 1955, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
were unified as the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.  
Chapter Four 
216 
and led by female officials. Ko Hwang-gyŏng (1909-2000),247 a female educator who had 
played a significant role in driving the Japanese austerity projects during the WWII, was 
appointed as the first leader of the Women’s Bureau.  
The major aims of the establishment of the Women’s Bureau were the 
advancement of the economic and political status of Korean women by promoting their 
entry into public affairs and improving women’s welfare and the abolition of the licensed 
prostitution system248 (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 50-51). To this end, the organization of local 
offices soon followed: beginning in June 1947 with the Women’s Division (Punyŏgwa婦
女課) within Seoul Municipal Government, Women’s Sections (Punyŏgye婦女係) were 
gradually established in each city and provincial government across the country (Pogŏn 
sahoebu 1987: 53).  
While women’s social and political advancement was set as the chief goal of the 
Women’s Bureau, in practical terms, its administration was largely focused on 
educational activities (Hwang C. M. 2002: 173). The officials of the Women’s Bureau 
believed that educational enlightenment was the most urgent and crucial thing for the 
advancement of women who wished to become active members of society by 
participating in public life (Chŏng H. J. 2004: 52). They strongly emphasized those 
public roles taken by women in the newly established ‘egalitarian democracy’; however, 
they also highlighted women’s household tasks, the conventional duty of the Korean 
woman. Based on the notion that housekeeping and women’s public work should go 
hand-in-hand, they insisted that women had to achieve a good balance between work and 
family. In order to juggle the two, household chores needed to be rationally and 
efficiently managed. The bureaucrats believed that it was the Korean woman’s duty to 
actively carry out public roles, by rationally managing domestic affairs, for the sake of 
building the new nation (Ibid.: 53). Just as housewifery moved from being a private 
matter to a public concern within the ideology of the ‘wise mother, good wife’ (hyŏnmo 
yangch’ŏ) under Japanese government policy, as will be discussed in 6.1, the matter of 
                                                
247 She remained in office until 1948. She was a key mmber of the Korean Women’s Problem Research 
Association, an organization that took the lead in implementing the wartime improvement of daily life 
campaign in colonial Korea after 1937. See 5.1.    
248 The system had been in effect since 1916, and was abolished on 14 November 1948 (Hwang C. M. 
2002: 174).   
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domesticity was also considered an important component of service in liberated Korea. 
The Women’s Bureau was central to keeping the connections between domesticity and 
the issue of national development, which had been established in colonial era, in post-
colonial Korea. The principle of the organization was materialized through women’s 
policy the majority of which was consisted of the campaigns to improve daily life for 
subsequent decades in South Korea.         
The rational management of domestic affairs was one of the most important goals 
of the educational programmes coordinated by the Women’s Bureau. For instance, in June 
and September 1947, two-day and three-day lecture courses were organized throughout 
the country for local members. From 5 to 15 September 1947, a Cultivation Course for 
Leaders of the New Daily Life (Sinsaenghwal chidoja suyanghoe新生活指導者修養會) 
was held, led by the central organization. On these courses, branch members who to 
assume teaching role, were taught about the correlation between the household economy 
and the national economy, along with political and social issues, such as election law and 
the problem of the licensed prostitution system (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 52-55). The Ǒmǒni 
hakkyo 어머니학교 (Mother’s School) programme, a weekend school design d for 
ordinary women, which took place in March and April 1948 in Seoul, acquired a good 
reputation. More than 100 participants received practic l education applicable to 
everyday life, in areas such as hygiene and housekeeping. This programme was soon 
fixed as a regular part of the educational curriculum of the Seoul City Women’s Division 
and was also spread to other areas (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 55-56).   
With the implementation of the New Daily Life Campaign in 1954, the Women’s 
Bureau played a key role in carrying out the post-war campaign alongside the WDLI 
Committee. For example, the ‘Improvement of the wartime daily life of women’ was set 
as one of the five aims of a five-year plan outlined by the organization in 1952.249 With 
slogans calling for the breaking of evil habits, the expulsion of luxuries, the use of 
domestic products, and the introduction of a scientif c basis for living, it actively 
encouraged frugality and rationalization in household management. The campaign was 
                                                
249 ‘Sahoebu punyŏguk, punyŏ saŏp 5-kaenyŏn kyehoek iban chung사회부 부녀국, 부녀사업 5개년 
계획 입안 중’, P’yŏnghwa sinmun평화신문, 25 April 1952. Electric document, available at 
http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_025_1952_04_25_0120 (accessed 21 July 2012) 
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conducted through radio broadcasts, public lectures, and the circulation of educational 
materials among women, such as Ǒmǒni hakkyo어머니학교 (Mother’s School) and Puin 
saenghwal tokppon婦人生活読本 (Women’s Life Reader) (Han’guk haengjŏng sahoebu 
1954: 43-44).  
Among the various publications issued by the Women’s Bureau, an official 
magazine called Saesallim 새살림 (New Housekeeping) is an excellent source that show  
what was meant by the ‘new life’ that the Korean authorities were keen to bring into the 
domestic lives of the people. The magazine was published from 1947 until 1961250 and 
was intended to educate women to be good homemakers, able to manage housework 
economically by providing them with a wide range of knowledge to reform domestic life. 
In the first anniversary issue of 1948, the Minister of Health and Welfare emphasized the 
crucial role of women in domestic life, and expressed his hope that ‘the magazine would 
be a leader and a good friend to 15 million Korean women’ (Pogǒn sahoebu 1987: 57-58). 
Although originally aimed at educated women in urban areas, the magazine was also 
distributed to rural areas across the country and used as an educational material by the 
local Women’s Bureau leaders (Pogǒn sahoebu 1987: 75). 
Saesallim included practical advice on how to improve and rationalize household 
management. In accordance with the aim of introducing a scientific basis for living, one 
of the goals of the New Improvement of Daily Life Campaign, the introduction of a 
scientific understanding and attitude towards diet was emphasized. To prepare more 
nutritious and hygienic meals, at a lower cost, was a fundamental principle of dietary 
rationalization. For example, as a method of scientif cally reforming the daily diet, meal 
planning was strongly encouraged. Housewives were rqui ed to maintain the health of 
family members cost-effectively, and to save food resources by managing the daily diet in 
a well-planned manner. As a way to save housewives’ time and labour, meal planning was 
actively encouraged as one of the essential elements of ‘cultural’ household management 
(P’yŏnjipsil 1957; P’yŏnjipsil 1958). Table 4-2 shows a weekly meal plan suggested by 
                                                
250 Although New Housekeeping was introduced both as ‘monthly’ and ‘bimonthly’ in an official 
publication issued by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 57, 75), it seems that 
this magazine was published on an irregular basis. For example, while it was first published in January 
1947, the eighth volume was only issued in January 1958.   
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the magazine to help the housewife prepare such rationalized home meals.   
Table 4-2: A weekly menu suggested in 1958 by Saesallim magazine   
 Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
Monday Steamed barley, seaweed 
soup, kimch’i,   
Cold rice, hot water, 
kimch’i 
Sujebi 251 , kimch’i, 
changatchi252   
Tuesday Steamed coarse grains, 
k’ongbiji,253 changatchi  
Cold rice, hot water, bean 
paste soup, kimch’i 
Wheat-flour noodle soup, 
kimch’i 
Wednesday  Steamed coarse grains, 
cabbage soup, puch’u 
kkaktugi254 
Steamed bread, vegetable 
casserole, puch’u kkaktugi 
Steamed coarse grains, 
hot pepper leaves 
changatchi, puch’u 
kkaktugi 
Thursday Steamed coarse grains, 
pan-fried young radish, 
kimch’i 
Steamed sweet potatoes, 
vegetable soup, kimch’i 
 
Steamed rice with bean 
sprouts, bean paste soup, 
kimch’i 
Friday  Steamed barley, vegetable 
soup, k’ongbiji 
Sujebi, kimch’i, changatchi Steamed coarse grains, 
vegetable soup, k’ongbiji     
Saturday Steamed coarse grains, red 
pepper paste stew, 
changatchi 
Wheat-flour noodle soup, 
kimch’i, changatchi 
 
Steamed coarse grains, 
green onion changatchi 
Sunday Steamed white rice, radish 
soup, kkaktugi255 
Steamed sweet potatoes, 
kimch’i, a grilled wheat 
cake 
Steamed coarse grains, 
namul 256 
Source: Saesallim새살림, January 1958, quoted in Kim Ŭ. G. 2007: 201-202    
As was true of a range of previous state-led improvement movements, the rationality 
stressed in the New Daily Life Improvement Campaign was due to the need to save food 
resources – especially rice. Most of the staple foods suggested in the menu above were 
coarse grains, tubers and wheat-based foods, which had been encouraged as substitute 
foods by the authorities within the framework of the rice-saving policy.  
Eating wheat-based foods was a particularly significant food strategy that was 
promoted in parallel with saving rice. In 1.2, I explained that the shortage of rice had 
                                                
251 Dumpling soup made with wheat-flour dough. 
252 A fermented food made with various kinds of vegetables and stored in soybean sauce, soybean paste or 
red pepper paste. 
253 Coarse soup made from bean-curd waste.  
254 A kind of kimch’i made with leaks and oriental turnip. 
255 A kind of kimch’i made with oriental turnip. 
256 A basic side dish eaten daily by Koreans, made with vegetables. The vegetables were sometimes served 
raw, sometimes lightly fried in oil and sometimes gntly boiled, but were always well seasoned. 
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been a grave problem in post-colonial Korea, and that t e food deficit was supplemented 
by food aid – the majority of which was wheat (flour) – from America. 257 After the 
Korean War, the Korean government’s dependence upon the wheat delivered from 
America increased. The food resource could ease the rice shortage and the revenue from 
sales of the shipped food was an important source of inc me for the Korean government. 
In other words, the consumption of wheat-based foods not only closely related to the food 
problem, but also to the matter of economy of the country. Until South Korea achieved 
self-sufficiency in rice in the 1970s, boosting the consumption of wheat-based foods 
remained a significant economic policy of the South Korean government (see Chapter 
Seven).  
As part of the rice-saving movement, encouraging the consumption of wheat-
based foods was an integral part of the improvement campaigns. The concept of nutrition 
was the most frequently applied rationale behind state efforts to develop new eating 
habits unfamiliar to the Korean people. Under the flag of the scientific improvement of 
eating habits, the nutritional aspect of wheat flour and other foodstuffs was emphasized 
as an essential criterion in selecting what was to be eaten. Pak In-sun, the leader of the 
Women’s Bureau between 1958 and 1960, stressed that eating wheat-based foods at least 
once a day would improve home-cooked meals in terms of nutrition, economy and the 
time taken up by meal preparation (Kim Ŭ. G. 2007: 204-205). The Women’s Bureau 
actively engaged in propagating wheat-based food in home cooking. For example, after 
the Korean War ended in 1953, the Women’s Division of Seoul City government made an 
arrangement with amateur cookery schools in each ward in the city to hold cooking 
classes that targeted the women in each area. At the classes, women learned how to make 
white bread and other dishes and snacks using wheat flour (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 158). In 
1956, South Korean President Syngman Rhee (1875-196) himself called for people to 
eat brown rice and grains other than rice, such as barley, stressing the insufficient 
vitamins in rice and the advantage of the cost-effectiv  nourishment available by eating 
other grains.258       
                                                
257 At first the aid was provided free of charge, but from the 1960s, charges were gradually introduced.    
258 ‘Hyŏnmisik aeyong haja, Yi taet’ongnyŏng siksaenghwal kaesŏn-ŭl kangjo玄米食愛用하자 李大統領 
食生活改善을 强調’, Tonga ilbo, 28 September 1951, p.2.   
Reforming the Home Front 
221  
In order to promote scientifically appropriate and rational eating habits, the 
Women’s Bureau and the WDLI Committee established the Korean Provisional 
Nutritional Standards (Han’guk chamjŏng yŏngyang kijun韓国暫定營養基準) in 1959.  
Their aim was to outline the standard nutritional requirements for different groups of 
people so that housewives could use them as the basis for rationalized cooking (Mun S. 
H: 1960). Even though particular emphasis had been placed on the nutritional aspect of 
diet before the announcement of the Standards, the basis for the requirements used thus 
far had been the dietary reference intakes set up in foreign country (Kim Ŭ. G. 2007: 208). 
However, these standards were exclusively created for Korean people, taking into 
consideration their eating habits and the average food expenditure per household. Along 
with calories, the minimum daily requirements of major nutrients, such as protein, 
calcium and vitamins, were determined for six groups classified by sex, age and amount 
of labour. Eight model recipes using seasonal ingredients were included with the 
standards (Mun S. H: 1960).      
The establishment of nutritional standards by the South Korean government had 
much in common with the Japanese government’s wartime food policy, which had also 
implemented the use of dietary standards by establihing ‘National diet’ in 1941. Laying 
out the minimum nutritional standards for the nation, the Japanese authorities advocated 
the rationalization of nutrition, which meant ensuring that the labour force was 
sufficiently maintained using the minimum quantity of food necessary, as food resources 
were rapidly deteriorating at that time. In an attempt to implement a food-saving 
campaign, the South Korean government also relied on the use of science to ensure 
efficient nourishment, reviving the Japanese war strategy of the scientific diet. That is, the 
scientific solution on which the wartime Japanese government relied upon to handle the 
food shortage during WWII was influential in Korean government’s implementing food 
policies during and after Korean War to reform Korean people’s diet.       
By the end of the 1950s, the government’s efforts to disseminate nutritional 
knowledge and raise housewives’ interest in the scintif c aspects of the diet seem to have 
produced results. For example, an article in To ga ilbo in 1959 reported that the terms 
‘nutrition’ and ‘calories’ had become trendy among housewives, and that cookery classes 
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were bursting with young and middle-aged housewives in urban areas.259 A readers’ letter 
to the magazine Yŏsŏnggye 女性界(Women’s World) testifies that housewives were 
active in putting nutritional knowledge into practice in their home cooking:  
‘Since I have learnt that fat, calcium and vitamins A, B1 and B2 are often lacking in 
our diet, I pay particular attention to supplying these nutrients when I prepare meals. I 
fry food, make stir-fried rice with a lot of oil, and use mayonnaise to increase fat 
intake… To boost the intake of vitamin A, I prepare one kŭn [600 grams] of beef liver 
each week, and stir-fry beta-carotene–rich food, such as carrot, in order to increase 
the absorption of nutrients.’  
(Chŏn Ch’ang-hŭi 1959, quoted in Kim Ŭ. G. 2007: 208)      
It would be misleading to assume that all Korean housewives achieved such a scientific 
improvement in their home cooking. As the colonial government’s drive to rationalize 
and improve had little to do with the poor diet of the rural people (see 4.1), the Korean 
government’s campaign seems not to have huge impact on the home-cooked meals of the 
rural population. Since their diet was already so frugal, they did not need to go so far as 
to choose different ingredients to save rice, as a Korean scholar pointed out in 1959 (Kim 
Ŭ. G. 2007: 207).  
Despite this, however, the government’s initiatives to change the eating habits of 
the Korean people proved essential as the improvement of daily life campaign unfolded 
during the 1950s, setting the tone for the Korean authorities’ systematic and increasing 
intervention into the daily diets of its people during the subsequent decades. Most 
importantly, by the 1970s, the New Daily Life Campaign, run by the Women’s Bureau in 
the 1950s, had been integrated into the Sa maŭl undong (New Village Movement), which 
had a critical impact on the lives of the majority of the South Korean population (see 5.2). 
 As a result of the Korean War, the centuries-old social class system collapsed, 
along with the economy and the social infrastructure (Cumings 1997: 270). The concept 
of social integration the Korean authorities sought to achieve to reorganize the society 
can be explained as the process of unifying the fragmented people as members of nation, 
and forcing them to internalize their duties to meet th  state’s needs (Kang I. C. 1999: 
                                                
259 ‘Tosi saenghwal man-ŭn chinilbo都市生活만은 進一步’, Tonga ilbo, 17 December 1959, p.4.  
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204-205). In this regard, the campaign for the improvement of daily life was an effective 
political tool, not only in encouraging thrifty among the nation, but in the integration of 
society. By linking domestic life with national prosperity, the government strengthened its 
control over the daily lives of the Korean people. Even after the cease-fire, the authorities 
made conscious efforts to maintain a ‘proper’ understanding of the horrors of war and the 
vulnerability of the country among the people, and called for social integration and 
modernization (Ibid.: 210). The Korean War is an important historical event that 
significantly contributed to strengthening a strong connection between the state and the 
Korean people.  
 It is important to note that the improvement of daily life campaign carried out 
during and after the Korean War was not only administrative measures for war-waging 
but also part of the modernization project of the country. The authorities’ increasing 
involvement in reforming the eating habits of Koreans was done in the name of scientific 
improvement, and was gradually accepted by the people as part of the modernization 
process. Ironically, however, the modernization proposed by the authorities was nothing 
but the reuse of the wartime policies used by the Japanese colonial government to enforce 


























Governmental Reforms and Women 
 
In the previous chapter, I addressed the improvement of daily life campaigns, focusing on 
the leading role of the government in twentieth century Korea, which sought to enhance 
state power by urging people to be frugal in daily life and to conform with national food 
policies. To transform the home into a modern and effici ntly run enterprise, women, who 
were chiefly responsible for domestic affairs, were th  major focus for the administrative 
promotion of the ‘improvement’ campaigns. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that women remained in a ‘top-down’ 
relationship with the government in reforming domestic life. Rather, with the authorities’ 
growing attention to domestic life as part of the public agenda, women themselves 
actively engaged in state reform projects through which they were able to demonstrate 
their special qualities as household managers, sometimes even as prominent leading 
forces working with the state (Garon 1997: 124-125, 130-145; So H. S. 2006: 149). As 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska has stated, in their role as housewives, women were the ones 
chiefly responsible for translating the state’s policies into domestic practice (2000: 99). A 
focus on their roles provides a fruitful angle for the full understanding of the mechanism 
of state’s intervention in the private sphere. 
This chapter aims to document the actions of the women who played significant 
roles in the government’s campaigns to reform the daily diet. The first part of this chapter 
focuses on the activities of Japanese women in colonial Korea who were actively 
involved in the colonial authorities’ war mobilization campaign between the end of 1930s 
and 1945. As intermediaries between the state and the Korean public, their engagement in 
the state’s projects for dietary reform emerged as another powerful influence on the 
transformation of the Korean diet which linked to the prominent colonial administration. 
In post-colonial Korea, women’s active participation n state reform projects which aimed 
at national development proved successful in influecing the state agenda on daily life. 
The role of women’s groups in Saemaŭl undong offers a prime example of such activities 
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and will form the focus of the second section of this chapter.    
It is true that women’s public activities were led by and largely shaped by the 
government’s political framework constructed with the aspiration of mobilizing women 
as national resource. However, as this chapter willdemonstrate, women’s active 
participation in the state’s mobilization projects ertainly aided government efforts and 
enabled the extensive involvement of the state in the consumption practices of its 
population. Focusing on women’s roles in the campaigns for dietary reform, I will reveal 
that the transformation of the Korean diet in the tw ntieth century proceeded as the result 
of an intricate and interactive relationship between colonialism, the state’s drive for 
mobilization and women.   
5.1 Ryokki Renmei     
The Assimilation of Korea by Japanese Migrants   
It was impossible for the government to assimilate 13 million [Korean] people single-
handedly. That is to say, the responsibility fell on the shoulders of the 300,000 
Japanese people [who lived in Korea]. 
(Professor Yamada, Tokyo Imperial University, quoted in Takasaki 2006: ii) 
 
In Korea, each Japanese settler obeyed the Emperor’s will for ‘impartiality and equal 
favour’ [isshi dōjin] and ‘harmony between Japan and Korea’ [naisen yūwa], and 
considered that they themselves had shared responsibilities for the colonial 
administration.   
(A Japanese employee of the Oriental Development Company, Inomata, quoted in 
Takasaki 2006: ii) 
Throughout the 36-year colonial occupation of Korea, no other administrative 
policy was more essential to the Japanese government tha  ‘assimilation’ (dōka 同化) 
(Miyata 1992: 149). The aim of the policy was to transform Korean people into diligent, 
loyal and law-binding ‘imperial citizens’ (kōmin 皇民) through the homogenization of 
Korea and Japan. The doctrine of assimilation was officially formulated by the edict of 
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Emperor Shōwa (1926-1989) after the March First Movement of 1919, a major Korean 
independence movement. This fundamental colonial princi le was particularly 
highlighted by Korean Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige (1931-1936) in the slogan 
‘harmony between Japan and Korea’ (naisen yūwa 内鮮融和). By the time of the Sino-
Japanese War (1937), the assimilation policy had been further intensified under the 
slogan ‘Japan and Korea as one’ (naisen ittai内鮮一体）advocated by Minami Jirō, who 
followed Ugaki into office in 1936 (Ch’oe Y. R. 1994: 6-7).  
However, as Peatties has observed, the assimilation pursued by the Japanese 
authorities did not mean a true fusion between Japanese and Korean people. Japan’s 
colonialism was based on the assumption that the Japanese race was superior to the 
Korean one, both biologically and spiritually, and that the superior rulers had moral rights 
and responsibilities to guide the ‘lesser’ people (P atties 1984: 39-40). Following the 
theory of Social Darwinism used by Western colonialists who contrasted themselves with 
the colonized, Japanese colonialists adopted the discourse of ‘self and other’, 
distinguishing themselves from other ethnic categori s within Asia (Young 1999: 364-
365). While emphasizing the affinities of race and culture which might contribute to the 
consolidation of the two nations, the colonial authorities insisted on their moral right to 
transform the institutions and mores of the less ‘civilized’ people in order to submit the 
Koreans to their colonial administrative controls (Duus 1995: 399).  
The ultimate goal of the assimilation policy was, therefore, nothing but the 
‘Japanization’ of the people in its colony. Especially during Japan’s total war years after 
1937, naisen ittai remained the basic philosophy for the whole colonial administration 
(Ch’oe Y. R. 1994: v). Aimed at mobilizing the whole-hearted cooperation of colonial 
subjects behind the fighting strength of Japan, the authorities required Korean people to 
become ‘true Japanese’, sharing the same lifestyle, values and morals, and bearing the 
same responsibilities as the Japanese (Chou 1996: 41-42). Along with various 
administrative measures, such as the recruitment of military volunteers in 1938, the 
name-changing campaign in 1940, the promotion of Japanese Shintoism and the national 
language movement,260 the reform of daily life for Korean people was hig on the agenda 
                                                
260 For detailed accounts of these four programmes, se Chou 1996: 45-67. 
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for ‘naisen ittai’.      
Although the matter of improving the lives of Koreans was an important one on 
the political agenda of the colonial authorities, the government was not always alone in 
providing encouragement for the reform of daily life among the Korean populace. 
Japanese settlers in Korea, who formed the largest overseas community of Japanese in the 
world by 1910 261 when Japan officially annexed Korea, were another major factor that 
influenced the transformation of the daily lives of Koreans under the slogan of naisen 
ittai.  
Japanese immigration to Korea began with the conclusion of the Kanghwa Treaty 
of 1876, an unequal treaty between the two countries that granted the Japanese the 
advantages of extraterritoriality and other benefits when trading in Korea. Beginning with 
54 people living in the major port city of Pusan in 1876, the number of Japanese settlers 
in Korea increased to 171,543 by 1910, and during the next decade doubled to 347,850. 
By 1942, the number of Japanese settlers had reached 752,823, accounting for 2.9 per 
cent of the entire population of the peninsula (Song K. J. et al. 2004: 91; Takasaki 2006: 
3). The flux of Japanese immigration was concentrated in urban areas: as of 1935, 
Japanese people comprised approximately 30 per cent of the population in Seoul and 
Pusan city, and 25 per cent in Taegu and Kusan (Uchida 2008: 16).       
 The movement of Japanese people from their homeland to Korea was prompted 
by the Japanese government’s promotion of overseas migration. Before 1870, the 
Japanese government’s emigration policy had been focused on Western countries, such as 
Hawaii, with the chief aim of forming foreign trade r lations and introducing Western 
agricultural techniques by providing a Japanese labour force (Duus 1995: 295). By the 
turn of the century, however, the principles behind migration policy had completely 
reversed. Official interest in migration was concentrated on Korea, where Japan’s 
political influence had been greatly heightened after i s victory in the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904-1905).  
This policy change was stimulated by the Japanese authorities’ desire to relieve 
                                                
261 As of 1910, 38.2 per cent of the total number of Japanese who were living abroad resided in Korea, 
followed by 21.8 per cent living in Taiwan (Duus 1995: 290).     
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internal social and economic difficulties—population growth accompanied by increasing 
unemployment—by channelling the flow of its people to the geographically close future 
colony. Additionally, and more importantly, the immigration policy formed part of a 
strategic decision by the government, which sought to constrain possible resistance from 
Russia or China by consolidating Japan’s economic and political influence in the Asian 
continent. To this political end, the Japanese authorities aimed to dispatch as many people 
as possible to Korea, thus erecting a political bulwark for Japan (Ibid. : 298, 300-303). By 
the early 1900s, the promotion of migration to Korea was an unquestioned axiom of 
Japanese policy to expand the country’s power. One advocate of overseas migration 
summed up its significance by saying that ‘[o]ur national wealth and strength lies in our 
emigration policy’ (Ibid.: 295, 299).  
 Japan’s strategic emigration policy was based on the assumption that its people 
who were transplanted to Korea would act as pioneers, permanent settlers, and the bearers 
of Japan’s destiny (Ibid.: 299). As migration was set as a goal for the expansion of 
national power, the settlers had to dominate the indigenous society and not be assimilated 
or tainted by the customs of the colonized. This wa p rticularly necessary, according to 
Japanese bureaucrats, when the Japanese race settled backward countries, such as Korea. 
They argued that it was the Japanese Empire’s greatmission to lead the native people to 
enlightenment and to show them the blessings of civilization, by bringing the political 
influence and Japanese institutions, culture, laws, customs and language from Japan 
Proper. This state policy was reinforced by a torrent of printed media (Ibid.: 296, 299-
300). In short, the Japanese settlers in colonial Korea were expected to be grass-roots 
colonizers working towards the goal of ‘assimilation’ from the earliest period of Japan’s 
penetration of Korea.  
Ryokki Renmei’s Campaigns to Reform Korean Daily Life as Part of Naisen Ittai  
The Green Flag League (Ryokki renmei緑旗連盟 ),262 a private educational 
association led by Japanese migrants in Korea, was one of the most influential 
organizations involved in improving the daily lives of Koreans under the slogan of naisen 
                                                
262 Hereafter the GFL.  
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ittai. Although the activities of the association began as a civilian enterprise, the Japanese 
people in this group functioned as government agents, implementing the various schemes 
of the Japanese colonial administration. The League was formed from a small study 
group composed of Japanese university students created in 1925 in Korea by Tsuda Sakae 
(1895-1961), who had been a professor at Keijō Imperial University since 1924. Sakae 
was a dedicated follower of Tanaka Chigaku (1861-1939), a Japanese Buddhist scholar 
known as the father of Nichirenism, a nationalistic blend of Nichiren Buddhism and 
Japanese State Shinto (Takasaki 2006: 167). While the original purpose of Sakae’s study 
group was to propagate the teachings of the Sutra among the second generation of 
Japanese settlers, he set great store in the spiritual indoctrination of Japanese youth. He 
believed that the second generation of Japanese migrants were losing their Japanese 
identities and spirituality as a result of living in a foreign country.  
On 11 February 1933, Kigensetsu263 Day in Japan, Sakae officially established the 
GFL, which aimed to provide education to the masses. The creation of the organization 
coincided with a surge of extreme nationalistic fervour in Japan, led by the ultra-rightist 
militarists who had accelerated their rise to power after the Manchurian Incident (1931), 
which marked the beginning of Japan’s quasi-war era (Chŏng and Yi 1999: 357). The 
GFL included Sakae’s student groups, graduates and a Japanese women’s group led by 
Sakae’s wife, which I will discuss in detail a little later on. Beginning with fewer than 
twenty Japanese members, the organization expanded rapidly, especially after 1937 when 
Koreans began to join: by 1939, the GFL had approximately 1,500 registered members 
(Uchida 2008: 25; Yi S. Y. 2000: 203-204). As of 1940, Korean members accounted for 
approximately 30 per cent of the 2,000 members, and by 1943, their numbers exceeded 
those of Japanese members, constituting 3,000 out of the 5,000 enrolled nationwide (Yi S. 
Y. 2000: 213).      
 The GFL considered social education (sahoe kyohwa社会教化) to be the purpose 
of its activities. Social education was a form of state-led mass education in Japan Proper, 
initiated as part of post-war social reconstruction after the Russo-Japanese War and 
intensified after World War One. Starting from the rather vague notion of indoctrinating 
                                                
263 The day on which the accession to the throne of Japan’s first Emperor, Jinmu, was celebrated. The day 
was set by the Meiji government and became National Foundation Day after the Second World War.   
Governmental Reforms and Women 
231  
the Japanese people with moral sense and nationalistic ideology, from the 1920s the 
educational policy set definite goals relating to the private sphere, such as improving 
daily life and public health, and internalizing the national duties of loyalty and being a 
model citizen (Garon 1997: 129; Koyama 1999: 98-99). Following the movement in 
Japan, social education was adopted as a political method crucial to reordering colonial 
society. The Rural Revitalization Campaigns, which I have dealt with in 4.1, were typical 
of the social education programmes implemented in the colony.   
Based on the principles of Japanese social education, the GFL promoted the 
reform of daily life as a practical way of introducing social reform, and ultimately of 
inculcating the Japanese imperial ideology of ‘national polity’ (kokutai国体) among the 
colonial people (Ryokki renmei 1939a: 47). Rooted in the patriarchal Confucian structure 
of social obligations, kokutai ideology was manipulated for political purposes by Meiji 
reformers, and was used to justify Japan’s imperialism after 1937. The theory identified 
the Japanese Empire as a unique ‘family state’ led by the emperor, the descendent of the 
divine and the sovereign, whom people were required to obey as the ‘parent’ within the 
given paradigm of filial piety and loyalty for the country (Duus 1998: 128-129; Gauntlett 
and Hall 1949: 8, 32).   
Scholars point out that one of most notable points of the activities of the GFL 
leaders was that they went ahead of the colonial government in disseminating the 
ideology of nationalism in colonial Korea (Uchida 2008: 23; Yi S. Y. 2000: 202). It was 
only in 1936, a few years after the establishment of the GFL, that the concept ofkokutai 
was officially announced by Governor-General Minami as part of the process of pursuing 
the policy of naisen ittai in Korea. The leaders of the GFL emphasized that they were not 
a state-involved organization, but a pioneering group that had provided the government 
with inspiration (Uchida 2008: 27).      
As part of such a philosophy, the members of the GFL were involved in a wide 
range of educational activities. As well as organizing their own lecture classes, they had 
special institutions through which to train educators, such as the Green Flag Research 
Centre for Japanese Culture (Ryokki Nihon bunka kenkyūjo緑旗日本文化研究所). The 
researchers belonging to the organization came to play significant roles in various 
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educational projects organized by the government within the war mobilization campaigns 
(Yi S. Y. 2000: 209-210). The League also produced a number of publications, including 
the monthly magazine Ryokki緑旗 (Green Flag),264 which appeared between January 
1936 and December 1944, and Sin yŏsŏng 新女性(New Women), published between 
August 1942 and 1945.    
More noteworthy in terms of their educational activities was that they promoted 
the colonial policy of naisen ittai within daily life. As mentioned earlier, the GFL saw 
that the reform of living practices was the first step to realizing kokutai ideology in 
Korea; to achieve this ultimate goal, the immediate task was the accomplishment of 
naisen ittai. Notwithstanding the colonial government’s decade-long call for Koreans to 
‘become true Japanese’, the ideology was still vague and theoretical for ordinary people. 
Differentiating themselves from such a theory-centrd state approach, the leaders of the 
GFL successfully crystallized colonial policy within the campaigns for the improvement 
of daily life. They focused on trivial yet crucial matters which connected closely with 
people’s everyday lives (Yi S. Y. 2000: 206-208). 
The Green Flag League Women’s Association265 was at the centre of putting the 
ideology of naisen ittai into practice through campaigns that closely involved matters of 
clothing, food and shelter in Korea. The Women’s Association originated from the 
Japanese female student study group created in 1928 by Tsuda Setsuko (1902-1971), the 
wife of Sakae, and incorporated under the GFL in 1933 (Chŏng and Yi 1999: 331). At 
first, the group was a friendly society of Japanese women in Korea organizing lecture 
classes just for themselves. Although Japanese immigrants constituted a large proportion 
of the urban population, especially in Seoul where the majority of GFL members were 
located, most of them remained within their Japanese communities, rarely associating 
with the life and culture of the indigenous people.266 After becoming involved in 
                                                
264 From March 1944 it was renamed Kyōa bunka興亜文化 (Development of Asian Culture)  
265 Hereafter I will refer to this organization as the‘Women’s Association’. 
266 For example, in line with the colonial government’s policy, Japanese residents mostly lived in Japanese 
neighbourhoods, around the foot of Namsan Mountain in the ‘namch’on南村’ (southern town) while 
Korean people lived in the ‘pukch’on北村’ (northern town) area, the northern part of Ch’ŏnggyech’ŏn, the 
river which crosses Seoul. For further accounts of the exclusively Japanese residential areas in Seoul and 
other cities, see Duus 1995:  324-334.     
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improving daily life for Koreans, Setsuko was referred to as one of the important 
Japanese women267  who significantly affected colonial Korean society by collaborating 
with the Japanese colonial administration (Suzuki 1994, quoted in An T’. Y. 2008: 7).  
Setsuko’s zeal for the improvement of daily life was greatly influenced by her 
mother Tsukamoto Hama 塚本ハマ(1866-1941), one of the pioneering female educators 
in Japan. A teacher of home economics, in 1900 she published Kaji kyōhon家事教本
(Housework Textbook), the first Japanese home economics textbook (An T’. Y. 2008: 15). 
More importantly, Hama was a key figure in promoting the Campaign of Daily Life 
Improvement, a government-led social education project carried out on a nationwide 
scale in the 1920s Japan. The state austerity campaign encompassed many female 
educators, and intended to alleviate pervasive social poverty after WWI in Japan. In 
addition to coordinating the campaign, she delivered public lectures on the improvement 
of clothing (Koyama 1999: 172, 189). Later, Setsuko described her mother as ‘the 
vanguard of the improvement of daily life’ and ‘a very progressive woman’, and recalled 
that her mother also practised what she preached in her daily life (Ibid.: 15-16).  
In addition to her mother’s influence, Setsuko was a highly educated woman with 
a career as a teacher. She graduated from Tokyo Girls’ H gher Teachers’ College, 268 
majoring in Japanese and Chinese literature, just before she came to Korea in 1924 with 
her husband. Upon arrival in Korea, she taught Japanese at Sookmyŏng Girls’ Higher 
Normal School269 for two years. From 1934, she ran Seiwa Girl’s School (Seiwa Jojuku
清和女塾), which offered a one-year course on housewifery for Japanese migrants in 
Korea. At the school, girls were taught the tea ceremony, cooking, needlework, 
homemaking and Buddhism (Ibid.: 16-17). Her experience as an educator was an 
important training ground for Setsuko’s active role in promoting the improvement of 
daily life in Korea. 
The entrance of the first Korean member, Hyŏn Yŏng-sŏp (1907-?), into the GFL 
                                                
267 The two other influential Japanese women were Okumura Ioko 奥村五百子(1845-1907) and Fuchizawa 
Noe 淵沢能恵(1850-1936). The issue of these three women’s collab ration with the Japanese colonial 
administration and the major impact of their social activities on the politics, economics, education, culture 
of colonial Korea were raised by Im Chŏn-hye and Suzuki Yūko (An T’. Y. 2008: 7).     
268 Present-day Ochanomizu University in Tokyo. 
269 Present-day Sookmyŏng Women’s University in Seoul. 
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in 1937 was the point at which Setsuko focused her att ntion on the living conditions of 
Korean people. Setsuko was especially moved by the pro-Japanese Hyŏn’s book 
Chōsenjin no susumu beki michi 朝鮮人の進むべき道(The Right Way for Korean 
People to Go) published in 1938, in which he denounced the culture, lifestyle and 
thinking of the Korean race, and urged Korean people to become loyal citizens of the 
Japanese Empire. Inspired by his book, Setsuko felt it was necessary to educate Koreans 
by reforming their daily lives (Tsuda 1938: 39).   
Setsuko’s educational goal was to achieve naisen ittai. Advocating the slogan of 
‘Let’s realize naisen ittai in concrete ways with our women’s strength’, she argued for the 
reform of daily life as a practical way to achieve th goal of naisen itttai (Ryokki renmei 
1939b: 3). Specifically, according to her, daily life should be well-planned and rational, 
and the time and labour saved though such efforts should be devoted to work for the 
country and the Japanese emperor (Kawa 2001: 7). Her idea was almost identical with the 
colonial authorities’ argument behind the promotion of rationalization of everyday living 
based on nationalism, which I will mention in 6.2. Her nationalistically tinted view of the 
reform of daily life was expressed thus:   
A sense of unity could be achieved not by theory or thinking but by conjoining 
daily practices in everyday life…The improvement of daily life grounded in the 
ideology of naisen ittai means to rebuild our lifestyle as one that is appro riate for 
imperial subjects by deeply reflecting on our current domestic lives… [What we 
are aiming for is to] make all people fit the doctrine of Japanese kokutai - love, 
strength, and the ideals of the Emperor - by adopting good habits and rejecting bad 
ones… I believe that the daily lives of Koreans arestill full of problems and 
irrationality…  
(Ryokki renmei 1939b: 1-2)   
Led by Setsuko, the members of the Women’s Associati n put great effort into 
improving Korean people’s lives. Their campaigns were accompanied by various research 
studies which often used scientific methods. Based on the results, they identified 
problems with daily practices and actively proposed olutions to correct them. They dealt 
with a wide range of issues surrounding living conditions and lifestyle habits. The focus 
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of dietary reform was placed on saving food resources and encouraging rational and 
scientific habits in eating and meal preparation.    
For example, in August and September 1939, a member of the Women’s 
Association conducted a dietary survey among seven Korean households (two wealthy, 
three middle-class, and two farming families) in the suburbs of Seoul. As part of this 
survey, the menus and ingredients for three days’ meals were recorded, and the nutritional 
composition was analysed. Concerning the farmers’ diet, she pointed out that the 
unbalanced nutrition provided by the Koreans’ habit of eating staple foods was a major 
problem. According to the researcher, despite the fact that Korean farmers ate 2,250 
grams of boiled rice per person per day, more than twice the average of 1,200 grams, 
there was little difference in terms of calorific intake with Japanese farmers. She argued 
that this uneconomical habit was responsible for the Koreans’ 95 per cent reliance on 
grain for energy intake. In order to create a balanced diet, she encouraged people to eat 
high-protein foodstuffs, such as fish and bean curd. When comparing the nutritional 
components of staple foods in two households, one was purely composed of white rice 
while the other was a mix of rice and red beans, which she noted was much better than 
white rice for its nutritional benefits. She also nted that it was advisable to cut down on 
garlic, hot pepper and red pepper paste intake sinc the spicy flavours of these ingredients 
would increase the consumption of rice (Ōhashi 1941: 140-145).   
In 1938, another study was conducted in Chin’gwanni village in Kyŏnggi-do into 
the eating practices of Korean farmers when working as a group. The survey was carried 
out with the help of a professor from Keijō Imperial University in the busy farming 
season when the rural tradition of sharing labour between farmers took place. As in the 
survey described above, that fact that Korean people ‘ate big meals’ was highlighted. The 
report stated that farmers ate five meals a day, which were accompanied by many side 
dishes, including soup, fish or meat, pickles, and re  pepper paste, and that alcoholic 
drinks were frequently consumed at one or two of the meals. The research concluded that 
Korean farmers ate a larger amount of food more frequently than the Japanese, and 
argued that such wasteful eating practices should be stopped (Nakamura 1939: 30).    
Korean children’s snacking habits were also the subject of research by the 
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Women’s Association. A poll conducted in June 1939 asked 1,287 children at Sŏdaemun 
Lower Primary School in Seoul about the snacks theyhad eaten on the previous day. The 
results included several examples of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ snacks. For instance, ‘three 
tomatoes and a bottle of milk’ was highlighted as a good snack, with the explanation that 
tomato was rich in vitamins and that milk was a good s urce of protein. As a bad example, 
‘four pieces of rice cracker’ exemplified the excessive size of some children’s snacks, and 
the high sugar levels in them (Ryokki renmei fujinbu 1939: 56-59).     
The activities of the Women’s Association were not limited to research; the 
members were also active in disseminating their knowledge on diet and in giving 
practical training to Korean women by working as the eachers of cookery classes. For 
example, on 9 December 1939, a member of the Women’s Association was dispatched to 
a cooking class organized by the Young Women’s Associati n of Samgak town in Seoul, 
where she taught Korean housewives how to cook fried rice with carrot and how to make 
Japanese confectionary. The Japanese lecturer remark d that she felt very nervous at first, 
as it was her first experience of teaching a class to Korean women. However, she soon 
felt comfortable when she saw the participants enjoyi g the Japanese dishes and, she 
added, the Korean women agreeably accepted her advice when she pointed out that they 
should change their eating habits. After the class, she satisfactorily stated that the 
movement towards the realization of naisen ittai had begun at this small gathering 
(Anonymous 1939b: 69).  
Another cooking class held in Hwanghae-do in February 1940 offers a good 
example of how the Women’s Association’s teaching had a practical impact on Korean 
home-cooked meals. The cookery class was coordinate by the Hwanghae-do Federation 
of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement, one of the local semi-official 
organizations in charge of the wartime mobilization campaign. At cookery classes held on 
the topic of ‘saving rice and substituting food’, Setsuko and three of her members visited 
Haeju city and Sariwŏn town and taught women how to make hijiki  rice,270 steamed bread 
and baozi.271 The three-day course was very successful, with more than 120 Korean 
housewives and female students attending. It is alleged that following the course, yeast, 
                                                
270 Rice cooked with hijiki , a kind of seaweed.    
271 A form of Chinese steamed bread with various fillings.  
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an ingredient demonstrated by the lecturers, sold out throughout Haeju city. In addition to 
recipes, a wide range of advice on meal preparation, nutrition, methods of saving rice and 
meal planning was shared with the participants. At the classes, Setsuko emphasized that 
Korean housewives should make a serious effort to save rice as the Japanese nation that 
respects the spirit of ‘all the world should be united under one roof’ (hakkō ichiu 八紘一
宇). This was one of the Japanese political slogans that became popular around 1940 as 
part of the ideology of kokutai (Ryokki renmei fujinbu 1940: 98-99).  
An ‘Exhibition on Food’ organized by the Women’s Association and students of 
Seiwa Jojuku was another channel for mass education. This was an annual event jointly 
organized by these two groups to provide mass education through the demonstration of 
their research results. The exhibition of 1939, which took place from 27 to 29 October in 
Seoul, attracted more than 2,000 people (Anonymous 1939b: 69). The promotion of 
eating partly polished rice was one of major themes of the exhibition. The subject was 
chosen in accordance with the state policy of saving rice, which was in particularly severe 
shortage in 1939 due to a crop failure in Korea. To clearly show the nutritional benefits of 
eating 70 per cent polished rice, nineteen eggs and 6.5 blocks of tofu were placed 
alongside the white rice with an explanation: the loss of vitamin B as a result of eating 
white rice instead of partly polished rice would be compensated only when this much 
food was additionally consumed. In addition to this special display, various research 
results, such as those looking at children’s lunch boxes and snacks, were also illustrated 
(Yamazawa 1939: 61-62).    
One of the components of the 1939 exhibition that caught the attention of many 
people was the paintings of Korean dishes. Thus far, this annual event had been chiefly 
focused on Japanese diets for the benefit of the people living in the Japanese communities. 
However, after the Women’s Association actively engaged with the issue of the reform of 
Korean eating habits, the diets of colonial people became one of the most important 
subjects dealt with at the exhibition. There were more than 300 paintings of Korean 
dishes, captioned with explanations of the ingredients in each. The information about the 
dishes had been collected through a dietary survey run by the Women’s Association. The 
following were emphasized as good points of Korean home cooking: the general 
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tendency to eat rice mixed with miscellaneous grains; the consumption of every last dried 
sardine (myŏlch’i ) and piece of meat after they had been used for making soup or stock; 
and the general lack of sugar used in cooking. But at the same time, the Korean 
homemakers’ practices of preparing many kinds of side dishes and their complete 
carelessness about the nutritional content of meals were criticized (Ibid.: 62-63).      
The comments and suggestions written by visitors to the exhibition clearly reveal 
that the section on Korean food attracted attention. For example, a Japanese man 
wondered why Korean people prepared so many side dishes, while a Korean woman 
wrote that ‘the effect of this [exhibition] shall be enormous…’ Another Korean visitor 
expressed an objection to the organizers’ criticism of Korean home cooking, pointing out 
that not all Korean women were careless with the matter of nutrition, as an increasing 
number were being educated on this subject. In contrast to the reaction of Korean women, 
the information on Korean home cooking seems to have been understood differently by 
Japanese people. A Japanese woman observed that ‘I feel it is our duty to raise the 
problems of Korean living, and to devote our efforts to handling them with the 
Koreans…’ (Ibid.: 60-63).   
As other scholars have stated, exhibitions, films and lectures were the typical 
tools of the Japanese colonial government’s social education in Korea. By clearly 
demonstrating the difference between ‘Japan’ and ‘colonized Korea’, the colonial 
authorities justified their colonialism and their ‘civilizing mission’, and internalized the 
legitimacy of colonial occupation in the minds of the Korean people (Han K. Y. 1997: 
340; Chu Y. J. 2006: 94-95). Moreover, the application of the methods of social education 
through a range of campaigns gave Koreans a sense of cultural inferiority which led to 
forced ‘cultural transplantation’ (Kim C. S. 2004: 12-13).  
In this regard, Setsuko and the Women’s Association’s improvement of daily life 
campaigns were not that different from the Japanese authorities’ colonial policy. The 
essence of their advocacy for improvement was none oth r than to transform the life of 
Koreans to fit the Japanese way of life, emphasizing the backwardness of Korean life. As 
discussed previously, making Korean people into loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire 
was the core focus of the colonial administration, a d Japanese settlers in Korea were 
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entrusted with the role of implanting Japanese norms within colonial society in order to 
maintain their superiority over the colonized. This mission, as it was given to the citizens 
of the Japanese colony, formed an important basis for the shared sense of responsibility 
among Japanese settlers to civilize the Koreans.  
Setsuko and her members worked as spearhead to undertake their missions as 
Japanese women in colonial Korea. Setsuko called herself and Japanese women the ‘elder 
sisters’ of Korean women, and felt a sense of respon ibility to ‘rescue’ the Korean people.    
It is an urgent matter to rescue the [Korean] peopl from their chaotic living 
conditions which have resulted from ignorance and thoughtlessness. Amid the 
government’s call for naisen ittai, I believe it is one of the Japanese women’s duties 
to worry about, to consider, and to improve the living conditions of Koreans 
together  … We are aware of our responsibilities as the elder sisters of Korean 
women.  
(Ryokki renmei 1939b: 4) 
Setsuko insisted that the improvement in daily lifethat she sought was not one-
sided and did not simply mean replacing Korean practices with Japanese ones. She stated 
that she and her compatriots were fully aware that e Korean traditions and lifestyle 
came from respectable historical backgrounds (Ryokki renmei 1939b: 2). However, in 
practice, Korean customs were frequently labelled as ‘heathen’ from the biased viewpoint 
of the Japanese. For example, in the 1938 study into ea ing habits of farmers, which I 
described earlier, the researcher from the Women’s Association stated that Korean rural 
communities, such as kye (契) that spontaneously organized mutual (financial) support 
for villagers, were harmful to rural society. She criti ized such community spirit among 
the Korean rural population, suggesting that it ‘encouraged dependence on each other’ 
and ‘ruined individuals’ ability to live independently’. 272 She also considered the practice 
of farmers eating meals between jobs in the field a ‘primitive’ Korean practice 
(Nakamura 1939: 27-29, 30). 
                                                
272 In contrast to her analysis, the colonial governmet focused on how effective the kye and other rural 
communities had been in implementing rural policies from the early period of colonial occupation. The 
authorities devoted sustained efforts to reorganization in order to facilitate administrative access to local 
society. For a detailed account of the colonial government’s rural policy to integrate local communities nto 
the administrative structure see Yun H. D. 2004 and Kim Y. H. 1996.     
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Setsuko frequently said that she was fond of Korean people and was willing to 
accept and learn about Korean culture (Tsuda 1938: 38-39). However, she was not free 
from the prejudices of the Japanese ethnocentric viewpoint of Korean culture. For 
example, she was fond of the hanbok, a traditional Korean costume composed of a 
shorter top and a wrap-around skirt, and used to wear one for everyday wear. Since the 
skirt was loose, it was common for Korean women to raise one knee to their chest when 
they sat in a room. However, she thought such a sitting position was bad manners, and 
encouraged Korean women to learn the Japanese way of kneeling, even though they wore 
hanbok (An T’. Y. 2008: 16-17). In this way, in a wide range of everyday matters, 
Japanese women continually inculcated Korean people to convert their ‘Korean 
backwardness’ into improvement by extolling the Japanese model.  
The Incorporation of Setsuko’s Campaigns into the War Mobilization Programmes 
The establishment of the Research Association for Korean Women’s Problems (Chosŏn 
puin munje yŏn’guhoe朝鮮婦人問題研究會) on 12 September 1938 accelerated the 
growing involvement of Setsuko in the daily lives of Korean people. It also marked the 
integration of her improvement of daily life campaign into the National Spiritual 
Mobilization Movement, a nationwide war mobilization campaign launched in July 1938 
(see 2.1). At a meeting with Governor-General Minami held on 1 July 1938, Setsuko 
stated that there was a need for further systemized efforts to improve the daily lives of 
Korean people (Chŏng and Yi 1999: 345). Two months later, a special mission comprised 
of fifteen members and led by Setsuko was organized by the Department of Social 
Education, part of the Bureau of Education. Aiming to ‘contribute to social development 
through the cultivation of Korean women’ the organiz tion was entrusted with the 
mission of researching activities concerning the daily life of Koreans and the mass 
education of Korean women (Chōsen sōtokufu gakumukyoku shakakyōikuka 1938: 150).     
What is noteworthy is the fact that Setsuko included Korean pioneers in the field 
of women’s education in her group. Despite her enthusiasm for the campaigns, she felt 
the limit of her strength as a Japanese woman to reach into the everyday lives of Koreans, 
and the need for Korean women to be involved was therefore inevitable to achieve 
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successful results (Ryokki renmei 1939b: 4). Thus, influential female Korean educators, 
the majority of whom had studied in Japan, were included among the members of the 
organization. For Setsuko, their experience of studying in Japan was of great significance. 
She thought that Korean women who had received a true Japanese education in her 
homeland were the very people to build the life of naisen ittai in the colonial society (Pak 
S. M. 2007: 181). Notable members of the association were Son Chŏng-gyu 孫貞
圭(1896-?) of Keijō Girl’s Higher Normal School; Yi Suk-chong 李淑鐘(1904-1985) of 
Sŏngsin Girls’ School; Cho Ki-hong趙圻烘 of Chinmyŏng Girl’s Higher Normal School; 
Song Kŭm-sŏn 宋今璇(1905-1987) of Sookmyŏng Girls’ Higher Normal School; and 
Kim Hwal-lan 金活蘭(1899-1970) and Ko Hwang-gyŏng高凰京 (1909-2000) of Ewha 
Women’s College (Ryokki renmei 1939a: 57). With theexception of Kim Hwal-lan, the 
first Korean woman to earn a doctorate from Columbia University in 1930, the members 
mentioned above all spent several years studying in Japan (Pak S. M. 2007: 179-180).    
The Research Association for Korean Women’s Problems had two sub-
organizations focusing on ‘discipline’ and ‘the improvement of daily life’. At the monthly 
meeting, on the last Saturday of the month, they conducted studies and held discussions 
on various topics concerning the improvement of living (Pak C. D. 1996: 97). Their 
studies and experiences served as an important basis for the state-led wartime 
improvement of daily life campaigns. For example, they took the lead in establishing the 
‘Guidelines for the improvement of national life ina time of national emergency’ 
(pisangsi kungmin saenghwal kaesŏnan非常時國民生活改善案) announced in January 
1939 by the Korean Federation for the Total Mobilization of the National Spirit. 
Comprised of five categories—clothing, eating, housing, amenities and morale—the 
guidelines were set up to promote wartime moderation and provided wide-ranging advice 
on how to save in daily life, as mentioned in 4.1  
In addition to formulating this guidance, the Association members coordinated a 
variety of activities to promote the improvement of daily life. For example, upon the 
creation of the group in September 1938, Setsuko and te  members organized a 
government-supported one-week tour to give lectures throughout the country. They all 
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wore Women’s National Defence Clothing273 and held lectures and discussions for 
general populace. In November 1938, they organized a ‘Round-table Talk to Discuss the 
Daily Lives of Koreans’ in order to disseminate theimportance of the campaigns (Pak S. 
M. 2007: 179-180). Through such events, they called for a spirit of unity and the 
rationalization of daily life, providing detailed advice on how to achieve these.  
In 1939, Setsuko and the Association members published Gendai Chōsen no 
seikatsu to sono kaizen 現代朝鮮の生活とその改善 (Modern Korean Life and its 
Improvement). Based on their research and experiences of mass education, 
comprehensive and practical advice on how to improve in the areas of food, clothing and 
shelter was provided. For instance, the book criticized Korean housewives’ indifference 
to nutrition, lack of meal planning, and the custom f hiring paid domestic helpers. The 
synchronization of mealtimes among family members had been propagated.274 The book 
also highlighted the monotonous taste of Korean side dishes, saying that Korean 
housewives used the same seasonings in almost all of their side dishes and used much 
more than was necessary. As a member of the Women’s Association had pointed out, the 
book discouraged the use of garlic and powdered hot pepper, two of the basic seasonings 
in Korean food, arguing that their strong flavours would cause harm to the health of 
women and children (Ryokki renmei 1939b: 22-30).  
Calling for correction of these Korean eating habits and introduction of Japanese- 
style diet instead was one of important roles carried out by the women. Japanese home-
cooked meals were promoted as the model of sound diet to follow in terms of efficiency. 
The book encouraged people to reduce the number of side dishes in Korean home 
cooking, exemplifying a typical Japanese menu – boiled rice mixed with other grains, 
tsukemono (Japanese-style pickles) and misoshiru (Japanese bean-paste soup). The 
Japanese way of attaching greater importance to dinner than breakfast – in contrast to the 
traditional Korean habit – was held up as a better habit. Preparing lightly-seasoned dishes 
was also encouraged (Ryokki renmei 1939b: 24, 30).    
This promotion of the reform of domestic diets, and praise of Japanese home 
                                                
273 A modified, khaki version of a traditional Korean woman’s outfit. They wore this specially made 
clothing for activities.   
274 For further detailed accounts of the discussion on the synchronization of home-cooked meals, see 6.2.   
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cooking as a better diet, imprinted the model Japanese dietary habits in the minds of the 
Korean people. It is not difficult to find the term ‘in a Japanese way’ (naejisig-ŭro 内地
식으로) in writings that dealt with the issue of the reform of Korean eating habits. For 
instance, Yi Kap-su, a medical professor at Keijō Imperial University who frequently 
wrote magazine articles on nutrition and diets, repeatedly recommended eating simple-
tasting Japanese-style foods for their health benefits (Yi K. S. 1939: 43-44; Yi K. S. et al. 
1939: 21). A male teacher at a junior high school also encouraged Korean women to 
simplify breakfast and to prepare a relatively substantial dinner, echoing the guidance 
given by the Research Association for Korean Women’s Problems (Chu K. Y. 1940: 63).  
Such advice was also given by ordinary Korean housewives. Readers’ letters sent 
to popular women’s magazines clearly show the influence of this dietary advice. For 
example, one Korean woman wrote that Korean home-cooked meals, which were always 
accompanied by several kinds of kimch’i, were inefficient, and she insisted that meals, 
especially breakfast, should be simplified and efficiently prepared, ‘just like Japanese 
meals’ (Ha I. S. 1941: 30). Another housewife urged Korean housewives to make it a 
practice to plan every meal in order to save time, oney and food resources, again 
following the example set by Japanese housewives (Yi K. W. 1940: 59). The activities of 
Setsuko and Korean female leaders might not be the only channel through which the 
modification of Korean eating habits was encouraged among ordinary women. However, 
given that the Japanese and Korean people hardly associ ted with each other then, it may 
be surmised that their efforts to reach into the liv s of ordinary Koreans contributed to the 
dissemination of the idea of the Japanese home-cooked meal as the modern and rational 
way to eat among Korean people.     
The Japanese scholar Miyata observed that the major impediment for the Japanese 
colonial authorities in implementing kōminka 皇民化 275 policy in Korea was ‘the 
fundamental culture and everyday practices that allowed Korean people retain to their 
Koreanness’ (1992: 96). To infuse the ‘Japanese lifestyle’ into the daily lives of Koreans 
                                                
275 Literally to transform (the colonial people) into imperial subjects. Naisen ittai was part of the kōminka 
policy that the Japanese government implemented in colonial Korea. The kōminka movement was also 
influential in other Japan colonies. For example, concerning the kōminka movement in Taiwan, see Chou 
1996.       
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was part and parcel of Japan’s colonial administration.  
In this regard, the daily life improvement campaigns led by Japanese female 
settlers in colonial Korea were critically importan. Beginning as a civilian enterprise, 
they were closely involved in the dietary reform of Korean households, one of important 
policies of the colonial administration. Their leading roles as homemakers and teachers 
for ordinary women proved essential in influencing the state wartime agenda on daily life 
of Korean people. Along with the government’s aspiration to integrate whole nation into 
public agenda, women’s active participation in government campaigns also constituted 
the essential part of reforming domestic lives in colonial Korea. The role of women as a 
channel for the government’s campaigns for reshaping domesticity remain crucial in post-
colonial Korea in promoting Saemaŭl undong, a major development campaign led by the 
South Korean government.  
 
5.2 The Role of Women’s Groups in Saemaŭl Undong  
Although I as a common housewife, feel that I am honoured and also proud of 
being a leader of my village, moving forward in the front of the column for 
modernization of the fatherland, I would like to avow on this occasion here that I 
will dedicate everything to the cause of building a prosperous fatherland in the 
future in cooperation with my villagers who have strong faith in me and do their 
cooperatively and harmoniously. Saemaul Leaders of the Nation! The way that we 
are passing as Saemaul leaders, is a solitary and frustrating one…. However, as 
President Park addressed the National Convention of Saemaul Leaders on 
November 22, 1973, ‘If anyone in later ages asks what his ancestors were, give 
them a reply that their ancestors were Saemaul farmers who worked diligently, 
ahead of others in the fervour of the Saemaul Undong of the 1970s.’ I would like 
once again to make it our firm conviction and determination that we would inherit 
for our posterity an honourable legacy and tradition. 
(Female Saemaŭl leader Lee Sun-ja, quoted in Institute of Saemaul Studies 
Republic of Korea 1981: 379-380)  
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The Impoverished Rural Economy in 1960s Korea  
Shortly after the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), the Korean economy showed signs 
of recovery.  With the annual GNP (Gross National Product) growth rate at a steady 
average of 5.1 per cent between 1953 and 1959, Korea’s GNP per capita reached 79 US 
dollars in 1960. However, the economic situation still lagged behind many nations: the 
achievement of 1960 was only equal to 101st place out of 125 countries worldwide (Kim 
D. H. 2008: 135-136).  
The most visible and striking economic development in Korea occurred as the 
result of rapid industrialization in the two decades following 1961. These were the so-
called years of high growth in the Korean economy and were led by President Park 
Chung-hee (1963-1979), who seized power by military coup on 16 May 1961. Between 
1960 and 1980, the country’s GNP expanded thirtyfold, from 1.9 billion US dollars to 
60.6 billion, growing at an average annual rate of 8.5 per cent. Korea’s rapid economic 
growth during this period was considered to be ‘compressed growth’, and it was held up 
as one of the top ten emerging industrial nations in a 1979 report for the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (Pak C. G. 2003: 1137). The economic 
development of South Korea was one of the success stories among the post-colonial 
states that emerged after the Second World War. 
Notwithstanding this rapid economic development, this economic strategy, which 
prioritized manufacturing industries such as steel, oil, and fertilizer production, led to 
unbalanced growth and an impoverished rural economy. The government developed four 
Five-Year Economic Development Plans (kyŏngje kaebal 5-gaenyŏn kyehoek): the first 
plan was implemented between 1962 and 1966, the second between 1967 and 1971, the 
third between 1972 and 1976, and the fourth between 1977 and 1981 (Rhee 1985: III-2-
III-3). Particularly during the first decade, the government focus for development was on 
an export-oriented industrialization policy targeting the huge markets outside Korea, 
including the US. The development project brought successful results, as early as during 
the first plan. Between 1962 and 1966, the plan sought 7.1 per cent annual growth and 
exceeded most expectations by achieving rapid expansion in both output and exports. 
GNP rose from 4.1 per cent in 1962 to 9.3 per cent in 1963 and thereafter remained at a 
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high level, between 5.1 and 13.2 per cent, until the end of the 1970s. (Buzo 2007: 107-
108; Pak C. G. 2003: 1138).  
In contrast, the relative neglect of the agriculture sector resulted in stagnation in 
the agricultural development of the country. The emphasis upon the industrial sector led 
to the mass migration of people to the cities in search of better paid employment in 
factories and offices rather than in agriculture. Korea was an agrarian country with the 
majority of the population living and working in rural areas. Despite moderate 
urbanization during the colonial period, the majority of people in Korea lived in rural 
areas: as of 1944, the ratio of rural to city dwellers was 86.9 to 13.1 (see Table 5-1). 
Urbanization accelerated after liberation, especially during the 1960s. The yearly rate of 
increase in the city population was 5.6 per cent betwe n 1960 and 1970, and 4.77 per cent 
from 1970 to 1980, exceeding the growth rates of the entire Korean population, which 
were 2.32 per cent and 1.75 per cent respectively (Yun A. R. 1988: 16). By 1970, nearly 
half of the Korean population lived in urban areas, nd by 1980 this had reached two-
thirds.  
Table 5-1:  Korean urbanization, 1920-1980 
Year Rural population (%) Urban population (%) 
1920 96.6 3.4 
1944 86.9 13.1 
1949 82.8 17.2 
1960 72.0 28.0 
1970 50.2 49.8 
1980 33.3 66.7 
Data from Pak C. G. 2003: 1047; Song K. J. et al. 2004: 95; Yun A. R.: 1988: 16 
The population shift to city areas brought about a decline in productivity in 
farming areas and an impoverished rural economy. While t ere was a sharp increase in 
the index of labour productivity in manufacturing industries from 157 to 521 between 
1965 and 1975 (if 1960 equalled 100), the increase in agricultural production remained 
moderate, growing from 127 to 211 in same period, an  thus widening the gap between 
the two industries (Pak C. G. 2003: 1147). The ratio of production in the GNP showed a 
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similar tendency: between 1960 and 1980 it nearly doubled from 13.8 per cent to 27.5 in 
the manufacturing industries, while in farm production it consistently declined from 46.8 
per cent in 1964 to 19.0 per cent in 1980 (Ibid.: 1139). Farmers were deeply in debt and 
struggling to survive. The economic gap between urban and rural areas became a serious 
problem. During the 1960s, the average income for mst farmers was approximately 40-
60 per cent less than that of urbanites (Rhee 1985: 3-7), while the per capita income of 
Seoul citizens in 1964 was more than double the natio l average (Kim D. H. 2008: 137).  
The weakened rural economy, a reduction in productivity and rapid urbanization 
inevitably caused food problems for the country. In spite of only a moderate increase in 
the production of rice in the 1960s, its consumption grew continuously. While the volume 
of domestic production of rice increased from 3,150 metric tons to 4,090 tons between 
1960 and 1970, annual consumption of it per person rose substantially from 3,126 
kilograms to 4,394 kilograms during same period (Table 5-2).  
Table 5-2: The domestic production and annual consumption of rice in Korea, 1960-70  
Year Domestic production volume of rice 
(metric tons)   
Annual consumption of rice 
(kilograms) 
1960 3,150 3,126 
1961 3,047 3,041 
1962 3,463 3,401 
1963 3,015 3,127 
1964 3,758 3,744 
1965 3,954 3,925 
1966 3,501 3,489 
1967 3,919 3,954 
1968 3,603 3,822 
1969 3,195 3,946 
1970 4,090 4,394 
Source: Kim P. T’. 2004: 506 
The strategically designed low-price policy for rice which was sustained 
throughout the 1960s was a significant factor in the increasing rice consumption among 
Koreans. By keeping the price of the main staple low, the government sought to maintain 
low wages which would make Korean exports more competitive (Pak C. G. 2003: 1148). 
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In spite of the government policy shift to a high-price policy in 1968, the gap between the 
supply of and demand for rice widened, resulting in the country’s self-sufficiency rate 
falling from 100.8 per cent in 1960 to 81 per cent by 1969 (Kim P. T’. 2004: 506; 
Nongsusanbu 1978: 420). This food shortage brought about a rapid surge in imported 
grain: the value of grain imports increased from two hundred million US dollars to 7.4 
hundred million between 1970 and 1975 (No S. K. 1976: 48). By 1970, the revitalization 
of the rural economy and productivity increases in the rural sector had become critically 
important to the economic policy of the Korean government.       
People’s Voluntary Participation in the Saemaŭl Undong   
The Saemaŭl undong (New Village Movement, NVM) was a social mobilization 
campaign initiated in 1970 by President Park in an effort to develop the rural sector as 
part of the modernization of the country. Later, the movement expanded its scope of 
implementation into city areas and in subsequent deca s had an impact on almost every 
aspect of Korean life. With its three goals of economic development, spiritual 
enlightenment and social renovation, the government and the Korean people collaborated 
in various improvement projects (Rhee 1985: 3-10). During its initial years, the NVM’s 
focus was on improving the living environment, with  gradually expanding to include 
income-generation projects. Along with the economic development achieved during the 
Park regime, in the collective memory of Koreans thi  nationwide movement played a 
crucial role in modernizing the country (choguk kŭndaehwa祖國近代化) (Han S. M. 
2004: 70; O Y. S. 2002b: 158).  
The movement began with the Korean government’s decision in 1971 to provide 
33,267 rural villages with 355 sacks of cement each (Sin H. O. 1999: 60). The NVM was 
experimental in its nature and did not have a theoretical basis. The initial intent of the 
government was to stimulate the village people intomproving their environment using 
their own labour by providing them with free raw materials from overproduction in the 
1960s (Ibid. :61). The government’s donation was used to improve housing, village roads, 
sewerage and electricity systems, and to develop infrastructure for productivity increases, 
such as irrigation facilities and cooperative warehouses (Institution of Saemaul Studies 
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Republic of Korea 1981: 3-8; Rhee 1985: 3-11). By virtue of people’s cooperation, the 
government enterprise proved to be a great success: as of 1972, a total of 7,400 
kilometres of roads in 27,000 villages had been widened without paying for the cost of 
labour and land. Between 1971 and 1973, the number of villages that had accomplished 
the various improvement projects reached 3,455 through ut Korea (O Y. S. 2002b: 168-
169). The government’s material supply continued more than a decade, fostering people’s 
voluntary work and greatly changing the rural landscape in Korea.  
The NVM programmes were managed systematically by an organization created 
in 1972 that incorporated an administrative division. The Central Council of the New 
Village (Saemaŭl chungang hyŏbŭihoe 새마을中央協議會) was established with the 
Minister of Interior Affairs (Naemubu内務部) as its chief and fifteen vice-ministerial 
officials. Branch organizations were then created at each level of local government in 
provinces, cities/counties, and townships, led by the head of each echelon. The villages in 
each myŏn formed the cell organizations led by New Village Laders (saemaŭl chidoja), 
who took practical responsibility for coordinating and leading various projects (O Y. S. 
2002a: 91). The decisions as to what projects should be undertaken with the materials 
provided were made by the villagers under the guidance of the leaders in each village, 
and the tasks were realized by a local volunteer workforce.   
To the extent that the NVM was launched under strong leadership from the 
government, it was undeniably a top-down state initiative. However, as many scholars 
have observed, at the root of the movement lay the rationale of mobilization through 
‘participation’ (ch’amyŏ 参與) (i.e., Yun H. D. 2006; Whang 1981). The government 
sought to achieve the improvement of the rural sector in such a way that the people would 
actively participate in community activities and improve their own economic condition 
and agricultural environment.  
The spirit of diligence, self-reliance and cooperation that was at the core of the 
movement, and people’s enthusiasm for these, were considered necessary for the success 
of the movement. This is why the operating mechanism of the movement was 
characterized not only as compulsory but also as ‘voluntary mobilization’ (O Y. S. 2002a: 
97; Sin H. O. 1999: 2) and ‘induced participation’ (Whang 1981: 95). From the outset, 
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people’s free labour and cooperation were considered th  prerequisites for building the 
rural infrastructure needed for production increases and improving the underdeveloped 
rural environment. In other words, people’s participat on was key to driving the NVM. 
By 1978, most villages throughout the country had crried out Saemaŭl projects. The 
total number of labour participants increased from providing 7.2 million man-days in 
1971 to 184 million man-days in 1978. More importantly, not only labour, but cash 
donations became the major method of contribution as the NVM became more extensive. 
The contributions made by rural people to the NVM increased twentyfold between 1971 
and 1978, while the government’s financial support increased just twelvefold in the same 
period. As of 1978, the people’s contribution to the NVM in terms of labour, money, land 
and other materials totalled 487,835 million wŏn (Whang 1981: 23, 92).     
 As the extensive participation of the rural population was a key factor in the 
success of the NVM, various mechanisms were put in place to foster people’s community 
engagement. In particular, the method of incorporating villagers into what Seung-Mi Han 
called the ‘egalitarian ethos’ was one of the most characteristic features of the NVM 
(2004: 78-79). Combining authoritarian rule and theid a of equal opportunities, the 
NVM planners appointed young country folk, from insignificant family backgrounds but 
with high levels of motivation for improving their lives, as the village leaders of NVM 
groups, instead of traditional local village personages who were wealthy, educated and 
from prestigious lineages (Han S. M. 2004: 78-80). Being unpaid volunteers, they 
received leadership training from the government and functioned as major actors in 
carrying out the Saemaŭl projects. Identifying themselves as average village folk, 
Saemaŭl leaders managed village affairs through democratic decision-making (Boyer and 
Ahn 1991: 103-108; Han T. H.2010: 274). This grassroots leadership provided people 
with novel opportunities of participating in decision-making, and the people’s sense of 
solidarity inculcated by these experiences remained a major force in their support of the 
NVM (Whang 1981: 95). 
The principle behind the management of the NVM, which granted accessibility to 
a broad range of ordinary villagers, was especially effective in recognizing the activities 
of rural women who had, until then, been relatively xcluded from public roles. In the 
Governmental Reforms and Women 
251  
deep-rooted patriarchal structure of Korean society, rural women’s status was low, even 
within the family. Notwithstanding their engagement in he production sphere, their work 
was neither recognized nor remunerated (Gills 1999: 121). But the ‘egalitarian ethos’ of 
the NVM provided rural Korean women with new opportuni ies to participate in social 
activities. As the village leaders of NVM groups, along men, rural women also received 
official training, and participated in the decision-making process (Whang 1981: 106-107). 
Through these experiences, female leaders were strongly motivated, and played an 
important role in inducing village women to join in. From the inception of the NVM, 
women eagerly participated in manual labour, someties working even harder than the 
men (Yu C. M. 2001: 22).  
The women’s enthusiasm was not limited to the Saemaŭl programme’s 
development projects: they had tremendous drive to improve everyday life. It goes 
without saying that the government’s motivation forintegrating women into the NVM 
was to use women’s labour to increase productivity. In order to utilize women’s potential 
outside the home, the government emphasized that the ability of women was equal to that 
of men, and continuously urged women to transform themselves, arguing for the 
importance of stamping out traditional Korean womanhood. For instance, according to a 
textbook used at a female Saemaŭl training course, Korean women should no longer be 
passive or silent. Contending that ‘women needed to develop their capability as 
independent individuals’ it urged women to participate in community activities and not 
just take care of their own families (Ibid.: 22-23).   
Nevertheless, the woman’s role as the manager of the home was retained (Ibid. 
2001: 82). The rationale behind the NVM was to urge women to be better housewives, to 
manage their household rationally, to turn their energy to community activities and to 
economize financially so that they could contribute to the national economy. The 
responsibility entrusted to women in NVM differed little from the basic policy of 
Women’s Bureau which emphasized Korean women’s public roles to serve the nation by 
rationally managing domestic affairs. Such principle of Korean authorities was 
remarkably similar to the Japanese women policy which expanded women’s domestic 
roles as reproducers in public for the sake of enhancing national war power during the 
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Second World War, as I will discuss in Chapter Six.    
Women’s activities in the NVM were systematized after the establishment of the 
Saemaŭl punyŏhoes 새마을부녀회 (New Village Women’s Association).276  Its 
organizational network was set up in July 1977 with the issue of ‘Stipulations of the 
Women’s Training Committee’ (Punyŏ chido hyŏbŭihoe-e kwanhan kŏn 부녀 지도 
협의회에 관한 건). Its areas of focus were fourfold: family planning, the cultivation of 
women, the improvement of daily life and thrift. With a central organization led by the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs, committees were established at the level of local 
governments, provinces, cities/counties and wards, and were followed by cell 
organizations composed of between 12 and 15 housewives of between 20 and 60 years of 
age in each village (Sin H. O. 1999: 128-130). In 1978 there were a total of 37,044 cell 
organizations, incorporating 1,585,000 members in rural Korea; this had decreased 
slightly to 37,251 and 1,307,000 members by 1985, in line with the population decline in 
rural areas. Although participation was not compulsory, as of 1984 67.5 per cent of 
economically active rural women were members of the Punyŏhoe (Ham T’. H. 1986: 29).   
Strictly speaking, the Punyŏhoe was not a completely new organization. It came 
into being through a merger of existing groups which had been involved in women’s 
affairs and informal education. Since the 1950s, numerous semi-official women’s groups 
had emerged in Korean society in pursuit of post-war reconstruction after the Korean War 
and the modernization of the country. Taking the form of social campaigns, the groups 
were involved in improving living conditions, agricultural extension (in rural areas), and 
educating women who had lost the opportunity to learn under Japanese colonial rule. By 
the 1970s, many different kinds of government-involved organizations had mushroomed 
throughout the country, meaning that many women had overlapping memberships (Ibid. : 
13-14).  
To enhance its effectiveness in managing women’s organizations and to ensure 
that women carried out concrete and useful activities, the Korean authorities decided to 
consolidate all women’s associations. Following this strategy, the Punyŏhoe was formed, 
                                                
276 Hereafter I will refer to Saemaŭl punyŏhoe as Punyŏhoe.  
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absorbing four major newtworks of women’s groups: the ‘Women’s Class’ (Punyŏ 
kyosil 부녀교실) and the ‘Family Planning Mother’s Association’ (Kajok kyehoek 
ŏmŏnihoe 가족계획어머니회) led by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
(Pogŏnsaghoebu), the ‘Women’s Association’ (Punyŏhoe) run by the Agricultural 
Cooperative (Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap農業協同組合), and the ‘Improvement of Daily 
Life Club’ (Saenghwal kaesŏn kurakpu生活改善倶楽部) led by the Rural Development 
Administration (Nongch’on chinŭngch’ŏng農村振興廳) (Sin H. O. 1999: 89).  
As a major network of women’s groups, wide-ranging improvement projects were 
coordinated by the Punyŏhoe, including all the enterprises which had been carried out by 
the preceding four groups. In addition to the wide-range of existing development projects 
run by the NVM, each Punyŏhoe unit coordinated its own campaigns. Their projects were 
diverse and depended on the group, but generally included campaigns related to: 
a. the improvement of the mind and training to make  wholesome home 
b. the education of children  
c. projects to develop the local community  
d. the improvement of the environment, food, clothing and housing (the operation 
of a village kitchen) and the simplification of family rituals 
e. the improvement of nutrition among the rural population 
f. teaching women farming techniques 
g. family planning and maternal and child health 
h. the rationalization of consumption (i.e., the opration of village co-op stores) 
i. the establishment of welfare and cultural institutions  
j. volunteer activities (carrying out collaborative work, running communal 
workplaces) 
k. thrift projects (credit unions, saving rice, the collection of waste) 
l. home businesses and cooperative home businesses 
(Pogŏn sahoebu 1981, quoted in Sin H. O. 1999: 131)  
As shown above, the Punyŏhoe’s activities were chiefly focused on reforming living 
practices and thrift. By rationally managing their domestic affairs and daily consumption, 
women were encouraged to generate household income and save their time and labour for 
the purpose of increasing rural productivity. Above all, the improvement of the diet was 
particularly emphasized, as proper nutrition for family members, achieved in a cost-
effective way, was crucial to increasing production efficiency (Sin H. O. 1999: 92-3).  
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The Transformation of Eating Practices in Rural Korea through the Applied Nutrition 
Programme  
The Punyŏhoe’s programmes to improve the rural diet were carried out by Improvement 
of Daily Life Club (IDL Club) units, one of the four women’s groups merged into the 
Punyŏhoe. As one of the systematic dietary reform projects led by the government, the 
IDL Clubs’ improvement campaigns set the tone for the various campaigns for the 
improvement of the daily diet that followed in subsequent decades in South Korea.  
The IDL Clubs were women’s voluntary groups organized within the framework 
of the Improvement of Rural Living (Nongch’on saenghwhal kaesŏn) programme. The 
programme was a pioneering enterprise set up under the influence of the US and aimed at 
development in rural Korea. It was initiated by Robert M. Macy’s report, which 
documented the results of extensive research conducte  in 1956 into the feasibility of 
launching community development projects in Korea. B sed on the conclusions and 
recommendations of the report, the Improvement of Rural Living programme was set up 
with support from the US Office of Economic Cooperation, alongside other subsidized 
projects (Institution of Saemaul Research Republic of Korea 1981: 50-51). In 1958, the 
‘Department of the Rural Household’ (Nongch’on kajŏnggwa農村家庭課) was created 
under the Agricultural Administration (Nongsawŏn 農事院) 277 to run the programme. 
Under the supervision of the institution, 91 ‘daily l fe advisors’ (saenghwal chidowŏn生
活指導員), 278 who were to take a leadership role in implementing he projects locally, 
were selected and deployed throughout Korea (Pae Y. J. et al. 2003: 49). Led by these 
advisors, rural women formed IDL Clubs. With just 80 units when the project began, this 
number had increased by fivefold within less than a ye r, and by 1960, had reached 1,484 
units with 28,781 members. As of 1971, there were 18,609 clubs throughout the county, 
an average of one per village (Ibid.: 49-50, 92). 
The Improvement of Rural Living programme included a wide range of projects 
to reform the daily life of rural households, dealing with food, clothing, shelter, child-care, 
                                                
277 The predecessor of the present-day Nongch’on chinhŭngch’ǒng 農村振興廳(Rural Development 
Administration).  
278 Initially the name of the post was kajŏng kyodowŏn家庭教導員 (homemaking instructor).   
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and home businesses, which could bring extra income into rural households. For example, 
practical advice was offered on making clothes, such as work wear and aprons. The 
renovation of wells, lavatories and kitchens was also encouraged. Diversified methods to 
increase farm household income, such as sericulture and apiculture, were also introduced 
(Song H. G. 1984: 2-4, 6).   
Among the various improvement projects, the primary focus of the programme 
was placed on reforming eating habits. Central to this was saving rice, as Korea had 
suffered from a chronic shortage of this staple for decades, even before the deteriorated 
rice supply in the 1960s. Through the various state campaigns, saving rice and 
encouraging the consumption of substitute foods, such as barley and wheat-based food 
continued to be a key government policy. In accordance with this policy, saving rice and 
eating substitute foods remained a core issue for the Improvement of Rural Living 
programme.    
Saving food resources was not the only issue in the improvement of the rural diet; 
adequate nutrition was also an integral part of the Improvement of Rural Living 
programme. Improving rural women’s nutrition gained increasing importance as a way to 
enhance the productivity and living standards of farm households. As explained 
previously, the Korean government’s industrialization policy in the 1960s led to 
decreased agricultural productivity. As women offered a potential workforce to expand 
production capacity, the issue of women’s health assumed increasing importance. 
However, the majority of rural women survived on a poor diet in difficult living 
conditions. Rural housewives’ contributions to total farm work rose from 27.5 per cent in 
1965 to 42.4 per cent in 1979. Time spent labouring in the fields also increased from five 
hours and 23 minutes in 1966 to nine hours and 47 minutes in 1980 during the peak 
farming season (Pogŏn sahoebu 1981: 77). Despite this growing burden of farm labour on 
women, their daily calorie intake remained insufficient: as of 1991, the average daily 
energy intake for rural women was 2,420 kilo calories, compared with the 2,715 kilo 
calories they needed. This situation caused a physical d fference between rural and urban 
women: according to statistical data from 1989, the av rage height and weight of rural 
women were 156.8 centimetres and 52.8 kilos respectively, while those of urban women 
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were 158.5 centimetres and 53.9 kilos (Nongch’on chi hŭngch’ŏng 1993). Considering 
that these women spent a lot of their time working o  the farm, efficient and rationalized 
methods of nutrition were needed.   
The Applied Nutrition Programme (Ŭngyong yŏngyang saŏp 應用營養社業), 
carried out between 1968 and 1986, was the core focus for various projects implemented 
within the framework of the Improvement of Rural Living Programme. It was a joint 
project led by the Rural Development Administration f Korea and UNICEF (United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund), the FAO (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations), and the WHO (World Health Organization). The 
purposes of the programme were to 1) change the patt rn of food consumption among the 
rural population; 2) remedy nutritional insufficiency; 3) improve farmers’ physique; and 
4) achieve self-sufficiency in food (Kim S. H. et al. 1976: 246). In addition to the 6.5 
million wŏn provided by the Korean government, 5.7 million wŏn from UNICEF and 5.9 
million wŏn from the FAO were donated for the first year of the programme. These 
international organizations’ assistance included materi l support and technical advice on 
matters such as food processing techniques, and they also sent nutritionists who provided 
suggestions on how to operate the programme (Chŏng K. J. 1994: 11). The total cost of 
the programme had reached 120 million wŏn by 1973, and continued to increase 
thereafter (Kim S. H. et al. 1976: 249).    
Initially the programme was designed to last for thee years (July 1967 - 
December 1970), but it continued for approximately two decades, while expanding the 
scope of its activity. The number of Model Villages (sibŏm maŭl) where the programme 
was implemented had increased from ten in 1968 to 1,847 by 1979 (Chŏng K. J. 1994: 
93). In addition to the 322 pre-existing daily life advisors who had been working as 
leaders of the Rural Living Programme since 1958, 120 new advisors, known as applied 
nutrition trainers (ŭngyong yŏngyang chidosa應用營養指導士), were trained to lead the 
Applied Nutrition Programme (Nongch’on chinhŭngch’ŏng 1993).  
  The major focus of the programme was to introduce proper nutrition to village 
people. Extensive surveys were regularly conducted into village people’s diets, including 
their food intake, eating practices and health. Reform plans were developed to correct the 
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dietary problems that were highlighted in the research results: a high reliance on 
vegetables (chiefly staple foods) and an inadequate intake of animal products. As a 
remedy for the deficiencies in vitamins, protein and calcium, cheaper but more nutrient-
rich ingredients were suggested. For example, ruralKoreans were encouraged to consume 
more beans; hare meat; fish; chicken; goats’ milk; sunflower, perilla and sesame seeds; 
and green and yellow vegetables. Along with dietary education, the villagers were taught 
how to cultivate these foods. To reduce rice consumption, eating white and sweet 
potatoes and wheat-based foods was promoted, and new ways of cooking them were 
introduced (Song H. G. 1984: 4). It is reported that 24 recipes using white potatoes, and 
115 using white and sweet potatoes and hare meat were developed during the 1970s 
(Nongch’on chinhŭngch’ŏng 1993).      
  The Applied Nutrition Programme adopted various groundbreaking methods to 
reform the diets of village people. For example, ‘Houses of Nutritional Improvement’ 
(yŏngyang kaesŏn-ŭi chip營養改善의집), multi-purpose communal kitchens established 
in town halls or village offices, were very popular mong village women. They were 
furnished with modern equipment for cooking and food processing - much of which was 
revolutionary for rural Korean women - such as refrig rators, sinks, preparation spaces, 
cookers, barley presses, starch-makers, flour-milling machines, blenders, noodle-making 
machines and steam cookers. The ‘Houses’ were open for people to use whenever they 
wanted. At cooking classes, housewives learnt about nutrition, how to use the utensils, 
how to make bread and jam, and how to bottle food. In addition, the facilities could seat 
up to 50 diners, and thus were used as eating places for children when their parents were 
absent with work, and as a public nursery during the peak farming season. Children were 
provided with carefully prepared nutritionally appro iate meals (Song H. G. 1984: 2-4; 
Sin H. O. 1999: 93). The ‘Houses of Nutritional Improvement’ contributed greatly to 
reducing the time and labour farm women spent on meal preparation, as well as to the 
dissemination of the western diet in rural Korea. By 1979, approximately 6,000 ‘Houses 
of Nutritional Improvement’ were operating in rural areas (Whang 1981: 108).  
After the running of the Applied Nutrition Programme was entrusted to the 
Saemaŭl punyŏhoe in 1977, the programme gained further momentum, developing 
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numerous new projects. One of the more innovative schemes was the Food Education 
Cars (siksaenghwal kyoyuk ch’a食生活敎育車), which were designed for the dietary 
education of those who lived in isolated villages. Between 1977 and 1979, the Korean 
government was given twelve cars furnished with kitchen facilities and projectors from 
the FAO to use as mobile ‘Houses of Nutritional Improvement’. Utilizing the vehicles’ 
greater mobility, daily life advisors and nutritionsts taught cookery and dietary 
knowledge, such as methods of food processing and preserving, meal planning and 
nutritional education, to housewives living in remote areas of Korea. Films with titles 
such as ‘Beans are meat from the field’ and ‘The improvement of diet for our village’ 
were shown using the projector provided. The education l tours were organized on at 
least ten days every month, and approximately 40 villagers participated in each lecture. 
Between 1979 and 1992, 12,821 rounds of lectures took place using the cars (Chǒng K. J. 
1994: 40-41; Nongch’on Chinhŭngch’ŏng 1993).  
The Applied Nutrition Programme to improve the rural diet stimulated the 
popularization of hitherto unfamiliar eating habits, especially the western diet, among 
farm housewives, and a change of attitude towards diet. The scientific aspect of dietary 
education contributed to increasing public awareness that adopting a western-style diet 
was the best way to improve and modernize the diet. The projects to modify Korean rural 
diets had a practical impact on home-cooked meals, as the testimonies below show.     
Before I became a daily life advisor, I had been a school teacher… [w]e female 
advisors were entrusted with the tasks of improving food, clothing and housing, and 
the operation of day-care centres for children. Among these, we especially focused on 
the improvement of diets. We were given cars from abro d. [Using them,] we went to 
country villages and taught people how to make American bread and jam. The 
utensils, such as the liquidizer, and other cooking facilities we used at that time were 
all foreign-made. 
(A former daily life advisor, quoted in Sin H. O. 1999: 107)    
…I won a prize when I took part in a speaking contest…. [w]hat I received was a loaf 
tin to be used for making bread. I pondered what I should do with it because I did not 
know how to use it. Later, daily life advisors taught me how to make bread as they 
travelled around the villages. Our Punyŏhoe members circulated the loaf tin, and 
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made bread. The method of bread-making was very scientific. In terms of using 
scales and a measuring cup and spoon, it was completely different from our 
conventional cooking practices which relied on measuring everything by eye.  
  (Sin H. O. 1999: 93) 
The dietary improvement projects had a definite impact on the modification of 
people’s eating habits. Research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s in the Model Villages 
where the Applied Nutrition Programme was implemented clearly demonstrates the 
consequences of the educational programme. Even between 1968 and 1970, during the 
first two years of the Applied Nutrition Programme’s implementation, average daily 
consumption of white and sweet potatoes rose from 35.3 grams to 48.7 grams, while that 
of the staple foods (rice and barley) fell from 551.9 grams to 533.6 grams per capita per 
day. The intake of oils and fats increased from 1.0 grams to 3.0 grams, and that of meat, 
fish and eggs also increased, from 12.2 grams to 34.6 grams. As of 1976, the per capita 
average daily intake of wheat flour among children in the Model Villages was 34 grams, 
much higher than the 25 grams consumed in normal vill ges (Chŏng K. J. 1994: 45-47). 
The results of the Applied Nutrition Programme in Korea were praised as ‘highly 
successful’ and as a ‘model case’ by Dr Derek S. Miller, a professor at Queen Elizabeth 
University who worked as an advisor for UNICEF, and i  other research by the WHO and 
the FAO in their evaluation report of 1976 (Ibid.: 43).  
Women as the Driving Force behind the Modification of the Diet   
The government initiative of a dietary reform programme was a success. However, it is 
important to note that the greater momentum that drove the dietary improvement 
programme as the projects progressed was the women’s thusiasm rather than 
government leadership. As explained earlier, the NVM began as a result of material 
government assistance. Subsequently, however, the villagers’ contributions, which were 
motivated by their own zeal for better living conditions, constituted the major source of 
funding for the NVM. The same holds true for the Applied Nutrition Programme. In the 
early years of the programme it was fully supported by the government (except for the 
assistance provided by foreign institutions), but from 1971 people’s donations to the 
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programme steadily increased: from 4,865,000 wŏn in 1971, to a total of 289 million wŏn 
by 1986, exceeding the 264 million wŏn from central government and 271 million wŏn 
from local government (Chŏng K. J. 1994: 12; Kim S. G. 1973: 73). In essence, th  rural 
women’s self-help efforts were also crucial to modifying eating habits in rural Korea.  
One of the important factors which drove women to transform daily practices was 
their strong will and burning desire for a better life, stimulated by the NVM. The ‘can do’ 
ethos, originally designed by NVM planners to enhance the ‘self-help’ spirit of the people, 
and disseminated with the expansion of the NVM, encouraged a dynamic work ethic 
(Han S. M. 2004: 79). Motivated by this mood, women were enthusiastic about 
transforming their household into rationally and scientifically-run enterprises in pursuit of 
better and more modern lives. This increasing awareness spread among women as they 
became active in the NVM. Although the NVM’s expectation of women’s roles was 
primarily as part of the labour force for agriculture production, the NVM’s incorporation 
of women into the public world provided them with educational opportunities to become 
enlightened ‘active players’ in modernizing their domestic lives (Yu C. M. 2001: 56).  
Being educated through the activities of the Punyŏhoe, I feel women should adopt 
scientific attitudes. We need to have more enterprising attitudes in life… Someone 
even expressed it as the ‘reform of humanity’ [in gan kaejo]…In terms of cooking 
and managing the household, we have to transform ourselves by introducing new 
knowledge, not merely following old practices… 
 (Sin H. O. 1999: 93) 
Another important motivation behind women’s positive participation in the dietary 
reform projects was that saving food resources was closely related to increasing income. 
Saving rice is a case in point. Among the various kinds of fund-raising programmes 
organized autonomously by each women’s group, saving rice was one scheme in which 
almost all associations participated (Yu C. M. 2001: 40). The method behind the scheme 
was for each housewife to save a spoonful of rice before cooking each meal. This scheme 
was popular among housewives since they were able to acquire a sizable sum of money 
later in exchange for this rice, without the burden of saving money on an everyday basis. 
In addition, the scheme was not new to Korean women: it was one of the common 
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methods used to save rice under the Rural Revitaliza ion Campaign rolled out in the 
1930s by the Japanese colonial occupation (see 4.1)  
However, saving rice was by no means easy for women. The scholar Gills observes 
that the scoop of rice saved was sacrificed by the housewives themselves (or their 
daughters). Housewives were the last family members to be served rice at mealtimes 
according to the normative rules of the Korean family’s hierarchical order. Therefore, 
Gills states, ‘the scoop of rice’ probably did not affect the meals of the male or elder 
family members, who were served before the women, but would come from the 
housewife’s own portion (1999: 134). Moreover, the ric -saving programme was required 
to overcome the ‘cultural obstacle’ of Korean mores. Given the low status of Korean 
housewives within the family, ‘diverting’ rice, a precious food resource that was symbolic 
of family wealth,279 was a challenging task. Mothers-in-law, who generally lived with 
their sons’ families, were especially critical of housewives taking rice before serving it to 
the head of the household, and considered it ‘outrageous’ behaviour (Sin H. O. 1999: 99, 
117).      
Despite all these difficulties, saving rice remained a key project for the Punyŏhoe 
and women actively engaged in it since it was directly connected to income-generation. 
For example, one village man describes the enthusiasm of his village’s women for saving 
rice in an article in a women’s magazine in 1972: ‘Women serve as a model for us men. 
Their activities were frighteningly vehement…their project started by saving barley little 
by little, but now the rice collected fills 41 sacks (approximately 3.3 metric tons) …its 
total value exceeds 4,000,000 wŏn. It is unbelievable that just fifteen women can make so 
much in just three years’ (Ibid.: 118). Between 1977 and 1980, rice collected by the 
Punyŏhoes totalled 1,257,046 straw bags (100,564 metric tons) throughout the country 
(Sim S. J. 1996: 73). Until South Korea achieved self-sufficiency in rice in 1976, the 
Punyŏhoes assumed the leading role in the rice-saving campaign in both rural and urban 
areas (Kong C. U. 2008: 161).     
The money earned from collected rice was deposited collectively into credit unions 
and agricultural cooperatives (Whang 1981: 107-108). Together with other savings 
                                                
279 For information regarding the cultural and symbolic meaning of rice in Korea, see 1.1.  
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acquired through fund-raising projects, such as the collection of waste and the home 
businesses initiated by the Applied Nutrition Programme, rice-saving funds were 
managed as the joint property of each unit. The total value of savings raised by Punyŏhoe 
activities in rural Korea amounted to 18,000,000,00 wŏn 1980 (Pogŏn sahoebu 1981: 
196). The money was principally reinvested to cover operating costs and development 
projects for each group. These included the purchase of communal kitchen utensils, and 
costs for the productivity increase programmes and welfare and environment 
improvement enterprises. The contributions made by rural women were the major source 
of funding for the NVM.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that all the earnings were appropriated for 
expanding NVM projects; the savings also went to individual members. For instance, in 
1980, the revenue from women’s cooperative farming projects – such as chicken farming, 
food processing and vegetable gardening – totalled 1,547,000 wŏn. Of this, 56 per cent 
was distributed to individual Punyŏhoe members according to their input into the work 
(Pogŏn sahoebu 1981: 184). Prior to this, rural women’s subordinate status had not 
allowed them to earn and keep money, even if they had engaged in farming work (Gills 
1999: 121). Thus, such incomes provided women with strong motivation to dedicate 
themselves to group activities (Yu C. M. 2001: 38). For example, Min, a female Saemaŭl 
leader in the 1970s, devoted her nights to growing beans after her farming work was 
finished. She said ‘[p]eople were doubtful about how women could make money…but I 
found enjoyment [in working] because I could earn as long as I worked harder’ (Ibid.: 38).   
In this respect, the ‘Bank Passbook Project’, a programme which aimed to 
encourage housewives to have their own individual bank accounts, was very successful. 
A female leader stated that the project further spurred on women’s active engagement in 
the Saemaŭl programmes:  
Members brought the rice collected little by little at every meal to the monthly 
meeting of their group. Later, group leaders distributed bank account passbooks 
[in which cash diverted from the collected rice had been deposited] to each 
member, allowing them to have bank accounts in their own name for the first 
time in their lives. Motivated by seeing the increasing money in their savings, 
members became more active in working on cooperativ projects. They ran 
Governmental Reforms and Women 
263  
village co-op stores, raised calves, etc…it was extraordinary that women were 
able to obtain money by their own hand. Without their usbands’ knowledge, 
they were able to keep money which could be used for the family, especially 
for their children… 
(Sin H. O. 1999: 100) 
The testimony above demonstrates that saving food resources was closely related to 
the matter of generating income for the rural household. It provided an opportunity 
for rural women to secure their own revenue which had not been allowed until then. 
One may say, as Kim does, that being remunerated for work contributed to the 
women establishing their own identities and had a positive influence on their self-
esteem (Kim 1997, quoted in Yu C. M. 2001: 38). It is likely that such experiences 
influenced Korean women’s self-awareness: in a 1970s’ study conducted among 
100 female Saemaŭl leaders, 94 per cent replied that women’s social statu  had been 
(greatly) improved through the NVM’s activities (Institute of Saemaul Studies 
Republic of Korea 1981: 278). While the original pur ose of the Korean authorities 
to mobilize rural women was completely different, the women found novel 
opportunities to gain access to economic power and to expand the scope of their 
lives beyond the domestic within NVM. These were important motivation behind 
their active participation in the state mobilization projects which called for women’s 
becoming dutiful nationals to support the country’s development.   
In the book Rural Women and Triple Exploitation in Korean Development, 
Gills explains that rural Korean women were exploited in three distinct ways during 
the process of the country’s industrialization: as producers and household managers 
in the sphere of production and reproduction correspondingly, and as the ‘extra’ 
labour pool, whereby women were mobilized by the state for the purpose of 
supporting national development. The NVM fell into the third category. Selectively 
combining the traditional patriarchal idea of women as primarily responsible for the 
home with egalitarianism, in which women had not previously been included, the 
government positioned women as a significant labour resource able to support the 
development of the rural sector. Gills defined the NVM as ostensibly ‘voluntary’, 
but actually a coercive national development programme (1999: 119-137).  
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However, establishing women’s roles and place in modern Korea was a 
complex process. Indeed, the Korean authorities’ careful efforts to rationalize home-
cooked meals and to alter people’s eating habits aimed at securing food resources 
and redirecting female labour to production activities. For women, however, such 
reforms offered new opportunities to explore multiple meanings of improvement 
within the constraints of the mass mobilization programme which sought to turn the 
people into dutiful citizens. The strategic articulation of female duties as 
housewifery and of women’s potential capabilities in the public sphere was 
effective for the NVM, as it successfully elicited women’s positive participation. 
Yu Chŏng-mi observed that women’s participation in the NVM was the 
outcome of the process of women bargaining with the authorities’ mobilization 
strategy, which induced women to cooperate in the development programme, by 
providing them with the power to control their own lives (Yu C. M. 2001: 30, 108-
109). The transformation of diet in rural Korea was as part of this process of 
bargaining with the state’s economic policy. While constrained by the state’s food 
policy and the nation’s modernization ideology, Korean women actively 
transformed their eating habits in pursuit of betterm nt of their lives. Thus, the 
transformation of the Korean diet proceeded as the result of an intricate and 
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 Home Economics 
 
 
The discipline of home economics created a class of trained women with 
disciplinary and managerial skills who worked to transform the most 
fundamental of political spaces, the home, and who invested deeply in instilling 
new, modern ideas in the inhabitants of that space, the families of the nation.  
(Schneider 2011: 3) 
 
Home economics emerged in industrializing nineteenth-century western nation states 
coincidently with the development of nutritional science. As part of nutritional strategies 
through which the states sought to economically manage societies and people’s health – 
the physical strength for production capacity and potential soldiers – the modern 
scientific discipline disseminated stimulated by the governmental policies. In general, as 
observed by Schneider, the political connotations of home economics education have 
been largely overlooked by scholars due to the subject’s perceived close link to the 
female domain and the ‘private’ sphere of life – food, clothing and shelter. However, the 
discipline was a definite field in which political actors pursued their agenda which 
addressed how best to save the nation, how to understand women’s contributions to 
society, and how to efficiently and rationally manage and develop people (Schneider 
2011: 3).  
While the home economics education in Korea was initiated by American 
Protestant missionaries with explicit religious purpose, it disseminated under the highly 
politicised climate during the first half of the twentieth century Korea. As a scientific 
education of Korean women, on the one hand, the modern iscipline was wholeheartedly 
accepted by Korean nationalist leaders who believed in the importance of women as good 
homemakers in their pursuit of sovereignty and modernity for Korea. On the other, to 
reform domestic life of Koreans, the foundation for the stability of colonial 
administration, through home economics, was also a highly political project for the 
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Japanese colonial government.  
This chapter aims to document the role of home economics as a vehicle for social 
control by the state. In the first section, I will examine the emergence of home economics 
in Korea stimulated by the efforts of three actors, American missionaries, Korean 
intellectuals, and the colonial state. The focus is placed on the construction of the yŏnmo 
yangch’ŏ 賢母良妻  (wise mother, good wife) ideology as the modern scientific 
motherhood promoted in parallel with home economics education. In the following 
section, I will demonstrate the growing importance of home economics to the Japanese 
government by showing the authorities’ accelerating efforts to disseminate the scientific 
concept of the discipline as a vital instrument in executing wartime food-saving policies. 
By doing so, I will argue home economics was exploited by the state as political tool to 
maintain control over the diet of colonial Koreans during Japan’s war years of the 1930s 
and 1940s.  
6.1 Constructing the Modern Identity of A Scientific Housewife: Hyŏnmo 
Yangch’ŏ  
The Introduction of Home Economics and Christian Domesticity   
It was May 31, 1886, when a young Korean woman, a Mrs. Kim, asked Mrs. 
Scranton to educate her. Mrs. Kim, a concubine of a Korean official, secretly 
visited Mrs. Scranton for fear of being seen by the neighbours. It was Mrs. Kim’s 
husband who wanted her to learn English with the hope that she could be a 
translator for Queen Min. Mrs. Scranton tried her bst to teach this first student, but 
Mrs. Kim quit her study after only three months. Mrs Scranton, however, was not 
discouraged, for a student entered at the end of June. This young girl was brought 
by her mother, whose family was poor; at least at the school her daughter would be 
eating properly. Shortly after, the neighbours accused the girl’s mother of being a 
bad parent and she began to regret her decision. They told her that the missionary 
might take the girl to America, frightening the mother into wanting her daughter 
back. But Mrs. Scranton did not give up this precious student so easily. She did 
everything possible to persuade the mother. Finally, the mother acquiesced after 
Mrs. Scranton gave her a written pledge that she would never take any Korean girl 
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out of the country. 
 (Lee 1989: 11-12) 
In June 1885, a few years after the first Korean-American Commercial Treaty of 
1882, the first group of American missionaries was sent to Korea from the Methodist 
Episcopal Church of the United States. Mary Fletcher Scranton (1832-1909), one of the 
members of the party, was the first female missionary sent by the Woman’s Foreign 
Missionary Society. In 1886, she founded Ewha Girls’ School (Ewha Haktang), the very 
first school for girls in Korea. The school became th first women’s college in 1910, and 
until 1938, when the Sookmyŏng three-year college opened, Ewha remained the only 
four-year private college for women in Korea (Conrow 1956: 11; Park J. 1990: 536). The 
American missionaries broke a long tradition of no formal education programmes for 
Korean women, and had a significant impact on the development of home economics 
education in Korea.   
Although the ultimate goal of the missionaries was to pread Christianity among 
the Korean people, the initial enterprises open to them were to found schools and start 
medical practices; missionary work was not permitted by the Korean government (Son I. 
S. 1971: 15). Known as ‘the Hermit Kingdom’, foreigners were not welcomed in Korea 
due to its history of national isolationism. The missionaries had to be cautious and patient 
in carrying out their religious mission. The Protestant missionaries were well aware of the 
execution in 1866 of nine French missionaries and 8,000 Catholic converts for their 
attempts to enact religious change (Yoo 2008: 45). Because their collective memory of 
these destructive persecutions was the only knowledge of Westerners that the Korean’s 
had, Korean people did not trust Christianity, and were suspicious of and feared contact 
with missionaries. The incident between Mrs Scranton and the mother of her second 
student cited at the beginning of this section clearly demonstrates the ill feeling Korean 
people felt towards Westerners.  
Finding it difficult to gain the trust of Koreans, Mrs Scranton thought that 
education would be the only way to win the hearts of the people and authorities in Korea. 
She made great efforts to provide high-level governme t officials with a better 
understanding of their educational situation and the pioneering work which the 
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missionaries were trying to initiate in Korea. As a result, Mrs Scranton gradually won the 
Koreans’ favour. In 1887, King Kojong (r. 1863-1907) gave the name Ewha Haktang 
(Pear Blossom School) to her school as a token of his approval of the institution (Lee 
1989: 8, 14). From this time on, people’s initial suspicion of the school and Westerners 
gradually disappeared, and they came to recognize Ewha’s good treatment of its students. 
This growing reputation increased the number of girls enrolled: by 1899, Ewha had 47 
girls studying there (Yoo 2008: 49). Even after Ewha became a fee-paying school at the 
turn of the century, it continued to boom: as of 1910 there were 177 students enrolled at 
Ewha who willingly paid all or part of their tuition and boarding fee (Choi 2009a: 92).     
Ewha’s success was the outcome of well-calculated efforts to develop missionary 
work to avoid it clashing with the Korean culture, which was rooted in Confucianism. 
This required, first of all, that the Americans maint ned Korean practices and showed 
respect for Korean culture, including the segregation of men and women in time and 
space. For example, girls’ Sunday schools took place separately from those for boys and a 
special evening service was scheduled for women in wh ch a curtain was hung to separate 
the minister from his female audience. In addition, L-shaped churches were built so that 
men and women could attend the same worship service but sit in separate wings (Yoo 
2008: 47).  
A further factor in the popularization of missionary education was the school’s 
educational aim of creating model Korean housewives. The goal set by the school was 
not to westernize the students, but to ‘make Korean girls better Korean girls and true 
Korean women’ (Lee 1989: 11). This was partly avowed in an attempt to escape from the 
repression of the Korean government, and partly to gain the acceptance of Koreans who 
did not want their daughters to abandon Korean tradition to follow a western lifestyle. 
This educational principle was wholeheartedly accepted by the majority of Korean male 
intellectuals who advocated an education in motherhood for Korean women (Choi 2009a: 
87).  
The domestic education of Americans was grounded in the Victorian ‘cult of 
domesticity’ which was consistent with the idea of K rean traditional mores in as far as it 
designated the home as the woman’s sphere. According to the attributes of True 
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Womanhood, which dominated nineteenth-century North America, domesticity was one 
of the four cardinal virtues of women, along with piety, purity and submissiveness 
(Welter 1966: 152). This concept was created to fit with religious values in a materialistic 
society in which values were rapidly changing amid social and economic instability. At 
the heart of the home, which was deemed the most ‘proper’ and ‘safe’ place for them, 
women were expected to comfort and cheer their husbands and sons, fulfilling their roles 
as wives and mothers with religious faith. The true dignity of the female character was 
the result of the correct understanding and faithful performance of social and familial 
duties. The reformation of women and their households was considered to be the 
missionaries’ task and the beginning of the reformation of the world (Ibid.: 152-153, 162-
163). Based on this idea, American women missionaries saw their task as ‘women’s work 
for women’. They engaged in evangelism by getting ivolved in social services as 
teachers, nurses and social workers in non-Christian countries, with the ultimate aim of 
opening up ‘heathen lands’ to the ‘full light of the Gospel of Jesus Christ’ (Choi 2009a: 
52-53; Hill 1985: 4). Home economics was the most suitable educational programme for 
the American missionaries to implement.  
Home economics, also known as domestic science, emerg d as housewifery 
education in industrialising western societies, including America, in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. With increasing importance placed on the health of the workers 
required to maintain economic productivity, the scientific aspect of diet – proper nutrition 
– drew the attention of the capitalist class and the governments (Kim H. G. 2006: 81-82; 
Kamminga and Cunningham 1995: 1-2). By the late ninteenth century, domestic science 
had become a part of the university curriculum as a result of the systematic efforts of 
educated women who were motivated by eagerness for housekeeping to be recognized as 
a profession. The name ‘home economics’ was given to the new discipline by American 
domestic scientists at a historic conference held at Lake Placid in northern New York 
state in September 1899. According to Ellen Richards (1842-1911), a pioneer of home 
economics in the US, ‘home’ stands for ‘the place for the shelter and nurture of children 
or for the development of self-sacrificing qualities and of strength to meet the world’ and 
‘economics’ means the ‘management of this home on economic lines as to time and 
energy as well as to money’ (Shapiro 1986: 176-177).  
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The female missionaries had a shared perception that cultivating girls was 
fundamental to building a Christian home in the future, and this was why they devoted 
their efforts to female education (Choi 2009a: 86-87). Based on this Christian philosophy, 
the American women actively promoted Korean girls’ education, bringing this newly 
developed concept to Korea.              
The motto of the missionaries was ‘women’s most important place will always be 
the home’ (Ibid.: 100). While Ewha’s curriculum included a broad range of western-
oriented subjects, including arithmetic, (world) geo raphy, physiology, biology, chemistry, 
English and Bible studies, the school’s teaching was centred on the home and the family. 
Even before sewing and embroidery entered the formal curriculum in 1896, the teaching 
of household management was carried out by using the system of boarding to educational 
advantage. In the girls’ dormitories, which had thelatest modern conveniences such as 
flushing toilets, hot and cold water and imported toile ries, the students learnt about 
modern domesticity through daily experience. The older girls looked after the younger 
girls with whose care they were entrusted. Girls did the washing, needlework, 
dishwashing, and cleaned their rooms every Saturday. As part of educational curriculum 
to learn how a good hostess should behave, sometimes hey organized social gatherings 
with snacks and invited teachers (Ewha kajǒnghak 50-yǒnsa p’yǒnch’an wiwŏnhoe280 
1979: 34-35).           
The establishment in 1929 of a Home Economics Department at Ewha marked the 
formal beginning of domestic science education for K rean women. Even though a 
housework course had already been provided prior to this, the setting up of a special 
department devoted entirely to home economics is considered a turning point in the 
history of home economics education in Korea. The department was created in response 
to the wishes of young male intellectuals returning from study abroad who wanted to 
marry the college graduates. The women, who were eag r to marry them, also wanted 
lessons so that they would be considered well-qualified housewives who could prepare 
western dishes for their future husbands (Ibid.: 38). Naturally, the educational goal set for 
the new department was to foster professional housewives: to teach scientific home 
                                                
280 EK50P’W.  
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management, childcare, hygiene, nursing and entertaining, and to provide academic, 
scientific and technical training to improve life (Ibid.: 43-44).  
The setting out of an educational curriculum for the training of professional 
housewives was cited as a success for the home economics department. At the first 
student recruitment in 1929, 32 girls were selected out of 42 applicants. As of 1936, the 
number of students belonging to the department had grown to 107, while there were 76 
students in the music department, 64 in the childcare department and 52 in the liberal arts 
department. In the following year, student numbers increased even further, reaching 135 
(Ibid.: 43, 69). 
The founder of the department, Harriet Palmer Morris (1894-?), was one of the 
most influential individuals in the history of Korean home economics education. Based 
on her two years of experience as a home economics tea her in America after graduating 
from the University of Kansas, she was the first person to teach nutrition to Korean 
women. With the implementation of her cooking lessons in August 1921, Ewha’s culinary 
education programme became visibly active. Her classes included lectures on nutritional 
knowledge and cookery training, which put the theory into practice (Ibid.: 38). Ewha’s 
nutritional education and cookery classes using the latest cooking facilities were praised 
for their innovation (No C. Y. 1939: 94). Girls’ skills, acquired in the classes, were 
practiced at meal preparation time in their own dormitories in order to gain real-life 
experience (EK50P’W 1979: 38-39). Students were requi d to spend one semester in the 
last year of their course in the ‘Housework Training House’, which was established for 
the practical teaching of homemaking. Through experiencing all kinds of household 
chores, such as managing family finances, buying ingredients, childcare, meal planning 
and cleaning, they gained practical domestic skills (Ibid.: 49).  
  A true pioneer of Korean home economics education was Pang Sin-yǒng (1890-
1977), who is considered to be the founder of modern Korean cuisine. Pang was educated 
at Chǒngsin Girls’ Higher School in Seoul, studied at Toky  Nutrition School in 1925 and 
1926, and taught for 22 years at Chǒngsin and Keijō Female Commercial School. With 
the foundation of the home economics department in 1929, Pang became a professor on 
the household management course at Ewha. Prior to her retirement in 1952, she wrote a 
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number of cookbooks and text-books: Yori chebǒp料理製法 (Cooking Methods) in 1913, 
Chosǒn yori chebǒp 朝鮮料理製法  (Methods of Cooking Korean Food) in 1917, 
Tarŭnnara ŭmsik mandŭnŭn pǒp다른나라음식만드는법 (Methods of Cooking Foreign 
Food) in 1957, and a text-book, Chungdŭng yori silsŭp kodŭng yori silsŭp中等料理実習
高等料理実習 (Secondary Cooking Practices and Higher Cooking Practices) in 1958 
(Han’guk chŏngsin munhwa yŏn’guwŏn 1995: 332-323). For more than 40 years after its 
first publication, Methods of Cooking Korean Food was continuously revised and 
enlarged, with a 16th edition published in 1964 as Urinara ŭmsik mandŭnŭn 
pǒp 우리나라음식만드는법 (Methods of Cooking Our Country’s Food) (Chŏng H. G. 
2007: 165).  
Pang played an invaluable role in disseminating knowledge of home economics to 
those beyond academic circles, reaching ordinary people through a variety of popular 
magazines. In an article for a women’s magazine, for example, she insisted that home 
cooking was not merely a skill but a branch of academic learning. She argued that 
housewives should increase their own interest in foodstuffs and nutrition, and make the 
effort to study them. She emphasized the importance of applying nutritional ideas to 
domestic cooking by describing the function of nutrients in the human body for 
maintaining the health of family members and the benefits of maintaining economical 
domestic accounts (Pang S. Y. 1936: 36-37). In this way, educators at Ewha played a 
significant role in disseminating the idea of learning home economics among ordinary 
women.   
Women educated at Ewha also had a critical impact on home economics education 
throughout Korea. It was not until 1938 that Ewha’s graduates were certified as public 
school teachers by the Japanese colonial government. However, prior to this they had 
already been teaching in many private schools or at missionary-led educational 
institutions for ordinary women. For instance, at a missionary-established girls’ school in 
the East Gate, one of 22 day schools in Seoul in 1911, a Ewha graduate offered classes to 
78 students in a church basement (Yoo 2008: 50-51).  
While 51 of the 81 graduates from the home economics department during the first 
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five years chose to become professional housewives in accordance with the goal of Ewha, 
23 girls got teaching jobs at private Christian institutions (EK50P’W 1979: 54). Some of 
them, for example Kim Ham-na, Kim Pun-ok, and Kim Mae-bul, continued their 
education at Oregon State University, and returned to Ewha as professors in the 1930s 
(Ibid.: 210). Ewha and other missionary schools provided an important basis for the 
development of home economics in Korea.    
However, the missionaries’ educational activities in Korea failed to ensure 
continued success due to the Japanese colonial authorities’ attempts to suppress private 
education. When Japan officially annexed Korea in 1910, missionaries were active in 
education, establishing numerous primary, secondary and higher educational institutions 
such as Ewha, and often stimulating the Korean people’s existing educational zeal, which 
was connected to a burst of patriotism (Tsurumi 1984: 295).  
Fearing the dissemination of nationalistic sentiment among Koreans, the Japanese 
authorities imposed a series of administrative restrictions on private schools in order to 
curtail educational activities. With the promulgation of the Private School Ordinances 
(Shiritsu gakkōrei私立学校令) of 1908, they set various standards for school operation 
concerning equipment, buildings and grounds. Schools were obligated to conform to the 
standards, which required considerable expenditure (Yoo 2008: 62). On the basis of the 
School Text-book Authorization Regulations (Kyōikuyō tosho kentei kitei教育用図書検
定規定 ) and Publication Act (Shuppanhō 出版法 ) established in 1908 and 1909 
respectively, text-books used in schools were put under the Japanese authorities’ 
censorship system. As a result of these acts, many text-books (written by Korean authors) 
used at private schools were prohibited by the administration (Chŏn M. G. 2004: 4). By 
1925, Bible studies and the teaching of history and geography by teachers not authorized 
by the government were banned, and lecturers were ord red to learn the Japanese 
language. From 1938, all the classes at Ewha had to be in Japanese and teaching was 
conducted through an interpreter since neither the teachers nor the girls were good at 
speaking Japanese (EK50P’W 1979: 67). In 1911, only 39 private institutions were 
recognised by the government, and between 1910 and 1925, the number of private 
schools fell from 1,973 to 604 (Yi Song-hŭi 2005: 21; Yoo 2008: 62-63).  
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However, until 1940, when all American citizens were forced to evacuate Korea as 
enemy nationals of Japan, the women missionaries were undoubtedly influential in 
spreading female education in Korea. Notwithstanding the increasing influence of the 
Japanese education policies, as of 1935, the girls studying at missionary schools 
accounted for more than 65.4 per cent of the total number of secondary-school girls, and 
60 per cent of the total number of women receiving college-level education (Pak S. M. 
2007: 53). The American missionaries laid the foundations for the modern scientific 
education of Korean women in home economics. Most importantly, they contributed to 
constructing an image of modern housewifery that involved managing the household 
scientifically and rationally. The results of American missionaries’ educational activities 
were made possible by their organized efforts to spread Christianity in Korea; however, 
another important factor behind the dissemination of home economics education was the 
zeal of Koran people for women’s education, as willbe discussed in the following section.  
Civilizing Domesticity, Strengthening the Country 
Korea’s first attempt to construct a modern educational infrastructure was made as 
part of the Kabo Reforms (Kabo Kyŏngjang), a series of major reforms led by pro-
Japanese Korean officials, such as Kim Hong-jip (1842-1896), between 1894 and 1896. 
The reforms, which were intended to reorganize Korean society into a modern nation-state, 
were encouraged by Japan, which had successfully remov d China’s claim of suzerainty 
over Korea by winning the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) (Kim Y. H. 1995: 124).  
By this time the need for mass education in Korea emerged as an issue. 
Recognizing the urgent need to modernize Korean society in order to fight Japanese 
aggression, in 1895 King Kojong announced the introduction of equal educational 
opportunities for everyone in Korea:  [t]he knowledg  of our people is the basis for the 
restoration of national power…the security of the Court and the power of the country 
entirely rest upon the education of our nation’ (Hong Y. H. 1997: 288). The King’s 
intention was to abolish the traditional Korean civil service examinations (kwagŏ) which 
were only open to men in the upper echelons of society (the yangban class) and to import 
a modern educational system based on the Japanese mod l. Beginning with the 
promulgation of the Primary Schools Ordinance (Sohakkyoryŏng 小學校令 ) and the 
Home Economics 
277  
establishment of the Hansŏng Teachers’ School (Hansŏng sabŏm hakkyo漢城師範學校) 
to train female primary school teachers in 1895, a broad range of plans for a modern 
schooling system was developed (Son I. S. 1971: 28-29).  
Despite this ambition for educational expansion, women’s education did not gain 
attention from either the government or society. This was the result of the observance of 
an old Confucian custom regarding female education in Chosŏn Korea (1392-1910). 
During the Chosŏn dynasty women had no access to formal education; women’s 
education meant informal training in domesticity. As a hierarchical social structure 
defined Chosŏn society, there was a rigid and strict division between men and women, 
even within families. The strictly ordered family hierarchy granted greater authority to the 
men, compelling women’s subservience to men under the code of the samjong chido 三従
之道(three obediences): obedience to their fathers, husbands, and sons (Yoo 2008: 19-20). 
Yi Ik (1681-1763), a progressive intellectual in Chosŏn Korea wrote, ‘Reading and 
learning are the domain [of] men. For a woman it isenough if she knows the Confucian 
virtues, she will bring disgrace to the family [if she knows more]’ (Kim 1976, quoted in 
Yoo 2008: 39). Although the Kabo Reforms were led by a progressive faction, many of 
whom had experienced study abroad, the deeply rooted notion that education was 
pointless for women continued to prevail in Chosŏn Korea. Not one public school for girls 
was established, despite the foundation of five prima y schools for boys in the late 
nineteenth century (Yoo 2008: 43).        
However, the absence of girls’ schools did not necessarily mean that there was not a 
debate about the need for female education. Rather, t  rise of a nationalistic 
consciousness among progressive Korean male leaders pol micized the issue of women’s 
education. These men called for qualified women to contribute to the desperately needed 
national revitalization. This idea was rooted in a m jor surge of nationalism inside Korea. 
The Korean leaders’ nationalism was born out of the realization that their country 
was politically weak. Internal reform and the self-empowerment of the country were 
emphasized as the way to maintain national sovereignty in the patriotic struggle Korea 
faced from the impingement of foreign powers. Such ideas surfaced with the nineteenth-
century policy change which saw Korea move from isolati nism to an open-door policy, 
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beginning with the Kanghwa Treaty signed with Japan in 1876. This first modern 
international treaty conferred extraterritoriality and economic privileges upon the 
Japanese (Kim Y. H. 1995: 120, 124). Recognizing Korea’s insecure international 
position, progressive young intellectuals who were acquainted with the outside world 
argued that Korea had to become a rich and powerful nation by developing relations with 
foreign countries. Korean nationalists embarked on a journey of ‘self-strengthening’ and 
‘enlightenment’ with the aim of achieving national empowerment (Yoo 2008: 40). 
The most powerful stimulus for the Korean enlightenm t movement was the social 
and cultural development that accompanied the modernization of Japan, which had 
skilfully adopted Western technology after the Meiji Restoration (1868). Korea sent 
official delegations to Japan soon after the Kanghwa Treaty was signed: Led by Kim 
Hong-jip, Vice-Minister of Rites, 58 ministers were sent to Japan in 1880, and the 
following year another twelve more junior Korean officials were dispatched to Japan to 
undertake a three-month study mission (Ibid.). They inspected a wide range of 
modernized institutions, including government offices, shipyards, regular (girls’) schools, 
industrial buildings, hospitals and prisons.  
What particularly struck the officials was the high value placed on female education 
by the Japanese government. The report written by the mission highlighted not only the 
number of schools, but the breadth of the school curriculum for girls, which included 
astronomy, geography, military strategy, science, agriculture, literature and painting (Kim 
Y. H. 1995: 134). Reflecting on the status of Korean women, some delegates stressed the 
need for a reassessment of women’s roles in the family and society in order to make 
Korea a truly modern nation. The social value and political utility of women’s education 
was acknowledged by them: educated mothers would raise accomplished and learned 
men who would strengthen the moral and intellectual fibre of the nation (Yoo 2008: 41).      
The inspiration of those who visited Japan stimulated the already emerging 
consciousness among Korean nationalist leaders of the significance of women’s 
education. For example, Sŏ Chae-p’il (1866-1898), one of the influential progessive 
Korean reformers who insisted on safeguarding Korean’s sovereignty through education, 
emphasized the need for female education in an article in the Tongnip sinmun ewspaper 
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in 1896:  
If the government sets up schools and educates Korean girls, who have been long 
neglected, the abandoned half of the population will become useful citizens within 
a few years. There will be no greater benefit to the country than this.  
(The Tongnip sinmun, 5 September 1896, quoted in Kim Y. H. 1995: 126) 
Given that Chosŏn Korea’s educational philosophy excluded women from 
education, this forceful argument was revolutionary. However, one thing should be noted: 
women’s education was not advocated for the benefit of women, but for the benefit of the 
country. Korean enlightenment thinkers believed that female education could form the 
basis for the nation’s strength and would thus ensure their country’s independence. In 
what specific ways did they attempt to educate Korean women for the sake of national 
revitalization? These are elaborated in another editorial in the Tongnip sinmun:        
Women’s education means a reinstatement of tens of millions of women, half of 
our population, from the state of lost things to human beings. From now on, women 
will no longer be mistreated, because they will retrieve their rights. Children will 
obtain loving teachers and men will acquire beautiful friends whose friendship will 
last over a hundred years. And Korea will naturally develop into a civilized country. 
(The Tongnip sinmun, 26 May 1899, quoted in Kim Y. H. 1995: 127)  
While the majority of Korean reformers agreed to secur  national independence by 
introducing Western- (and Japanese-) style modernization and denying the Korean caste 
system, with regard to women’s education, they claimed they had to maintain the 
patriarchal order which limited women’s territory to he domestic sphere (Kwon I. S. 
1998: 398). The goal of the modernization of Korean women was to train them to be 
good housewives and mothers. This foreshadowed the in roduction of the new ideal of 
‘wise mother, good wife’, which was to epitomize the model for Korean women by 1930 
(Kim Y. H. 1995: 127).  
In the eyes of Korean reformers, many of whom were exposed to modernity during 
their education overseas in places such as the United S ates or Japan, the degraded lives 
of Korean women were seen as linked to the evil custom  of old Korea, and were viewed 
as something that needed to be overcome in order to modernize the country. Furthermore, 
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they believed that valuing women’s education and treating them better were signs of an 
advanced civilization (Choi 2009b: 5). Accordingly, the issue of women’s education as 
good homemakers emerged on the social agenda in theKorean reformers’ pursuit of the 
self-strengthening and enlightenment of the country. This created a favourable 
atmosphere for the missionaries’ educational activities, which stressed the centrality of 
domesticity and the woman’s role at its core.  
As Korea succumbed to the Japanese colonial power, which increased in 1905 as a 
result of Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Korean nationalists’ 
aspirations for female education erupted and they accused the state of neglecting this area 
of development. A provision included in the Protectora e Treaty of 1905 further 
confirmed the Korean people’s belief that only self-strengthening through education 
would bring independence. In response to Kojong’s refusal to sign the treaty, the Japanese 
delegate, Itō Hirobumi, added a clause which limited the efficacy of the treaty ‘until 
Japan acknowledges Korea to be wealthy and strong enough’ (Pak C. S. 1992: 44-45). 
This provision provided the momentum for subsequent independent movements and the 
mass education of Koreans, which was how many Korean formers stressed that Korea 
would overcome its social weakness and become stronge .  
The Korean nationalists’ zeal for self-empowerment manifested itself in a social 
movement founded in the 1920s after the failure of the March First Movement, a mass-
scale independent movement headed by Korean students and intellectuals. Under the 
three slogans of building a new culture (sinmunhwa kŏnsŏl 新文化建設), cultivating 
one’s ability (sillyŏk yangsŏng實力養成), and national reconstruction (minjŏk kaejo民
族改造), the mass education of the Korean race was carried out as part of the Cultural 
Movement (Munhwa undong文化運動) (Pak C. S. 1992: 197). Led by gradualist Korean 
intellectuals, the movement called for moral and mental training, unity among all classes 
of Koreans, and long-term commitment to the reconstruction of all areas of life, from the 
individual to the family and nation (Wells 1985: 836).    
The new type of domesticity promoted within the movement could be explained by 
the distinct ideals of the ‘new home’ (sin kajŏng新家庭). Influenced by the domestic 
ideology which had disseminated throughout Japan by 1920, the Korean version of the 
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‘new home’ became popular in 1920s’ Korea. The neologism sin kajŏng suggested a 
bourgeois and modernized domestic space reformed in the Western style and included, as 
a fundamental component, a peaceful family life led by a hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ, an educated 
professional housewife (Chŏn M. G. 2004: 17; Yu Y. H. 2006: 9). The rubric of new 
housewifery rested on a bourgeois middle-class model f a two-generation family 
composed of ‘a husband, wife and children’, rather t an the late Chosŏn family which 
generally included the husband’s parents. In this concept, ‘filiality’, the Korean married 
women’s traditional virtue, was replaced by ‘efficiency’ (So H. S. 2006: 130; Yoo 2008: 
85). In the new profession of house ‘mistress’ (chubu主婦), great emphasis was placed 
on mothers and wives managing their home democratically, scientifically and 
economically (Inoue 2006: 120). The yŏnmo yangch’ŏ function of educated women was 
crucial to constructing the new culture of domesticity in colonial Korea.  
The basics of home economics – thrift, simplicity, h giene, household finances and 
efficiency – figured prominently in the new ideology of modern housewifery. The key 
phrase of ‘scientific management of the domestic household’ called on women to 
transform their family life into one that was clean, healthy and comfortable (Yoo 2008: 
86-87). The movement also called for increasing the efficiency of household chores and 
eliminating wastefulness, including the time, money and energy spent on housework. The 
ideology of sin kajŏng and hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ was strengthened by the proliferation of 
articles in Korean ethnic newspapers and popular magazines which exploded in 
publishing world in the 1920s Korea by relaxed publication control of the colonial 
authorities.  
Among household chores, the reforms regarding diet were the major subject of 
argument among reformers pushing for the modernization of the Korean home. For 
example, the number of side dishes served at each meal was one of the typical problems 
highlighted by them. Although it was normal to hire domestic help in middle-class 
Korean households at that time, many Korean housewives prepared three family meals by 
themselves, each of which was accompanied by five or six different side dishes (Modŏn 
Ilbonsa 2007: 209).  
To enhance the efficiency and rationality of the dit, reformers encouraged the 
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elimination of a number of side dishes and more attntion to be paid to nutrition. For 
example, in his contribution to a 1931 issue of the women’s magazine Sin yŏsŏng新女性  
(New Women) a male educator, Pang Chŏng-hwan (1899-1931), urged Korean women to 
learn about the nutritional components of ingredients, stating that nutritional knowledge 
enabled housewives to prepare nutritionally suitable family meals at a lower cost (Yi H. 
H. et al. 2004: 101).  
In parallel with the cost benefits, the matter of nutrition was emphasized as a virtue 
of the educated women who brought science into domestic life. Apple states that the 
growth of home economics and the development of the ideology of a ‘scientific 
motherhood’ influenced the emergence of nutrition as the woman’s domain, and enhanced 
her position at home, giving her an arena in which to practice science (1995: 129-130). 
For the male Korean reformers, who sought to moderniz  the Korean home by keeping 
their wives in the domestic sphere, the rhetoric of a scientific motherhood was most 
appropriate for the accomplishment of their goal. Denying the ‘masculine nature’ of 
science, the male reformers frequently asserted that educated women should adopt 
nutritional knowledge in their home cookery to improve living standards and ultimately 
to advance the culture (Chŏng K. Y. 1938: 78-80; Yŏn’gu konggan suyu+nŏmŏ kŭndae 
maech’e yŏn’gut’im 2005: 232). For example, Yi Kwang-su (1892-1950), one of the most 
prominent leaders of the Cultural Movement, praised O Ŏk’s book Saenghwal chillo生活
進路 (The Pathway of Living), which dealt with nutritional issues in the diet, so highly 
that he said that housewives should memorize it (Yi K. S. 1971: 287). Nutritional 
knowledge was not just utilised practically to make savings in the household economy, it 
also had a moral element for educated professional housewives, and the housewife’s 
mastery of nutritional knowledge increasingly came to symbolise the modernization of 
the home.     
 Another key issue related to the dietary reform often discussed by Korean 
reformers was the synchronization of home-cooked meals. According to Confucian ethics, 
Korean family members were not allowed to eat meals together: the spaces and times 
allocated for eating were strictly segregated by sex and age. Housewives prepared meals 
on separate low tables for each group and carried th m to the room where the group ate, 
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as traditional Korean houses did not have separate dining rooms. Moreover, the table had 
to be prepared sequentially following the hierarchical order in which the male and older 
family members came first. The food left over from the previous group’s meal was served 
to the next group. Such meal preparation practices w re an enormous burden on 
housewives, to the extent that both men and women said that by ‘[p]reparing family 
meals from morning till night, [Korean women] waste their entire lives …’ (So H. S. 
2006: 130). Eating home-cooked meals together was part and parcel of increasing the 
efficiency of kitchen work.  
 An important argument for synchronizing the time and place of meals was the 
new meaning of family dining in the modern home. As mentioned previously, family life 
under the philosophy of sin kajŏng was epitomized as peaceful and joyous, and the term 
‘family circle’ (ilga tallak 一家團欒 or kajok tallak家族團欒) became ubiquitous with 
the rise of the ideology of the modern home (Cho P. C. 1940). The reformers sought to 
create this close family atmosphere through family embers eating together. Juxtaposing 
the conventional practice of ‘eating alone on an individual tray’ with the ‘happy harmony’ 
(hwagisurŏun화기스러운) and ‘pleasure’ (chŭlgŏun즐거운) attained by synchronizing 
the time and place of the meal, eating together with family members was often depicted 
as the chief time when the ‘family circle’ was formed (Yi S. 1932: 104; Songwŏn 1923: 
33). To assemble the family in one place for meals, the reformers advocated transforming 
Korean eating habits by moving the main emphasis of meals from breakfast to dinner so 
that everyone could enjoy leisurely meals (Songwŏn 1923: 33).  
All these examples show that the housewives who scientifically and efficiently ran 
their households were recognized not only as modern, but also as virtuous women within 
the newly constructed model of hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ. At first, the ideology of the modern 
home and housewifery was strongly advocated by a nationalistic male group, however, in 
tandem with the increasing visibility in the 1920s of educated women’s social activities, 
many educated Korean women, especially home economics experts, supported the 
ideology, identifying themselves as the professional guardians of the home (Kim H. G. 
2006: 256).   
Yet, not all educated women accepted the idea of hyŏnmo yangchŏ. From the mid-
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1910s, criticism of the hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ ideology intensified through the rise of the sin 
yŏsŏng (New Women). Formed in the early twentieth century, the sin yŏsŏng were a 
group of educated intellectual women who could be distinguished from more traditional 
Korean women. They challenged the moral system of Confucian patriarchy and society 
(Kwon I. S. 1998: 382). They objected to the gender-based division of labour and the 
oppressive nature of the hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ concept. These progressive women called for 
liberation and the freedom to work in public, and asserted that financial independence 
could truly enable women’s empowerment (Pak S. M. 2007: 204, 207-208).  
In contrast, there were also moderate female intellectuals who were in favour of the 
centrality of domesticity. According to the views of these ‘domestic feminists’, women 
would only be able to gain a legitimate position in the family and become true members 
of society and the nation by being good mothers and wives (Kim H. G. 2006: 82-83; Choi 
2009b: 12). Its advocates saw the status of the hyǒnmo yangch’ǒ as a ‘power’ which 
would bring women the prosperity and advancement that traditional Korean women had 
never had. The scientific knowledge essential to the ideology of hyǒnmo yangch’ǒ, 
sharply distinguished the modern housewife from the former uneducated ‘inside helpers’ 
(Pak S. M. 2007: 202, 206). This romantic solution t  the radical feminism discourse was 
in harmony with the views of Korean male intellectuals, who only paid attention to the 
role of the housewife in as far as it was a source of hope for national independence. By 
1930, the public debate on the modern womanhood of Korea had been concluded in 
favour of the hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ ideal. Notwithstanding its initial well-educated, bourgeois 
connotations, the concept of hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ spread beyond the privileged class, 
providing a model which many Korean women aspired to follow (Choi 2009a: 9).      
From Ryōsai Kenbo to Hyŏnmo Yangch’ŏ  
The notion of hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ tends to be portrayed as confirming traditional 
values, in contrast to the progressive thoughts of he ‘New Women’. This is because there 
are some common denominators, such as obedience, loyalty and diligence, between 
Chosǒn Korea’s Confucian ideology of pudǒk 婦德 (womanly virtue) and the ideology 
of hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ. However, these ideological models were completely different. As 
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scholars point out, the former put the greatest stres  on the role of daughters-in-law, based 
on the idea of ‘filial piety’ (hyo孝) – that is, supporting her parents-in-law and producing 
offspring. Under the norms of pudǒk, married women’s housework meant putting the 
‘piety’ into practice, and housewives were expected to tend to their parents-in-law with 
filial piety (Hong Y. H. 1997: 19; Kim H. G. 2006: 250). In the latter, as explained earlier, 
the major emphasis of the married woman’s role was pl ced on being a good wife and 
mother, and providing adequate support for her husband and children (Hong Y. H. 1997: 
19). 
The hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ was a modern construct which developed under 
considerable influence from the Japanese ideal of womanhood, ryōsai kenbo 良妻賢母
(good wife, wise mother) which carried political connotations  (Hong Y. H. 1997: 22-23). 
Ryōsai kenbo was the model of womanhood created within the educational policies of 
Meiji Japan (1868-1912). As part of the country’s modernization, under the Meiji Civil 
Code of 1898, Meiji leaders set education as a natio l priority, and made efforts to teach 
the Japanese people basic literacy, economic utility and political obedience (Tsurumi 
1984: 275-276). Embracing well-functioning households as the basis for modern nation-
building, Meiji bureaucrats focused on the reproductive domain, and especially on the 
potential of Japanese women, who had previously been excluded from the formal 
education system. Ryōsai kenbo was based on an explicit understanding of gender 
segregation which determined the ‘inside of the house’ as the woman’s exclusive realm. 
Within the ideology, the Japanese woman was obliged to serve to her country by being a 
‘good wife’ by supporting her husband who would devot  himself to making Japan a 
strong and wealthy country, and by being a ‘wise mother’ to future Japanese citizens 
(Aoki 2010: 465).  
Ryōsai kenbo was officially set as the aim of education for Japanese women with 
the promulgation of the ‘Ordinance for Higher Girls’ Schools’ (Kōtō jogakkōrei高等女学
校令) in 1899 Japan (Koyama 2007: 38). By making the ideology the key educational 
philosophy for Japanese women, Meiji education taught Japanese girls about modern 
housewifery, household finances, nutrition, childcare nd hygiene, in a curriculum of 
housework (kaji 家事) (Sand 1998: 195). The ideal of ryōsai kenbo penetrated society at 
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the same time as the expansion of female education: by 1902, 70 per cent of Japanese 
girls were enrolled in primary school, and as of 1925, the rate of secondary education 
among Japanese girls had reached 46 per cent (Cwiertka 2006a: 98; Sin Y. S. 1999: 108). 
From the 1920s onwards, the ideology of ryōsai kenbo was further disseminated with the 
emergence of new middle-class households composed of husbands with white-collar 
professions and educated housewives. The modern and thrifty domestic household, run 
by an educated housewife – represented as katei家庭 (home) and ryōsai kenbo – served 
as a symbolic model of domesticity in Japan (Cwiertka 2006a: 88-96). It notably 
influenced the construction of the rhetoric of the new home and hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ in 
1920s’ Korea.        
Japan’s nation-centred educational philosophy laid the foundations for educational 
policy in colonial Korea. As the Meiji leaders had highly valued public education when 
modernizing Japan, the colonial authorities also used education to transform Koreans into 
loyal Japanese subjects equipped with modern but humble living practices and attitudes 
that would contribute favourably to the Japanese Empire (Tsurumi 1984: 294-295; Shin 
and Robinson 2000: 12). The systematic suppression of Christian (private) schools in 
Korea, even before the official annexation of the country, as described earlier in this 
section, clearly demonstrates that schooling was one of the central areas of life used by 
the colonial authorities to control Korean society. Women’s education was of especially 
great political significance to the achievement of Japan’s key policy of ‘assimilation’ 
(dōka同化).281 This is clearly revealed in a statement made by Japanese counsellor Ōno 
in 1936.   
Of economic and social assimilation, the two foundation stones of colonial policies 
[in Korea], social assimilation is the harder to achieve. However, once 
accomplished, it shall be the ‘cement’ which will have a more powerful effect than 
economic assimilation. For this purpose, we must start out by educating women 
through whatever means…Needless to say, women are mor  easily influenced than 
men, as they are emotional without self-consciousnes  or awareness. Once 
influenced, however, their thoughts are not easily changed. Moreover, men will 
naturally follow such women….Only after consolidating the foundations from the 
                                                
281 For details about the Japanese policy of assimilation, see 5.1.  
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bottom, will we be able to truly solidify the ruling system of [colonial Korea]. By 
reforming the Korean home, the whole of Korean society shall be civilized….  
(Ōno 1936, quoted in Chŏng H. S. 1978: 16) 
As a means to implement the educational strategy stated above, Japanese teachers, 
especially female teachers were strategically dispatched to Korea by the Japanese 
government, as they were the most favourable agents who could effectively penetrate 
Japanese womanhood into Korean society (An T’.Y. 2008: 13; Chŏng H. S.1978: 16). In 
the research on the role of Japanese female teachers at Keijō Women Teachers’ College 
(Keijō joshi sihan gakkō京城女子師範学校), a Japanese scholar Sakimoto, for example, 
documented the effective conveyance of ryōsai kenbo ideology from Japanese teachers to 
Korean girls not only through educational curriculum but also exemplary attitude as 
models of ryōsai kenbo in her study (1999). The roles of Japanese female te chers were, 
according to Takasaki, the vanguard of ‘Japanization’ projects in colonial Korean 
transforming Koreans girls to Japanese ryōsai kenbo (Takasaki 2006: 169).  
Such an importance notwithstanding, the expansion of public education in Korea 
was very slow. The colonial authorities paid special attention to keeping Korean people 
out of higher education so that they were not exposed to ‘dangerous thoughts’ such as 
nationalism (Son I. S. 1971: 48-49; Park J. 1990: 536). The expansion of education 
among girls was insignificant: as of 1944, 89 per cent of the total female population were 
illiterate, compared to just 67 per cent of men. The ratio of secondary school graduates 
did not exceed one per cent of the total female population until 1945. However, the 
number of students continued to increase, especially after 1920: while only 116 girls were 
attending public girls’ high schools in 1912, the number of students had grown to 1,062 in 
1921, and had reached 3,243 by 1927. By 1936, the number of students enrolled at the 16 
public girls’ high schools in Korea totalled 6,532282 (Kim H. G. 2006: 106-107; Kim S. J. 
2006: 499-500). 
The promulgation of the Korean Education Ordinances (Chōsen kyōikurei朝鮮教育
                                                
282 The source does not indicate whether the numbers included the students at private schools, but it seem  
likely that they only included students enrolled at public schools. According to Pak S. M., 9,177 girls 
attended secondary-level schools (including vocation l schools) in 1936 (2007: 40).      
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令) in August 1911 marked the beginning of the incorporation of Japanese educational 
policies into the Korean educational system. Based on Meiji Japan’s Imperial Rescript on 
Education, the emperor-centred educational principles established in 1890 in Japan, the 
ultimate goal of Korean education was to make Korean citizens into ‘loyal subjects’ of 
the Japanese Empire (Aoki 2010: 473). The ordinances were revised in 1922 and again in 
1938. Concerning secondary education for women, Female Higher Normal School 
Regulations (Joshi kōtō hutsū gakkō kisoku女子高等普通学校規則),283 Female Higher 
Normal School Provisions (Joshi kōtō hutsū gakkō kitei女子高等普通学校規定), and 
Higher Female School Provisions (Kōtō jogakkō kitei 高等女学校規定) were decreed 
within the respective ordinances. In the 1938 revision of the female education ordinance, 
teaching of the Japanese ideology of ryōsai kenbo was explicitly proclaimed as an 
educational goal (Sakimoto 1999: 83). Since this amendment, along with the knowledge 
of home economics and ryōsai kenbo ideals were integrated in national agenda to 
enhance war power of Japanese Empire, as I will discuss in the following section.  
With consistent emphasis on fostering womanly virtue, home management was 
central to the Korean women’s educational curriculum. Through three- or four-year 
courses of secondary education,284 students studied a wide range of subjects, including 
Japanese, housework, history, science and music, for 30 (or 31) hours per week. The 
hours spent on housework were consistently kept at four hours a week until 1945. The 
number of hours spent on this subject was second only t  the five (or six) hours a week 
spent learning Japanese.  
Women education in colonial Korea was shaped within e Japanese framework 
of home education system; the contents of the Japanese home economics lessons 
provided a model for the discipline in Korea. The school text-book censorship of 1908, 
explained earlier in this section, was one of the initial administrative steps taken by the 
Japanese authorities to establish a Japanese-style educational system in Korea. Even 
before government control was established, text-books published in Korea had been 
                                                
283 The terminology of ‘normal’ was used until the 1930s to distinguish the schools for Koran people from 
those for the Japanese in colonial Korea.   
284 The courses were for three years at first, extended to a four-year course by the 1922 ordinance revision, 
and from 1938 ranged in length from three to five years, depending on the school.  
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strongly influenced by Japanese books. For example, two out of the three home 
economics text-books, excluding one by an anonymous author,285 issued for the first time 
in Korea in 1907 were translations of Japanese books. The original was Sinsen kaseigaku
新撰家政学 (The New Selected Home Economics) written by Shimoda Utako 下田歌子
(1854-1936) and published in 1900 in Japan. Shimoda was a pioneering women’s 
educator who established Toyō School in 1882 in Japan and wrote many books that aimed 
to educate women (Chŏn M. G. 2005a: 136). Her book was first translated into Chinese 
and published in China in 1902. The Chinese translation, Hanmun kajŏnghak漢文家政
学  (The Chinese Home Economics), and the new version in Chinese with Korean 
characters, Sinp’yǒn kajǒnghak新編家政学 (The Newly Compiled Home Economics), 
were both published in Korea in 1907 (Ibid.: 150). These books were authorized as 
school text-books by Government-General in 1910 (Chŏn M. G. 2004: 5).   
 With the promulgation of the Female Higher Normal School Regulations in 1911, 
the colonial authorities only permitted the use of text-books authorized by either the 
Government-General in Korea or the Ministry of Education in Japan Proper (Ibid.: 3-4, 9). 
It does not necessarily mean that the colonial authorities entirely prohibited the use of 
text-books written in Korean authors. However, as a result of this regulation many 
Japanese home economics text-books were introduced to Korea. According to Chŏn Mi-
gyǒng’s research, every book that appeared in the lists of authorized home economics 
text-books between 1925 and 1927 and between 1931 and 1933 was Japanese. For 
example, they included Ōyō kaji kyōkasho応用家事教科書 (The Applied Housework 
Text-book) written by Ōe Sumi 大江スミ (1875-1948) of Tokyo Women’s Higher 
Teachers’ School and Gendai kaji kyōkasho現代家事教科書 (The Modern Housework 
Text-book) by Inoue Hide 井上秀(1875-1963) of Japan Women’s University (Ibid. 2004: 
5). These two educators were pioneers of Japanese hom  economics.286 The Japanese 
home economics provided the fundamental basis for the development, in terms of both 
                                                
285 This book is Kungmun sinch’an kajŏnghak國文新撰家政学(The Newly Edited Home Economics in 
Korean) translated by Pak Cha’ng-dong.   
286 For example, these two Japanese educators attended the International Federation of Home Economics 
conference held in 1908 in Switzerland, and presented papers on ‘The Training of Homemakers in Japan’ 
and ‘The Standard of Living in Japan’ respectively (Pak S. M. 2007: 275).   
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educational principles and the contents, of the discipline in colonial Korea.  
Home economics education, which placed emphasis on practical training of women 
as housewives, was important opportunities to Korean girls to learn modern knowledge. 
In Japan, according to a Japanese scholar Ehara Ayako, the practical aspects of home 
management were particularly emphasized since 1920 with the revision of the education 
act in Japan Proper (1998: 101). This change in educational policy was closely related to 
the Japanese social context. By 1920, the new middle-class population in urban Japan 
was suffering from widespread living difficulties accompanied by price rises after the 
First World War. In response to this, the Japanese gov rnment launched the Campaign of 
Daily Life Improvement, calling for thrifty living to address the economic recession.287 
Under this circumstance, there was an increased neeto train skilful future housewives 
who were able to economically manage their households through female education 
(Monbushō 1972: 444-445).  
In line with the Japanese educational policy, the Female Higher Normal School 
Provision of 1922 in Korea clearly announced that te aim of female education was to 
‘cultivate the qualifications of the nation by providing knowledge and skills applicable to 
life’ (Hong Y. H. 2001: 240). In parallel with the changing educational principle, the 
home economics curriculum in Korea also changed. For example, fancy needlework 
(suye手芸) disappeared from the curriculum. Housework and science, which had thus far 
been taught as one subject, were now separated for the purpose of intensifying the 
teaching of housework (Ibid.). These changes were modelled on the revision that took 
place in Japan in 1920.    
According to Chŏn Mi-gyŏng’s study on the home economics text-books by 
Japanese authors whose publication were consistently appeared in the lists of authorized 
text-books in Korea, the aim of the curriculum was to provide students with practical and 
applicable knowledge that utilised the latest scientific discoveries, so that they could 
improve household efficiency and move with the times (2004: 7-8). For example, 
emphasis was placed on nutritional knowledge and the scientific methods of cooking to 
achieve effective nourishment. Specifically, this involved calculating the nutritional 
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content of dishes, cooking to minimize the loss of nutrients and economizing on the use 
of fuel. For rational and economical household management, subjects such as meal 
planning and keeping household accounts were also tugh  (Chŏn M. G. 2004: 16, 19-20).  
Efficiency in housework was also one of the central opics. For example, in the 
book Saishin katei kanri to kaji keizai 最新家庭管理と家事経済(Recent Family 
Management and Household Economics), which was available in Korea in 1938, Ujiie 
Hisako, a professor at Japan Women’s University, argued in favour of the standardization 
of housework. She placed great emphasis on time management and the rational 
movement of housewives to eliminate wasted time and unnecessary effort in housework 
in order to improve efficiency (Kim H. G. 2006: 259; Yoo 2008: 88). The home 
economics taught in Korea under the Japanese curricul m created a modern housewife 
equipped with the scientific knowledge and management skills to run the family home 
rationally and efficiently. This was the reason for the gaining of public acceptance of the 
discipline, notwithstanding the initial bourgeois connotation, in Korea.  
While emphasizing practicality in managing the household, in reality, the teaching 
of home economics seems to have been rather more theore ical for Korean housewives. 
As discussed previously, home economics in Korea, both in terms of its educational 
principles and its text-book content, was under the dir ct influence of Japanese home 
economics education, and there seem to be many aspects of this that did not translate to 
Korean realities. For example, impractical cookery lessons at schools drew frequent 
criticism in the print media. A reporter from the popular magazine Sin yŏsŏng stated that 
‘[a]lthough [girls are] taught how to make sukiyaki 288 and western dishes at schools, this 
is useless for Koreans’ (T’ae H. S. 2004: 181). In another article published inPyŏlgŏngon 
別乾坤(A Different World) magazine in 1930, a Korean man cynically pointed out that 
‘female students know how to cook rice curry and hashed beef,289 but they can never 
make good bean paste soup’ (Kim K. I. 2004: 131). Even though girls were taught 
standardized recipes in their cookery classes, it was impossible for them to follow what 
                                                
288 A Japanese hot-pot–style dish made with beef and vegetables with soy sauce, sugar and mirin (sweet 
sake used for cooking).  
289 ‘Curry with rice’ and ‘hashed beef rice’ were hybrid Japanese-Western style dishes popularised in late 
nineteenth-century Japan. For further detailed accounts on the acceptance of Western dishes in Japanese 
cuisine, see Cwiertka 1999: 49-56 and Ehara 2009: 195-264.    
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they had been taught when they made bean paste soup at home. This was because most 
bean paste was homemade at the time and the amount of salt in it differed depending on 
each household’s recipe, thus meaning that they had to just the amount of bean paste to 
use or follow the conventional method of measuring by eye (So H. S. 2006: 151).   
Notwithstanding the impractical aspects, the modern image of home economics 
attracted Korean women, and home economics courses were very popular among Korean 
girls. For example, Chŏng Tae-mun, who graduated from Kyŏnggi Public Girls’ Higher 
Normal School in Seoul, stated that competition for a place at her school was extremely 
high, with 600 girls applying for 100 positions when she was a student there (Chŏng M. G. 
2000: 85). The same was true of private schools, even though they did not attract as many 
girls as public schools due to the colonial governme t’s strategic policies which limited 
job opportunities for graduates. In 1939, for example, while the departments of liberal 
arts and music failed to meet their student quotas, there were 2.35 times as many 
applicants as places for Ewha’s home economics department (Ibid.: 101).  
A similar tendency can be observed in Pak Sŏn-mi’s research on female Korean 
students who had studied in Japan, and played a prominent role in perpetuating their 
knowledge and the ideology of hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ in colonial Korea after finishing their 
studies. Of the 64 surveyed women who had been in Japan between 1911 and 1944, home 
economics was the most studied subject (34 people) (Pak S. M. 2007: 51, 183-229). The 
reasons, stated by the researched, for choosing home economics were: ‘it is good and 
useful for women’, ‘being advised to by teachers and parents’, and ‘it is necessary for 
Korean women and Korean society’ (Ibid.: 49). These opinions reveal that home 
economics education was considered by Korean society to be a normative model that 
women should internalize, even though it was theoretical and ‘useless’ in practical terms.  
Shin and Robinson have remarked that the modernization of colonial Korea was a 
dynamic process stimulated by multiple actors, but ultimately mediated through the 
Japanese filtering of modernization (2000: 5, 10). The fact that housekeeping reforms 
centred around home economics involved Christian domesticity, a zeal for self-
empowerment from Korean reformers and the colonial power demonstrates that there 
were multiple players behind the introduction of the modern knowledge of Korean 
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domesticity. It is true that the scientific education had been grounded in a Western model 
of women education. However, the educational policy of the Japanese colonial 
government was a key factor in disseminating the scientifically based household 
management in Korean women by systematically expanding it through public educational 
system. The discipline of home economics and the symbolic model of hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ 
within it were firmly-established as part of Korean womanhood by national edict, and 
played a crucial role in reform Korean domestic lives and training Korean women to be 
loyal and obedient to the Japanese nation. The issu of the scientific motherhood which 
emerged with the rise of home economics came to be exploited for the colonial 
government’s wartime austerity policies during Japan’s war years after 1937.     
 
 6.2 Nutrition for the War Efforts   
The Politicization of Home Economics for Wartime Food Management  
Science is continually being developed…While Germany lost the former war [World 
War One] due to food [problems], it is allegedly now using various kinds of military 
rations invented as a result of its global-level technology which was developed over 
the last three decades in a strategic military operation [during World War Two]. Only 
advances bring victory. If there is no progression in learning, it is dead knowledge. 
We must continue to study more so as not to lose the battle against our enemies, 
America and Britain, and to strive to meet our goal of ‘military strength and healthy 
people’ by making use of [our] scholarship. By engraving it in our minds, we deeply 
feel our responsibility for its success.   
            (Associate professor at Keiō Gijuku University, Hara 1944: 9) 
As discussed in the previous section, from 1938 the Japanese colonial authorities 
made serious efforts to turn Korean women into ryōsai kenbo (good wives, wise mothers) 
with the promulgation of the Higher Female School Provisions, the secondary education 
policy for Korean women. The idealized image of Japanese womanhood constructed 
within the nation-centred Meiji educational philosophy was included in the Provisions, 
and officially set as the model for Korean women to follow in formal education. The 
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major aim of Korean women’s education was to ‘make ‘[Korean women] loyal and 
absolutely pure imperial women by training them to fulfil their potential as ryōsai kenbo’ 
(Sakimoto 1999: 83).  
The revision of the education policy was part of Japan’s far-reaching 
administrative programme to reorganize Korean society in preparation for the so-called 
all-out war waged by the Japanese Empire. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War 
(1937) which marked Japan’s headlong path to the Pacific War, Korea was regarded as 
highly important in terms of Japanese military strategy to expand into China (Eckert 
1996: 12). With the promulgation of the National General Mobilization Law (Kokka 
sōdōinhō国家総動員法) in April 1938, both material and human resources b came the 
subject of mobilization to support the war, and theeducational system was revised to 
meet the state’s needs. In an effort to mobilize the energies of the entire nation, women’s 
roles as housewives needed to transcend the confines of the home and contribute to the 
national war effort. Considering the importance of the Korean woman’s role, Minami Jirō, 
the Korean Governor-General (1936-1942), emphasized th  urgent need to fix the Japan-
oriented ideology of hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ as the female educational goal for the nation 
(Hong Y. H. 2001: 248). Under Minami’s three major spiritual goals for colonial Korea of 
the ‘clarification of kokutai ideology’ (kokutai meichō国体明徴),290 ‘Japan and Korea as 
one’ (naisen ittai内鮮一体),291 and ‘endurance and training (ninku tanren忍苦鍛錬)’, 
hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ was set as the rubric for the Japnese ‘Imperial Women’ (hwangguk 
yŏsŏng皇國女性) (Yi Song-hŭi 2005: 27).  
Considering home economics education to be a crucial contributor to achieving 
these educational goals, the Japanese authorities improved female education. By the 1938 
revision, home economics, which had thus far only been taught to students in the third 
(and fourth, depending on the school) year was included on the curricula for first- and 
second-year secondary school students (Hong Y. H. 2001: 235, 241, and 251). In primary 
schools, the hours spent on the subject per week had doubled by 1938: three hours for 
third year girls, and four hours for fifth and sixth year students. According to a 1941 
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291 The ‘Japanization’ policy implemented in colonial Korea. See 5.1.  
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government statement, home economics was the ‘most essential’, and the ‘most effective’ 
education for girls, so ‘it should be continuously taught under any circumstance.’ (An T’. 
Y. 2006a: 117)  
Not only the intensification of the discipline, the ome economics curriculum 
came to be more firmly under the administrative control of the colonial government: the 
discipline rested on a major reconceptualization of the housewife’s role within the 
framework of Japanese nationalism. For example, the book Gakkō keiei no riron to jissai 
学校経営の理論と実践 (Theory and Practice of School Management) published in 1941 
by Oikawa, the principal of Chinju Public Girls’ Higher School in Kyŏngsangnam-do, 
clearly revealed the principles behind home economics after 1938. The institution had 
been a private school for Korean students, but after th  1938 ordinance amendment, it 
was appointed by the government as the model for mixed Korean and Japanese girls’ 
public schools. The school-reorganization project was intended to make Korean girls into 
true Japanese women through collaborative educational curricula. The book was used as 
guidance for running girls’ schools and was written based on the school’s two-year 
experience as a model school, with an introduction written by Siohara, the head of the 
Government-General’s Bureau of Education (Oikawa 1941: Introduction).  
The book shows that the focus of home economics education shifted from training 
housewives to run a modern and democratic family home to ensuring that they put their 
patriotism into practice. While emphasizing practical solutions in home management, the 
end goal of home economics education was to make Kor an girls into ‘Imperial Women’ 
by providing them with knowledge and skills based on the spirit of the Japanese i  
ideology (the Japanese family system)292 and of ‘serving the country’ (poguk報国) (Ibid.: 
439). In order to achieve naisen ittai among the students, Korean girls were instructed to 
transform their Korean living practices into Japanese ones, following the teaching of the 
home economics curriculum. For example, cookery classes at Chinju Public Girls’ Higher 
School focused on teaching Japanese dishes to familiarize Korean girls with Japanese 
foods (Ibid.: 446). In essence, the teaching of home economics became the place where 
                                                
292 Meiji Japan’s modern family system officially disseminated under the Meiji Civil Code promulgated in 
1898. It is defined by lineage and is strongly patriarchal; it is also linked to the state myth of theemperor as 
the national patriarch. For details on the ie 家 system, see Sand  2003: 21-25.     
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future Korean housewives learnt the method of running a Japanese-style home that was 
grounded in Japanese nationalism.     
In her book Keeping the Nation’s House, Schneider states that the Chinese 
authorities, who efficiently managed the family life of their people as the basis for 
national power, made efforts to train home economics experts to have the right ‘national 
ethics and scientific knowledge’ during the Second World War (2011: 129). The same 
holds true of colonial Korea: the basic principle of h me economics – the scientific and 
rational management of living – remained central to the Japanese strategies of the reform 
of the domestic lives and social management in Korea until 1945. This was due to the fact 
that the lean management of family life that maintained a minimum standard of living 
and was based on scientific thinking and attitudes was relevant to the wartime 
government’s austerity policy.  
In particular, scientifically appropriated efficient ourishment was indispensable 
to securing the health of the people amid an increasingly worsening food shortage. Food 
rationing began in 1940 to handle increasingly worsening food, and in 1943 a uniform 
nationwide rationing programme for staple foods was established by the colonial 
authorities (see 1.1). However, the food supply continually deteriorated, and there were 
invigorated black market in which foods were dealt wi h at very high prices, as I 
discussed in Chapter Three. Notwithstanding the increasing food deficit, the health of the 
people was important as national resources to be used to support the country’s war efforts.  
To mitigate food shortages while still maintaining the nation’s health, nutritional 
education in home economics was taken especially seriously. For example, Theory and 
Practice of School Management explicitly declared that ‘[n]utrition formed the basis of 
home economics for the purposes of enhancing national health and solving food 
problems’ (Oikawa 1941: 446). A home economics text-book edited and published by the 
Government-General in 1941 for secondary school use emphasized the importance of the 
nutritional aspect of home-cooked meals. As a specific way to prepare nutritious home-
cooked meals and budget economically, a week’s meal planning was encouraged. The 
described benefits of meal planning were that it enabled one to 1) prepare well-balanced 
nutritional meals with an increasing variety of dishe ; 2) keep food expenses within 
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budget and eliminate the time spent on cooking and buying foodstuffs (Chōsen sōtokufu 
1941: 70-72). Scientific and efficient nutrition was n essential part of home economics, 
both from the view-point of family health and from that of the country’s wartime food 
strategy.  
The pursuit of nutritional knowledge in the framework of home economics was 
well explained by the idea of the ‘nutritional component-centred view’ (eiyō seibun 
honikan 栄養成分本位觀) which appeared in Senji kaseigaku 戦時家政学 (Wartime 
Home Economics), issued in Japan in 1944 by Japanese scholar Hayashi Yūki. This was 
the guiding concept for cooking in home economics and it was politically linked to 
supporting the wartime food policies. On the basis of this theory, eating meals was 
nothing but the consumption of nutrients. What was to be considered first when people 
ate was not what kind of food they consumed, but which nutrients were taken into their 
bodies. For instance, people were encouraged to eat white potatoes as a substitute for rice 
during the rice shortage, despite potatoes being a staple that was not preferred as rice to 
most Koreans. According Hayashi, there was no difference between eating rice and 
potatoes since both were to be absorbed as carbohydrates in the body. He insisted that this 
view was that of the scientifically-based innovation f diet. From the view-point of 
nutritional science, individual food preferences, such as the adherence to eating white rice, 
were to be broken as faddish choices (Hayashi 1944: 205-207).  
Given that Hayashi wrote many books on food and home economics education 
including Nōson kaji kyōiku no kensetsu 農村家事教育の建設  (Construction of 
Housework Education in Rural Areas) in 1932, Joshi kyōiku kaji kyōiku女子教育家事教
育(Female Education, Housework Education) in 1933, and Senji shokuseikatsu nyūmon
戦時食生活入門 (Introduction to Wartime Eating) in 1942, it is likely that the view 
expressed in Wartime Home Economics was widely acknowledged in the home 
economics world at that time. Even though Hayashi’s book was published in Japan, if we 
consider that the Korean curriculum of the discipline followed the Japanese model, and 
that the Japanese text-books were used in the classes in Korea, as explained in 6.1, it 
seems reasonable to say that the nutritional view was highly influential in Korea. After all, 
the home economics view was that cooking in this way offered the most scientifically 
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appropriate way to ingest nutrients for the biological survival of human beings. However, 
this view was nothing but an expedient catalyst to drive people to come to terms with 
substitutes and to restrict people’s food consumption. This centrality of nutrition home 
economics theory remained the rationale behind the stat ’s wartime food strategies aimed 
at dealing with the increasingly deficient food resources.  
Putting Nutritional Science into Practice in the Framework of the Wartime Food 
Policy 
The centralization of the nutritional concept in eating was disseminated beyond 
the specific field of academic study through its adoption as part of the government’s 
policy of retrenchment. As discussed in 6.1, the sci ntific approach towards home-cooked 
meals in Korea spread during the 1920s, chiefly stimulated by Korean nationalist 
reformers. At first, the scientific management of home-cooked meals carried strong 
bourgeois connotations since it was a marker of a sin kajŏng run by a housewife who had 
received a modern education. Despite its bourgeois nature, the use of nutritional science 
in family cooking was accepted broadly as a virtue of modern housewives, and had 
become part of the idealized image of women by the 1930s. The image of nutritional 
science combined with modern housewifery provided a fertile ground for the colonial 
government’s promotion of a nutrition-centred diet as part of the wartime strategy of food 
management.       
Nutrition was an essential concept within the colonial government’s wartime food 
policies. For example, as mentioned in 4.1, ‘to eat simple meals focusing on health 
enhancement and nutrition’ was included in the ‘Guidelines for the improvement of life in 
a time of national emergency’. These guidelines were assembled in 1939 to provide 
advice to ordinary people on how to lead a frugal life during the wartime shortages. They 
were established by the Korean Federation of the Total Mobilization of National Spirit, 
293 a semi-official organization that led a major war campaign through a nationwide 
network of sub-organizations, aegukpan (‘patriotic units’) (see 2.1). The widespread 
adoption of nutrition in the daily meals of ordinary Koreans was part of the agenda of the 
                                                
293 Hereafter I will refer to this organization as the‘Korean Federation’.  
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wartime campaign. Nutritional knowledge was not, therefore, specialized academic 
knowledge that belonged only to a handful of educated people.  
The term ‘nutrition’ became increasingly important d came to feature frequently 
in Sōdōin 総動員(Total Mobilization), an official publication of the Korean Federation. 
For example, in November 1939, a themed issue of Sōdōin was published on the topic of 
the food shortage. The publication of this special issue coincided with the serious failure 
of the rice crop in Korea. Due to Korea’s pivotal ro e as a rice supplier for Japan, 
controlling the consumption of rice in Korea was part nd parcel of the Japanese 
government’s food policy which sought to secure rice to export to Japan (see 1.1). 
Subtitled ‘A special edition on the food problem’, it contained various articles on saving 
food based on the nutritional concept including ‘Rice-saving campaigns’(Siohara 1939: 
4-6); ‘Food issues in colonial Korea during the emergency situation’(Yamamoto 1939: 7-
13); ‘The improvement of staple food’(Nomura 1939: 14-20); ‘The nutritional values of 
substitute foods’(Satō 1939: 21-25); ‘How to select foodstuffs and improve cooking 
methods’(Pang S. Y. 1939c: 26-28); and ‘Eating brown rice’(Wada 1939: 40-44). 
Comparing the nutritional qualities of a variety of f ods, such as white rice, seventy per 
cent polished rice, brown rice, potatoes, and sweet potatoes, the articles emphasized the 
importance of consuming highly nutritious foods at a low cost while avoiding eating 
white rice. In addition to nutritional information, they also discussed how to cook these 
ingredients without losing their nutritional benefits. Through these channels, the 
government’s food management policies were conveyed to people as scientifically-
appropriated foods.  
One important example of the Japanese wartime government’s utilization of the 
nutritional concept in promoting the frugal consumption of food was the establishment of 
the ‘national diet’ (kungminsik國民食) in 1941 Japan Proper. This set out the nutritional 
standards of the Japanese nation as determined by the Patriotic Food Union (Shokuryō 
hōkoku remmei食糧報国連盟), a special group created in the previous year composed of 
Japanese dieticians and officials from the Health and Welfare Ministry. As the first 
official nutritional standards set by the Japanese government, the standard daily calorific 
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intake requirements for the Japanese nations were set according to groups categorized by 
age, sex and type of labour, with separate requirements for pregnant and nursing women 
(Chang S. H. 1941c: 30-31).  
After the establishment of the standards in Tokyo, they soon appeared in the print 
media in Korea, including in the government-controlled magazine, and were introduced 
as a rational method of obtaining proper nourishment. The purpose of it was stated as 
‘setting out a national diet was to standardize consumption and to show how many 
calories and other nutrients were needed as a minimum in order to maintain one’s health’ 
(Ibid.). However, its purpose was not necessarily to encourage people to consume enough 
nutrients. It was more important to encourage people find their own way of meeting the 
requirements in the most economical way. One important reason behind the establishment 
of the standards explained in a magazine article was rational nourishment: ‘During 
wartime, it is unavoidable that the quality of our lives be lower, however, it is important 
to prevent deterioration in the physical and labouring power of the nations since they are 
the sources of national strength…in order to maintain our productivity in a more 
economical way … the rationalization of nutrition comes first…’(Ibid.)  
With regard to the practical application of the ‘national diet’, Hara Minoru, an 
assistant professor at Keiō Gijuku University, gave a further detailed account in his book  
Senjishoku no kagaku戦時食の科学 (The Science of Wartime Eating) published in 
Japan in 1944. According to him, the central objectiv  of the national diet was to help 
people find the most efficient, rationalized and economical way possible to ingest 
nutrients while bearing in mind the food shortages, rather than to instruct people to 
maintain their standard calorific intake. Calling it ‘cheap nutrition’ (anka eiyō安価栄養) 
and ‘economic nutrition’ (keizai eiyō 経済栄養), he argued that it was the ‘duty of 
wartime nations’ to cut food costs as far as possible by choosing cheaper foodstuffs if the 
equivalent nutrition was available (Hara 1944: 10-15). In terms of putting great emphasis 
on the nutritional components rather than the foodstuffs, the basic notion of the national 
diet was similar to that of the ‘nutritional component-centred view’ of home economics 
described above. For the authorities, the concept of nutritional values could be used as a 
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convincing justification to restrict or encourage th  consumption of specific foods.   
The project of national diet went beyond only setting of nutritional standards of 
people; it was promoted though the Campaign for the Wartime National Diet (Chŏnsi 
kungminsik undong戰時國民食運動) in Korea, part of the war mobilization led by the 
colonial government. For example, in 1942, Kyŏnggi provincial government ordered all 
counties (kun) to organize ‘National diet cookery classes’ for lcal housewives. These 
classes were instigated in order to educate housewives about nutrition and scientific 
cookery and eating. For example, the consumption of more wild foods instead of rice and 
barley, the increasingly scarce staple foods, was encouraged.294 In 1943, through the 
further extension of this campaign, the government initiated the ‘Movement to Develop 
Food Resources’ (Singnyang chawŏn kaech’ŏk undong食糧資源開拓運動 ) which 
promoted gathering and the consumption of wild animls and plants and the study of 
cooking methods for these food resources. A newspaper rticle noted that there were 320 
kinds of edible wild animals, including 27 kinds ofinsects, and stressed that the 
nutritional values of these resources were not less valuable than those of rice and other 
grains which people ate through mere force of habit.295  Nutritional science was part of 
the state apparatus that aimed to address the increasingly worsening wartime food 
shortages in colonial Korea.         
An important element in the implementation of nutritional strategies was mass 
education. As discussed in the Introduction of this study, mass education of nutrition 
originated in the nineteenth century Western industrialising societies to ease widespread 
poverty, and Japan is not the only modern nation which devoted efforts in promoting 
nutrition among people. However, as a late comer, Japan had an opportunity to learn from 
the western examples, and most of all, food was highly important component of Meiji 
Japan’s Westernization policy in pursuit of increasing wealth and military power of the 
country. Due to the political significance, Japanese authorities had made concrete efforts 
to inculcate and diffuse nutritional knowledge among the population, and such a 
                                                
294 ‘P’ilsŭng-ŭi siksaenghwal undong-pisangsi singnyang chunbi-wa kungminsik pogŭb-e manjŏn必勝의
食生活運動-非常時 食糧準備와 国民食普及에 万全’, Maeil sinbo, 18 August 1942, p.2.   
295 ‘Singnyang chawŏn kaech’ŏk undong食糧資源開拓運動’, Maeil sinbo, 24 March 1943, p.2.   
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governmental strategy in Japan had a considerable influence on the mass education about 
nutrition in colonial Korea.  
The National Research Institute for Nutrition (Kokuritsu eiyō kenkyūjo 国立栄養
研究所, NRIN) in Tokyo, established in 1920, was influential in the mass education of 
nutrition in Japan Proper as well as colonial Korea. Led by a prominent Japanese 
dietician, Saeki Tadasu (1876-1959), the NRIN was a pioneering research institute on a 
global scale, and was entirely devoted to the issue of human nutrition. Established in 
response to the 1918 Rice Riots in Japan, one of the major objectives of the institute was 
to enable the economical nourishment of the Japanese populations using nutritional 
science. Its activities ranged from fundamental research to the promotion of nutrition 
suitable for practical use in the daily diet (Ehara 2009: 246). The teachings of Saeki and 
other experts at the institute played an important role in the popularization of nutritional 
knowledge and the importance of scientific nourishment in Japanese society (Cwiertka 
2006a: 122).  
The accumulated research results and dietary advice provided by the NRIN in 
Tokyo were continuously disseminated in colonial Korea through newspapers and 
popular magazines. For example, in April 1940 Chosŏn ilbo, a major Korean newspaper, 
published the dietary guidelines announced by the institute, emphasizing the significance 
of proper nutrition for Korean people in the daily diet amid deteriorating food shortages. 
With two categories, of adults and children, it offered twenty guidelines for ensuring 
efficient nourishment while consuming and preparing less food, including advice such as 
making nutritional values the top priority rather than eaters’ taste preferences, eating 
nutrient-rich foods, and trying to consume animal products and vegetables.296 In an article 
in the Tonga ilbo newspaper of 1938 a Korea dietician remarked on the importance of 
protein in human nutrition quoting the information provided from the NRIN. Reflecting 
on the dietary advice of the institution, he advised Koreans to put more myŏlch’i  
(anchovies) into bean paste soup in order to consume more protein, which was often 
                                                
296 ‘Yŏngyang innŭn kŏs-ŭro ŭmsig-ŭn kolla mŏkcha營養있는것으로 음식은 골라 먹자’, Chosŏn ilbo
朝鮮日報, 3 April 1940, p.14.    
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lacking in the Korean diet.297    
Women’s popular magazines also often featured information about nutrition from 
the Japanese institute. For example, an article in Yŏsŏng 女性  (Women) featuring 
practical advice on the scientific and rational management of the daily diet suggested 
putting the nutritional information table from the NRIN on the kitchen wall for ease of 
access. It suggested that although it was difficult to memorize all of the nutritional 
information, doing this would increase Korean housewiv s’ nutritional knowledge and 
further its application in cooking (Hŏ Y. S. 1938: 88). In this manner, the nutritional 
education involved by the state provided with the standard of scientific diets, and might 
lead housewives to the realization that academic knowledge was useful in dealing with 
wartime cooking.       
Along with the emergence of the nutritional concept in he diet, meal planning 
was also emphasized as an important element in the scientific management of home-
cooked meals. As explained previously, meal planning was indispensable for preparing 
scientifically appropriate and cost-effective meals, nd was one of the central components 
of home economics education. Along with the stress placed on the nutritional aspect of 
diet, the media advocated the need to plan daily meals to ensure the economical and 
proper nourishment of the family. For example, an article in Yŏsŏng written in 1940 noted 
the importance of meal planning: ‘in wartime, we [women] are required to achieve the 
perfect balance between domestic economy and nutrition…to prevent time-wasting when 
we buy foodstuffs, planning every day’s meals is an absolute necessity’ (Yi K. W. 1940: 
2). Week-long sample meal plans frequently appeared in popular magazines (Im M. S. 
1938: 78; Yi K. W. 1940: 2).    
In July 1940, a standardization of Korean meals took place, led by the government 
and nutritionists in Korea, which aimed to ‘improv[e] Korean people’s health and 
nutrition on the home-front’. By this time, the rice shortage was evident, and various rice-
saving campaigns, such as a ban on polishing and selling white rice, had been introduced, 
                                                
297 ‘Inch’e yŏngyang-ŭi kibon chisik (sam) karori-ran muŏs in’ga人體体營養의 基本知識（三）
카로리란 무엇인가’, Tonga ilbo東亜日報 16 August 1938, p.5.   
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together with the rationing of rice. In response to this situation, 140 ‘Economical and 
nutritional wartime menus’ (chŏnsi kyŏngje yŏngyangsik戰時経済栄養食), which used 
many different substitutes for (staple) foods, were published as ‘good’ and ‘perfectly 
nutritious’ meals. The meal plans were categorized by their suitability for mining 
labourers, factory workers, school dormitories, cafeterias and home-cooking.298 Female 
educators, such as Yi Suk-chong, the principle of Sŏngsin Women’s School and Tsuda 
Setsuko, 299 a Japanese educator who was actively involved in the campaigns to reform 
the daily life of colonial Koreans were involved the project. These standardized meal 
plans were used in canteens as mentioned above, and distributed via newspapers, 
magazines, radio programmes and public lectures.300    
All of this nutritional advice and these economical ooking methods, which were 
spread via various channels, were put into practice by housewives. Readers’ letters sent to 
women’s magazines in 1938 show us that housewives ex rcised their ingenuity in 
managing home-cooked meals in an economical way:  
I make it a rule to use less beef [in making soup]; instead, I use MSG, hanagatsuo,301 
iriko,302 and kombu303 as substitutes… 
(Song K. S. 1938: 87)    
[a]mid endlessly soaring prices, it is impossible to eat as we did before, so I use 
cheap and nutrient-rich foodstuffs,  such as dried or salted sardines instead of buying 
sea bream and croaker. I have reduced by half the amount of beef used when making 
soup, and add a small fish instead…For the children’s s acks, I make porridge with 
boiled beans, and use the leftovers to make soup… 
(Pak K. S. 1938; 87)           
The scientific management of home-cooked meals based on nutritional knowledge 
                                                
298 ‘Chŏnsiha-ŭi yŏngyangsik subaekchong ‘sikt’akp’yo’ chaksŏng戰時下의營養食 数百種‘食卓表’作
成’ Tonga ilbo, 13 July 1940, p.3;   
299 See 5.1 about the campaigns of daily life improvement led by Tsuda Setsuko in colonial Korea.   
300 ‘Isang-chŏk sikt’akp’yo理想的食卓表’  Maeil sinbo, 11 July 1940, p.2.     
301 Shaved katsuobushi like petals. Katsuobushi s dried, smoked and cured bonito (a fish). When the fillets 
are as hard as a piece of wood, they are shaved, and these shavings have numerous uses, especially in 
making soup stock.   
302 A small dried fish used for making soup.  
303 Kelp, an essential ingredient in soup. 
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was the central theme of the home economics taught at girls’ schools. Before 1938, the 
scientific education for future housewives, while being called to be innovative, had been 
the subject of criticism in Korean society due to its impractical nature. However, by the 
time of the introduction of the colonial government’s wartime food policies, a theoretical 
knowledge of nutritional science had become an essential skill for housewives who were 
to meet their responsibilities of economically and efficiently managing the home on a war 
footing.      
The Rationalization of the Wartime Diet   
The concept of nutrition was not the only scientific aspect that housewives were 
encouraged to follow in managing family life: scient fically grounded rationalization 
(hamnihwa合理化) and efficiency (hyoyul効率) were other buzzwords that came with 
the rise of the scientific home management discourse. A  discussed in 6.1, the concepts of 
rationalization and efficiency were the symbols of modern domesticity, and were the 
definite goals of home economics education. Girls were taught to make the household 
budget last through budgeted living and saving, and to increase the labour efficiency of 
housework from the view-point of making a modern and happier family life.  
The modern theory of rationalization, originally invented in Western industrial 
nations to improve industrial efficiency, arrived in Korea via Japan. By the mid-1910s, 
the ‘efficiency movement’ in the domestic sphere had become active in Japan, influenced 
by the principles of rationalization advocated by Frederic Winslow Taylor (1856-1915) 
(Sand 2003: 84). Influenced by the Japanese, the term ‘rationalization’ became a 
household word by the 1930s in Korea, and was promoted by educated Koreans, 
including home economics educators, who wanted to reshape their domestic life for 
greater efficiency (So H. S. 2006: 151). During Japan’s wars with China and the Western 
powers (1937-1945), the discourse of rationalization was exploited as part of the war 
campaign of the colonial government which sought to mobilize all material and human 
resources to support the country’s war effort (Chŏng K. S. 2006: 32-34). 
The colonial government’s statement published in the January 1942 issue of 
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Kokumin sōryoku (National Total Mobilization),304 the official magazine of the Korean 
Federation, offers a telling example of how the discourse of rationalization gained 
nationalistic connotations: ‘Korean people must cutall unnecessary aspects from their 
lives so that they can devote the time, labour and materials saved to the benefit of the 
country’ (Anonymous 1942d: 124-125). This statement was made immediately after 
Japan declared war on America and Britain in December 1941. The authorities’ 
declaration was part of a simple war strategy which required the all-out mobilization of 
colonial Koreans to exercise economy in their daily life in order to sustain Japan’s war 
footing. Combined with the rhetoric of nutrition, the idea of the rationalization of home 
economics framed the model of scientific living, reflecting the colonial government’s war 
policies. Like other government directives concerning war mobilization, the 
rationalization of the diet was promoted through various state-involved campaigns.  
In the name of the rationalization of the diet, numerous guidelines to transform 
the eating habits of Korean people were introduced. As mentioned in 4.1, the number of 
side dishes at a meal was one of the issue most frequent dealt with when it came to the 
problems of Korean diet. Government-involved magazine articles pointed out the 
inefficiency of Koran diet arguing that Korean people’s practice of eating more than 
necessary would lead to excess of calorific intake, which would end up being passed out 
of the body without any nutritional benefit (Anonymous 1940c: 92; Anonymous 1940d: 
86). In terms of efficiency of meal preparation, the accurate measurement of all seasoning 
before cooking was encouraged in order to prevent waste, such as the juices left after 
boiling food. The importance of cooking meals according to the recipes to reduce food 
waste was also emphasized (Nakajima 1940: 41-42). In other words, the point of 
rationalizing the diet was to eat less food and to extract the maximum nutrition possible 
from meals using the smallest possible amount of fod, time and labour. Such dietary 
advice to enhance efficiency of everyday diet was provided people through many kinds of 
austerity campaigns and mass education throughout te country.  
However, as the government stated in the article of Kokumin sōryoku that ‘Korean 
                                                
304 The official magazine of the Korean Federation, Sōdōin, was renamed Kokumin sōryoku 国民総力
(National Total Mobilization) from the November 1940 issue.   
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people must cut all unnecessary aspects from their liv s’, cited earlier, the objects which 
should be rationalized within the government reform drive were not just material 
resources, but also people’s time and labour. According to Foucault, the power to control 
and dispose of an individual’s time in everyday life was useful for discipline and could be 
used to impose particular responsibilities upon people, eliminating anything that might 
disturb or distract them from their work (1991: 236). The colonial government paid great 
attention to controlling Korean housewives’ time, arguing that it was necessary to change 
their attitudes to living and their habits of time anagement which would enhance living 
efficiency. The authorities even went so far as to create housewives’ timetable in 1942, as 
shown in Table 6-1 below:  
Table 6-1: A daily timetable for housewives 
06.30 → noon Noon → 18.00 18.00 → 23.00 23.00 → 06.00 
-wake up, get dressed 
-cleaning (hallway, dining 
room)  
-preparing breakfast and 
lunch boxes 
- kyūjō yōhai 305 , radio 
gymnastics 
-sending children to school 









-clearing the table 
-going out, shopping, 
sewing 
-welcoming the 
children back from 




-eating dinner, enjoying 
the family circle  
-clearing the table 
-folding the laundry, 
sewing 
-preparing for the next 
day’s work (clothing, 
lunch boxes, shoe 
polishing) 
-reading and keeping 
books (diary, household 
accounts, planning for 
next day) 
-sleeping 
Source: Anonymous 1942d: 126      
By following this daily timetable, housewives were required to lead an orderly life in 
keeping with the discipline of the state. That all domestic duties were entrusted to 
housewives and that the emphasis was placed on the virtuous and economical 
motherhood – welcoming children home from school, creating a ‘family circle’ at dinner 
time, and keeping household accounts – indicate that the epitomized domestic life and 
housewives suggested by the colonial government had much in common with the 
                                                
305 Performing a salutation towards the Imperial Palace in Japan.  
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attributes of hyŏnmo yanch’ŏ within the new home ideology of 1920s’ Korea. However, 
at the same time, the authorities included disciplinary elements, such as kyūjō yōhai 宮城
遥拝 and silent prayer, in the daily practices of housewiv s. Korean women were 
required to follow this standard, to manage their household with discipline and to practice 
wartime moderation. The government also urged housewives to save at least 20 per cent 
of the family income through rational and well-scheduled housework. All the surplus 
capacity achieved by efficient home management had to be contributed to the country 
(Anonymous 1942d: 125).  
 Then, what specific roles were housewives expected to carry out to serve the 
country by saving their time and labour? It is likely that homemakers needed more time 
and to work harder to reduce their living expenses to the minimum. For example, in a 
reader’s letter printed in Yŏsŏng, one housewife said that she spent much more of her 
time sewing in order to patch and re-patch her family’s clothing, as she tried to mend as 
much as possible instead of buying new clothes (Kim . J. 1938: 87). In addition, 
housewives were increasingly required to get involved in the various war campaigns led 
by the government since many war mobilization projects (e.g., saving rice and collecting 
waste) were related to domestic duties. The fact that t e aegukpan organizations were 
chiefly led by female leaders, explained earlier in 2.1, is a case in point. Korean women 
were the major force who took the lead in promoting war-supporting campaigns.  
As the food shortages worsened, housewives were urgd to turn their time and 
labour to production activities, in which the majority of urban women had not previously 
engaged. Notwithstanding the expansion of the food rationing programme, the original 
aim of which was the even distribution of scarce food, the short supply through the 
rationing channels led to a widespread black market where things were traded at prices 
much higher than those that had been fixed. The prices of rice and other ingredients 
dramatically increased in the run up to 1945: in 1944, Seoul citizens had to pay twelve 
times the official price to buy white rice (see table 3-3 in Chapter Three). From 1940, the 
home businesses run by women to acquire foodstuffs or extra income, such as kitchen 
gardening, poultry farming and rabbit rearing, became a frequent topic in women’s 
magazines (Cho C. G., Yun J. Y., and Kye Y. G. 1940: 46-87; Chŏn H. J. 1940: 35).      
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In August 1941, Kawasaki, the head of the Korean Federation, announced official 
guidelines that promoted vegetable gardening. This wa part of the administrative effort 
to secure food resources which were in increasingly short supply, especially in city areas. 
He urged women to plant vegetables on unused ground near houses, schools and 
government buildings. Led by the Korean Federation, the vegetable gardening projects, 
from the distribution of seeds to fertilizing and from destroying insects to weeding, were 
managed by aegukpan units (Anonymous 1941f: 89-90). In the all-out war, the rational 
management of family life, which had once been regarded as a symbol of the modern 
‘wise mother, good wife’, became an essential skill for good ‘wartime home managers’. 
The focus on efficiency in the household shifted from the improvement of individual life 
to the serving of the nation.  
Another issue that frequently arose within the discourse of the rationalization of 
domestic life was the synchronization of family meals in the Korean home. As discussed 
in 6.1, the segregation of the time and space for family meals in Korean houses was one 
of the key issues discussed by Korean nationalist reformers who wanted to modernize 
Korean domesticity. The colonial authorities also recognized this Korean eating practice 
as irrational, and urged Koreans to eat together as a f mily. However, the main motivation 
behind the Japanese authorities’ discouragement of this Korean eating habit was their 
desire to use the time for eating home-cooked meals to spiritually indoctrinate the Korean 
people, rather than the viewpoint of modernization of daily lives of the people.  
The political significance of eating together in the Korean home was clearly 
represented in a booklet called Katei seikatsu saiken undō yōkō家庭生活再建運動要綱 
(Guidelines of the Movement for Domestic Life Reconstruction) published in 1943 by the 
Hamgyŏngnam-do Federation for Total National Mobilization, a provincial branch of the 
Korean Federation. The booklet was written to encourage the reform of Korean domestic 
life. Setting out its major goal as ‘instilling a sense of nationhood grounded in loyalty in 
Korean family life by inculcating the emperor-centred Japanese spirit’, the movement had 
four objectives: 1) kyūjō yōhai and offering prayers following Japanese Shinto; 2) the 
renovation of manners among family; 3) the improvement of eating habits; and 4) the use 
of the national (Japanese) language (Kokumin sŏryoku Hamgyŏng-namdo renmei 1943: 1, 
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2, 4, and 8). Along with other essential colonial projects which aimed to spiritually 
indoctrinate the Korean people during the final years of Japanese rule, the matter of the 
family meal was considered highly important.  
The eating of a common meal with family members was promoted as a 
fundamental method of uplifting the spirit of national solidarity among Koreans. The 
avowed reasons why meals must be eaten together were mo e practical, such as the 
Korean custom being ‘a wasteful practice in terms of the labour and time of housewives’ 
and it ‘depriv[ing] Koreans of the opportunities ofthe ‘family circle’, leading to the 
harmful effect of making housewives ignorant and of bringing a frigid atmosphere into 
the home’ (Kokumin sōryoku Hamgyŏng-namdo renmei 1943: 7-8) However, a closer 
look at the detailed guidelines for home-cooked meals reveals the political intention of 
the colonial authorities, which sought to inculcate  totalitarian ideology among Koreans. 
The advice in the above-mentioned booklet instructs the Koreans to 1) wait until all 
members are gathered; 2) give thanks for the food before and after meals in chorus; and 
3) eat together at the same table. In addition, the heads of the household were encouraged 
to talk about the country’s war situation with their family members, and help their 
children understand the country’s position (Ibid.). While the encouragement of the 
synchronization of family meals in Korea had not been stimulated with political 
connotation, by the time of the Japan’s all-out waryears, it was certainly discussed within 
a political frame by the authorities.        
The use of family mealtimes as a political tool was one of Meiji Japan’s nation-
building projects which had been implemented several decades earlier in Japan. The 
Japanese scholar Omote states that the Japanese domestic discourse that had emerged by 
the end of the nineteenth century was linked to the M iji reformers’ ‘policies of 
paternalism’ (Omote 2006: 376). Initially influenced by the Victorian ‘cult of 
domesticity’, the Japanese ideology created a picture of the home as the place for family 
members to gather together, in addition to instilling moral and educational values. Within 
this ideology, according to Omote, the image of the family circle eating together had 
taken shape by 1890. The image was used to reinforce nationalistic ideology among the 
Japanese people through the conscious efforts of the Meiji leaders who identified the 
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Japanese Empire as a unique ‘family state’ led by the emperor (Ibid.). As a result, the 
synchronization of family meals, a revolution in eating for the late nineteenth-century 
Japanese, was disseminated within urban Japanese families during the first decades of the 
twentieth century (Cwiertka 2006a: 92-93). The issue of synchronization of family meals 
in the Korean home was a part of Meiji Japan’s political apparatus grounded in 
totalitarian view which escalated during the Japan’s wartime years of the 1930s and 
1940s.  
Women’s knowledge and skills to rationally and efficiently run households was 
regarded by the Japanese authorities as a vital instrument in executing war policies. 
While home economics in colonial emerged led by discur ive forces motivated by 
different agenda of multiple players, the most powerful factor in the dissemination of the 
modern academic discipline among Koran women was the food policy of the colonial 
government. The Japanese government placed great faith in the scientific solution – 
efficient nourishment grounded in nutrition and family management – for wartime food 
shortages. As Cwiertka states, under the Japanese doctrine of ‘total war’, nutritional 
science was transformed from the domain of scientific specialists into practical advice for 
ordinary people (2006a: 117).  
Japanese home economics education and hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ ideology in it turned 
colonial Korean women into professional housewives. Within the colonial frame, Korean 
women modernized themselves by practicing science i their home. After 1938, however, 
home economics was fully exploited adopted as the sate apparatus for training Korean 
women to be imperial housewives who put scientific principles into practice in the 
framework of the wartime austerity policies. The legacy of colonial modernity in relation 
to housekeeping reforms and the ideology of hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ remain essentially intact 
in twenty-first century Korea, and continue to shape Korean women’s attitudes towards 




























Chapter Seven  
The Food and Economic Policies of the South Korean Government 
 
Turner observed that the growth of systematic knowledge coincides with the extension of 
power-relations, especially with the exercise of state social control over people’s bodies 
in the social space. Scientific advance, according to him, does not liberate the body from 
external control, but rather intensifies the means of ocial regulation (Turner 1982a: 23). 
As a vehicle in which such a disciplinary mechanism functioned, formal education 
systems in modern states have played an important role in shaping people’s eating 
practices by offering nutritional education that keeps people fit and healthy in an efficient 
way (Smith and Nicoloson 1995; Akiyama 2008).   
 As the Japanese colonial authorities had relied upon education to keep Korean 
people healthy and productive, and to train them to anage their diet rationally to fit with 
the state’s policies, so the South Korean government attached great importance to 
education for reforming the eating habits of Korean people. This chapter will attempt to 
explore the intensive involvement of the South Korean government in reshaping the diet 
of its people through various instruments within education. I will pay special attention to 
the influence of economic and political issues on the policies of food education in schools, 
which ultimately aimed to alter Korean children’s eating habits. Each of the following 
two sections addresses the programmes of food education implemented as an important 
part of school education in Korea for several decads uring the latter half of the 
twentieth century.      
 As earlier chapters have discussed, Korea was a rice – the most preferred staple – 
deficit country until the 1970s, and self-sufficiency in it remained an important national 
goal (Kihl and Bark 1981: 47). Foreign food aid, which was initially started to ease the 
food shortage in post-colonial Korea but continued for more than two decades, changed 
the dietary habits of the Korean people. In particular, the vast amounts of American-
produced surplus wheat led to a major transformation in the Korean diet, in combination 
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with the state’s economic policy (Kong C. U. 2008: 143). Food aid gave the Korean 
government the opportunity to promote the consumption of wheat-based foods and to 
discourage people from eating rice as a staple. This strategy enabled rice to be saved, 
which in turn was very beneficial for the South Korean economy.  
 The school lunch programme, which will be dealt with in the first section of this 
chapter, was one of the major educational tools used to inculcate new eating habits in 
Korean children. Originally initiated as a relief project, the lunch programme provided 
pupils with meals in accordance with the larger forces of state food policies rather than 
the recipient’s nutritional needs. This was highly political matter – as noted by Susan 
Levine who has researched American school lunch programme in the book School Lunch 
Politics’ (Levine 2008). Later on, the focus of this chapter will shift to the campaign of 
honbunsik changnyŏ (encouraging the eating of barley and wheat-based foo s), a 
nationwide government movement which forcefully penetrated school education and 
directly affected children’s eating habits. In this chapter, I will argue that food education 
within the formal school system in Korea was a political apparatus carefully designed for 
the purpose of the economic development of the country, and was crucial in the formation 
of Korean eating habits in the twentieth century.  
7.1 The School Lunch Programme  
From Powdered Skimmed Milk to Bread-centred Meals  
One of the most remarkable results attained from the implementation of the 
Self-supported School Lunch Programme306 of last year was that children’s 
habits of eating only what they want [p’yŏnsik] was corrected. By making 
children eat foods, such as bread and milk, which had been avoided by them 
thus far simply because the foods did not suit their taste, we were able to 
ensure the pupils’ nutritional improvement. Children were taught table 
manners, how to eat quickly, and came to have sense of hygiene through 
washing their hands before having meals. The programme proved to be very 
popular among parents because they did not have to prepare lunchboxes for 
                                                
306 A type of school lunch programme initiated in 1972 in rural Korea.      
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their children. This successfully aroused parents’ interest and led to their 
active involvement in the lunch programme.  
(Vice Principal of Taesa Primary School in Kimhae county Kwŏn H. G. 
1975: 131)  
 On 14 January 1977, the South Korean Ministry of Education enacted 
fundamental policies for the implementation of the school307 lunch programme in the 
Rules of the School Lunch Programme (Hakkyo kŭpsik kyuch’ik學校給食規則). The 
establishment of these comprehensive rules took place more than two decades after the 
school lunch programme was initiated in 1953. Making it clear that the lunch programme 
was part of school education, the 1977 Rules set th overall tone for the Korean 
government’s school lunch policies. They also laid the foundation for the ‘School Lunch 
Law’ (Hakkyo kŭpsikpŏp學校給食法), an independent and comprehensive legal basis for 
the school lunch programme, promulgated on 29 January 1981 (Kim and Yang 2002: 12-
13). The aims of the school lunch programme, as described in the 1977 Rules were to  
a. promote the correct understanding of nutrition and inculcate good eating habits 
in the daily diet  
b. build good human relationships and create a spirit of collaboration by making 
children’s school lives better 
c. promote the rationalization of eating, nutritional improvement and health 
enhancement 
d. contribute to the implementation of state policies of food consumption by giving 
pupils an appreciation of the production and distribution of food resources  
e. run it as a part of Saemaŭl undong308 with the cooperation of parents and local 
communities in order to achieve a self-supported school lunch system [rather than 
relying on the government’s support]   
 (Hakkyo kŭpsik paeksŏ p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe309 1978: 275-276) 
Over a decade since the school meals programme began, the principle aim of Korean 
school lunch programme was to improve physical and mental well-being of children. 
                                                
307 This section only deals with the school lunch programme that operated in primary schools in Korea, 
since middle schools which had school meals programmes were extremely limited until the beginning of 
the 1990s. Hereafter, I will use the terms ‘schools’ and ‘children’ to refer to ‘primary schools’ and ‘primary 
school children’.        
308 The issue of Saemaŭl undong is discussed further in section 5.2.  
309 HKPP’W 
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However, the fourth article cited above clearly shows the frame under which school 
children’s health was to be improved: it suggests that he school lunch programme served 
as an opportunity to teach pupils about state economic policies. Such a strategic aim for 
the school lunch programme was very different from its initial intention – relief – when it 
was introduced in the early 1950s. 
The Korean school lunch programme was initiated supported by food aid from 
abroad, to ease malnutrition and starvation among children after the Korean War (1950-
1953). Children from destitute families and remote ar as were offered lunches prepared 
in their school facilities free of charge. Until 1956, powdered skimmed milk from the 
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) was provided as the 
school meal. Cornmeal was included in the food donati  in 1961 courtesy of the 
Cooperative for American Remittance to Everywhere (CARE), which gave the Korean 
government food between 1957 and 1966 (Ibid.: 99). In principle, a cup of reconstituted 
powdered milk (containing 35 grams of powdered milk) was supposed to be offered to 
each child. However, due to insufficient kitchen facilities and the cost of labour and fuel, 
not all schools were able to prepare the lunches (Ibid.: 63). Many children were given 
uncooked milk powder, which often led to diarrhoea when eaten without being dissolved. 
Thus, the milk powder gained a bad reputation among the children and their parents, and 
frequently ended up as livestock feed. Circumstances did not much change after cornmeal 
was provided since it also needed to be cooked before serving. Although cornmeal gruel 
was a welcome addition for many children, the difficulty of preparing it remained (Sŏng 
K. H. 1972: 47-49).   
The introduction of bread, which could be mass-produce  in factories, into 
school meals was the perfect solution to dealing with the problem of cooking in schools. 
Mass-produced bread was first made successfully in Pusan in 1963. It was distributed to 
95,000 children in 66 schools, and was considered a groundbreaking event in the history 
of the Korean school lunch programme. The provision of school lunches using mass-
produced bread was copied by 359 schools in eighteen cities, including Seoul, in the 
following year. By June 1966, 1,456 schools throughout the country had introduced the 
new system and were providing 1,252,000 children with bread for lunch (HKPP’W 1978: 
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97, 116). Between 1963 and 1966, the number of children who ate factory-produced 
school meals in Seoul more than tripled, from 65,874 children at 52 schools to 223,000 at 
140 (Sŏng K. H. 1972: 48). By 1966, school children in nearly every city in Korea were 
provided with a piece of bread weighing 124 grams for their lunch. The bread was made 
from 62 grams of cornmeal, 40 grams of powdered milk and one gram of sugar, and was 
supposed to provide each child with 308 kilo calories.310 Lunches were provided on ten to 
twenty days per month.311 Although the lack of fermentation meant that the cornmeal 
bread hardened quickly, to the extent that it was known as ‘stone bread’ among children, 
the success of the mass production of bread created the basis for the dissemination of the 
school lunch programme in Korea (Sŏng K. H. 1972: 48). 
The true development of the Korean school lunch programme was made possible 
by the delivery of wheat flour. This was donated by the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), which took over from CARE in 1966, and continued to provide 
food for Korean school children until 1972. The newly provided wheat flour and 
vegetable oil, specially provided to produce better quality bread, definitely improved the 
quality of school meals: white bread replaced the previous cornmeal bread (HKPP’W 
1978: 147-148). The use of wheat flour enabled more children, especially those living in 
impoverished remote areas, to eat meals at their schools. From 1968, pupils at schools 
which had neither cooking facilities nor proper methods of transportation to deliver 
children’s meals on time were provided with factory-p oduced hard-tack (kŏnppang) 
which kept longer than white bread (Ibid.: 67). Betw en 1966 and 1970, the annual 
supply of wheat flour from USAID increased from 11,043 metric tons to 35,906, 
gradually replacing cornmeal (Pak C. G. 1986: 18).  
Wheat flour donated by America not only transformed the food on the children’s 
lunch trays but was also enormously influential in shaping the school lunch system in 
Korea. Although America’s food donations to foreign countries were based on the 
humanitarian grounds of helping those in need, there were also economic and political 
                                                
310 ‘Kyŏlsik adong-e sikppang nae 10-put’ŏ K’ea wŏnjo缺食兒童에 食빵 來 10부터 케아援助’, 
Kyŏnghyang sinmun京郷新聞, 29 February 1964, p.8.    
311 ‘Ŏrinidŭl-e simgakhan ch’un’gung어린이들에 深刻한 春窮’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 26 April 1963, p.7.  
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motivations behind such aid. The delivery of agricultural products to America’s occupied 
nations after the Second World War was part of a str tegy to expand America’s future 
international trade options. Wheat flour was shipped to Korea on the basis of Public Law 
480 (PL 480) of America that aimed at expanding the future export market for US 
agricultural products, as I will discuss further later in this section.  
School lunch programmes were a primary vehicle for absorbing US food imports 
in indigenous countries. There were two main reasons f r this. First of all, it was vital to 
create future customers for American food in Korea (HKPP’W 1978: 98). Secondly, 
according to Solt, this US strategy was essential to creating the healthy workforce needed 
for recovery in the occupation zones, which would reduce America’s burden of 
supporting the countries, and become bastions against the expansion of the communist 
Soviet force (2010: 191, 193). In this respect, South Korea was strategically a very 
important area as it was in direct contact with the communist enemy in North Korea.312 
Thus, the US authorities saw the South Korean school lunch programme as a serious 
matter in terms of their own economic and political interests. 
After 1966 the US government made concerted efforts t  complete the setting up 
of the school lunch system in Korea before the aid programme came to an end in 1972.313 
In the agreements on food assistance made in 1966 and 1968 between the Korean and US 
authorities, it was agreed to promote the lunch programme as part of the national agenda 
of the Korean government, and that all Korean children would be school lunch recipients 
by 1972 (HKPP’W 1978: 196, 202). These contracts included detailed promotion plans 
for the Korean government, including the yearly budget allocation for the programme, the 
reform of school lunch administration, the development of new school meals schemes, 
and a plan to expand the number of recipients (Ibid.: 212, 222-223). American provisions 
were to be delivered to Korea on the condition that t e Korean government fulfil its 
duties (Ibid.: 57). Whatever the reason behind the aid policy of the US government, it 
                                                
312 In pursuit of the political and economic stabilizat on of the southern part of the Korean peninsula, the 
US authorities paid special attention to the management of food resources during the years of its occupation 
of southern Korea (1945-1948) and after the establishment of the South Korean government in 1948. See 
1.2.   
313 ‘Kyŏlsiga kŭpsik chungdan wigi缺食兒급식 中斷위기’ Tonga ilbo東亜日報, 9 April 1968, p.7.    
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was important for the Korean government to receive food assistance to feed its 
undernourished children, who numbered 1.2 million or 20 per cent of the total number of 
Korean children by 1969 (Ibid.: 219).  
After the signing of the 1966 food aid contract with the US, the system of school 
lunches in Korea began to be consolidated. Organizational reinforcement began in July 
1969 with the creation of the Department for School Lunches (Kŭpsikkwa급식과), the 
first organization responsible for school lunch administration under the Ministry of 
Education (Kim and Yang 2002: 10). Thus far, the administration of the school lunch 
programme had involved two organizations, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the 
Ministry of Education. All provisions, including wheat flour for school use, had first been 
handled and allocated by the former, with the practic l operation of the meals programme 
supervised by the latter. The establishment of a separate department was intended to 
improve administrative efficiency as well as ensure th  centralized management of the 
school lunch system. As a result of the creation of this new organization, by the beginning 
of 1970 full responsibility for the school lunch system had been entrusted to the Ministry 
of Education (HKPP’W 1978: 85). This reorganization shows that the school meals 
programme came to be officially recognized as an educational policy rather than as a 
social welfare project. Accordingly, the goal of school lunch programme expanded from 
so-called ‘relief-feeding’ (kuho kŭpsik 求護給食), to ‘nourishing feeding’ (yŏngyang 
kŭpsik 營養給食), which was not only intended for undernourished children but to 
provide many pupils with balanced nutrition to ensure their healthy growth (Pak C. G. 
1986: 16).  
The ‘General School Lunch Programme’ (ilban kŭpsik일반급식) introduced in 
1968 was one of the initial steps taken by the Korean government to introduce a self-
supported school-lunch system in anticipation of inter ational food aid coming to an end 
in 1972. This scheme was not free of charge, but all children qualified if their parents 
paid for their lunches. The lunch was either a piece of factory-produced (white) bread 
and/or a cup of (reconstituted powdered) milk (Kyoyuk injŏk chawŏnbu 2000: 228). This 
scheme was part of the various plans jointly designed with the US government for the 
Chapter Seven  
320 
purpose of strengthening and expanding the school meals system in Korea (HKPP’W 
1978: 254).   
For the stable management and expansion of the systm, it was imperative that 
the scheme was paid for by parents, enabling the government to draw operational 
expenses from it (Ibid.: 110). Even while foodstuffs were still being provided without 
charge from America, the Korean government’s expenditure on the operation of the lunch 
programme had grown with the increasing number of recipients. Moreover, as the 
termination of food assistance approached, the Korean government was required to share 
the cost of the food aid with the US government. By 1972, for example, the Korean 
government had to cover half of the expenses for the delivery of the food from the US 
(Ibid.: 97).  
Budget shortfall frequently prevented the smooth operation of the school lunch 
programme. For instance, in early 1968, before the General Lunch system was introduced, 
the existing free lunch programme was halted for moe than six months in Seoul. This 
was because of protests from the bakers about the low price they received from the 
government: while the production cost of a piece of bread was 1.15 wŏn, the money paid 
for it by the government was just 0.98 wŏn.314 To prevent the money shortages that 
caused such problems, the Korean authorities needed to secure financial backing through 
the paid-for lunch programme.315      
Starting in October 1968 in Seoul, the General School Lunch Programme was 
introduced to schools in Kyŏngsang-pukto in the following year. Within a few years, the 
system had spread to many urban areas where parents w re affluent enough to be able to 
afford to share the cost of the lunches. By 1977 nearly 800,000 children were 
participating in the paid-for school lunch programme throughout the country (HKPP’W 
1978: 110, 172). The programme using factory-produce  bread continued to expand until 
1977, when the scheme was suddenly abolished due to a fo d-poisoning scandal in Seoul 
in which one child died and more than 5,000 became seriously ill. Because of this 
                                                
314 ‘Hoengsŏl susŏl 횡설수설’ , Tonga ilbo, 29 June 1968, p.1; ‘Kungmingyo kŭpsik ppang 
chungdan국민교給食빵中斷’ , Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 26 March 1968, p.4. 
315 ‘Kungmingyo kŭpsik ppang yuryo-ro국민교給食빵 有料로’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 31 July 1968, p.8.    
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incident, the use of factory-produced bread in school meals was prohibited. Only schools 
equipped with their own kitchen facilities were allowed to serve lunches to children. Thus, 
the number of pupils who ate school lunches declined sharply, from 1.2 million, or 22 per 
cent of school children in Korea, to 129,000 children, or 2.3 per cent (Kim and Yang 
2002: 23-24). Despite this incident, the ten-year implementation of the General School 
Lunch Programme provided children with the opportunity to eat bread, and played an 
important role in children’s acceptance of the new pattern of eating bread at meals.  
Another step taken by the Korean government in preparation for its self-
supported school meals operation was the establishment of seventeen experimental 
‘Model Schools’ (sibŏm hakkyo시범학교) in 1968. With the aim of establishing a new 
type of school lunch programme supported by local communities and parents, the 
government distributed between 2.5 and 3 million wŏn per school in urban areas for the 
creation of cooking facilities (HKPP’W 1978: 122-3). Under this scheme, parents were 
required to contribute to the cost of the ingredients. This system did not spread because 
the General School Lunch programme was favourable for those urban schools without 
cooking facilities, but relatively substantial meals were offered that met government 
nutritional standards (providing 830 kilo calories per meal) and recommendations from 
nutritionists (Ibid.: 123, 125). For example, a lunch prepared at Chŏnnong primary school 
in Seoul consisted of a piece of bread accompanied by a bowl of soup, a cup of milk and 
an egg316 (Pak C. G. 1986: 20).        
The rural version of the Model School project was lunched in 1972. Beginning 
with two schools in Kyǒnggi-do and Chǒllanam-do, the number of schools involved 
gradually increased to 55 by 1975 (HKPP’W 1978: 167, 170). As was the case with its 
urban predecessor, the costs of establishing cooking equipment were met by the 
government. A substantial difference in the schemes wa  the fact that in rural areas 
parents were required to help in the preparation of meals at the school facilities or to 
provide labour for school gardening, which was introduced with the aim of producing 
supplementary ingredients, such as vegetables, for school meals. Since production 
                                                
316 The source does not specify how the egg was cooked. However, considering the practicality of serving 
eggs to a large number of children, we may surmise that it was most probably hard boiled.   
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activities accompanied this scheme, this programme was referred as to the ‘Self-
supported School Lunch’ (chahwal kŭpsik 자활급식). A typical lunch menu in this 
scheme would include a wheat-based staple, such as a piece of bread or noodles 
(kuksu,317 sujebi318), and a bowl of soup accompanied by one or two side d shes, such as 
an egg or kimch’i, or by a glass of (reconstituted powdered) milk (HKPP’W 1978: 167-
169; Pak C.G. 1986: 20).  
The fact that staple foods provided under these newly developed schemes was 
bread denotes that the expansion of the scope of the Korean school lunch programmes 
closely related to the availability of bread for school meals. Food aid, especially wheat 
flour from the US provided under the PL 480 programme, had a considerable influence 
on the introduction of wheat-based foods as a fixed component within school meals.  
School Meals, the Source of Nutritional Deficiency?  
As shown at the beginning of this section, the concepts of ‘nutritional improvement’ and 
‘health enhancement’ were clearly spelled out as two of the major principles behind 
introducing school meals in the ‘Rules of the School Lunch Programme’ promulgated in 
1977. A government-edited home economics text-book published in 1979 describes the 
goal of school lunches as: ‘to raise the nation’s physical standards’ and ‘to provide 
children with supplementary nutrition which cannot be covered by only eating home-
cooked meals’ (Mun’gyobu 1979: 10).  
Indeed, the improvement of nutrition and health wasthe promotion statement of 
the Korean government which sought to expand the scool meals system. Nutritional 
experts were also active in promoting the importance of school lunches as a source of 
enhanced nutrition for children. For example, Hyŏn Ki-sun, a former professor at Seoul 
National University, stressed that every meal eaten by children should be appropriately 
nutritious in order to foster their complete development, and that the aim of school meals 
was to achieve the perfect development of children (1972: 254). Supposedly, adequate 
nourishment was of primary importance in school meals.  
                                                
317 Noodle soup.   
318 Dumpling soup. 
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Yet, in contrast, the school meals actually provided to children were not 
nutritious. For example, under the General Lunch Programme, which started in 1968 and 
was prevalent by the latter half of the 1970s with approximately 800,000 participants, 
children were supposed to be offered a piece of factory-produced bread and a cup of 
(reconstituted powdered) milk, as mentioned earlier. However, from the beginning of the 
programme, only a handful of children received the milk. The majority of children were 
only offered a piece of bread and nothing to drink. As of 1975, the number of school 
lunch participants in Seoul who received milk (with bread) did not exceed ten per cent of 
the total number of school meal recipients due to the instability of the supply of milk.319 
The General School Lunch programme was a target of criticism in the Korean media for 
the lack of nourishment it provided.320 
In terms of the children’s nutritional requirements set out by the government, a 
piece of bread was short on nutrients. According to a study conducted by a research team 
at Yonsei University in 1967, school meals were less nutritious than lunchboxes prepared 
at home, not to mention the nutritional standards. The research report particularly 
emphasized the obvious inadequacy of the vitamins contained in bread for children’s 
health, as table 7-1 shows (HKPP’W 1978: 68).  
Table 7-1: The nutritional values of a school lunch compared to a typical lunchbox and 
the nutritional standard    
 Calories Protein 
(g) 















534.9 17.3 8.385 197.55 210 0.383 0.23 1 
Lunchbox 619 16 3.2 55 658 0.56 0.29 9.7 
Nutritional 
standard 
(1/3 of a 
day) 
830 25 11 300 600 0.4 0.5 2 
*International Units 
                                                
319 ‘Hakkyo kǔpsig-ǔn hwaktae twaeya handa學校給食은擴大돼야한다’, Tonga ilbo, 22 May 1975, p.5; 
‘Ajikto kil m ŏn ‘uyu masigi’아직도 길 먼「우유마시기」’Maeil kyŏngje매일경제, 10 April 1972, p.7; 
‘Chŭngnyang sŏdunŭn wŏnyu konggŭp增量서두는 原乳공급’, Maeil kyŏngje, 28 June 1973, p.7.       
320 ‘Memarŭn ppang hana nanjŏm mahnŭn kukkyosaeng kŭpsik메마른 빵 하나 難點많은 國校生급식’ , 
Tonga ilbo, 31 October 1968, p.7.  
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Source: HKPP’W 1978: 68 
Another more specific study of 2,130 children, 1,920 parents and 79 teachers at 
five Seoul schools in 1969 reveals similar results about the nutritional content of school 
meals and people’s dissatisfaction with the food. While the calorific intake of children 
who brought lunchboxes ranged between 560 and 830 kilo calories, that of school-lunch 
eaters was only 465 kilo calories (Cho and Ch’oe 1969: 60-61). It was found that a large 
majority of those questioned in the three groups thoug t that a piece of bread was not 
entirely nutritious for a child’s lunch. People thought that the lunch provided could hardly 
be said to be a meal, more a snack (Ibid.: 60). A mother who lived in Seoul complained 
about such school meals at a round-table talk of housewives. She referred to the bread 
served in schools as a ‘great problem’, saying:  
I cannot understand why [the school lunch programme] is being managed so 
irresponsibly… for the hungry children [a piece of]bread would be better than 
nothing, but for the rest of the children it would be much better to bring a lunchbox. 
I think [children] should have something more [with the piece of bread], such as 
milk or even spinach namul.321 Nutrient-enhanced bread is still better, but bread 
made with only wheat flour is pathetic.322  
School lunches were also unpopular among children. In some schools, a piece of 
bread was provided all through the week without variation or consideration of the eater, 
who might be sick of being served the same meal day after day.323 Depending on the 
school, the meal might have been varied by including bread filled with cream or sweet 
bean paste; however, the food was still unattractive to children due to its bad taste.324 The 
unpopularity of the bread was proved by a test at a model school: no child or parent chose 
the school bread when they had choice of school lunch bread and ordinary bread 
(HKPP’W 1978: 129). Other than the low quality or nutritional inadequacy of school 
                                                
321 A side dish eaten daily by Koreans. Namul sometimes referred to all vegetables grown in the mountains 
or fields, and sometimes to side dishes made with vegetables. Namul might be served raw, fried lightly in 
oil or slightly boiled in water.    
322 ‘Chwadamhoe ch’in’gŭnhaejin sikppang-ŭl chŏm handa座談會친근해진 식식식 點한다’,  
Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 7 April 1969, p.5.  
323 ‘Yŏngyang kyŏlp’ib-e ‘puch’aejil’營養결핍에「부채질」’, Maeil kyŏngje. 12 November 1968, p.3. 
324 ‘‘K ŏmŭn ppang’ hakkyo kŭpsik(ha) ‘검검식’학교 給食(下)’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 21 September 
1977,p.7.  
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lunch bread, it should be clarified that bread itself, which became a permanent fixture as a 
staple on the Korean school lunch menu in the 1960s, wa  unfamiliar to most children. 
They had difficulties in adapting to bread-based school lunches since their home meals 
were all centred around rice (and barley) (Ibid.).  
The rising standard of living during the 1960s325 in Korea led to a transformation 
in the pattern of food consumption, including an increased intake of meat. However, 
statistical data from the Korean government shows that people ate a lot of crop-based 
food, most of which consisted of rice, until the 1970s. During the periods 1962-1965, 
1966-1970, and 1971-1975, Korean people’s calorific intakes from crop-based food 
accounted for 95.7 per cent (2,188 kilo calories out f a total intake of 2,285.6 kilo 
calories), 94.4 per cent (2309.2 out of 2446.4), and 93.6 per cent (2424.4 out of 2591.4) 
respectively. The majority of the energy intake from crop-based foods was from cereals: 
84 per cent, 83.4 per cent, and 82.8 per cent respectively (Ch’oe H. J. 1993: 66-68). Rice 
was the most eaten food among the grains consumed by Koreans (see table 7-2). These 
results indicate that boiled rice (with a certain amount of barley) was the major element 
of Koreans’ staple consumption.  
Table 7-2: Daily grain consumption per person in Korea, 1962-1975  
Years 1962-1965 1966-1970 1971-1975 
Total grain consumption  537.7g (100%) 565.9g (100%) 567.6g (100%) 
Rice 337.7g (62.8%) 336.6g (59.5 %) 344.1g (60.6%) 
Barley 129.0g (24.0%) 166.7g (29.5%) 142.6g (25.1%) 
Wheat 55.2g (10.2%) 52.3g (9.2%) 71.7g (12.5%) 
Others  15.8g (3.0%) 10.3g (1.8) 9.8g (1.7%) 
  Source: Ch’oe H. J. 1993: 44 
 Naturally, children’s daily meals largely included rice and barley as the staple. A 
study into children’s lunchboxes carried out in 1970 in Ch’ungch’ŏngnam-do and 
Ch’ungch’ŏng-pukto clearly reveals the pattern of meals for Kean children at that time. 
According to the study, only six children brought white or sweet potatoes or wheat-based 
foods as their lunches out of a total of 658 pupils. In tead, 416 children, or 63.2 per cent, 
                                                
325 See 5.2.  
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had boiled rice mixed with barley, and 103 children, or 15.7 per cent, brought just boiled 
rice (Kim K. N. 1970: 365). In essence, these studies suggest that the school meals were 
not appreciated by Korean children, both in terms of nutritional need and the food 
preference.     
Eating School Lunches for the National Economy and Defence  
In a study of America’s school lunch programme, Levin  stated that the principle of 
school lunches is surely rooted in nutritional scien e and the idea of a healthy diet for 
children (2008: 2). However, she demonstrates how nutritional issues and the health of 
children have taken a back seat within the structural barriers created by political power, 
and how children’s meals in the dining hall have ben determined by ‘external’ – political 
and agricultural – influences. The same was true of the school lunch programme in Korea. 
Although it was initiated as a social programme to ase malnutrition among children, the 
school lunch programme was shaped under the powerful infl ence of national economic 
policies. The reliance on bread in school meals wasdetermined less by the nutritional 
benefits of wheat-based foods than by the Korean government’s desire to boost the 
consumption of wheat, the relatively cheaper substitute staple for rice, and to reduce the 
consumption of rice. The school lunch programme was part of national economic policy.    
While rice has been the backbone of Korean agriculture for long periods and is 
most preferred by Koreans as the staple food, it remained a luxury foodstuff that only a 
limited number of the wealthy could afford to consume until only a few decades ago due 
to its high price and insufficient yields. By the 1960s, the shortage of rice became more 
conspicuous due to dramatic industrialization accompanied by urbanization: the 
consumption of rice per capita grew continuously throughout the 1960s (see Table 5-2), 
resulting in the self-sufficiency rate for rice falling from 100.8 per cent in 1960 to 81 per 
cent by 1969 (Kim P. T’ 2004: 506), and annual imports f rice increased sharply, from 
112,604 metric tons to 907,407 metric tons between 1967 and 1971 (Nongsusanbu 1978: 
436). The enormous amount of money spent on rice imports posed a serious threat to the 
Korean government, which was aiming to establish export-oriented economic 
development (see 5.2). In these circumstances, saving rice became an important national 
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economic goal, and the school lunch programme was regarded as a huge potential 
opportunity to transform the eating habits of children, making them accustomed to eating 
other staples and breaking the habit of consuming rice.         
The large quantities of wheat flour which had been d livered to Korea since the 
1950s were hoped to be the new staple grain for the Kor an people. After the armistice 
agreement of 1953, post-war reconstruction projects in South Korea were initiated that 
relied on aid supplies from international organizations and foreign countries. Between 
1954 and 1959 $1.44 billion worth of aid goods were delivered by the Foreign Operation 
Administration (FOA) and International Cooperation Administration (ICA),326  and $122 
million worth were delivered by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency 
(UNKRA) in the period 1951-58 (Yi T. G. 2002: 320, 327).  
It was the aid programme based on PL 480 which becam  tremendously 
influential on the Korean government’s policy of encouraging the consumption of wheat-
based foods. The PL 480 law was created in 1954 in America as a solution to the surplus 
grain problem caused by huge stocks of American grain which could not be sold on the 
country’s domestic market. To protect American farme s and grain companies from 
unprofitable business led by a decline in the price of grain, the US government set aside a 
sizeable market outside America without affecting its internal market situation. Setting 
one of its goals as ‘to encourage economic development in the developing countries’, the 
US government anticipated the expansion of US agricultural commodities to international 
trade (Wallensteen 1976: 285-286). While other aid programmes for Korea consisted of 
providing a variety of supplies or meeting development costs, such as materials and 
research costs for the mining and manufacturing industries, the PL 480 programme only 
provided agricultural products. The deliveries began as an aid project but gradually 
became a long-term loan after 1961, continuing until 1976 (Chŏng H. G. 1988: 16). 
Starting with the introduction of raw cotton and leaf tobacco in 1955, more than $164 
billion worth of wheat, barley, rice, canned pork and cooking oil were shipped to Korea 
in just the 1950s (Table 7-3).  
                                                
326 As a result of a reorganization in the US governmet, responsibility for Korean aid-administration 
moved from the FOA to the ICA from 1955.   
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Table 7-3: The value of agricultural products imported from the US to South Korea under 
the PL 480 aid programme, 1955-1959    
(Millions of US dollars) 
Years 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 Total 
Grain (total) 
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 14,839 46,896 18,758 49,878 33,780 164,251 (100%) 
Source: Yi T. G. 2002: 335 
Between 1955 and 1959, grain accounted for nearly 80 per cent of the total aided value of 
farm products. The total value of wheat was $66,162,000,000, or more than half of the 
overall value. While the amount of wheat donated increased between 1955 and 1959, 
those of barley and rice, which had been generally consumed as staples by Koreans, fell. 
This illustrates that the grains originally eaten by Koreans were being replaced by wheat-
based foods made from American wheat.  
Moreover, the amount of imported grain exceeded the amount needed in Korea. 
For example, while the grain deficit in 1957 equalled 5,859,000 sŏk (approximately 
837,840 metric tons), the amount of imported grain totalled 6,317,000 sŏk (903,330 tons). 
The ratio of grain supply was 107.6 per cent of the required amount. This situation 
continued in the following years: by delivering 1,890,000 sŏk (270,270 tons) in 1959, 
3,512,000 (502,220) in 1969, and 3,451,000 (193,493) in 1961, the rates of grain supply 
equalled 172. 6 per cent, 165.8, and 127.2 respectively (Song I. J. 1998: 11). In order to 
‘get rid’ of the imported grains on the Korean market, the government had to encourage 
its population to eat wheat-based food, such as bread and noodles. The massive amount 
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of imported wheat flour even made it possible for the Korean government to export rice, 
the international price of which was higher than that of wheat: between 1959 and 1966, 
the volume of yearly rice exports (mainly to Japan) increased from five metric tons to 44 
metric tons (Kim P. T’. 2004: 75, 506). The chief motivation behind the Korean 
government’s strategies of saving rice and encouraging the consumption of wheat-based 
foods was closely related to the country’s economic policy.  
On top of that, the financial revenue from the sale of delivered food became a 
prominent source of income for the Korean government. The PL 480 agreement 
stipulated that supplied goods were to be sold to Korean civilians or private companies, 
except for those distributed for free for relief pur oses. The revenues earned from the 
food had to be deposited and shared between the Koran and US governments. In the 
1950s the Korean government used 85 per cent of the money deposited on averagely a 
year while the US government used fifteen per cent (Yi T. G. 2002: 337-8). Even though 
there was not complete freedom to use the money according to its own will, the Korean 
government was able to acquire a considerable amount of i come from the sales of the 
food. In 1961, the secured money accounted for 48.4per cent of the total national budget 
(Chang S. H. 2003: 927). The majority of the money was appropriated for purchasing 
arms from the US, and for augmenting the military based on the agreement with the US 
government. Because the Korean government was able to obtain food assistance under 
the agreement with the US on the condition that it would use the sales income only for 
the national defence budget. With this money, for example, the 570,000-strong military in 
1953 had grown to include 720,000 men by 1958. The siz  of the military as a percentage 
of Korea’s GNP ranked third in the world between 1957 and 1966 (Ibid.: 928).  
If we consider that the Korean War had ended with a ce se-fire, not the 
termination of war, securing defence spending was one of the most pressing matters for 
the Korean government. That is to say, the revenues from imported wheat were crucial to 
Korea’s defence expenditure. Therefore, the Korean government wanted to import as 
much food as possible. It was said that there was even juggling of statistical data by the 
Korean government in pursuit of gaining more food from the US (Song I. J. 1998: 14). 
Under the complicated international relationship, Korean children functioned as an 
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important outlet for US surplus agricultural products. Moreover, by doing so, they 
actually supported the Cold War.   
Many studies have revealed that school-lunch based foo  education had positive 
effects on attitudes and behaviour in both the short and long term.327 Kim Suk-hŭi and 
influential Korean nutritionists also stated that the school lunch programme was a highly 
effective educational tool in developing the habit of eating wheat-based foods. Through 
the programme, according to them, children would become accustomed to new practices 
which would not be easily altered (Kim S. H. et al. 1976: 129).  Based on such idea, food 
education via school lunches drew Korean authorities’ attention as a strategy to boost 
wheat-based foods. More consumption of the foods was beneficial not only for economic 
development but also for national security of the country.  
In view of its effectiveness in forming new eating habits in children, it is not 
surprising that the Korean authorities took the expansion of the school lunch programme 
very seriously, often using heavy-handed methods. Both children and teachers had trouble 
fulfilling the school lunch quota ordered by the government. For example, in 1974, when 
4,000 children in Chollanam-do were participating i the school lunch programme, the 
Ministry of Education set a goal of 10,000 recipients. In compliance with this directive, 
the teachers in Mokp’o city made eating school lunches almost compulsory for the pupils. 
While the number of children who wanted to eat school lunches was just 1,500, Mokp’o 
city government was determined to expand the meals programme to include 4,000 pupils, 
and instituted a quota for each school. At one school in the city, some 300 children, or 
two-thirds of the total school-lunch eaters, were forced to participate by their teachers. It 
was not uncommon for two coerced participants to share a piece of bread, as well as the 
cost of it. Children at another school in the city were forced to eat school lunches by 
rotation, with no other choice.328  
On being ordered by Seoul City government to achieve a target of 25 per cent of 
all children eating school meals, a school in Tongdaemun ward made their children eat 
                                                
327 For example, see Gordon et al. 1995; Templeman 1989; and Shōji Kondo et al. 1978. 
328 ‘Kangjero mŏginŭn kŭpsik ppang強制로 먹이는 給食빵’, Tonga ilbo, 27 May 1974, p.7. 
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school lunches on a weekly rotational basis until the goal was achieved. Teachers had to 
drink milk in front of the children to set an example and encourage their pupils to follow 
them, as many children were not used to drinking milk, especially reconstituted milk 
(Sŏng K. H. 1970: 141). One teacher said that he felt as if he were ‘doing a sales 
campaign’ when he was encouraging the children to ea  more school meals.329 In addition 
to this edict from Seoul city government, teachers had to tell children to bring kimch’i as 
a side dish from home when the issue of the nutritional deficiency of school lunches 
emerged. However, it appears that many children were not accepting of the idea of bread 
as a meal. The coerced participants brought their own lunchboxes in spite of the lunches 
prepared at school. Uneaten bread was often taken home or thrown away. The parents of 
these children had to bear the expenses of both school meals and making lunchboxes.330 
The school lunch programme was not welcomed by many Korean people, except for 
those children who could not afford to eat lunch without the provision of school meals.          
The government’s efforts to encourage the eating of wheat-based foods proved 
effective after the school lunch programme had been in place for several decades. A fair 
body of research reports the ‘positive’ changes in chool children’s food preferences in 
relation to school meal experiences during the 1970s and 1980s. Children’s increasing 
preference for wheat-based foods was broadly recognized in Korean society as an 
improvement in the diet and as a break from the old practice of rice-centred eating (Kim 
H. M. 1982: 43; Kim and Hwang 1984: 29). For example, in a survey of preferences 
among 594 children at four schools in Seoul in 1974, the majority of children gave 
positive responses about wheat-based foods. The pref rred foods as the main element of 
meals among children were toast (63.8 per cent), white bread (53 per cent), and steamed 
rice (41.9 per cent) (Hyŏn K. S. 1974: 652). Another study of 400 school chidren carried 
out in Seoul in 1982 shows how the change in food preferences had progressed further. 
Of the participants, 165, or 41 per cent, preferred the combination of ‘bread and milk’ to 
‘cooked rice (with other grains) and Korean style-soup’ for school meals, while just 95 
children, or 24 per cent, expressed the opposing view (Kim H. M. 1982: 40). It was also 
                                                
329 ‘‘K ŏmŭn ppang’ hakkyo kŭpsik (ha) ‘검검식’학교 給食(下)’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 21 
September 1977,p.7  
330 Ibid.  
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shown that more than 85 per cent of children liked to drink milk (Ibid.: 38). The most 
common favourite food chosen by the children was milk (19 per cent), followed by bread 
(16 per cent) and instant noodles (15 per cent) (Ibid.: 42). Children’s changing attitude 
towards wheat-based foods was not confined to urban areas. The results of a survey of 
pupils at a rural Model School in the neighbourhood f Taegu city in 1984 showed that 
there was little difference between the proportion of those who preferred rice-centred 
lunches and those who preferred wheat-based lunches (br ad or noodles): 47 per cent 
preferred the former and 41 per cent the latter (Kim and Hwang 1984: 30).  
The development of the Korean school lunch was closely related to the state’s 
food policies. Despite the fact that it was the improvement of the diet and the health of 
children that the government held up as the major aims of the programme, it was, in a real 
sense, an economic policy carefully designed for strategic purposes. The dramatic change 
in the content of the meals caused by another problem – a surplus of rice – which 
emerged in the 1980s is clear evidence of this.  
Surplus Rice and Rice-centred School Lunches 
Ironically, all the efforts devoted for more than two decades towards saving rice led to a 
surplus of rice, which became a matter of growing concern for the Korean government. 
The issue of surplus rice emerged hand in hand witha general dietary change among 
Koreans that took place in the latter half of the tw ntieth century. Along with the steadily 
rising standard of living after the 1960s, the consumption of foods previously considered 
luxurious, such as meat, dairy products and fruit, increased, and there was less ‘room’ for 
rice in the Korean diet. For example, daily meat consumption per capita increased sharply 
from 13.2 grams in 1962 to 64.6 grams in 1990 (Han’guk nongch’on kyŏngje yon’guwŏn 
2003: 43, 99). Moreover, as demonstrated by the example of the school lunch programme, 
the consumption of rice was deliberately restricted by government policy, which 
encouraged greater consumption of wheat instead. All these factors greatly influenced the 
decline in rice consumption. Between 1970 and 1989, the daily consumption of rice per 
capita dropped from 366.6 grams to 341.3 grams, while t at of wheat flour increased 
markedly from 51.6 grams to 88.3 grams during the same period (Ibid.: 59, 79, and 97). 
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The increase in wheat consumption coinciding with the reduction in rice consumption 
shows that rice, the traditional staple of the Korean diet, was being replaced by wheat-
based foods. In combination with the westernization of the Korean diet, the government’s 
rice-saving policy created the new problem of a rice surplus.  
However, it should be added that the decline in rice consumption alone was not 
responsible for the rice surplus. T’ongil rice, a high-yield variety of rice obtained as a 
result of the Korean government’s great efforts to increase yields of the grain, caused an 
unexpected food problem. At first, the three years of continuously successful rice harvests 
from 1976, the so-called green revolution, made possible by T’ongil rice, was welcomed 
by Korean society. It was thought to be a solution for the longstanding rice shortage in the 
country, fulfilling Korea’s hopes of self-sufficiency in rice (Kim P. T’. 2004: 76). But it 
was not long before it became a source of serious cncern for the Korean government. 
Due to its unpleasant flavour, the price of the new variety was lower than that of the 
previous rice that had been eaten, and thus it was chiefly consumed by those on low-
incomes. However, in line with the general rise in living standards in Korea, even the 
lower social strata came to be able to afford high-quality rice, and the T’ongil rice 
remained unconsumed. From the 1980s, the government ade efforts to decrease the 
output of T’ongil rice and, by 1992, the variety had disappeared entirely from farms in 
Korea (Ibid.: 242).  
By that time, however, large quantities of T’ongil rice had been already 
stockpiled in government warehouses as so-called ‘government rice’ (chŏngbumi政府米). 
These stocks were increasing in volume every year due to the decrease in rice 
consumption. Government rice was secured through a dual-pricing system for rice (ssal 
ijung kagyŏkche쌀二重價格制), in which the government bought the rice from farme s 
at relatively high prices, and sold it to distributors at market prices, which were often 
lower. By introducing this distributional system in 1969, the government was able to 
stimulate the production of rice by supporting farme s and maintaining a balanced market 
and the steady price of rice by controlling the supply (Ibid.: 76). Therefore, in principle, 
the government had to store a certain amount of rice. However, the increasing rice 
stockpile, much of which was T’ongil rice, was a big financial burden for the government. 
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As of 1991, the value of the rice stockpile equalled 3.7 trillion wŏn, the equivalent of 
fourteen per cent of the yearly national budget. Approximately 70 per cent of this 
stockpile was T’ongil rice produced between 1985 and 1990.331  
As a solution for the consumption of the stockpiled T’ongil rice problem, a 
project to reinforce the school lunch programme wasdeveloped by the government. In 
1989, the Economic Planning Board (Kyŏngje kihoegwŏn 經濟企画院) adopted the 
school lunch programme as a core policy on the governm nt agenda (Kim and Yang 
2002: 15). The announcement of the detailed reinforcement plan was followed by an 
expansion plan from the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries in the following year. The 
plan was to increase the number of schools with the meals programme from the existing 
765 to every school in the country in the coming years.332 Following the announcement of 
the project, the revision of the school lunch programme was promoted with the definite 
aim of ‘expanding the consumption of abundant rice’.333  
During the years following the outbreak of the food poisoning scandal in 1977 
which I mentioned earlier, a comprehensive institutional basis for the Korean school 
lunch programme was established. For example, dispatch of a nutritionist in charge of 
school lunches was mentioned for the first time in 1978. The following year, a directive 
was issued that specified that a school meal was to provide 670 kilocalories for a child in 
the lower years and 770 kilocalories for those in the higher years. The most noteworthy 
development was the establishment of the School Lunch Law in 1981, an independent 
law governing the school meals programme (Pak C. G. 1986: 31-32). In spite of these 
institutions, however, schools were not allowed to pr vide lunches to children if they did 
not have their own cooking facilities.  
To boost the consumption of the government stock of rice, it was important to 
encourage more schools to get involved in the school meals programme, even if they did 
                                                
331 ‘3-chŏn 6-paengman kama chŏngbumi ch’anggo-sŏ natcham 3천 6백만가마 정부미 창고서 낮잠’, 
Chosŏn ilbo朝鮮日報,12 April 1991, p.7.  
332 ‘Ssal tambo yungjaje toip kŏmt’o 쌀 담보 융자제 도입 검토’, Maeil kyŏngje, 12 November 1990, 
p.1.  
333 ‘Ssal makkŏlli, yakchu chuse p’yeji kŏmt’o 쌀막걸리, 약주 주세 폐지검토’, Chosŏn ilbo, 23 
November 1990, p.2.  
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not have a kitchen at the school. The first solution  this problem, introduced in 1992, 
was the Communal Cooking System (kongdong chori共同調理): lunches for several 
schools’ pupils were prepared at one central facility and then distributed to each school. 
This efficient system was experimentally introduced to nineteen schools in Kyŏnggi-do 
and then expanded gradually to other areas (Kim and Yang 2002: 15-16). The School 
Lunch Outsourcing System (wit’ak kŭpsik委託給食) began in 1996, enabling schools to 
contract general catering companies to prepare lunches in the schools’ facilities. Ready-
made meals could also be provided for school lunches. The huge financial burden 
incurred by these promotional projects was shared by the government and the Association 
for School Lunches (hakkyo kŭpsik huwŏnhoe學校給食後援會), which was composed 
of parents, interested corporations, and representatives of each school (Kyoyuk injŏk 
chawŏnbu 2000: 252). The Korean government’s drive to bolster the school meals 
programme sharply increased the penetration rate of he programme: between 1991 and 
2001, the ratio of school children who ate school lunches soared from 7.8 per cent to 90.7 
per cent.334 As of 1999, 99.9 per cent of Korean schools provided lunches for children 
(Han’guk kyoyuk kaebarwŏn 2002: 116).     
It was in 1990, immediately after the government’s ambitious project to expand 
school lunches was announced, that the rice in the gov rnment warehouses began to be 
distributed to schools. During the first ten years, the stockpiled rice was provided at half 
its market value (Im S. H. 1995: 64). The annual supply to schools increased dramatically 
from 19,000 sŏk (approximately 2,717 metric tons) in 1990 to 270,000 sŏk (38,610 tons) 
in 2000 (Yi and Kim 2002: 83). As a result, the size of the government stockpile shrank 
from 1,891,000 tons to 892,000 between 1990 and 2000.335    
Throughout the 1990s, the government was frequently accused of distributing 
                                                
334 During this period, the school lunch programme in m ddle and secondary schools in Korea was also 
expanded: the uptake in middle schools grew from 4.9 per cent in 1997 to 58.6 in 2001, and in secondary 
schools rose from 2.6 in 1997 to 64.3 in 2001 (Han’guk kyoyuk kaebarŏn 2002: 116).  
335 Government rice was also used for military rations, i  prisons and state-run hospitals, and for relief aid 
and food assistance for North Korea. Since the actual distribution was entrusted to the municipal authori ies, 
the central government does not have detailed end-usage data. The statistical data cited above was obtained 
through personal contact with a researcher at the Kor an Rural Economic Institute (Han’guk nongch’on 
kyŏngje yŏn’guwŏn) on 21 August 2008.        
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old rice for school lunches. For example, the rice distributed for school lunches in Seoul 
in 1994 included 1,549 tons of old rice, 57 per cent of what was distributed, which 
included rice that had been stored for two years, and even fourteen tons of rice that had 
been stored for four years. The amount of old rice provided to the pupils in the city 
equalled 2,625 tons or 80 per cent of the total rice provided by the government in 1996.336 
Even children in rural areas, where rice was produce , had no choice but to put up with 
old and flavourless rice. In a newspaper article a rur l housewife who lived in Kohŭng 
County in Chŏlla-namdo expressed her anger at seeing old rice distributed when she 
visited her children’s school to help with preparing the lunches. She was especially angry 
as she was engaged in rice farming and a certain portion of new rice produced by her was 
sold to the Korean government every year.337 To address this public dissatisfaction, in 
2001, the government announced that it would supply new rice as far as possible for 
school use (Yi and Kim 2002: 83).  
The problem of surplus rice led to a fundamental change in the content of 
Korean meals. This time, the basic structure of the school lunch menu was ‘a bowl of 
steamed rice (mixed with other grains), a bowl of soup, side dishes, and a bottle of milk’. 
Emphasizing the importance of faithfully reflecting children’s food preferences, balanced 
nutrition and eating habits, the authorities stressed the need to increase the variety in 
school lunches by using local specialities and surplus agricultural products, and by 
introducing traditional Korean dishes (Kyoyuk injŏk chawŏnbu 2000: 241). At a 
symposium called ‘Let’s learn about rice’ (ssar-ŭl alja 쌀을 알자) held by the Korean 
Agricultural Cooperative in 1990, there was a lively discussion on the urgent need to 
provide rice-based lunches in schools in order to help children grow up in good health 
and to inculcate the correct eating habits before they became accustomed to the taste of 
Western food.338 The bread-based lunches of the past were forbidden in the face of the 
issue of surplus rice. In an analysis of over a thousand menus served between 2000 and 
                                                
336 ‘Sŏul sinae ch’odŭnggyo kŭpsik 2-yŏn isang mugŭn ssal konggŭp서울 시내 초등교 급식 2년 이상 
묵을쌀 공급’, Tonga ilbo, 22 October 1996, p.41. 
337 ‘Mugŭn ssal sayong hakkyo kŭpsik chedo kaesŏn tŭng noryŏk piryo묵은 쌀 사용 학교급식제도 
개선등 노력 필요’, Han’gyŏre sinmun한겨례신문, 4 March 1997, p.23.  
338 ‘Hakkyo kŭpsik chŏnmyŏn hwaktae haja학교급식 전면확대하자’ Han’gyŏre sinmun, 15 November 
1990, p.9  
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2003 in two primary schools, one in Pusan and one in Ansan, rice boiled with other grains 
appeared as the staple at 95 per cent of the lunches at the school in Pusan and at 99 per 
cent of the lunches at the school in Ansan (Pak K. H. 2006: 3). This data provides clear 
evidence that school lunches in contemporary Korea a  overwhelmingly rice-based. 
Today the overconsumption of wheat-based foods, such as bread and (instant) 
noodles, is considered to be the source of a variety of health problems in children in 
Korea.339 The ‘westernized diet’ (siksaenghwal-ŭi sŏguhwa식생활의 서구화), centred 
on bread, is discouraged by the government and dieticians, while the nutritional merits of 
a rice-based diet are promoted (Kim H. N. 2002; Yi Y. J. 2002). Eating a rice-based, 
Korean-style meal is perceived as beneficial not only for one’s health, but also from the 
point of view of preserving Korea’s traditional dietary culture. The ‘Guidelines for 
Dietary Life’ (siksaenghwal chich’im식생활지침) developed by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare in 2004, which aimed to improve the eating habits of Koreans, put rice-
centred meals at the centre of the model menu. The guidelines encourage primary school 
children and adolescents ‘to eat rice-based meals more than twice a day’ (haru-e tu kki 
isang-ŭl pab-ŭro mŏksŭmnida하루에 두 끼 이상을 밥으로 먹습니다).340        
In her research, Levine saw the history of the American school lunch programme 
as a ‘crucial mirror into the variety of interests that continually vie for power and 
authority in American public life’ (2008: 2). This holds true for the Korean school lunch 
programme. The developmental process of the programme and the shift of the staple food 
in it – from bread to rice (mixed with other grain) clearly demonstrate that the policy of 
food education of the country has been shaped more by surplus food than the ideas about 
healthy diets. Korean school lunch programme has developed in a way that was designed 
to solve food problems which arose from the changing circumstances of economy of the 
country.    
                                                
339 ‘Milkaru sobi churyŏ nagal ttae밀가루 소비 주려나갈때’, Tonga ilbo, 28 August 1986, p.11; ‘Ssal-to 
kisul kaebal sŏdullŏya쌀도 기술개발 서둘러야’, Kyŏnghyang sinmun, 18 May 1994, p. 9. 
340 Pogŏnpokchibu보건복지부, ‘Han’gugin-ŭl wihan yŏllyŏngch’ŭng pyŏl siksaenghwal silch’ŏn chich’im 
sŏlchŏng, palp’yo한국인을 위한 연령층별 식생활실천지침 설정, 발표’. Electric document, 
available at http://epic.kdi.re.kr/epic/epic_view.jsp?num=68003&menu=1 (accessed 3 November 2011) 
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7.2 The Honbunsik Changnyŏ Campaign  
The Incorporation of the Honbunsik Changnyŏ Campaign into the School Curriculum 
The South Korean government’s efforts to reform the dietary habits of children were not 
limited to the school lunch programme but included a variety of unique programmes to 
augment the educational effects of the school system. Not only the subjects of practical 
coursework (silgwa 實科) and home economics, but also every special opportunity 
related to the school life of pupils, such as writing and public speaking contests, was 
utilized for promoting the reform of dietary habits (Pak S. H. 2008: 63). Through such 
comprehensively planned educational programmes, pupils were encouraged to eat rice 
substitutes - wheat and barley - and to curb their consumption of rice, the major staple of 
the Korean diet. This strategy was part of the honbunsik changnyŏ 混粉食奨励 
(encouraging the eating of barley and wheat-based foo s) campaign carried out on a 
massive scale in the 1970s in South Korea. Honbunsik is a compound of honsik混食 and 
punsik粉食: the former denoting ‘eating grains (primarily barley) mixed with rice’, and 
the latter ‘eating foods made with wheat flour’ such as bread and noodles. However, it 
was punsik that formed the core of the government’s campaign (Kong C. U. 2008: 186).  
According to Kong Che-uk, the honbunsik changnyŏ campaign can be traced back 
to the rice-saving campaigns and the improvement of daily life (saenghwal kaesŏn) 
campaigns promoted by the Japanese colonial government (Ibid.: 145). Due to Korea’s 
important role as a rice supplier for Japan, controlling the rice consumption of the Korean 
people had been the core food policy of the Japanese colonial government in Korea. 
Emphasizing the rational management of the daily diet, the colonial authorities 
encouraged the economization of the diet based on scie tific knowledge by eating cost-
effective and nutritious meals, such as partly polished rice, or barley instead of white rice 
(see 4.1).  
The stream of colonial campaigns stressing the importance of thrift in the diet was 
taken over by the post-colonial governments after 1945. Calling for austerity in its nation, 
the authorities emphasized the importance of saving rice which was in short supply. 
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Earlier Japanese methods of saving rice, such as the restriction on drinking of alcoholic 
drinks and a ban on serving boiled white rice at restaurants, were revived under the 
Campaign of Wartime Daily Life Improvement (Chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn undong) 
initiated in 1951 (see 4.2). Thus, saving rice was nothing new for the Korean people, who 
had been experiencing a chronic shortage of rice for decades.  
However, it was the Park Chung-hee government (1963-1979) that particularly 
tightened its control over people’s rice consumption. Notwithstanding the rapid 
industrialization and export growth in the 1960s, domestic production could not meet the 
increased demand for rice. Hit by a rice crop failure in 1968 and 1969, the food supply 
situation deteriorated: from a yield of 3,919 metric tons in 1967, that of 1968 was just 
3,603 metric tons, and this fell still further to 3,195 metric tons in 1969 (see table 5-2 in 
5.2). The volume of grain imports in 1969 reached 2,389,000 metric tons, up 59.6 per 
cent from the previous year, with the falling self-sufficiency ratio hitting 73.6 per cent, a 
record low for the 1960s (Nongsusanbu 1978: 437). In an effort to address the food 
supply situation, the government became serious about implementing rice-saving policies. 
Following the example of the Japanese colonial food-saving measures, the Park 
government established ‘no rice days’ (mumiil 無米日) in January 1969, completely 
prohibiting the sale of white rice at restaurants between 11.00 and 17.00 on every 
Wednesday and Saturday. This marked the beginning of the government’s strengthening 
of the rice-saving policy and the introduction of the honbunsik changnyŏ campaign that 
encompassed the whole of Korean society (Pak S. H. 2008: 42). All the restrictive 
consumption controls were exercised on the legal basis of the Grain Management Law 
(Yaggok kwalliopŏp) established in 1950 by the South Korean government odelled after 
the Japanese Foodstuff Management Ordinance promulgated in 1943 colonial Korea 
(Kim P. T’ 2004: 484).341  
The school curriculum was also included within the scope of the honbunsik 
changnyŏ campaign. The Ministry of Agriculture (Nongnimbu農林部) announced a new 
plan in November 1970 to strengthen the honbunsik changnyŏ campaign in schools by 
                                                
341 For more details on the Grain Management Law, see 1.2.  
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establishing a new subject, the ‘improvement of dietary life’ (siksaenghwal kaesŏn食生
活改善).342 In accordance with government policy, saving rice and honbunsik education 
became increasingly important.  
The honbunsik changnyŏ campaign was an important part of the School New 
Village Movement (Hakkyo saemaŭl undong) initiated in January 1973. This, in turn, was 
part of the New Village Movement, a major development project which began in 1970 
with the aim of dealing with rural poverty. Beginnig in rural Korea, the movement 
spread throughout the country and among a vast number of urban dwellers, including 
students, civil servants and white-collar workers (Lee C. J. 1973: 98). The School New 
Village Movement was set up at President Park’s special instruction and stressed the need 
to enhance people’s motivation for strengthening natio l defence and security. It saw the 
education of pupils as a fundamental basis for achieving local and national development 
(Institute of Saemaul Studies 1981: 206). Under the instruction of local Education 
Committees and schools, pupils were entrusted with various tasks, such as research into 
local societies, and voluntary activities for the dvelopment and increase of income in 
localities. For example, pupils were involved in cleaning towns, helping farmers during 
the busy season, and in practicing thrift and saving (No K. W. 1985: 27-28). Saving rice 
was one of the most important points on the agenda, coming under the auspices of thrift 
and saving. In the name of saving food resources and the improvement of the diet, pupils 
were encouraged to eat more wheat-based foods and barley, instead of rice (Ibid.: 35). 
Nutrition within the Strategy of Science Promotion    
While the strategy of nutrition-centred food management remained at the centre of the 
post-colonial South Korean authorities’ economic policies, as discussed in 4.2, the 
advocation of the scientific improvement of the diet was further strengthened within 
honbunsik changnyŏ campaign. Park Chung-hee’s government put the promoti n of the 
general public’s understanding of science on the natio l agenda. During the first decade 
or so after his seizure of power, science was endorse  in terms of its technological 
applications that would support the development of light industry in line with the 
                                                
342 ‘Honbunsik kyuje chaegŏmt’o混粉食규제 재검재’, Maeil kyŏngje매일경제, 26 November 1970, p.7.   
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government’s industrialization policy. In October 1972, Park proclaimed the 
establishment of the Yushin Constitution which marked the beginning of the Fourth 
Republic of Korea (1972-1979), Park’s authoritarian state. In accordance with the radical 
political changes required by the Yushin Constitution, the Park administration 
consolidated control of the educational system to ensure that it effectively carried out its 
nationalistic educational policies (Chang Y. M. 2004: 447). The national strategy to 
reshape the eating habits of Koreans based on scientifi  k owledge was embodied in the 
educational goals as the ‘promotion of science as a national movement’ (chŏn kungmin-ŭi 
kwahakhwa undong全國民의科學化運動) and the ‘promotion of saving rice and eating 
barley and wheat-based foods as a national movement’ (chŏn kungmin-ŭi chŏlmi 
honbunsik undong全國民의混粉食運動) (Kangwŏn-do kyoyuk yŏn’guwŏn 1973: 66-
67). 
Eating barley and wheat-based foods was promoted as a method of practicing 
science in daily life, and the President Park was enthusiastic about the campaign. This is 
evident in the scheme of the ‘Presidential order for effective education about the 
nutritional value of miscellaneous grains’ (Chapkog-ŭi yŏngyangga-e taehan 
hyogwachŏgin kyemong-e kwanhan taet’ongnyŏ g chisi 잡곡의 영양가에 대한 
효과적인 계몽에 관한 대통령 지시) sent to the Ministry for Culture and Public 
Information (Munhwa kongbobu文化公報部) by President Park in 1968.  
The presidential order for effective education about the nutritional value 
of other grains  
A. The ministry for Culture and Public Information is responsible for making 
nutritional analysis reports about rice and other grains  
B. Munhwa kongbobu carries out the following projects in cooperation with 
newspaper publishers and broadcasting companies   
a. organizes lecture for professionals, scientists and housewives 
b. publishes round-table talks using the print media  
c. has academics and professors of nutrition and home economics write for 
newspaper columns 
C. Munhwa kongbobu promotes film production [on food education] and 
screenings at every theatre 
D. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
a. shall create a comparative table of the nutritional information of rice and 
other grains and distribute them to restaurants to have them put on the 
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walls  
b. propagates [food education] with the family plan project343 
E. The Ministry of Education 
a. develops teaching materials which are to be used at morning meetings 
[chohoe] and during extracurricular activities at various schools. Children 
should be trained to influence their parents.  
 b. makes efforts to provide pupils with practical tr ining in the improvement 
of the daily diet, including eating wheat-based foods and barley, through 
the curriculum of home economics and practical coursework    
 
(Kukka kirogwŏn 1968, quoted in Pak S. M. 2008: 95) 
Following the promotion plans elaborated by the government, the nutritional benefits of 
eating wheat-based foods were strategically disseminated. Such information was 
continuously demonstrated in government publications, academic journals and popular 
magazines. Since many of these articles included a scientifically based plausible 
explanation, the information was convincing enough to spread the notion that these foods 
were valuable sources of nourishment.    
Nutritional analysis demonstrates that all other grains are richer than white rice in 
nutrients. It has been proven through biological testing that eating other grains 
offers greater nutrition [than eating rice]. According to the experiment’s findings, 
the rice-eating group had a greater risk of developing hepatic steatosis than the 
group that ate other grains. This suggests that eating only rice as a staple food 
increases the risk of a fatty liver and heart disease…  
(Yŏsŏng tonga magazine 1969, quoted in Song I. J. 1998: 43) 
Tangible scientific data was continuously shown to the public to emphasize the 
nutritional value of barley and wheat-based foods. Comparisons of the quantities of 
nutrients in rice, barley and wheat flour were very frequently seen at the time. Table 7-4 
shows an example of the nutritional information published in a popular magazine and an 
academic paper issued in 1968. By comparing each nutritional component of barley and 
wheat flour with those of rice, it emphasizes the nutrients in barley and wheat flour and, 
at the same time, the deficiencies in rice.  
                                                
343 Most probably, this clause indicates the campaign med at women. The campaign surrounding family 
planning is one of the Korean government’s continuing educational programmes directed at women. It was 
included in the projects of the Saemaŭl punyŏhoes (New Village Women’s Association). See 5.2.    
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Water (%) 14.1 11.0 +3.1 14.8 +0.7 
Energy (kilo calories) 340 354 +41 332 -8 
Protein (g) 6.5 11.2 +4.7 10.3 +3.8 
Fat (g) 0.4 1.4 +1.0 1.9 +1.5 
Carbohydrate (g) 77.9 74.6 -3.3 71.0 -6.9 
Mineral (g) 0.5 0.9 +0.4 2.1 +1.5 
Calcium (mg)  24 46 +22 40 +16 
Phosphorus (mg) 147 220 +73 560 +213 
Iron (mg) 0.4 1.6 +1.2 4.0 +4.0 
Vitamin B1 (mg) 0.1 0.28 +0.18 0.40 +0.40 
Vitamin B2 (mg) 0.05 0.07 +0.02 0.10 +0.10 
vit
am
in Niacin (mg) 7.5 3.0 +1.5 7.0 +7.0 
Source: Kungnip pogŏn yǒn’guwŏn, quoted in Ku P. H. 1976: 4 
When this kind of information was provided, the higher protein and vitamin content of 
wheat flour was especially emphasized. Supporting the notion that ‘wheat-based food is 
richer in nutrients than rice’, the nutritional information remained an important scientific 
source for encouraging the consumption of wheat-based foods (Song I. J. 1998: 44). This 
argument was partly a reaction to the Korean people’s unbalanced diet, which lacked an 
adequate intake of animal protein and vitamins in the 1960s and 1970s. As mentioned in 
7.1, more than 90 per cent of Koreans’ calorie intake was from crop-based foods, 
approximately 80 per cent of which was supplied by grain. This high reliance on plant 
foodstuffs led to a deficiency in animal protein. Kim Chǒng-sun, a professor at Seoul 
National University, and other nutritionists demonstrated the nutritional problem of the 
Korean diet by analysing data collected from 1960 to 1977. According to their research, 
the ratio of animal protein to total protein consumption was seventeen per cent, far below 
the recommended 30 per cent, and the proportion of cal ries gained from fat intake was 
five to eight per cent, much lower than the minimum standard of twelve per cent. The 
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researchers also pointed out that vitamin deficiency was one of the major problems with 
the Korean diet.344  
In this regard, wheat flour, which was relatively rich in protein, was seen as a 
more favourable staple than rice. Furthermore, the nutritional values of white bread, 
which was provided as primary school meals from the 1960s, appeared notable. Since 
animal products, such as eggs and milk were added in the bread-making process, the 
amount of protein and fat in the diet increased. However, such nutritional benefits were 
explained as if they came from the wheat flour and not from the animal products (Ibid.: 
45). That the absorption rate of protein into the human body from rice is 70 per cent, 
while that of wheat flour is just 42 per cent, was never mentioned. This is de facto more 
important than the protein content itself (Ibid.: 44). The dissemination of false 
information on the digestibility of wheat based-foods and rice was also noted. While the 
digestive efficiency of 70 per cent milled wheat flour was 90 per cent, that of white rice 
was 99 per cent (Kong C. U. 2008: 176). However, such information was rarely provided 
to people or was misrepresented: the nutritionist Y Soon-ae remarked that the rates of 
digestion and absorption of bread and noodles were much better than those of rice (Yi S. 
A.1961). Nutritional science was used selectively and strategically.   
 Moreover, the honbunsik promotion of the government included not only 
admiration for wheat-based foods and barley, but dissemination of the harmful 
consequences of eating rice as well. On the president’s orders shown earlier, university 
professors and dieticians highlighted the possible physical and mental problems that 
could be caused by a high reliance on rice. According to Professor Yi Kil-sang of Yonsei 
University, the possible diseases that could be caused by a nutritional deficit from eating 
rice were beriberi, obesity, high-blood pressure, fatigue, malnutrition, and a deterioration 
in brain function, which would cause weakness of will, hypertension, delusion, auditory 
hallucination, anxiety, a sense of inferiority, jealousy, hysteria, neurosis, and even 
schizophrenia (1975: 28). These warnings issued by scientists were directly reflected in 
school education. For example, the teacher’s manual for the practical coursework 
                                                
344 ‘Taech’ero ‘k’alori’ kyŏlp’ip— pogǒnhak kyǒnji-sǒ pon Han’gugin yǒngyang대체로「칼로리」결핍 
—보건학見地서 본 韓国人營養’, Maeil kyǒngje, 12 June 1978, p.8.  
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curriculum issued in 1975 by the Ministry of Education echoed the threat described above, 
stressing the nutritional deficiency of rice (Silgwa kyosayong chidosŏ 1975, quoted in 
Song I. J. 1998: 37).   
The knowledge of nutrition is, according to Coveney, is highly influential in 
changing the dietary practices of people since it served as the basis of food choices 
(Coveney 2000: 1). The findings of nutritional research became to wield influences on 
outside the laboratories in the form of the discourse of ‘good nutrition’, the view about 
food and health promulgated by experts such as scientists and doctors (Crotty 1995, 
quoted in Coveney 2000: 18-19). In Korea, the dissemination of the nutritional benefits of 
wheat-based foods substantially contributed to intensifying the honbunsik campaign 
among Korean people. According to a survey conducte in 1973 of 65 children, 62 
parents and the teachers at a primary school in Pusan, the majority of all three groups 
gave ‘nutrition and health’ as the primary reason when asked about the main reason for 
eating barley and wheat-based foods (Cha P. C. 1973: 1-92). A study of 688 Seoul 
citizens in 1975 showed a similar tendency. More than 95 per cent of the citizens 
surveyed answered that they mixed in other grains when they cooked rice, with the 
largest group choosing ‘nutrition’ as the biggest reason for this (Yi C. G. 1977: 14-15). As 
the involvement of scientists in the implementation of in modern societies took place 
coincidently with the rise of the political concern about the diet of people, the Korean 
scientists were enlisted by government to promote fod policies (Teich 1995: 213).  
Consuming Wheat-based Foods, a Symbol of Patriotism and Modernization   
Consuming less rice and eating other grains were giv n the moral symbolism of acts of 
patriotism. As discussed at the beginning of this section, the crop failures of 1968 and 
1969 caused the implementation of the Korean governm nt’s honbunsik campaign. In the 
1970s, the situation of the food supply in Korea became increasingly worse. Korea 
imported grain, including rice, worth $200 million i 1970, $460 million in 1973, and 
$740 million in 1975 (No S. K. 1976: 48). The increasing foreign exchange expenditure 
on food imports was a crucial factor in the need to save rice, as it impeded the economic 
growth of South Korea, when the authorities was fuelling an export-oriented economic 
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growth of the country. In this regard, saving rice and eating cheaper grains instead, which 
could reduce the outflow of foreign capital, were glorified as acts of patriotism. The 
government presented the imports of huge volumes of rice as ‘shameful’ and as 
hampering national development (Mun’gyobu 1970, quoted in Song I. J. 1998: 39). The 
importance and meanings of the campaign formed by the government were reproduced 
and strengthened though the media which, in turn, had a great impact on shaping the 
honbunsik campaign throughout the country.     
Have you heard the saying ‘paengmi mangguk’ [白米亡國, white rice destroys the 
country]? If the whole nation eats only boiled rice three times a day, even though we 
have a bumper harvest currently, it will undermine our health and the country’s 
economy day by day. We should banish this evil custom hat should only be seen in 
backward countries, and eat other economical and nutrie t-rich grains. Let’s save and 
export millions of sŏk of rice by striving to eat other grains so that we can earn 
precious foreign currency and, at the same time, achieve the improvement of the entire 
nations’ health. 
(Chubu saenghwal 1959, quoted in Song I. J. 1998: 39)  
Another point emphasized by the Korean media when promoting substitute foods, 
especially wheat-based ones, was westernization. By linking consumption of wheat-based 
foods with the developed western societies, it efficiently disseminated the notion that 
eating bread was the ‘civilized’ diet. Such images were spread among the Korean people, 
as shown below:  
It is said that if the nation does not eat bread as a staple food, the country will not be 
civilized. It would be difficult to introduce such practices in a short space of time; 
however, if we consider that it could bring civilization and economic efficiency, eating 
bread-centred meals would be ideal for us housewives.  
(Yŏsŏng tonga 1958, quoted in Song I. J. 1998: 42)  
Why are the westerners tall and healthy? Because they eat bread made with yeast. 
(from an advertisement for yeast in Chosŏn ilbo1963, quoted in Song I. J. 1998: 43) 
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Weatherall observed that the media in contemporary societies have exerted a powerful 
influence on people’s eating habits by creating a consumer culture related to food choices 
(1995: 179). A specific example of such a role of the media is stated by Cwiertka. 
According to her, periodicals in the 1920s and 1930s in Japan was crucial in shaping 
housewives’ desires to modernize their diet by providing information and recipes that 
embodied the new westernized ideals of home cooking, eventually contributing to the 
development of post-war home-cooking practices (Cwiertka 2006a: 99-100). The same 
could also be said of Korea, especially in the 1960s and 1970s when the slogan of the 
modernization of the country (choguk kŭndaehwa祖國近代化 ) was vigorously 
expounded by the Park regime. Persistent media influe ce led to a creation of the myth of 
eating wheat-based foods: eating bread was broadly ccepted as an ‘improvement in 
nutrition’ (yŏngyang kaesŏn) and ‘balanced diet’ (kyunhyŏngsik均衡食) (Chŏn S. G. 
1975: 34). Combined with the patriotic notion, the consumption of wheat-based foods 
carried strong connotations of modernization (Kong C. U. 2008: 174). 
This aggressive attitude towards introducing a western diet was also observed 
among nutritional scientists. Even though the professionals’ thinking was not exactly the 
same as the vague aspirations that appeared in the mass media, in the respect that they 
called for the changes in Korean eating habits, they s ared their viewpoint with the media. 
For example, the main features of the diet in the developed countries observed by Korean 
nutritionists were the lower levels of grain eaten and the greater consumption of animal 
products (i.e. eggs and meat). In terms of increasing the variety of the Korean diet, the 
introduction of western-style foods was attractive to Korean dieticians. They were aware 
of the increasing globalization of food, through which the many merits of foreign food 
could be introduced. For instance, the Japanese began to consume more jam and butter 
instead of soy sauce and soybean paste as part of the westernization of their diet. In 
contrast, however, they could see how the Korean diet ‘lagged behind’, with an extremely 
limited number of urban dwellers eating bread for their breakfast, and rural people still 
tied to traditional eating patterns based on fermented food, such as kimch’i, soybean paste 
and pepper paste. Emphasizing the need for a comprehensive reform of the Korean diet, 
they warned that the ‘poison’ (haedok害毒) could even be found among the rich Korean 
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people who could afford to indulge in eating what345 they wanted (Kim S. H. et al. 1976: 
6-7). They called for a change in the traditional Korean diet and the reduction of rice 
consumption through the acceptance of a western diet.    
The transformation of the Korean diet advocated by many Korean people was 
accompanied by the denial of their own eating habits, especially the tradition of rice-
centred meals. Koreans’ preference for rice and dislike of other grains was said to be 
outdated and evil (Han’guk toro kongsa 1973: 17).  Represented by the terms chusik主食 
(main dish) and pusik 副食 (side dish), Korean dishes at meals were sharply divided into 
two categories, and rice, which belonged to the former, was considered especially 
important. It is only recently that rice has come to be available to everyone in Korea due 
to the insufficient supply and its relatively high price, but it has always been deeply-
ingrained in the Korean psyche that rice is the soltaple and other grains are nothing but 
substitutes. Having rice on a daily basis remained an unattainable dream for the majority 
of the population until the 1970s.346  
While the clear distinction between main and side dishes is regarded as one of the 
unique features of Korean food in research since the 1990s,347 the opposite view was held 
by many Koreans in the 1970s. This was embodied in the call to remove the idea of 
separate food categories at meals in order to dispel the practice of placing a high value on 
rice (Kim S. H. et al. 1976: 68; Chu C. S. 1975: 26). Food experts advised people to 
break the practice of ranking foods, and to reduce ri consumption and eat every 
available foodstuff as much as possible in order to at ain a balanced diet (Hyŏn and Mo 
1974: 111; Kim and Hwang 1964: 21). Furthermore, nutritionists emphasized that food 
preferences were merely psychological, and by no means related to the nutrients absorbed. 
All of the moral meanings of honbunsik and nutritional information propagated by the 
                                                
345 Most probably, this refers to eating white rice. The term ‘poison’ (haedok) was frequently used to 
explain the nutritional disadvantages of eating rice at that time. For example, in their articles written to 
encourage the eating of wheat-based foods and barley,  professor at Yonsei University, Yi Kil-sang, talked 
of the ‘poison brought on by eating white rice …’ (1975: 29), and the vice-principal of a primary school, 
Kwŏn Hyŏn-gu, mentioned the ‘poison of white rice’ (1975: 128).  
346 For more details about the symbolic meaning of rice and Korean people’s preference for it, see the major 
example detailed in 1.1.  
347 For example, see Kang I. H. 2000: 171.   
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government were incorporated into the programmes of the honbunsik campaign in 
schools.  
A Comprehensive Project for Honbunsik Changnyŏ : Lunchbox Inspections  
Among the various honbunsik changnyŏ schemes implemented in schools, the inspection 
of lunchboxes was one of the most common. Under the supervision of the government, 
the project enabled the Korean authorities to becom directly involved in the 
modification of the eating habits of school children, as well as those of their parents. 
Along with the school lunch programme, which was esential to reshape the eating habits 
of Korean children, the inspection of lunchboxes asumed a crucial role in promoting the 
honbunsik changnyŏ campaign.  
The lunchbox inspection is vividly described in a report on a one-year honbunsik 
education project carried out between March 1972 and February 1973 at Ch’ojang 
primary school in Pusan. This was an aggressive honbunsik project designed to target not 
only the pupils, but also their parents. Lunch-time was selected as the prime time to 
encourage children to actively participate in honbunsik.  
There was an urgent need to change children’s thinking about rice and other 
grains. As explained earlier in this section, despit  the fact that only rich people could eat 
pure boiled rice and that it was normal to boil rice with other grains for reasons of 
economy, there was broad recognition that barley and other grains were a poor man’s 
food, even among children (Ch’a P. C. 1973: 89). To break the habit of feeling ashamed 
to eat barley and instil the idea that eating more of it was good for oneself as well as for 
the country, teachers carried out the inspection of children’s lunchboxes.  
In order to trigger a boom of honbunsik among children as the first step, teachers 
regularly praised children who practised exemplary honbunsik – those who brought 
boiled rice mixed with other grains or only other grains without rice – in front of the class. 
The praise proved to be very effective: soon the notio  that ‘eating only white rice 
without other grains was shameful’ prevailed in theschool and almost all the pupils 
voluntarily practiced honbunsik (Ibid.: 99). Within two months of the project starting, the 
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idea of feeling embarrassed about eating barley and wheat-based foods had been banished 
and instead an atmosphere of being proud of eating them became common among the 
children at the school (Ibid.: 94).  
Pupils also participated in a contest for writing, drawing posters, giving public 
speeches, creating slogans and writing songs about the merits of honbunsik. The results 
were displayed at the school, and some excellent examples were sent in to the nationwide 
contest. The rest of the work was made into a book, which circulated among the parents 
of each class, before being returned to the pupils. The teachers recommended that the 
children put their own work up in their homes. These activities were evaluated as 
beneficial in terms of drawing the attention of children to practicing honbunsik (Ibid.: 96). 
The children’s changing thinking and attitudes towards honbunsik were well expressed in 
their essays.  
I opened my lunchbox wondering what was in it. I first opened it covertly so as not 
to be seen by Suk-hŭi who was sitting next to me. There was my favourite ojingŏ 
t’wigim348 in my lunchbox. I threw it open. There was black kkongdang poribap!349 
Suk-hŭi also had kkongdang poribap! Suk-hŭi and I looked at each other and 
smiled. We began to use our chopsticks. I chewed it well, and then it smelled nice, 
as my teacher told me so. The teacher began to inspect our lunchboxes. ‘Chong-
hwa, you need to have more barley!’ Chong-hwa went r d in the face. But I did not 
need to worry about mine. Today, there were four people who did not have punsik 
and honsik…    
(Ibid.)  
One of the remarkable results brought about by the honbunsik project was that it 
influenced the changing attitude of parents towards eating staples and contributed to the 
consumption of less rice in meals. Circulating the c ildren’s work among the parents was 
one of the carefully orchestrated measures aimed at educating parents. Each parent was 
required to sign after reading the children’s work and pass it on to the next parent. Since 
                                                
348 Pieces of squid deep-fried in batter.   
349 Literally, ‘pure boiled barley’. Rice was often boiled with barley, millet or other grains, but in the 
consciousness of most Koreans it was still considered ‘boiled rice’ (pap) and referred to as such. Since the 
staple food mentioned above consisted of only barley, the writer called it poribap (lit. ‘barley rice’).   
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the children’s work was collated based on neighbourh od, some parents, who already 
knew each other, organized special meetings at which t e children read their essays in 
front of other people. By doing so, the school repoted that a ‘double effect’ was achieved, 
which denoted the educational impact not only on the c ildren, but also on the parents 
(Ibid.: 100).  
Separate educational programmes for parents were also developed by the 
Ch’ojang primary school in Pusan. A nineteen-page document entitled Improvement of 
Dietary Life (Siksaenghwal-ŭi kaesŏn 食生活의改善) was distributed among the parents. 
It was made up of three parts: the basis for the improvement of diet, the government’s 
food policies, and the human constitution and food (Ibid.). Special lectures for parents 
were also held. For example, at ‘Parents’ Class’ (ŏbŏi kyosil어버이교실), 171 parents 
listened to a lecture on honbunsik and were taught how to put it into practice when they 
prepared home-cooked meals. Teachers made home visits to their pupils to meet their 
parents. All occasions at which parents gathered, such as the enrolment ceremony, 
meetings of the Improvement Association (yuksŏnghoe育成會)350 and sports day, were 
utilized to promote the campaign. Another notable method of encouraging honbunsik at 
home was the record card programme. Nine hundred and seventy-eight parents were 
given a card on which they were to record how they practised honbunsik at the three 
home-cooked meals for 50 days. Parents were directed to make an honest self-assessment, 
and to rank themselves using a three-level grading system. The cards were to be brought 
to the school every Monday to be checked by the teachers (Ibid.: 100-101).  
One of the most distinctive features of the 1973 project at Cho’jang primary 
school in Pusan was the education of parents using their children’s influence. The reason 
the school focused on the children’s role in transmitting what they were taught at school 
was that the parents were those who actually practiced honbunsik. The indirect education 
of parents through their children was the most effectiv  way to gain successful results, as 
the testimonies below show.       
Ch’un-hŭi, sitting next to me, also had white rice. Everyone else had brought 
                                                
350 A parents’ organization that supported the school management.  
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bread or poribap. I could not open my lunchbox. As soon as I returned home, I 
cried to my mother. ‘Mum, why did you put white rice [in my lunchbox] today? 
It was so shameful.’ ‘I could not buy barley. I will buy it right away’, my mother 
replied. 
(Ibid.: 97)   
Chŏng Hyang-hŭi received all of her family’s love as an only child. Insisting on 
feeding her white rice, her mother cooked only thisfor her at home. However, her 
mother had no alternative but to prepare poribap for her daughter’s lunch since 
she [Hyang-hŭi] was adamant that she should eat it [at school]… When the poster 
painted by Hyang-hŭi was passed to her parents, there was an argument between 
the mother and daughter. While her mother wanted to pu  the poster on the wall 
of the other room to keep it clean for longer, Hyang-hŭi persisted in hanging it on 
the wall of the kitchen, saying that it must be there so that it would stop her 
mother from cooking only white rice… 
(Ibid.: 100-101)          
Kim Myŏng-bae, a pupil from a destitute family of an uneducated single parent 
and two younger brothers and a sister, used to misshis lunch every three days. 
His mother did not have a regular income since she made the family’s living 
through day labouring. Yet, when she did manage to ge  some money, she would 
spend her earnings on white rice. Accordingly, someti es Myŏng-bae brought 
lunches of entirely white rice and sometimes he did not bring any lunch at all to 
school. His teacher bought a piece of bread for himwhen he came to school 
without lunch so that he did not miss a meal. Almost every day, the teacher tried 
to persuade the boy to eat other grains instead of only white rice (and told him to 
tell this to his mother). On the following day, the teacher would ask the pupil 
about his mother’s reaction. During the first week (from 21 to 28 March), the 
teacher found that the mother’s view was that whatever people said, white rice 
was the best, and even though her family could not aff rd to have good meals all 
the time, they at least deserved to eat white rice wh n the situation allowed. Thus, 
the teacher taught the boy about the nutritional and economical benefits of eating 
barley and wheat-based foods, and told him to convey only a piece of this 
information to his mother each day. During the two eeks after this second step 
was taken, the mother allegedly remained silent. In he meantime, the boy began 
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to take his lunch more frequently…and began to bring poribap. This started on 
the twenty-eighth day after the teacher set about cnvincing the mother (through 
the boy)…       
(Ibid.: 99) 
The report from Ch’ojang primary school reveals that 97 per cent of the 978 
parents actually practiced honbunsik at home following the school’s instructions (Ibid.: 
102). This school’s programme can be regarded as a successful example. As seen in the 
case of Kim Myŏng-bae above, teachers made every endeavour to encourage pupils and 
their parents to save rice and eat other grains. As practical trainers of honbunsik, teachers 
held the key to educating both children and their parents.  
Teachers and Moulding Dietary Habits 
Honbunsik education in schools was not limited to checking children’s lunchboxes, as 
seen in the programme at Ch’ojang primary school, but extended to ensuring children 
developed a specific understanding of h nbunsik, that they would eventually carry out 
themselves (Yi K. H. 1976: 198; Kwŏn H. G. 1975: 130). An article in the periodical Suŏp 
yŏn’gu 授業研究 (Class Research), which included teaching guidelines and advice on 
educational activities for teachers, shows that a vast range of responsibilities was 
entrusted to teachers concerning food education. Teachers were advised to pay special 
attention to the content of children’s meals. They encouraged their pupils to consume 
enough of the five major nutrients, with a special emphasis on eating more protein by 
eating barley, millet and soybeans mixed with rice. Following dieticians’ advice, teachers 
taught their pupils not to distinguish between main and side dishes at mealtimes. Teachers 
also changed the children’s conventional view that wheat-based foods were not a meal 
but rather a snack and that they were a poor man’s sub titute for rice (Yi K. H. 1976: 198). 
Teachers endeavoured to make their pupils understand that the country’s rice production 
was far from sufficient to meet the growing demand for it, and to recognize that all 
Korean people would have to pay back the cost of the imported rice for many decades to 
come (Ibid.: 199).      
Detailed instructions on how to inspect children’s lunchboxes were given to 
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teachers. There were standards by which to evaluate the lunchboxes, according to the 
proportion of other grains mixed with rice and the ype of staple foods. For example, a 
lunch with boiled rice mixed with more than 30 per c nt of other grains was given a circle 
mark; wheat-based foods were given a triangle mark; other staples, such as potatoes 
equalled a square; and all others received crosses. Inspections were carried out twice a 
day, the first in the morning by the children’s peer group, and the second by teachers 
(Ibid.: 200). The results of the school inspections were reported to the government, and 
schools achieving good results were rewarded. For example, Haesŏ primary school in 
Taegu city received a certificate and a cash prize in 1973 from the Minister for 
Agriculture for its 98.7 per cent achievement of h nbunsik. The money was used to buy a 
bread-carrier for school lunches (Chang Y. T’. 1973: 83).    
Teachers were also advised on how to better consider children’s feelings. For 
example, they were instructed not to scold a child who did not follow the honbunsik rules 
at lunch-time so as not to give him an upset stomach: instead, the pupil should be spoken 
to privately after school, and gently admonished about bringing lunches containing at 
least 30 per cent of grains other than rice. When tre were children who did not bring 
lunchboxes, teachers were advised to ask why, and to try o find a solution in a way that 
would not make the pupil feel inferior (Yi K. H. 1976: 198-199).   
However, many schools set stringent standards for lunchbox inspections, and took 
forceful measures to implement the campaign. An article in the Tonga ilbo newspaper of 
1976 featured the extremely coercive controls used by schools, with examples of the 
actual conditions at several schools in Seoul. For example, a girls’ junior high school in 
Tongdaemun ward set a standard of at least 50 per cent of other grains mixed with rice, 
higher than the 30 per cent standard set by the Ministry of Education. Pupils who broke 
the rule were made to clean the toilets as punishment, and their parents were summoned 
to the school and forced to give written pledges that ey would never disobey the rule 
again. Another girls’ junior high school in Sŏngdong ward reflected the results of the 
lunchbox inspection in the grades of the subject of m rality (todŏk道德).  
The regulations were even stricter at primary schools. A primary school in 
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Tongdaemun established a ‘no rice-day’ twice a week, and made all its pupils eat bread 
and milk for their lunches. The food was bought by he school with money collected from 
the pupils – 630 wŏn per pupil per month. Another primary school even co fiscated 
children’s lunchboxes when the school’s standard of a 50 per cent minimum mixture of 
rice and other grains was not kept. Even worse, the children who did not bring lunch 
because their families could not afford to provide it were also considered to be ‘acting 
contrary to the rule’, and special research into their ome environment was conducted.  
Parents clearly showed their dissatisfaction with the schools’ coercion. One 
housewife who had children at primary school complained that she had to cook twice 
every morning because she had to put more barley in her children’s lunches than was 
eaten at home. Another housewife complained about the school policies because her 
children frequently left the food she had prepared for lunch because they found the boiled 
barley to be tasteless. The following example depicts the scene of a thorough lunch-time 
inspection.351                         
The greatest concern of our class teacher was neither our education nor our health. 
He paid attention solely to our lunchboxes… the country was promoting a 
campaign, the so-called honbunsik changnyŏ, then. There was even a song called 
‘there is no weakling if we eat barley and wheat-based foods’… When the lunch-
time bell went, all the children opened the lids of their lunchboxes, and waited 
for the teacher’s inspection. The lunch had to include at least 30 per cent of 
grains other than rice. In fact, our lunches looked coal-black. The lunches of 
children from wealthy families who lived in town had  thin covering of boiled 
barley over white rice. They only brought boiled barley to pass the inspection. 
Wŏndu did not need to [do this] since he was already used to eating [boiled 
barley] at home. It was Chin-yong that was the problem. His family could not 
afford to prepare lunches for him. Thus, he had no choice but to raise his palms 
upwards when the teacher approached him. When mixed grains or wheat-based 
foods were not brought it was the rule that the pupil would be beaten on the 
palms. The brilliant honbunsik campaign ended with the teacher practicing what 
                                                
351 ‘Haksaeng tosirak honbunsik kwaing tansok, sŏngjŏg-e panyŏng, ch’ŏbŏl kkaji 學生도시락 混粉食 
과과과과 成績에 反映, 處罰까지’, Tonga ilbo, 12 June, 1976, p.7.  
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he preached – having noodle soup delivered as his lunch. On top of being 
starving, Chin-yong was forced to prepare his lunch, following the specified 
mixing ratio. But he was beaten because he did not obey the rules. Before the 
inspections started, nobody cared about his lunches. For Chin-yong, the 
honbunsik campaign was a campaign of being beaten on his palms. We could not 
help feeling intimidated by such a school.                      
(Sŏng 2004, quoted in Pak S. H. 2008: 80-81) 
It seems that teachers, who were responsible for making sure that their pupils 
obeyed the lunchbox rules no matter what, also had trouble carrying out the campaign. 
They had to devote considerable time and energy to the inspections, to the extent that 
they had a detrimental effect on classes. Notwithstanding these difficulties, teachers were 
obligated to report the performance of pupils to their superiors. On top of this, schools 
were visited by groups of observers, including government officials, on a regular basis 
and sometimes unexpectedly. According to a newspaper report, on one occasion the 
children’s lunch-time was delayed for hours while waiting for the officials to visit for an 
inspection.352 Chŏng Kŭn-yŏng, a retired school teacher who was in post in the 1970s, 
described one of his experiences:  
It happened when I had just become a school teacher at the beginning of the 
1970s. At the time, there was a great fuss throughot the country about saving 
rice…We checked pupils’ lunches. By presidential order, teachers were directed 
to prepare a ‘lunchbox inspection report’ and to reco d the results of every 
inspection in it. But the government seems to have be n untrusting [without the 
direct involvement of their own inspectors]. The authorities frequently mobilized 
all higher educational officials, and sent them to schools to monitor the 
inspections. One day, an official visited our school. He went through the 
inspection reports. After checking the reports for my class, he became angry. He 
called me up and rebuked me: ‘I do not think you can be carrying out the 
                                                
352  ‘Tosirak chǒmgǒm, sop’ungbi, hakkyo chǒch’uk tǔng ‘kwaing silch’ǒn’-e haksaeng-ǔn 
koeroptta도도도點檢, 소풍費·學校貯蓄등 「過剩實踐」에學生검 괴괴괴’, Tonga ilbo, 13 
September 1976, p.7.   
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instructions of the principal, as you don’t even obey the president’s orders.’       
  (Chŏng Kŭn-yŏng, quoted in Pak S. H. 2008: 79-80) 
The teacher’s statement above clearly shows his displea ure with the government’s 
coercive honbunsik campaign carried out in schools. However, even if the policy was 
thought to be unreasonable, there was often nothing teachers could do but obey the 
government. If schools received poor audit marks, the people in charge of monitoring 
were severely punished as well as the teachers. For example, after it was discovered that 
the honbunsik performance was not very good at a primary school in P’yǒngt’aek town, 
the school’s principal and the local chief education officer were forced to transfer as 
punishment for the situation. The teachers’ lunches w re also checked by government 
officials when there was an inspection. One primary school teacher in Taegu was forced 
to submit a written apology to officials when the boiled barley in the teacher’s lunchbox 
was deemed less than the minimum standard of 30 per cent in the eyes of the observer 
(Pak S. H. 2008: 80).   
 It was in 1977 that the Korean government ended th honbunsik campaign by 
abolishing the ‘no rice day’ which had marked the official beginning of the campaign in 
1969 (Nongsusanbu 1978: 689). This was made possible by the successful harvest of 
T’ongil rice, a high yield variety which was established after the considerable efforts of 
the Korean government. This revolutionary crop brought great self-sufficiency in rice in 
the three-year period beginning in 1976 (Kim P. T’. 2004: 93), and stopped the Korean 
government from propagating the armful consequences of eating rice and the nutritional 
benefits of wheat-based foods (see 7.1).  
A Korea scholar Moon states that Park Chung-hee’s regime saw the public school 
system as an effective network for social control. According to her, schools functioned as 
a mechanism for reshaping individual thoughts and attitudes, and for normalizing 
individuals as members of the state (Moon 2005: 35). This argument is especially true for 
the honbunsik changnyŏ campaign, which aimed to modify and reshape the eating habits 
of Korean children through schooling. The utility of the formal school system enabled the 
Korean authorities to successfully control the diet of pupils and further extend its 
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influential power to the home-cooked meals of the people. Definitely, the issue of good 
nutrition had remained at the core of the onbunsik campaign. However, the campaign 
was a strategically-designed governmental project aiming at moulding new eating habits 
among Korean people so that it was beneficial for the country’s economic policies rather 
than healthy diets.  It is important to bear in mind that it was in schools that the onbunsik 
changnyŏ campaign was most systematically executed, revealing the Park regime’s 
authoritarian nature.   
Scholars have pointed out that President Park, who had been an officer in the 
Japanese Kwantung Army before 1945, revived the totalitarian state system in post-
colonial Korea by resurrecting the Japanese colonial ruling structure through his social 
mobilization strategies (Cumings 1984: 479; Moon 2005: 23; Shin and Han 2000: 96). 
The intense involvement of the Park regime in the food consumption practices of its 
people resembled the Japanese colonial methods of food control during the Second World 
War. Both of these control methods combined the moral symbolism of nationalism and 
nutritional science as the rationale behind the call to save food resources, and both 
systematically imposed state food policies on peopl through the education system. 
Through the honbunsik changnyŏ campaign, Korean children were forced to have their 
meals at a ‘radical and violent lunch table’ – in Pak Sang-hŭi’s words – designed by the 
authorities, and to put into practice the state’s economic policies by eating boiled rice 
mixed with barley or wheat-based foods.   
 
 





The Legacy of Colonial Food Policies in Twentieth-Century Korea 
 
 
This study has examined the governmental policies through which intervention in and 
control of the Korean people’s food practices has taken place, and the impact of those 
policies on the transformation of twentieth century Korean foodways. I have focused on 
the role of wars that occurred in twentieth-century Korea. The wars have constituted a 
vital factor in the growing intervention of the state in the civilian diet of the country.  
Along with the dissemination of the fundamental perception that bodies constitute 
a working force and a military potential to be used for the nation, the political use of food, 
public health and nutritional science to keep the people fit has been common in modern 
nation-states since the nineteenth century (Coveney 2000: 18; Turner 1982b: 268). The 
importance of the nutritional quality of wartime diets was fully recognized on a national 
scale in many countries during World War One (Teich 1995: 213). During World War 
Two, mass education on nutrition was included in the wartime food policies of the 
countries involved the conflict (den Hartog 2011: 183). By the mid-twentieth century, the 
issue of food and nutrition had gain ground as a political agenda with great importance as 
a form of social control by the state. The political use of food significantly altered the 
relationship between the state and society, which often remained effective in subsequent 
years. The significance of the examination of food an  eating in the era of wars lies not 
only in understanding what happened to people’s lives under the circumstance of wars, 
but also in identifying the long-term impacts made on post-war societies by the reforms 
implemented during war.     
In this respect, the examination of the state’s food c ntrols aimed at sustaining 
war and transforming the people’s diet in Korea is n excellent example that demonstrates 
the critical consequences of conflicts in shaping people’s eating habits. Due to the 
political instability surrounding the Korean peninsula – Imperial Japan’s colonialism and 
expansionism, and ideological confrontation with communism, the country was forced to 
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experience a series of wars and has been consistently menaced by war for most of the 
twentieth century. The particular social context under the circumstance (threat) of war 
was a potent factor behind the Korean authorities’ maintenance of rigid control over the 
food practices of its people. As explained in the first sections of Chapters One and Two, 
state control of food was first instituted in modern Korea by the Japanese colonial 
authorities within the controlled economy during World War Two. After the war ended in 
1945, the Japanese system of centralized food controls was reinforced by the post-
colonial authorities as an integral part of the economic policies of the country in order to 
deal with post-colonial food shortages and to effectiv ly mobilize Korean society in the 
Korean War. These developments have been documented i  the second sections of 
Chapters One, Two and Four. As further elaborated in Chapter Seven, during the 1960s 
and 1970s – the age of rapid industrialization – the Korean government’s tightening grip 
on food consumption was one of the key policies in ustaining the country’s economic 
development and supporting the Cold War and complicated diplomatic relationships with 
America. The state’s powerful food policies were important factors behind the extensive 
modification of Korean eating habits in the latter half of the twentieth century. Although 
the initial implication relating to colonialism had gradually been lost, Japanese wartime 
food management programmes laid the foundation for the formulation of Korea’s central 
food policies, which provided the government with the enormous power to exercise 
controls over the production, distribution and consumption of food. Modern Korean 
foodways were greatly influenced by state policies formulated and implemented against 
the backdrop of colonialism and wars.  
A focus on the relationship between food and state in Korea helps us understand 
how the state controlled a society as a whole by the exploitation of food in the name of 
nutrition. Nutrition has long functioned as a mechanism for the state’s social control in 
maintaining the power relationship between the state and the people. John Coveney 
applied Foucault’s concept of governmentality, within which modern states develop and 
use a range of modern knowledge techniques, to identify utritional knowledge as a 
technology of power used by states to control people (2000: 14). In the form surveys, 
examinations, comparisons, and normalizations, nutritional knowledge forced people to 
scrutinize their diet, imposing a discipline to follow ‘correct’ ways of eating (Ibid.: 10).  
The Legacy of Colonial Food Policies in Twentieth-Century Korea 
361  
In contrast to the visibility of power exercised in a cient times, such as public 
execution observed by mass gatherings, in the modern era the way in which power 
functions became less visible, as Foucault discussed (1991). Power works on the level of 
the conscience – the ‘soul’ – and discipline is inter alized by each individual with moral 
meaning through social institutions such as schools and the workplace. Through the 
process, the concept of nutrition became the basis for the judgement not only of the 
scientific but also of the morally right diet (Coveney 2000: 8-9, 15).  
During Japan’s occupation of Korea, nutritional scien e was an important political 
tool in the control and reorganization of colonial society. As documented in Chapter Four, 
the rationale behind the state’s drive for dietary reform aimed at austerity was nutritional 
improvement. It could be explained by the Japanese authorities’ criticism of the Korean 
diet for ‘wastefulness in terms of nutrition’, pronounced in an effort to curtail food 
consumption by Koreans. However, in many cases, especially in the wartime austerity 
drive of the first half of the 1940s, the state’s call for dietary reform was less related to 
nutrition. Rather, it was an indication of the political determination of the state to direct 
citizens to eat such types of food as were cost-effici nt for maintaining the people’s 
health – the productive machine – and suitable for the nation’s fitness in terms of military 
and economic interests. State food controls often forced Korean people to relinquish the 
pleasure and enjoyment of things they had eaten traditionally thus far. Following 
Foucault’s argument, the advance of scientific knowledge led to the intensification of 
external control over the body in social space (Turner 1982a: 23).  
However, repression was not the only measure employed by the Japanese 
government to implement nutritional science in Korea. Less coercive yet more effective 
methods, such as dietary education and food campaigns, were also utilized. The role of 
these social institutions was essential since they could reshape the mores of Koreans and 
led to their voluntarily cooperation with the government’s projects. Within the Japanese 
nationalistic educational goals – to train loyal and obedient imperial citizens who were to 
lead frugal living for the sake of the country – Koreans, especially women, were taught 
nutrition so that they could efficiently nourish their family members. A simple and 
nutritious diet combined with the rhetoric of modern housewifery became an absolute 
standard of scientifically proper eating under the colonial authorities’ disciplinary power, 
Conclusion  
362 
and the Korean people internalized the discourse of nutrition. As elaborated in Chapter 
Six, such a context laid a favourable foundation for the colonial government’s 
establishment of nutrition as a central food policy during war years after 1937 within 
which scientific and efficient nourishment was elevated to the level of patriotic conduct.  
Combined with the post-colonial Korean authorities’ resurrection of the Japanese 
colonial food-control system, the implementation of nutritional science remained central 
to the economic policies of the country. The only difference from the former colonial 
strategy was the reason for which people had to eat ‘nutritionally’ appropriate meals: 
while Koreans had been urged by the colonial authorities to do this to enhance Japan’s 
war power, this time they were required to do so in rder to increase Korea’s economic 
and military power.  
The exigencies of social management during and after th  Korean War and 
modernization – the possession of an industrial and strong economy – in post-colonial 
Korea inspired the authorities to resort to scientific solutions in managing the people. 
Nutritional science was a rigid justification for Korean state controls over the nation’s 
diet. The strategy entered the ultimate stage, between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, 
led by Park Chung-hee’s totalitarian regime. The authorities vigorously propelled food 
strategies, encouraging the consumption of economical wheat-based foods and 
discouraging the eating of expensive rice. The mass media and scientists promoted the 
high nutritional value of wheat flour, often accompanied by an explanation about the 
nutritional deficiency of rice. As explained in Chapter Seven, invested with patriotic 
virtues and modernization, the discourse of nutrition reverberated across the country 
through the state’s food campaigns. With the intrica e and dynamic social, political and 
economic transformation of twentieth-century Korean society as a backdrop, food, in the 
form of nutritional science, has been a political tool to control the everyday lives of 
citizens. 
It seems natural at this point for a question to arise: what is wrong with people 
becoming healthy and fit under the guidance of state nutritional campaigns or food 
education? It is true that the progress of nutritional science has identified a close link 
between nutrients and body condition. The findings of modern science are valuable in 
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preventing health problems related to diet, and have made people’s lives longer on 
average. However, it is important to note that nutrition – as an issue – is a product of the 
modern nation state, and that nutrition – as a science – has been developed interrelated 
with and embedded in political discourse (Kamminga and Cunningham 1995: 1-2). What 
should be borne in mind is that the strategy of food, r to be more exact, invisible 
disciplinary power and moral meaning, has been frequently used as a state apparatus to 
control societies. This is the way how nutritional science has had strong social impacts in 
a myriad of ways ever since its rise in the modern nineteenth century nation-states.   
A statement made in 1991 by an influential Korean university professor of home 
economics, at a time when Korea was faced by the problem of surplus rice, is a good 
illustration that demonstrates how the state manipulates modern knowledge to control 
people. In her report, presented at a public lectur on ‘Rice and the Dietary Lives of 
Koreans’ held by the Rural Development Administration (Nongch’on ch’inŭngch’ŏng), 
rice was praised as an excellent source of nutrients in comparison to wheat flour. She 
pointed out that in the campaigns of honbunsik changnyŏ (encouraging eating barley and 
wheat-based foods) in the 1970s, the nutritional value of wheat flour was strategically 
propagated by overwhelmingly emphasizing the amount f protein, minerals and vitamins 
it contained, but by failing to mention the balance of the essential amino acids, the most 
crucial aspect when the nutrients of wheat flour are evaluated. Using a comparative table 
– a typical method which had been used in former campaigns – for the essential amino 
acids of rice and wheat flour, she demonstrated the high nutritional value of rice (Mo 
1991, quoted in Pak S. H. 2008: 87-88). Ironically, nutritional science, once used by the 
Korean government as the basis for justifying the state discouraging of the consumption 
of rice, was once again adopted as the scientific basis for state encouragement of rice-
eating. That is to say, the state’s strategic use of nutrition, the food policy which had been 
in place in colonial Korea during Japan’s war years, remained essentially intact for 
several decades after decolonisation. The mechanism of state food-control system in 
South Korea is a heritage of wartime measures impleented under the Japanese 
colonialism.  
The legacy of the Japanese colonialism is one of the most sensitive subjects to be 
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handled in Korean historiography. For well over a millennium, civilization in Northeast 
Asia flowed largely from China through Korea to Japan. For Korean elites, Japan had 
always been regarded as an inferior country in the C inese cultural sphere, and therefore 
Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea provoked mixed f elings of shame and wrath in 
their minds. Together with the politicized climate after 1945, such a view of colonialism 
led to extremely nationalistic paradigms of historiog aphy among Korean scholars 
(Eckert 2000: 368-369). Within this framework, Korean scholars argued that the Japanese 
occupation destroyed Korea’s drive toward modernity (Cumings 1999, quoted in Yoo 
2008: 202) by disproportionately emphasizing the repressive nature of the Japanese 
domination. The continuity of Korean society before and after 1945 is less pronounced. 
The traces of Japan’s colonization other than macroscopic politics and economy in post-
colonial Korean society had hardly been acknowledged until recently.  
However, as this study has demonstrated, the colonial experience in a significant 
way formed the foundation of post-colonial Korean society. Japanese wartime food 
polices, which remained essentially intact in post-colonial Korea, provide a unique 
evidence supporting this claim. They laid foundations for the legal framework for the 
post-colonial food policies through which the South Korean government exercised vast 
control over the rice consumption of its people for decades.  Moreover, they 
fundamentally shaped the state-society relationship in post-colonial Korea. 
Understanding colonial context is essential in order to grasp the complete picture of the 
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Practical Guidelines for the Daily Life of the Population in Wartime  




a. Wear comfortable and clean clothing appropriate to the national economy.   
b. Adapt traditional clothing [traditional Korean dress] bearing in mind comfort and 
economy, and and employ moderation in order to avoid offending public morality 
when wearing new types of clothing [Western dress] 
B. Practical points 
a. Wear ‘nation-building clothing’. 
b. Refrain from wearing dress shirts and ties with suits except in winter. 
c. Do not wear specific “spring” coats in the spring and autumn. 
d. Use domestically produced material and wear dyed clothing. 
e. The following rules should be obeyed:  
 Men 
- Wear narrow-legged and shorter trousers. 
- Shorten turumagi (topcoats) and do not wear turumagi made with ramie fabric.     
Women 
- Do not wear kaekki (women’s lined gossamer garments).  
- Wear narrow skirts, instead of long or flared ones. 
Men and women 
- Wear dyed clothing rather than buying new garments. 
- Use buttons instead of korŭm (ribbons used to close jackets).   
- Abandon the uneconomical custom of unstitching garments every time they are 
washed. 




a. A home is the most fundamental aspect of life and once fixed, it is not easy to change 
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it. Improve daily life by making your home more cheerful.  
b. Place emphasis on the practicality of daily life and particularly on hygiene. 
c. Follow the standards of house construction set by he government in the case of 
rebuilding due to war damage.  
B. Practical points 
a. Keep the inside and outside of the house clean. 
b. Pay attention to the passage of light and air into the house.   
c. Control contamination by installing proper drainage facilities and toilets. 
d. Create a flower garden around house. 
e. Do not intrude into public spaces; lead a morally upright community life.   
National Morale 
A. Principles 
a. Keep up morale with a determined attitude of self-h lp.  
b. Help other people.  
c. Demonstrate friendship and hospitality to other p ople. 
d. Carry out obligations and responsibilities for the sake of the country. 
e. Cultivate international friendship. 
f. Behave correctly and respect good manners.  
g. On public transport, offer your seat to women, elderly or handicapped people, 
wounded soldiers and to the sick.  
h. Accept the idea that the government is not above the people and that men and women 
are equal. 
i. Remember that engaging in profiteering is an act of treason against the country, and 
ensure that you make only a normal profit.  
j. Prevent and eradicate smuggling for the smooth operation of the national economy.  
Wartime moderation 
A. Principles 
a. Use time wisely, and never be late.  
b. Save electricity, water and fuel (note in particular that no petroleum is produced 
domestically). 
c. Do not make alcoholic drinks, yŏt (sweets made of rice and malt) or rice cake, and 
prevent the waste of rice.   
d. Do not use luxuries, jewellery (i.e., rings and tie pins) or ornaments.    
e. Women – do not have your hair permed. 
f. Women – use minimal make-up. 
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g. Frivolous foreign customs should be avoided.  
h. All expensive restaurants should be closed. 
i. Do not work as dancers or entertainers (with the exception of those engaged in 
entertaining the UN forces and international social institutions).  
j. Use cheap eating places and do not order more than five dishes when there is a social 
function.  
k. Keep the roads clean and do not place street stalls near to arterial roads.   
Moral welfare 
A. Eliminate superstition.  
a. Regulate businesses that delude society and deceive p ople (impose control over 
advertisements). 
b. Control followers of superstition and superstitious events. 
B. No gambling: do not play mah-jong and avoid speculative playing. 
C. Ceremonial occasions such as the coming of age, weddings, funerals and ancestral 
rites: 
a. Put your heart into these events and avoid empty formality. 
b. Simplify wedding and funeral ceremonies to fit war circumstances regardless of 
whether following the traditional or modified style. 
c. Complete funeral ceremonies within three days. 
d. Abolish drinking and eating in connection with ceremonies. 
Practical methods 
A. These guidelines are not legal regulations, but should be applied in an individual spirit 
of patriotism and determination while war circumstances apply. 
B. These guidelines should be applied as a nationwide campaign led by civilian and 
social groups.  
C. The Bureau of Public Information (Kongboch’ŏ) and the Promotion Committee 
(Sŏnjŏn taech’aek wiwŏnhoe) are responsible for advertising and promotion through 
mass media and public gatherings.                
D. Set up the ‘Weeks for Wartime Daily Life Improvem nt Campaigns’ to promote the 
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This study examines the governmental policies through which people’s food practices 
were intervened in, controlled and modified in twenti th-century South Korea. The 
study’s main focus is on the wars that occurred in twentieth-century Korea, as it acted as 
an important stimulus in increasing state interference in the daily diet of the people and 
contributed to the transformation of Korean foodways.     
As elsewhere, controls over food played a central role in the policies of the authorities 
which took power in Korea. However, an examination of the modern Korean diet is 
particularly interesting due to the fact that the last century was one of the most turbulent 
eras in Korean history, during which a large number of momentous historical events 
occurred. Dramatic social changes – the experience of the Second World War under 
Japan’s colonial rule (1910-1945), occupation by the United States and the Soviet Union 
(1945-1948), the division of the country into North and South Korea under the Cold War 
rivalry between these two countries (1948-), and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-
1953) – brought dramatic influences to bear on the country’s politics and economy. The 
specific social context was a potent factor behind the Korean authorities’ maintenance of 
rigid control over the food practices of the Korean people. Despite constant changes in 
the administration – from the Japanese colonial authorities and the US Military 
Government in Korea (USAMGIK) to the South Korean government – food-related 
policies have remained at the core of the country’s politics due to the overwhelming 
importance of food as a political tool. Modern Korean foodways have been great 
influenced by state policies that were formulated an implemented against a backdrop of 
war (and the threat of it), colonialism and industrialization, all of which were entangled 
with each other in complex ways.  
The main purposes of this study are twofold: first, it documents the adoption of the matter 
of the people’s diet as the focus of economic policies in order to sustain national fighting 
power, and investigates the wide range of channels through which the authorities devoted 
consistent efforts to controlling the daily diet ofthe Korean people. Second, it 
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demonstrates how the food-control programmes, once dev loped as war strategies, were 
not abolished after the end of the wars, but rather reinforced as part of the government’s 
post-war social management. The goal of this study is to explore the long-term impact of 
colonial Japan’s wartime food policies on the formation of the dietary practices of 
Koreans in the latter half of the twentieth century by demonstrating that the wartime 
reforms instituted during the Second World War laid the foundations for post-colonial 
food policies in South Korea.  
This study is largely divided into three parts – food distribution, food consumption and 
food education – which represent the areas through which state control measures were 
transferred and implemented. The first part of thisproject includes three chapters which 
deal with the issue of food rationing. Chapter One demonstrates the revival of the 
Japanese system of food rationing in post-colonial Korea, chiefly focusing on the role of 
the USAMGIK, which resurrected the Japanese machinery of food management to handle 
the food shortages in decolonized Korea. The first section looks at the Japanese staple-
food distribution programmes implemented between 1940 and 1945, and the second 
covers the rationing controls under the USAMGIK (1945-1948) and during the formative 
years of the South Korean government (1948-1950). The centralized food-control system 
that originated with the colonial administration was further reinforced by the post-
colonial authorities of the country, and this set the overall tone for the country’s food 
policies for decades to come.     
Chapter Two describes the process of the restoration of the Japanese food programme 
after 1945, following the same time frame as Chapter One. A major focus is placed on the 
role of the aegukpan (‘patriotic units’), the civilian groups involved in the administration 
of food rationing. The first section examines their pivotal role within the Japanese food-
control mechanism, and the following section demonstrates that they were entrusted with 
exactly the same roles by the post-colonial governmnts in Korea. Notwithstanding the 
authorities’ efforts, the government system of food control remained incomplete, and 
there was a widespread black market, which is dealt with in Chapter Three. Emerging 
under the ill-fated Japanese food management system in the late 1930s, the black market 
was an established part of Korean people’s everyday lives and continued to exist in 
liberated Korea alongside the Japanese rationing system. This chapter covers the period 
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between 1937 and 1950.  
The second part of this study looks at the state’s control over food consumption, dealing 
with the state’s war mobilization campaigns carried out in the name of the improvement 
of daily life. The first section of Chapter Four focuses on the Japanese war campaigns 
during the Second World War, which appropriated the structure of the Rural 
Revitalization Campaign (Nongch’on chinhŭng undong) initiated in 1932 in colonial 
Korea. As discussed in the second section of this chapter, the Japanese campaigns for war 
mobilization were revived in 1951 in liberated Korea in an effort to address yet another 
conflict, the Korean War. The wartime campaigns of the South Korean government 
remained intact until 1960, long after the cease-fire agreement of 1953, allowing the 
authorities to intervene in the daily diet of the peo le for the purposes of post-war social 
reorganization and the modernization of the country.    
Food consumption is closely related to women, who were chiefly responsible for 
managing family meals in Korea. Chapter Five attempts to show how the transformation 
of the Korean diet proceeded as the result of an intricate and interactive relationship 
between women, colonialism and the state’s policies of mass mobilization. The first 
section documents the unique role of female Japanese immigrants in colonial Korea. As 
intermediaries between the state and the Korean public, they were actively involved in 
the Korean dietary reforms during the Second World War. The following section focuses 
on Korean women’s active participation in Saemaŭl Undong, the state reform projects 
aimed at national economic development in 1970s’ South Korea. The women’s 
engagement in the state’s projects for dietary reform emerged as a powerful influence on 
the transformation of the Korean diet. A focus on women’s roles provides a fruitful angle 
for gaining a fuller understanding of the mechanism of the state’s intervention in the 
private sphere. 
The function of education as the principal vehicle for the implementation of the state’s 
nutritional policy and the shaping of Korean food practices is documented in the third 
part. The first section of Chapter Six considers the emergence of home economics during 
the first half of the twentieth century in Korea. It shows that this modern scientific 
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discipline for women was disseminated alongside the ideology of the ‘wise mother, good 
wife’ (hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ), the idealized Korean womanhood, shaped under the influence 
of the Japanese concept of the ‘good wife, wise mother’. The second section discusses the 
growing importance of home economics in Japanese wartime austerity policy. The 
colonial authorities’ serious efforts to disseminate nutritional science in order to train 
Korean women to manage their family diet economically during the war years are 
elaborated in this section. While the political conn tations are invisible, the principles of 
home economics definitely prevailed in the highly politicised war situation.    
Chapter Seven concentrates on South Korean food education, an area to which the 
authorities attached great importance in the reshaping of the eating habits of the people. 
The first section examines the school lunch programme as a reflection of state food 
policies during the last five decades of the twentieth century. Originally intended to 
achieve the improvement of nutritional intake amongst school children, the lunch 
programme became less focused on the recipient’s nutritional needs and more concerned 
with the larger forces of state food policies. The food on the children’s lunch trays was 
strategically selected so that it was beneficial for the country’s economic development. 
The development of the lunch programme, and the shift from bread to rice (mixed with 
other grain) as its staple food, clearly demonstrates that the policy of food education in 
the country has been shaped more by surplus food than ideas about healthy diets. The 
second section of this chapter deals with the honbunsik changnyŏ campaigns (which 
encouraged the eating of barley and wheat-based foos), with special emphasis on 
various projects carried out in the school curriculum in order to change the eating habits 
of pupils. The utility of the formal school system, an effective mechanism for reshaping 
individual thoughts and attitudes, enabled the Korean authorities to control the daily diet 
of the people.  
The legacy of Japanese colonialism is one of the most sensitive subjects to be handled in 
Korean historiography and, until recently, there has been reluctance amongst academics 
to deal with this issue. However, as this study has demonstrated, the Japanese system of 
wartime food control was revived and further reinforced by the post-colonial authorities 
in an effort to support the Korean War and the Cold War, as well as the economic 
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development of the country. As the focus of politics in South Korea, the state food control 
system instituted during the Second World War by the Japanese colonial government 
formed the foundations for post-colonial Korean food policies.  
However, the preservation of the Japanese food system in post-colonial Korea denotes 
something far more significant than mere reuse of the colonial machinery. The centralized 
food control system that originated under Japanese imp rialism left a crucial legacy that 
shaped the state–society relationship in liberated Korea. The Japanese colonial 
government’s domination was by no means merely repressive; rather, there were various 
disciplinary institutions, such as the educational system and mass campaigns, which 
allowed the authorities to intervene in and control he everyday lives of the people. 
Together with the state’s vast control over civilian food consumption, the various 
disciplinary mechanisms through which state controls could be effectively imposed 
continued to function for the purpose of social contr l over the people’s diet in post-
colonial Korea. The power relationships between the state and the people, connected by 
the heritage of the colonial experience, were, and still are, fundamental in moulding the 













Deze dissertatie bestudeert het beleid van de Zuid-Koreaanse overheid waarmee is 
ingegrepen in de eetgewoontes van het volk in het Zuid-Korea van de twintigste eeuw. Er 
wordt speciale aandacht gevestigd op de rol van oorlog, als belangrijke stimulus voor 
overheidsingrijpen in, en als drijvende kracht achter de transformatie van, de Koreaanse 
eetgewoontes.  
Zoals ook elders het geval, heeft de controle over vo dsel een centrale rol gespeeld in het 
beleid van de autoriteiten die aan de macht waren in Korea.  Een studie van juist de 
Koreaanse huidige eetgewoontes is echter bijzonder i t ressant, vanwege het feit dat de 
laatste eeuw een van de meeste turbulente was in de geschiedenis van het land. 
Gedurende deze eeuw hebben zich een aantal belangrijke historische gebeurtenissen 
voltrokken: de Japanse koloniale overheersing (1910-1945), de opdeling van Korea in 
noord en zuid wegens de Koude oorlog tussen Rusland en e Verenigde Staten, en de 
overheersing door die twee staten (1945-1948), de vorming van de Zuid-Koreaanse 
regering (1948) en de Koreaanse oorlog (1950-1953). Deze gebeurtenissen hebben 
drastische invloed gehad op zowel de politiek en de economie, als op de levens van de 
gewone Koreaan. Deze bijzondere sociale context is een krachtige factor geweest achter 
het strak blijven beheersen van de eetgewoontes door de Koreaanse autoriteiten. Ondanks 
de voortdurende veranderingen in machthebbers (de Japanse koloniale machten, het 
Amerikaanse leger en de Zuid-Koreaanse regering), is het voedselbeleid altijd de kern 
van het politieke beleid gebleven, wegens de grote belangrijkheid hiervan als een 
praktisch middel. Het voedselbeleid is geformuleerd in e context van (de dreiging) van 
oorlog, kolonialisme en industrialisering. De huidige Koreaanse eetgewoontes zijn 
gevormd onder grote invloed van dit voedselbeleid. Er bestaat een complexe relatie 
tussen de omstandigheden, en het voedselbeleid en de etgewoontes. 
De hoofddoelen van dit onderzoek zijn als volgt. Ten eerste wordt beschreven hoe de 
eetgewoontes van het volk centraal gezet zijn in het economisch beleid, ten einde de 
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militaire macht te ondersteunen en wordt het spectrum van kanalen waardoor de 
autoriteiten voortdurend en consistent druk hebben uitgeoefend om de eetgewoontes van 
het Koreaanse volk te beïnvloeden. Ten tweede wordt aangetoond hoe de van oorsprong 
als oorlogsstrategie ontwikkelde voedselcontroleprogramma's na de oorlog versterkt 
werden voor het doel van wederopbouw en economische ontwikkeling. Het uiteindelijke 
doel van dit onderzoek is het verkennen van de impact van de in de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
doorgevoerde hervormingen op de eetgewoontes van Koreanen, in de tweede helft van de 
twintigste eeuw. 
Deze dissertatie is onderverdeeld in drie delen: voedseldistributie, voedselconsumptie en 
voedselonderwijs (waarmee de staatscontrolemechanismes overgedragen, 
geïmplementeerd en geïnterneerd werden). Het eerste deel van deze dissertatie bevat drie 
hoofdstukken die gaan over voedselrantsoenering. Hoodstuk één laat de wederopstanding 
van het Japanse voedselprogramma in post-koloniaal Korea zien, waarbij de significante 
beïnvloedende rol van de United States Army Military Government in Korea 
(USAMGIK) centraal staat. De eerste paragraaf van dit hoofdstuk kijkt naar het Japanse 
distributie systeem dat geïmplementeerd is tussen 1940 en 1945 en de twee paragraaf 
behandelt de rantsoenering onder de USAMGK (1948-1950).  
Hoofdstuk twee beschrijft dezelfde periode als hoofdstuk één, maar focust op de 
restoratie van het Japanese voedselprogramma ná 1945, en de rol van groepen van 
burgers die betrokken waren het rantsoeneringsbeleid. De eerste paragraaf beschrijft de 
rol van deze groepen in begin jaren '40, en de volgende paragraaf toont aan dat deze 
groepen precies dezelfde rol kregen van de naoorlogse autoriteiten. Hoewel de 
autoriteiten er veel aandacht aan besteedden, was de controle over het voedsel niet 
compleet; er was een tijd verspreide zwarte markt. Deze zwarte markt staat centraal in 
hoofdstuk drie. De zwarte markt is ontstaan tijdens het Japanse 
oorlogsvoedselmanagementprogramma eind jaren dertig, en is na de bevrijding van 
Korea een deel van het leven van de mensen gebleven. De periode die behandeld wordt 
door dit hoofdstuk is die van 1937 tot 1950. 
Het tweede deel van dit project beschouwt de controle van de staat over 
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voedselconsumptie, en de staatsmobilisatiecompagnes. Het eerste deel van Hoofdstuk 
Vier behandelt de Japanse plattelandsontwikkelingscampagnes die startten in 1932 en 
omgebogen zijn tot oorlogsmobilisatiecampagnes gedurende de Tweede Wereldoorlog. 
Zoals in de tweede paragraaf besproken wordt, werden ze campagnes opnieuw 
opgestart in 1951 als antwoord op de Koreaanse Oorlog, en bleven intact tot 1960. De 
relatie tussen voedselconsumptie en vrouwen is sterk, n hoofdstuk vijf tracht de 
transformatie van het Koreaanse eetpatroon te verklar n door een hechte en interactieve 
relatie tussen vrouwen, kolonialisme en het staatsmobilisatiebeleid. De eerste paragraaf 
documenteert de de activiteiten van vrouwelijke Japanese immigranten die betrokken 
waren bij de voedselhervormingen van koloniaal Korea gedurende de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog. De paragraaf daarna focust op de active rol van Koreaanse vrouwen die 
betrokken waren door de regering gestuurde nationale economische hervormingen van 
Korea in de zeventiger jaren. De hervormingsprogramm 's van de staat breidden de rol 
van de vrouw binnen het huishouden uit tot rationele managers van het dagelijkse 
eetpatroon ten einde oorlogsmobilisatie en economische groei te ondersteunen.  
De functie van onderwijs als het belangrijkste overdrachtsmechanisme voor de 
implementatie van het beleid op het gebied van voedsel en eetgewoontes van Koreanen 
wordt beschreven in het derde deel. De eerste paragraaf van Hoofdstuk Zes beschouwt 
het onstaan van 'home economics' aan het einde van de negentiende eeuw tot aan het 
einde van de jaren '30 van de twintigste eeuw Korea. Het laat zien dat de moderne 
discipline voortkwam uit het Japansgeoriënteerd geideal seerd beeld van de vrouw in 
koloniaal Korea. De tweede paragraaf behandelt 'home economics' als een 
oorlogsstrategie op het gebied van voedsel, dat werd gebruikt door de Japanse 
oorlogsregering. In Hoofdstuk Zeven ligt de focus op v edseleducatie in Zuid-Korea. De 
eerste paragraaf bestudeert de Koreaanse schoollunch, waarin het beleid van de laatste 
vijf decenia duidelijk te zien is. De tweede paragraaf behandelt honbunsik changnyo (het 
aanmoedigen van het consumeren van gerst en tarwe bevattende producten) met speciale 
aandacht voor de verscheidenheid aan projecten die door middel van de schoolcurricula 
uitgevoerd werden om de eetgewoontes van de leerling n te veranderen.  
De erfenis van het Japans kolonialisme is een van de gevoeligste onderwerpen in de 
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Koreaanse geschiedschrijving en er is tot voor korteen duidelijke weerstand geweest om 
hier onderzoek naar te doen. Maar, zoals dit onderzoek aantoont, werd het Japanse 
systeem van voedselcontrole in oorlogstijd nieuw leven ingeblazen en verder versterkt 
door de Koreaanse postkoloniale authoriteiten om de Koreaanse Oorlog en de Koude 
Oorlog, en de economische ontwikkeling, te ondersteunen. Als de kern van Zuid-
Koreaanse politiek heeft het staatscontrolesysteem van voedsel dat ingesteld werd door 
de Japanse koloniale regering gedurende de Tweede Wr ldoorlog, de fundamenten van 
het postkoloniale voedselbeleid gevormd.  
Maar het behoud van het Japanse voedselsysteem in postkoloniaal Korea indiceert iets 
veel belangrijkers van het hergebruik van koloniale m chanismes. Het gecentraliseerde 
staatsvoedselcontrolesysteem dat zijn oorsprong heeft in het Japans imperialisme heeft 
een belangrijke erfenis achtergelaten dat de relatie tussen de staat en de maatschappij 
heeft vormgegeven in bevrijd Korea. De overheersing door de Japanse koloniale regering 
was niet slechts onderdrukkend; er waren verschillende disciplinaire instituten die de 
authoriteiten directe en effectieve controle en invloed gaven op het dagelijks leven van 
mensen. Samen met de grote macht van de staat over de voedselconsumptie van burgers, 
bestonden er verschillende dsciplinaire mechanismes waarmee de macht van de staat 
effectief bekrachtigd kon worden en de functie van sociale controle over de eetgewoontes 
in postkoloniaal Korea lang kon blijven bestaan. De krachtverhoudingen tussen de staat 
en het volk die zijn beïnvloed door de erfenis van het koloniale verleden waren, en zijn 
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